Volume III Acquisition Research Creating Synergy for Informed Change, Thursday 18th Annual Acquisition Research Proceedings by Acquisition Research Program
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2021-05-10
Volume III Acquisition Research Creating
Synergy for Informed Change, Thursday 18th
Annual Acquisition Research Proceedings
Acquisition Research Program
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/68106
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 





Eighteenth Annual  
Acquisition Research Symposium 
Thursday, May 13, 2021 Sessions 
Volume III  
Acquisition Research: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 11–13, 2021 
 
Published: May 5, 2021 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Defense Management at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table of Contents
Welcome: David H. Lewis, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret), Acquisition Chair, 
Acquisition Research Program ......................................................................................... 1 
Keynote Speaker: Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, U.S.Navy, Director, Missile Defense 
Agency ................................................................................................................................ 2 
Panel 17. DoD Acquisition Research ................................................................................ 3 
Panel 18. The Digital Transformation of Engineering ...................................................... 5 
A Framework to Categorize the Benefits and Value of Digital Engineering ............... ........6 
Competencies, Education, and Training for Digital Engineering in the DoD ....................26 
A Study of MBSE Through the Development of Modeling and Data Exchange Processes
 .......................................................................................................................................43 
Panel 19. Managing Risk in Software Development and Acquisition ............................76 
A Complexity-based Approach to the Measurement of Technical Risk in Defense 
Acquisition ......................................................................................................................78 
Addressing Software-Based, Platform Interoperability Risks by using Distressed Debt 
Financial Strategies ........................................................................................................92 
Making the Kessel Run: Re-Insourcing Software Development in the U.S. Air Force.... 100 
Panel 20. A Global Perspective on Defense Acquisition .............................................. 116 
How to Measure Value from Defence Spending? The Malaysian Case Study .............. 117 
Rapid Innovation with Chinese Characteristics: National Defense Science and 
Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams and the Military-Civil Fusion Innovation 
Ecosystem .................................................................................................................... 141 
Panel 21. Principles for Managing Software Acquisition ............................................. 151 
Speed Limits for Software Acquisition ........................................................................... 152 
Using Value Engineering to Propel Cyber-Physical Systems Acquisition ...................... 162 
Integration of Production Management into Software Development and Acquisition 
Processes ..................................................................................................................... 178 
Panel 22. Deliver at the Speed of Relevance ................................................................. 190 
Buying for the Right Battle: Determining Defense Acquisition Strategies ...................... 191 
It's About Time: Toward Realistic Acquisition Schedule Estimates ............................... 205 
Agile Improvements to Critical Path Method (CPM) ...................................................... 218 
Panel 23. Tools and Strategies for Acquiring Information Technology ...................... 226 
Automated Comparison of Software Versions .............................................................. 228 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Technology Trust: The Impact of Trust Metrics on the Adoption of Autonomous Systems 
used in High-Risk Applications ..................................................................................... 246 
Applying Agile Principles Beyond Information Technology and Computer Software ..... 259 
A Comparative Analysis of Advanced Methodologies to Improve the Acquisition of 
Information Technology in the Department of Defense for Optimal Risk Mitigation and 
Decision Support Systems to Avoid .............................................................................. 274 
Panel AI. Innovations in Developing Artificial Intelligence in Defense Programs ...... 295 
Increasing Confidence in Machine Learned (ML) Functional Behavior during Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) Development using Training Data Set Measurements ......................... 297 
Artificial Intelligence Systems: Unique Challenges for Defense Applications ................ 321 
Acquiring Artificial Intelligence Systems: Development Challenges, Implementation Risks, 
and Cost/Benefits Opportunities ................................................................................... 333 
Leverage Artificial Intelligence to Learn, Optimize, and Wargame (LAILOW) for Navy 
Ships ............................................................................................................................ 353 
Papers Only. .................................................................................................................... 369 
Schedule Risks Associated with Middle Tier Acquisition ............................................... 370 
Two-Stage, Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis of Technology Transition Performance 
in the U.S. Defense Sector ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Developing a Threat and Capability Coevolutionary Matrix: Application to Shaping 
Flexible Command and Control Organizational Structure for Distributed Maritime 










Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 






Acquisition Research Symposium 
Thursday, May 13, 2021 Sessions 
Volume III 
Acquisition Research: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 11-13, 2021 
Published:  May 5, 2021 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 1 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
WELCOME: DAVID H. LEWIS, VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY 
(RET), ACQUISITION CHAIR, ACQUISITION RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 
Vice Admiral David H. Lewis, USN (Ret.) took the helm as the Naval Postgraduate School 
Chair of Acquisition. As chair, he will lead the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) in the Graduate 
School of Defense Management and connect NPS with leaders and policymakers in the acquisition 
community. 
Lewis graduated from NPS in 1988 with a Master of Science in Computer Science, and we’re 
pleased to welcome him back to campus in this leadership role. Lewis is replacing the founding Chair 
of Acquisition, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Jim Greene, who retired this June. 
Most recently, Lewis served as Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, 
managing over $7 trillion in defense contracts. In this role, he oversaw the agency’s efforts to ensure 
that supplies and services contracted for by the Department of Defense are delivered on time and in 
line with contract performance requirements. 
During his career at sea, Lewis served as a communications officer, fire control and missile 
battery officer, and combat systems officer aboard destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. 
Upon selection to flag rank in 2009, Lewis served as Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command and then served four years as Program Executive Officer, Ships, where he directed the 
delivery of 18 ships and procurement of another 51 ships. From 2014-2017 he served as 
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command where he led a global workforce of 
10,300 civilian and military personnel who design, develop and deploy advanced communications 
and information capabilities. 
Lewis’s extensive experience in shipbuilding has given him a unique understanding of the full 
acquisition lifecycle. He has delivered ships as a program manager and program executive officer, 
then later sustained and modernized them as a fleet engineer and systems commander. He will bring 
valuable perspective to NPS students and faculty, as well as the broader acquisition innovation 
community working to get superior capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. 
Lewis’s expertise in product delivery will amplify ARP’s ability to execute its mission of 
delivering the real-time information and analytical capabilities needed by today’s acquisition 
professionals and policymakers. Adding VADM Lewis to the team also demonstrates NPS’s 
continued commitment to providing world-class defense-focused education and research... 
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KEYNOTE SPEAKER: VICE ADMIRAL JON HILL, USN, 
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 
Vice Admiral Jon Hill, USN is a native of Texas, born and raised on Fort Bliss. A Surface 
Warfare Officer, designated as an Engineering Duty Officer, he is a graduate of Saint Mary’s 
University. He earned his Master of Science in Applied Physics and Ordnance Engineering from 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
In June 2019, Hill became the 11th director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In this 
capacity, he oversees the MDA's global mission to develop, deliver, and sustain layered capabilities 
to defend deployed forces, the United States, allies and friends against ballistic missile attacks in all 
phases of flight. 
Admiral Hill’s first Flag Officer tour was Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare 
Systems (PEO IWS). In this role, he was accountable for developing and certifying the deployment of 
all surface ship combat control systems, radars, missiles, launchers, electronic warfare, naval 
gunnery systems, and surface and subsurface anti-submarine warfare mission capabilities within the 
Fleet and joint force. 
Hill previously served as the Deputy Director, Missile Defense Agency. Other leadership and 
acquisition engineering positions include AEGIS Shipbuilding (PMS 400), Naval Surface Warfare 
Center (NSWC) Dahlgren Division and Port Hueneme Division, PEO Theater Surface Combatants, 
and on the Assistant Secretary of the Navy staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN 
RD&A). 
He also served on the JOINT Staff (J-6), U.S. Army Staff for Missile Systems, and as a senior 
fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG XXVII). He served as 
Technical Director for AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense then as AEGIS Combat Systems Major 
Program Manager (MPM) responsible for delivering Naval Integrated Fire Control and Counter Air 
(NIFC-CA) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities to forces afloat. 
Personal awards include the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service 
Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (two awards), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal (two 
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the 
U.S. Army Commendation Medal, the Navy & Marine Corps Commendation Medal (two awards) and 
the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards). 
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PANEL 17. DOD ACQUISITION RESEARCH 
Thursday, May 13, 2021 
7:45 a.m. – 
9:00 am. 
Chair: David H. Lewis, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret), Acquisition Chair, 
Acquisition Research Program at Naval Postgraduate School 
Panelists:  
Dr. Arun Seraphin, Professional Staff Member, United States Senate 
Committee on Armed Services 
Dr. Dinesh Verma, Professor; Executive Director, Systems Engineering 
Research Center (SERC), Stevens Institute of Technology 
Dr. Keith F. Snider, Dean and Professor of Public Administration and 
Management, Graduate School of Defense Management at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
David H. Lewis, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret)—took the helm as the Naval Postgraduate 
School Chair of Acquisition. As chair, he will lead the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) in the 
Graduate School of Defense Management and connect NPS with leaders and policymakers in the 
acquisition community. 
Lewis graduated from NPS in 1988 with a Master of Science in Computer Science, and we’re 
pleased to welcome him back to campus in this leadership role. Lewis is replacing the founding Chair 
of Acquisition, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Jim Greene, who retired this June. 
Most recently, Lewis served as Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, 
managing over $7 trillion in defense contracts. In this role, he oversaw the agency’s efforts to ensure 
that supplies and services contracted for by the Department of Defense are delivered on time and in 
line with contract performance requirements. 
During his career at sea, Lewis served as a communications officer, fire control and missile 
battery officer, and combat systems officer aboard destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. 
Upon selection to flag rank in 2009, Lewis served as Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command and then served four years as Program Executive Officer, Ships, where he directed the 
delivery of 18 ships and procurement of another 51 ships. From 2014-2017 he served as 
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command where he led a global workforce of 
10,300 civilian and military personnel who design, develop and deploy advanced communications 
and information capabilities. 
Lewis’s extensive experience in shipbuilding has given him a unique understanding of the full 
acquisition lifecycle. He has delivered ships as a program manager and program executive officer, 
then later sustained and modernized them as a fleet engineer and systems commander. He will bring 
valuable perspective to NPS students and faculty, as well as the broader acquisition innovation 
community working to get superior capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. 
Lewis’s expertise in product delivery will amplify ARP’s ability to execute its mission of 
delivering the real-time information and analytical capabilities needed by today’s acquisition 
professionals and policymakers. Adding VADM Lewis to the team also demonstrates NPS’s 
continued commitment to providing world-class defense-focused education and research 
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Dr. Arun Seraphin— Dr. Arun A. Seraphin is a Professional Staff Member on the staff of the 
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. His areas of responsibility include acquisition 
policy, Pentagon management issues, Department of Defense’s science and technology programs, 
information technology systems, technology transition issues, defense laboratories, Small Business 
Innovation Research program, manufacturing programs, and test and evaluation programs. As such 
he assists Senators in their oversight of DOD policies and programs, including in the authorization of 
budgets, civilian nominations, legislative initiatives, and hearings. He rejoined the committee staff in 
2014, after previously serving there between 2001 and 2010. In 2009, he was named one of ten 
Defense “Staffers to Know” by Roll Call, a Capitol Hill newspaper. 
Dr. Dinesh Verma—served as the Founding Dean of the School of Systems and Enterprises 
at Stevens Institute of Technology from 2007 through 2016. He currently serves as the Executive 
Director of the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC), a US Department of Defense 
sponsored University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) focused on systems engineering research. 
During his fifteen years at Stevens he has successfully proposed research and academic programs 
exceeding $150m in value. He has a curtsey appointment as a Visiting Professor in the Department 
of Biochemistry in the School of Medicine at Georgetown University. Verma served as Scientific 
Advisor to the Director of the Embedded Systems Institute in Eindhoven, Holland from 2003 through 
2008. Prior to this role, he served as Technical Director at Lockheed Martin Undersea Systems, in 
Manassas, Virginia, in the area of adapted systems and supportability engineering processes, 
methods and tools for complex system development.  
Dr. Keith F. Snider—is Dean and Professor of Public Administration and Management in the 
Graduate School of Public Administration and Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point and served on active duty 
for twenty years, the last several as a member of the Army Acquisition Corps. He received his PhD in 
Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. His 
teaching and research interests lie in the areas of defense acquisition policy, defense project 
management, public organizations, and public administration theory and history. 
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PANEL 18. THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
ENGINEERING 
Thursday, May 13, 2021 
9:15 a.m. – 
10:00 a.m. 
Chair: Rear Admiral Jason Lloyd, USN, Deputy Commander for Ship Design, 
Integration and Engineering 
A Framework to Categorize the Benefits and Value of Digital Engineering 
Tom McDermott, Stevens Institute of Technology 
Competencies, Education, and Training for Digital Engineering in the DoD 
Nicole Hutchison, Stevens Institute of Technology 
A Study of MBSE Through the Development of Modeling and Data Exchange 
Processes 
William Emeny, NSWC PHD 
Dustin Talley, NSWC PHD 
Michael Rubow, NSWC PHD 
Ryan Robar, NSWC PHD 
Lynn Nguyen, NSWC PHD 
Lance Lowenberg, NIWC Pacific 
 
Rear Admiral Jason Lloyd, USN—is a native of Maryville, Tennessee and a graduate of 
Florida State University with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. He earned his 
commission through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program and also holds a Master of 
Science in Mechanical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
His shipboard tours include USS Bainbridge (CGN 25) and USS Nimitz (CVN 68). From May 
2013 until June 2016, he served as the first Reactor Officer on USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) in 
Newport News, Virginia. During these assignments, Lloyd conducted deployments to the 
Mediterranean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean as well as executed a Refueling Complex Overhaul and 
a New Construction testing program. 
Ashore, Lloyd served as a Deputy Project Superintendent at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 
Maintenance Coordinator at Commander Naval Air Forces, Principal Assistant Program Manager at 
PEO Carriers, Program Manager Representative for Refueling Complex Overhaul and Program 
Manager Representative for New Construction Carriers at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport 
News. Following his Reactor Officer tour, Lloyd served as the Executive Assistant to Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command. From June, 2017 until March, 2020 Lloyd served as the Commanding 
Officer of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia. In May 2020, Lloyd assumed duties 
as Chief Engineer and Deputy Commander for Ship Design, Integration and Engineering, Naval Sea 
Systems Command. 
As the Navy’s chief engineer and NAVSEA deputy commander for Ship Design, Integration 
and Naval Engineering, Lloyd leads the engineering and scientific expertise, knowledge and technical 
authority necessary to design, build, maintain, repair, modernize, certify and dispose of the Navy’s 
ships, aircraft carriers, submarines and associated combat and weapons systems. He is authorized to 
wear the Legion of Merit (three awards), Meritorious Service Medal (four awards), the Navy and 
Marine Corps Commendation Medal (four awards), Navy Achievement Medal (two awards) in addition 
to various unit awards. 
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A Framework to Categorize the Benefits and Value of Digital 
Engineering 
Tom McDermott—Stevens Institute of Technology [tmcdermo@stevens.edu] 
Additional authors: Alejandro Salado, Eileen Van Aken, Kaitlin Henderson: Virginia Tech 
Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) envisions that digital engineering information exchange, 
system modeling, and data driven system engineering processes will become core to product and 
process development. As this transformation occurs, it will change the way Systems Engineering 
(SE) is measured and valued. Over the past 3 years, the Systems Engineering Research Center 
(SERC) has studied the Digital Engineering (DE) transformation processes and progress. This 
work has focused on DoD acquisition and program office activities but is applicable to all 
enterprises undergoing DE and Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) transformations. A 
previous SERC research task created an Enterprise System-of-Systems Model for DE-enabled 
acquisition, conceptually modeling the potential future DoD acquisition enterprise. This research 
helped to understand the structure of future DoD/contractor program enterprises when the five 
goals of the DoD DE strategy were achieved, and the expected outcomes of that transition. That 
research cited the need for the community to standardize and implement measures that reflect 
success at the enterprise level. A second research task was completed to define metrics that 
represent value, benefits, and change progress in enterprise DE transformation. A third task is 
currently underway to design and implement measures that quantify DE benefits. 
Introduction 
DE is defined as “an integrated digital approach that uses authoritative sources of 
systems’ data and models as a continuum across disciplines to support life cycle activities from 
concept through disposal” (DAU, 2020). A DE ecosystem is an interconnected infrastructure, 
environment, and methodology that enables the exchange of digital artifacts from an 
authoritative source of truth. MBSE is a subset of DE, defined as “the formalized application of 
modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification, and validation activities 
beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life 
cycle phases” (OMG, 2020).  
MBSE has been a popular topic in the SE community for over a decade, but the level of 
movement toward broad implementation has not always been clear. With the release of the DoD 
DE strategy, a clear set of high-level goals are defined for the DoD acquisition community and 
its industry base.  
Digital transformation is a change process heavily rooted in “how we train and shape the 
workforce to use those processes,” as noted by Goal 5 of the DoD Digital Engineering Strategy 
(DoD, 2018). Each of the DoD’s goals implies that an enterprise, organizational unit, or multi-
organizational program has a means to define the outcomes of a DE strategy, performance 
metrics, measurement approaches, and leading indicators of change in the transformation 
process.  
This research sought to define a comprehensive framework for DE benefits and 
expected value linked to the ongoing development of DE enterprise capabilities and 
experienced transformation “pain points,” enablers, obstacles, and change strategies. Using a 
combination of literature review, broad surveys, and government program office visits, we found 
that the DE and MBSE communities, across government, industry, and academia, are not 
sufficiently mature at this point in their DE transformations to standardize on best practices and 
formal success metrics. Pockets of excellence exist, but experience and maturity vary widely. 
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We also found that government lags industry in maturity and should look to both their industry 
partners and the broader swath of commercial industry for best practices. The differing levels of 
DE capability across a government acquisition enterprise, prime contractors, and support 
contractors will be an obstacle to successful DE transformation. Programs, particularly legacy 
programs that have established non-digital processes, must invest effort in program-wide 
development and maturation of DE. 
In addition, MBSE and an Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT), as the core DE 
strategies for managing the complexity of large complex systems and systems-of-systems 
(SoS), lag in maturity to other DE strategies, such as Agile software development, product line 
engineering/product life-cycle management (PLM/PLE), and integrated supply chain 
management (ICSM). Pilot efforts that integrate MBSE and the ASOT across other more 
established disciplinary DE areas are necessary, but they should be executed broadly across all 
of these areas (many current pilots focus only on selected disciplinary areas or life cycle 
stages). Lessons learned from these efforts should inform best practices and success metrics 
for the full DE transformation.  
In this research to date, we have only been able to document two instances where 
actual measurement approaches for DE processes had been developed and used (McDermott 
et al., 2020a). Based on this research, we were able to create a framework that categorizes DE 
benefits and adoption metrics. Efforts are now underway to pilot the most frequently cited DE 
benefits and build measurement models for them. This guidance is still being sought after by 
government agencies. The long-term goal of this research is to advance the practice of DE and 
MBSE through definition of enterprise value. 
Research Results 
A DE transformation process needs to assess both adoption of the methods and tools 
into the workforce in terms of number of users, resources, etc., and also the drivers of adoption 
that are linked to user experience with the methods and tools. To understand productivity 
indicators and areas of new value, the previous SERC study, “Enterprise System-of-Systems 
Model for Digital Thread Enabled Acquisition,” was used as the base digital enterprise 
transformation model (SERC, 2018). This study linked digital enterprise transformation to 
outcomes related to improved quality, improved velocity/agility, and better knowledge transfer. 
Knowledge transfer is a unique value of DE/MBSE that can be distinguished from other digital 
enterprise transformation metrics. A primary goal of MBSE and the associated data collected in 
an Authoritative Source of Truth is communication, sharing, and management of data, 
information, and knowledge.  
Based upon this background research, we created a general categorization of DE/MBSE 
organizational change metrics linked to quality, velocity/agility, user experience, knowledge 
transfer, and adoption. Using literature reviews and a broad survey of DE/MBSE benefits, 
obstacles, and enablers, as well as government and industry discussions, the research 
produced an initial “top 10” list of metrics. A key result of the research is the development and 
definition of two frameworks that categorize DE benefits and adoption strategies that can be 
universally applied to a formal enterprise change strategy and associated performance 
measurement activities. The first framework is linked to the benefits of DE and categorizes 48 
benefit areas linked to four digital transformation outcome areas: quality, velocity/agility, user 
experience, and knowledge transfer. The second framework addresses enterprise adoption of 
DE and provides a categorization of 37 success factors linked to organizational management 
subsystems encompassing leadership, communication, strategy and vision, resources, 
workforce, change strategy and processes, customers, measurement and data, workforce, 
organization DE processes relate to DE, and the organizational and external environments. The 
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study conducted background research on literature discussing the benefits and values of 
DE/MBSE, a benchmark survey to assess the current state of maturity across enterprises 
currently implementing DE/MBSE, and interviews and discussions with government and 
industry.  
The study found the systems engineering community perceives significant benefit from 
DE and MBSE transformation, but specific benefits have not yet been translated to 
organizational value drivers and success measures. Organizations appear to be searching for 
guidance on measuring the value and benefits of DE/MBSE usage. The study documented 10 
top-cited metrics categories from literature and survey data. Seven of these were classed as 
benefits: increased traceability of requirements, design, and testing; reduced errors/defects in 
program phases; reduced activity times in development processes; improved consistency from 
phase to phase and project to project; increased capacity for reuse of data and models; higher 
support for automation; and better communication and information sharing. Three were classed 
as adoption measures: maturity of DE/MBSE methods and processes; training; and people 
willing to use DE/MBSE tools. Current efforts are underway to build causal models and data 
collection and analysis approaches to address the seven benefit measures. 
Enterprise Metrics Categorization 
Digital engineering is a subset of the larger aspects of enterprise digital transformation. 
Gartner (2019) reported four common characteristics for good enterprise-level digital 
transformation metrics: adoption, usability, productivity, and new value. This research 
developed five metrics areas relevant to DE: adoption, user experience (usability), 
velocity/agility (productivity), quality and knowledge transfer (both new value). These are 
shown in Figure 1. 
A DE transformation process needs to assess both adoption of the methods and tools 
into the workforce in terms of number of users, resources, etc., and also the drivers of adoption 
that are linked to user experience with the methods and tools. To understand productivity 
indicators and areas of new value, the previous SERC study, “Enterprise System-of-Systems 
Model for Digital Thread Enabled Acquisition,” was used as the base digital enterprise 
transformation model (SERC, 2018). This study linked digital enterprise transformation to 
outcomes related to improved quality, improved velocity/agility, and better knowledge 
transfer. Knowledge transfer is a unique value of DE/MBSE that can be distinguished from 
other digital enterprise transformation metrics. A primary goal of MBSE and the associated data 
collected in an Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT) is communication, sharing, and 
management of data, information, and knowledge. Based upon this background research, we 
created a general categorization of DE/MBSE organizational change metrics linked to quality, 
velocity/agility, user experience, knowledge transfer, and adoption. Using literature reviews and 
a broad survey of DE/MBSE benefits, obstacles, and enablers, as well as government and 
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Figure 1. Top-Level Metrics Framework 
It is important to note that measurement of DE/MBSE is a complex process that must be 
integrated with the entirety of enterprise measurement strategies across all enterprise functions. 
DE/MBSE cannot be isolated to a small group or limited set of programs if the goal is to 
understand and track enterprise value. Generally pilot efforts are recommended to start the 
adoption process, but maturity in DE/MBSE must become enterprise strategy and a component 
of enterprise performance measurement. This list is a starting point; a full list of 55 metrics 
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Category Inputs Ex. Processes Ex. Outputs Outcomes 
Quality Increased traceability 
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Descriptive Summary of Top-Cited Metrics Areas 
Table 2 provides a full descriptive summary of 55 candidate metrics derived from the 
benefit and adoption categories. These are grouped into the five metrics areas of Table 1 and 
ranked by number of literature or survey citations in each area. The table includes example 
descriptive phrases of each metrics category developed in textual analysis of the literature and 





Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 13 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 2. Descriptive Summary of Top-Cited Metrics Areas (McDermott et al., 2020a) 
Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
Metric Area: Quality 
Increased traceability requirements, design, information traceability 
• Full digital traceability 
of requirements, design, 
test, and information 
• Availability from one 
source of truth 
Reduce cost cost effective, cost savings, save money, optimize cost 
• Lower total cost 
compared to similar 
previous work 
Improve system quality 
higher quality, quality of design, increased 
system quality, first time quality, improve SE 
quality, improve specification quality 
• Improved: total quality 
(roll-up of quality 




reduce development risk, reduce project risk, 
lower risk, reduce technology risk, reduced 
programmatic risk, mitigate risk, reduce design 
risk, reduce schedule risk, reduce risk in early 
design decisions 
• Risks identified and 
risk mitigations executed 
via DE enterprise 
processes  
• New risks uncovered 
by system modeling  
Reduce defects/ errors 
reduce error rate, earlier error detection, 
reduction of failure corrections, limit human 
errors, early detection of issues, detect defects 
earlier, early detection of errors and omissions, 
reduced specification defects, reduce defects, 
remove human sources of errors, reduce 
requirements defects  
• Reduced: total 
errors/defects in each 
program phase; 
errors/defects that 
escape from one phase 
to the next 
• Increased number of 
saves in each phase 
Improved system design 
improved design completeness, design process, 
design integrity, design accuracy, streamline 
design process, system design maturity, design 
performance, better design outcomes, clarity of 
design 
• Design outcomes show 
improvement and the 
design process is more 
effective compared to 




requirements definition, streamlining process of 
requirements generation, requirements 
elicitation, well-defined set of requirements, 
multiple methods for requirements 
characterization, more explicit requirements, 
improved requirements 
• Measurement of 
requirements quality 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
Improved deliverable quality  improve product quality, better engineering products 
• Reduced deliverable 
defects  
• Improved deliverables 
acceptance rate 
Increased effectiveness 
effectively perform SE work, improved 
representation effectiveness, increased 
effectiveness of model, more effective processes 
• Effectiveness of a 
process is how relevant 
the output is to the 
desired objective 
Improved risk analysis earlier/ improved risk identification, identify risk • Risks identified by phase 
Better analysis capability 
better analysis of system, tradespace analytics, 
perform trade-offs and comparisons between 
alternative designs, simulation 
• Decisions balance 
cost, schedule, risk, 
performance, & 
capabilities 




Strengthened testing model based test and evaluation, increased testability, improved developmental testing 
• Improved: test 
coverage; automated 
tests; number of errors 
found by automation 
versus manual means; 
efficiency & 
effectiveness of test 
process  
• Reduced number of 
defects/errors in each 
phase  
Increased rigor/ Improved 
predictive ability 
rigorous model, rigorous formalisms, more 
rigorous data, better predict behavior of system, 
predict dynamic behavior, predictive analytics 
• Increased: level of 
difficulty/complexity of 
project; number of 
alternatives analyzed; 
subject matter experts 
involved 
• Improved: 
exhaustiveness of data 
collection; consistency of 
analysis processes; 
predictive links between 
design & capabilities 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
More stakeholder 
involvement 
easy way to present view of system to 
stakeholders, better engage stakeholders, quick 
answers to stakeholder’s questions, share 
knowledge of system with stakeholders, 
stakeholder engagement, satisfy stakeholder 
needs 




in modeling; number of 
stakeholders 
contributing; stakeholder 
access to tools, models, 
data 
Metric Area: Velocity/Agility 
Improved consistency 
consistency of info, consistency of model, 
mitigate inconsistencies, consistent 
documentation, project activities consistent, data 
consistency, consistent between system artifacts 
• Processes produce 
consistency from project 
to project in: results; 
data; models used; work 
processes & instructions 
applied by practitioners 
Reduce time 
shorter design cycles, time savings, faster time to 
market, ability to meet schedule, reduce 
development time, time to search for info 
reduced, reduce product cycle time, delays 
reduced 
• Time reduction trend 
data: total project 
schedule; average 
across projects; total & 
average per activity; 
response time to need; 
delays from plan 
Increased capacity for reuse reusability of models, reuse of info/designs 
• Models/datasets 
reused project to project 
• percent direct 
use/modification/change;  
• related cost/schedule 
estimation & actuals 
Increased efficiency 
efficient system development, higher design 
efficiency, more efficient product development 
process 
• More efficient process 
time, resources per unit 
output, flow 
• Reduced waste 
Increased productivity gains in productivity • Effort per unit of production 
Reduce rework reduce rework 
• Reduced: number of 
rework cycles; percent 
rework; errors causing 
rework; size of rework 
effort; technical debt 
Early V&V early verification and/or validation 
• Formal testing: 
credited in earlier 
phases; done in models 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
Reduce ambiguity less ambiguous system representation, clarity, streamline content, unambiguous 
• Higher levels of 
specificity; decisions 
based on data; 
application of uncertainty 
quantification methods 
Increased uniformity uniformity 
• Application of 
standards: technical, 
process, work & effort, 
etc. 
Easy to make changes 
easier to make design changes, increased agility 
in making changes, changes automatically 
across all items, increased changeability  




Reduce waste reduce waste, save resources • Lean processes: waste removal and flow (pull) 
Better requirements 
management 
better meet requirements, provide insight into 
requirements, requirements explicitly associated 
with components, coordinate changes to 
requirements 
• Process effectiveness 
demonstrated by how 
relevant output is to 





Higher level of support for 
integration 
integration of information, providing a foundation 
to integrate diverse models, system design 
integration, support for virtual enterprise/supply 
chain integration, integration as you go 
• Developmental testing 
credited in earlier 
phases; testing done in 
models and simulation 
vs. system; reuse of 
data & models in 
integration activities 
Increased precision design precision, more precise data, correctness, mitigate redundancies, accuracy 
• Six Sigma processes 
• Reduced standard 
deviation 
Increased flexibility flexibility in design changes, increase flexibility in which design architectures are considered 
• Time- and cost-
effective incorporation 
of: new requirements; 
sensitivity analysis to 
change vs. a reference 
Metric Area: User Experience 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
Improved system 
understanding 
reduce misunderstanding, common 
understanding of system, increased 
understanding between stakeholders, 
understanding of domain/behavior/system 
design/requirements, early model understanding, 
increased readability, better insight of the 
problem, coherent 
• Assessments from 
activities such as 
technical reviews and 
change processes, 
standard models or 






Better manage complexity 
simplify/reduce complexity, understand/specify 
complex systems, manage complex information/ 
design 





disciplines; ability to 
iterate/experiment 
Higher level support for 
automation 
automation of design process, automatic 
generation of system documents, automated 
model configuration management 
• Increased: automated 




Better data management/ 
capture 
representation of data, enhanced ability to 
capture system design data, manage data 
• Improved data 
management 
architecture, automation 
• Reduced technical 
debt 
Better decision making make early decisions, enables effective decision making, make better informed decisions 
• Visualizing different 
levels of specificity; 
more decisions based 
on data and analysis, 
access to and 
visualization of data 
Reduce burden of SE tasks reduce complexity of engineering process 
• Reduce time spent on 
or waiting for SE 
artifacts 
Reduce effort 
reduce cognitive load, reduction in engineering 
effort, reduce formal analysis effort, streamline 
effort of system architecture, reduce work effort, 
reduce amount of human input in test scoping 
• Process efficiency 
demonstrated by 
relevancy of output to 
desired objective: effort 
per unit of production; 
total effort vs. similar 
programs; effort vs. plan 
 
Metric Area: Knowledge Transfer 
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engineering disciplines, information sharing, 
knowledge sharing, exchange of information, 
knowledge transfer 
• Improved: processes 
and tools to share and 
jointly assess 
information; 
opportunities to share 
knowledge and learn in 
process around common 
tools & representations 
Better accessibility of info 
Ease of info availability, single source of truth, 
centralized/unique/single source of info, simpler 
access to info, synthesize info, unified coherent 
model, one complete model 
• Develop: tools that 
support access to and 
viewing of data/models; 
widely shared models; 
executable models 
Improved collaboration simplify collaboration within team 
• Develop: tools that 
support human 
collaboration around 
shared data & models 
Better knowledge 
management/capture 
knowledge capture of process, better information 
capture, early knowledge capture, more effective 
knowledge management 
• Develop: tools that 
support wide diversity of 
information; integration 
across domains; 




viewpoints of model 
help develop unambiguous architecture, rapidly 
define system architecture, faster architecture 
maturity, accurate architecture design; shared 
view of system, more holistic representation of 
system/models, dynamically generated system 
views 
• Develop tools that 
support intuitive 
structuring of model 
views, story-telling, 
interface management 
Metric Area: Adoption (Ranked separately from the other four metrics areas) 
Leadership 
support/Commitment 
Demonstrating commitment and general support 
for MBSE implementation by senior leaders 









Developing a workforce with the knowledge, 
skills, and competencies needed to support 
MBSE adoption 
• Availability and 
maturity of MBSE 
competencies (refer to 
the INCOSE MBSE 
Capabilities Matrix in the 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
DE/MBSE methods and 
processes 
Developing and deploying consistent, systematic, 
and documented processes for MBSE 
throughout the relevant parts of the organization, 
including steps/phases, outputs, and 
roles/responsibilities 
• Availability and 
maturity of MBSE 
capabilities (refer to the 
INCOSE MBSE 
Capabilities Matrix in the 
complete report for a full 
assessment) 
Training 
Investing in and providing the education/training 
required to develop the workforce 
knowledge/skills needed to support MBSE 
implementation 




Ensuring MBSE tools have sufficient quality, 
have sufficient maturity, are available, and are 
common 
• Tools: availability, 
investment in, 




Creating “quick wins” to demonstrate results 
(benefits and outcomes) from applying MBSE 
• Develop DE/MBSE 





Defining and implementing a systematic change 
approach to implement MBSE, with clear actions, 
timeline, roles, resources needed, staged 
deployment steps/phases for experimentation 
(where relevant), and outcomes expected 
• Revised and relevant 
vision, mission, change 
strategy, engagement 
plan, feedback plan, etc. 
General resources for 
DE/MBSE implementation  
Ensuring financial and other resources are 
available to support MBSE implementation 
• Funding, IT support, 
training support, Internal 
R&D, etc. 
People willing to use 
DE/MBSE tools 
Willingness and motivation of people in SE roles 
across organization to use MBSE tools 
• Communicate models 
and modeling tools 
output to all of the 
general users in an 
accessible form 
Alignment with customer 
requirements 
Identifying how MBSE adoption supports meeting 
customer needs and requirements 









Clearly identifying a common terminology, 
ontology, and libraries to support MBSE adoption  




libraries, stability of data 
definition and stores 
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Metrics Category Example descriptive phrases Example outcome metrics 
Champions 
Defining and creating the role of champion to use 
expertise to advocate for and encourage others’ 
use of MBSE 
• Create evangelist role, 
and enlist number of 
evangelists 
• Demonstrated 
leadership support  
People in SE roles Quality of and support from people holding SE roles across the organization 
• Defined SE role  
• Develop plan 
integrating SE and DE, 
scope of SE 
teams/organization, etc. 
Communities of Practice 
Creating a community of practice within the 
organization to provide guidance, expertise, and 
other resources as MBSE is deployed 
• Investment in CoP 
• Established number of 
participants 
 
Figure 2 provides a full summary of the top DE benefit areas from the literature review 
and survey conducted in the research on DE benefits. The figure depicts the percentage of 
literature review papers or survey respondents citing each benefit area. This was used to define 
the top metric categories related to benefits of DE. Figure 3 provides a summary of the top 
enablers, obstacles, and areas of change based on survey data. This was used to derive the top 
metrics categories related to DE adoption. 
 
Figure 2. Top Cited DE Benefits Areas from Literature and Survey Results (McDermott et al., 2020b) 
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Figure 3. Obstacles, Enablers, and Changes for DE Adoption, ranked by Frequency of Mention 
(McDermott et al., 2020b) 
Findings 
This research task used the following four guiding questions: 
1. What would a “Program Office Guide to Successful DE Transition” look like?  
2. How can the value and effectiveness of DE be described and measured?  
3. Are there game-changing methods and/or technologies that would make a difference? 
4. Can an organizational performance model for DE transformation be described?  
At the start of the research effort, the hope was to identify and document best practices 
across the DoD, defense industry, and other industries related to measurement of the DE 
enterprise transformation, metrics for success, and standard success guidance. It quickly 
became clear that best practices do not yet exist in the DE and MBSE community, and the 
transformation process is not yet mature enough across the community to standardize best 
practices and success metrics. Given the state of the practice, the research shifted to a set of 
efforts to define a comprehensive framework for DE benefits and expected value linked to the 
ongoing development of DE enterprise capabilities and experienced transformation “pain 
points,” enablers, obstacles, and change strategies. 
A key result of this research is the development and definition of two frameworks that 
categorize DE benefits and adoption strategies that can be universally applied to a formal 
enterprise change strategy and associated performance measurement activities. The first 
framework is linked to the benefits of DE and categorizes 48 benefit areas linked to four digital 
transformation outcome areas: quality, velocity/agility, user experience, and knowledge transfer. 
This framework identifies a number of candidate success metrics. A test application to an 
ongoing DoD pilot project was completed and is documented in this report. The second 
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framework addresses enterprise adoption of DE and provides a categorization of 37 success 
factors linked to organizational management subsystems encompassing leadership, 
communication, strategy and vision, resources, workforce, change strategy and processes, 
customers, measurement and data, workforce, organization DE processes relate to DE, and the 
organizational and external environments. The following summarizes the findings based on the 
four research questions: 
What would a program office successful DE transition look like?  
1) The DE and MBSE communities, across government, industry, and academia, are not 
sufficiently mature at this point in their DE transformations to standardize on best practices and 
formal success metrics. Pockets of excellence exist, but experience and maturity vary widely.  
2) Government lags industry in maturity and should look to both their industry partners and the 
broader swath of commercial industry for best practices. The differing levels of DE capability 
across a government acquisition enterprise, prime contractors, and support contractors will be 
an obstacle to successful DE transformation. Programs, particularly legacy programs that have 
established non-digital processes, must invest effort in program-wide development and 
maturation of DE.  
3) MBSE and the ASOT, as the core DE strategies for managing the complexity of large 
complex systems and systems-of-systems (SoS), lag in maturity to other DE strategies, such as 
Agile software development, product line engineering/product life-cycle management 
(PLM/PLE), and integrated supply chain management (ICSM). Pilot efforts that integrate MBSE 
and the ASOT across other more established disciplinary DE areas are necessary. Lessons 
learned from these efforts should inform best practices and success metrics for the full DE 
transformation.  
4) Organizations should continue to share lessons learned from their pilot efforts.  
5) The community should share their implementation and measurement strategies, and future 
surveys should assess maturity and best practices.  
6) More effort is necessary to pilot draft guidance and to test and validate results. The next 
phase of this research is working with a government/industry/academia effort to standardize key 
practices and metrics. 
How can the value and effectiveness of DE be described and measured?  
7) The community perceives significant benefit from DE and MBSE transformation, but specific 
benefits have not yet been translated to organizational value drivers and success metrics. In 
fact, organizations appear to be searching for guidance on measuring the value and benefits of 
DE/MBSE usage. Based on extensive literature review and survey data, this research presents 
a guiding framework for benefits and metrics. Based on this work, the DoD should provide 
common guidance to program offices on data collection and should track several top-level 
measures that are consistently used across those offices. Table 1 of this report makes 
recommendations based on categories of metrics most frequently reported in literature and from 
survey data, but further work is needed to evaluate these metrics in practice—few examples 
exist today. 
Are there game-changing methods and/or technologies that would make a difference? 
8) Technology in the DE and MBSE ecosystem is evolving rapidly. Tools and infrastructure, 
based on survey data, are becoming more mature and less of an obstacle to DE success. 
However, enterprises must continue to focus on their unique DE innovation strategies to build 
successful infrastructure and practices, focus resources and people on the unique aspects of 
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the DE infrastructure as part of the DE transformation team (not general IT), and create 
programs to invest in and evaluate evolving technologies and standards.  
9) The transformative aspect of DE/MBSE will succeed based on how technology enables 
automation of SE tasks and human collaboration across all disciplines across a full model-
centric engineering process. The DoD should fund research and incentivize tool vendors to 
introduce more automation into the DE/MBSE processes. 
Can an organizational performance model for DE transformation be described?  
10) Successful DE and MBSE are inseparable from good systems engineering. DE/MBSE is 
just an extension of existing systems engineering roles and skills. DE presents newer roles 
related to the data science aspects of MBSE, particularly data management, data integration, 
and data analysis. Also, there is more emphasis on tool experts: roles focused exclusively on 
the use and maintenance of tools to support DE/MBSE. Workforce development is a critical 
component of DE/MBSE adoption, and this research provides an initial survey-based framework 
for DE roles and skills. The results of the MBSE Maturity Survey conducted with this effort 
capture this framework (McDermott et al., 2020b). 
11) In a transformation program, one would start with a high-level description of program 
adoption practices linked to the benefits of DE/MBSE, then use these to design a set of 
organizational capabilities for doing DE/MBSE, measure the performance of the organization 
within each of these capabilities, and use this to produce results that enable new value to the 
organization. This starts with leadership and strategy; is implemented across enterprise 
operations and workforce capabilities; and should produce customer value and enterprise-wide 
results. This is the core of the Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence (NIST, 2019). 
Although this research was not able to produce a “cookbook” for program office success, it does 
provide a set of frameworks for a program office or enterprise to evolve that guide. 
11) Finally, there appears to be a strong top-to-bottom leadership commitment to DE 
transformation at this point in time, but the perception of progress and success differs greatly 
between leadership and the workforce using the methods, processes, and tools. In terms of the 
Gartner Hype Cycle (Gartner, 2020), the community is just starting up the “Slope of 
Enlightenment” where benefits start to crystallize and become widely understood. A strong 
understanding of adoption obstacles and enablers must exist and be tracked at all enterprise 
levels.  
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Figure 4. Top Level Organizational Performance Model (McDermott et al., 2020a) 
Summary 
A key result of this research is the development and definition of two frameworks: a DE 
benefits framework and an enterprise adoption framework, which can be universally applied to a 
formal enterprise change strategy and associated performance measurement activities. From 
these, we derived an additional metrics framework and captured, at this point, 10 primary 
categories of metrics around which to start a measurement program. The primary value of this 
research is in these comprehensive frameworks. 
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Abstract 
Digital transformation is fundamentally changing the way acquisition and engineering are 
performed across a wide range of government agencies, industries, and academia and is 
characterized by the integration of digital technology into all areas of a business, changing 
fundamental operations and how results are delivered in terms of new value to customers. It 
includes cultural change centered on alignment across leadership, strategy, customers, 
operations, and workforce evolution. Digital engineering (DE) is ‘‘an integrated digital approach 
that uses authoritative sources of systems’ data and models as a continuum across disciplines to 
support life-cycle activities from concept through disposal. A DE ecosystem is an interconnected 
infrastructure, environment, and methodology that enables the exchange of digital artifacts from 
an authoritative source of truth.” (ODASD [SE], 2017) The purpose of the Digital Engineering 
Competency Framework (DECF) is to provide clear guidance for the DoD acquisition workforce, 
in particular the engineering (ENG) acquisition workforce, through clearly defined competencies 
that illuminate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors (KSABs) required for DE 
professionals. Though the DECF includes considerations specific to the Defense acquisition 
workforce, data was also gathered from outside the defense community. 
Introduction 
Based on evidence across the Services and industry, digital engineering (DE) has been 
affirmed as a vital practice necessary to support acquisition in an environment of increasing 
global challenges, dynamic threats, rapidly evolving technologies, and increasing life 
expectancy of systems currently in operation and future systems. In order for the DoD to provide 
the best advantage for successful acquisitions and sustainment, the DoD must continue to 
practice systems engineering efficiently and effectively. DE updates the systems engineering 
practices to take full advantage of the digital power of computation, visualization, and 
communication to take better, faster actions throughout the life cycle. 
Methodology 
The Digital Engineering Competency Framework (DECF) was created in compliance 
with DoD Instruction 1400.25, volume 250, “DoD Civilian Personnel Management Systems: 
Civilian Strategic Human Capital Planning” (DoD, 2016). DoDI 1400.25, vol. 250 outlines five 
tiers of competencies: 
• Tier 1. Core Competencies, which apply across DoD regardless of DoD component or 
occupation. 
• Tier 2. Primary Occupational Competencies, which apply across discrete occupational 
series and or functions. 
• Tier 3. Sub-occupational Specialty Competencies, which are unique to sub-occupational 
specialties. 
• Tier 4. DoD Component-Unique Competencies, which are so unlike any of the other 
competencies identified that they exist at the component level and are unique to the 
context or environment in which the work is performed. 
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• Tier 5. Position-Specific Competencies, which are required for a particular position within 
an occupation and are not addressed in tiers above. (DoD, 2016) 
DECF version 1.1. (DECF v. 1.1) addresses competencies in Tiers 2–5, with Tier 2 for 
acquisition professionals generally and Tier 3 specifically for acquisition ENG professionals 
being the primary focus. Though focused on the DoD, the overarching framework is intended to 
be relevant to a wide variety of stakeholders across government and industry and should 
provide critical insights for any organization looking to successfully implement DE.  
Key Terminology 
• Competency Group. Top-level grouping of related competencies that represents a core 
area of expertise in DE.  
• Competency Subgroup. Subgroups contain related/like competencies. 
• Competency. Major grouping of related KSABs; each competency is identified by its title 
and includes a description that succinctly encompasses the general knowledge and 
skills related to said competency. 
• KSAB. A brief statement of knowledge, skill, ability, or behavior related to a competency 
and associated with a specific proficiency level in said competency.  
• Proficiency Level. For each competency, there will be five possible levels of attainment 
or proficiency: awareness, basic, intermediate, advanced, and expert. 
The entire DECF rests on a foundation of general digital competencies that are required for any 
individual who may have tasks within a digital environment. 
Building on Existing Competency Models 
Existing competency models and guidance from the practicing acquisition community 
were used to develop the DECF. For baseline terminology, the DoD competency models (DAU 
ENG and PM and U.S. Department of the Navy Systems Engineering Career Competency 
Model [SECCM]) are used, as these are already in use within the DoD for systems acquisition. 
The non-DoD competency models were mapped against the DoD models and existing 
competencies were updated to reflect a digital environment in lieu of the traditional acquisition 
environment where appropriate.  
The existing competency models examined included: 
• DAU ENG and PM competency models (DAU, 2016a, 2016b) 
• INCOSE Systems Engineering Competency Framework (INCOSE, 2018) 
• MITRE Systems Engineering Competency Model (MITRE, 2007) 
• NASA SE/PM Competency Model (NASA, 2019) 
• Helix Atlas Proficiency Model (Hutchison et al., 2020) 
• IEEE Software Engineering Competency Model (IEEE, 2014) 
• U.S. Department of Labor Engineering Competency Model (U.S. Department of Labor, 
2017) 
• Mission Engineering Competency Framework (Vesonder et al., 2018) 
• U.S. Department of the Navy Systems Engineering Career Competency Model (SECCM; 
Whitcomb et al., 2017) 
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The team gathered materials from the DE community related to competencies, including 
in-progress competency frameworks such as the Naval Digital Engineering Body of Knowledge. 
Paired with the assessment of existing models, experts and practitioners in DE and Model-
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) provided insights into their common activities and current 
training programs. These inputs were collected and compared to the competency models to 
determine where they fit in the existing frameworks and where new competencies needed to be 
created to account for them.  
Modeling the Framework 
The team utilized a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to create a 
SysML model of the DECF, its context, and its use cases. This approach leveraged the 
capabilities of DE and demonstrated the value proposition of their adoption. The primary focus 
of the model was to capture the structure and content of the DECF. Block definition diagrams 
(BDDs), such as that shown in Figure 1, are functional and visual representations of the 
structure of the DECF. The actual content of the model—the multitude of groups, competency 
areas and KSABs—is fulfilled by specified instances of each of these blocks.  
 
Figure 1. BDD of the DECF Structure 
The primary purpose of the model was to capture the DECF structure and content, but 
initial efforts were made into exploring the use cases of the DECF. First the context of the 
relationship of the DECF to a defense organization was modeled as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. BDD of the DECF Context Within a Defense Organization 
Although images captured from the SysML model may yield some insights to any 
person, attempting to browse model information natively is often inefficient and infeasible. 
Instead, an open-source tool called OpenMBEE was incorporated to generate text-based 
documents directly from model elements. (OpenMBEE, 2020). These documents were 
generated in, and accessible through, a web-based interface called View Editor. The View 
Editor interface not only allowed for easier sharing of model documents, but it also for direct 
commenting and modification of model elements. This modeling approach allowed reviews to 
take place in a DE environment using the online View Editor interface—giving potential users 
real-life experience using the required competencies—and it improved the visibility and 
collection of review feedback and facilitates its implementation. The model established an 
authoritative source for the DECF and followed DE practices for model management.  
Digital Engineering Competency Framework v. 1.1 
The DECF begins with the data foundations that are required for an effective digital 
environment (“Data Engineering”). The competency groups constitute how DE takes full 
advantage of the digital power of computation, visualization, and communication to take better, 
faster actions throughout the life cycle. These competency groups can be seen as supporting 
the four elements of John Boyd’s OODA loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Data 
Engineering guides how to observe, ensuring that data is acquired, curated, compressed, 
secured, and prepared. Next, Modeling and Simulation provide the ability to orient this data to 
describe and understand a phenomenon of interest. Decision Making utilizes analysis tools and 
techniques to make appropriate decisions. Finally, Engineering Methods are used to transform 
these decisions into engineering actions (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. DECF Competency Groups 
There are five competency groups identified for the DECF, as shown in Figure 4, along 
with a foundation of general digital competencies. Competency groups provide a logical 
structure for the individual competencies, making the DECF easier for users to understand and 
utilize. The groups in Figure 4 are intended to provide a holistic perspective of all the skills 
required to provide value in a digital environment. The five competency groups are defined in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptions of DECF v. 1.1 Competency Groups 
ID Competency Title Competency Description 
G1 Data  Engineering 
Apply knowledge on how to acquire, curate, compress, secure, and 
prepare data resulting from a DE environment. Create or support data-
focused processes. Data could originate from modeling and simulation, 
or from sensors in the physical world.  
G2 Modeling and Simulation 
Use of digital models to describe and understand phenomena of interest 
from initiation of the effort through the entire life cycle maturation. Model 
literacy—understanding what models are and how they work—is 
required to move into more advanced skills, from the ability to build a 
model using appropriate tools, standards, and ontology to creating a 
modeling environment.   
G3 Digital Engineering and Analysis 
Apply traditional engineering methods and processes in a digital 
environment. Create new engineering processes and methods for a 
digital environment. Create digital artifacts throughout the project or 
system life cycle. Use engineering methods, processes, and tools to 
support the engineering and system life cycle. 
G4 Systems Software 
Apply technical knowledge in various software or coding languages to 
create, support, and maintain applications. This includes the abilities to 
understand, apply, problem solve, create, and critique software in pursuit 
of particular learning and professional goals. 
G5 Digital Enterprise Environment 
Use the foundations of data, modeling, and software to create and 
maintain the digital enterprise. This requires creating the environment in 
which digital engineers, discipline and domain engineers, program 
managers, and decision-makers work. 
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The five competency groups are broken into nine competency subgroups and 31 
competencies (including six foundational digital competencies). The competency hierarchy 
includes competency groups (G#), subgroups (S#), and individual competencies (C#). Where 
appropriate, the competency groups are divided into subgroups. Subgroups contain related like 
competencies. The competency hierarchy provides a logical structure for the individual 
competencies, making the DECF easier for users to understand and utilize. The hierarchy 
structure provides an overview of all the skills required to provide value in a DE environment 
regardless of specific roles. The overarching structure is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Overview of DECF v. 1.1 
Any acquisition role is likely to require some skills from each of these competencies in a 
digital environment; however, no role should require all the skills in every competency in each 
group at top proficiency level. The specific competency, proficiency levels, and KSABs required 
for an individual are dependent upon the role(s) being played.  
Each of the competencies listed in Figure 4 is defined in the addendum at the end of this paper. 
Proficiency Levels 
In compliance with DoD Instruction 1400.25, each competency is broken down into 
KSABs relevant to proficiency levels within each competency (DoD, 2016). Not every individual 
will fully obtain all the competencies. The individual’s proficiency level must be assessed to 
understand the true status of the workforce with respect to DE. Proficiency is the level to which 
an individual attains a competency, as illustrated in Table 2.  
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DECF v. 1.1 contains 962 KSABs divided among these competency areas. Each 
represents a unique and important aspect of what will enable a successful digital transformation 
and productive DE practices. The distribution of these KSABs in terms of both their competency 
area and respective proficiency level is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.Distribution of KSABs in DECF v. 1.1 
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The KSABs within each competency are specifically targeted to DE. Therefore, a 
broader competency area like Communications has a relatively low number of KSABs related to 
DE, while a specific area like Model-Based Systems Engineering Processes, that is intrinsically 
linked with DE, has many KSABs.  
It is also interesting to note the distribution of the KSABs across the five proficiency 
levels. KSABs at the Awareness and Basic levels represent broad fundamentals within a 
competency area, while KSABs at the Advanced and Expert levels include the practice of 
specific techniques that make up the various applications of the competency area. The DECF is 
established to be a general framework that can be used to create specific competency models 
that will be tailored based on component implementation of the Digital Engineering Strategy. As 
a result, the KSABs must cover the breadth of potential DE practices, even if all these practices 
are not utilized within every organization.  
Cross-Cutting Elements in the DECF 
Because there is not a specific competency surrounding them, it could be perceived that 
some relevant key elements in DE are not included in the DECF. The DECF is structured in a 
manner that concisely captures the breadth of DE enabling skills with a minimal number of 
competencies. Most technologies are inherently multidisciplinary in practice, and so creating 
distinct competencies for each potentially relevant technology would create significant overlaps 
in the framework. To demonstrate this potential overlap, three noteworthy cross-cutting DE 
elements were identified and analyzed: 
• Digital Twin: An integrated multiphysics, multiscale, probabilistic simulation of an as-built 
system, enabled by Digital Thread, that uses the best available models, sensor 
information, and input data to mirror and predict activities/performance over the life of its 
corresponding physical twin. 
• Digital Thread: An extensible, configurable, and component enterprise-level analytical 
framework that seamlessly expedites the controlled interplay of authoritative technical 
data, software, information, and knowledge in the enterprise data-information-knowledge 
systems, based on the Digital System Model template, to inform decision-makers 
throughout a system’s life cycle by providing the capability to access, integrate, and 
transform disparate data into actionable information. 
• Digital Artifact: An artifact produced within, or generated from, the digital engineering 
ecosystem. These artifacts provide data for alternative views to visualize, communicate, 
and deliver data, information, and knowledge to stakeholders. 
These elements are all enablers of the digital transformation of the DECF. An analysis of 
the DECF showed that each of these technologies had several dozen corresponding KSABs 
across various competencies. There were 55 KSABs related to Digital Artifacts spread across 
ten different competencies, 32 KSABs related to Digital Twin found in seven competencies, and 
another 32 KSABs related to Digital Thread in 11 different competencies. Each of these 
elements has more associated KSABs than several of the individual competencies included in 
the DECF. However as shown in Figure 6, the spread of these KSABs across the variety of 
competencies demonstrates the inherent interdisciplinary nature of these elements and how 
much overlap would occur if they were uniformly included as their own competencies. The 
exception to this rule is the competency for AI/ML, which was deemed both vital for inclusion 
and unique in its content. In the future there may be some additional unique, self-contained 
elements that may also warrant their own competencies in future iterations of the DECF. 
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Digital Engineering Competencies in DoD Resources 
Using the DECF as a baseline, the team has been conducting a gap analysis using 
existing curriculum for digital engineering training in the DoD. Specifically, the team has 
investigated three courses:  
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) CLE084: Models, Simulations, and Digital 
Engineering; 
• Coursera MBSE: Model Based Systems Engineering (currently utilized by the DAU); and 
• MIT Architecture and Systems Engineering Program (utilized by NAVAIR), which 
includes relevant courses such as Models in Engineering and MBSE Documentation and 
Analysis. 
The method used was to review course materials and attend the course as appropriate. 
Researchers captured the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) illustrated in the curriculum as 
well as the stated learning objectives. These were then compared against the KSABs in the 
DECF to determine the level of coverage and any major gaps. In addition, materials covered in 
the courses but not reflected in the DECF were flagged by the team for consideration and, 
where appropriate, incorporated into the DECF. 
The key recommendations based on this analysis are outlined here. Additional details on 
the analysis can be found in (Hutchison et al., 2021). 
The current courses in use by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU; DAU’s internal 
course CLE084 and Coursera’s MBSE course) are useful for providing a common foundation 
and orientation to the terminology and benefits of MBSE and DE. They would help individuals 
attain “Awareness” or “Basic” proficiencies—understanding of the concepts and in some 
instance the ability to apply them with heavy guidance or supervision. They are particularly 
helpful for individuals who have no background in systems engineering or modeling or who are 
firmly entrenched in a document-based acquisition approach. However, seasoned systems 
engineers and engineers would require substantially deeper training to become practitioners of 
DE. 
Based on mapping of the DECF to the limited course materials available online for the 
MIT Architecture and Systems Engineering Program, the team found that the courses provided 
a solid fundamental understanding of models in engineering, MBSE, systems engineering, and 
digital architecting. In some cases, individuals can obtain proficiencies as high as the 
“Advanced” level. This program is recommended by NAVAIR for individuals who are facilitating 
change in their departments or organizations as they transition towards digital transformation.  
Overall, the Department needs to: 
• Screen for foundational skills. The DECF assumes a foundation of skills on which to 
build digital engineering competency. However, when it comes to training, this 
foundation cannot be assumed. The DoD needs to implement some basic screening 
approaches to ensure that individuals who do not have this foundation are offered 
opportunities to build it. Courses like DAU’s CLE084 and Coursera’s MBSE are already 
in use by the department and provide some of the necessary foundations. But it is 
important that only individuals who need these foundations utilize the resources, while 
individuals who will not gain proficiency through these courses be directed to other 
courses. 
• Introduce courses using modeling and simulation projects and problems as part 
of the curriculum. As currently structured, CLE084 and Coursera MBSE training focus 
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on the lowest levels of proficiency. While Awareness level skills are a critical foundation 
on which to build skills for practical application of DE, they are not sufficient in and of 
themselves. Because up to 70% of learning is gained through experience (rather than 
classroom instruction), creating models and simulations that students can use to practice 
the skills of the task is paramount.  
Ideally, implementation of modeling and simulation projects would impact not only DE-
focused curriculum but could help enable a variety of disciplines for digital 
transformation. A modeling environment that spans, for example, the ENG and PM 
training courses at DAU would enable systems engineers and program managers to 
improve their familiarity with working in a digital environment before they are exposed to 
DE-specific training. 
• Include coaching and mentoring as part of the longer-term curriculum. While 
coaching and mentoring can be applied within a single course, it would be most 
beneficial if longer-term coaching relationships were established specifically around the 
transition to DE in the DoD. The DAU may be in a unique position to broker such 
coaching opportunities, allowing individuals the opportunities to apply their DE 
knowledge on the job with expert guidance. 
Future Work 
The DECF provides only a starting point for updating the skills of the Defense acquisition 
workforce. In order to move forward, the DECF must be integrated into efforts such as the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD [R&E]) and in 
particular, the Engineering and Technical Management (ETM) competency framework. The 
DECF and related competencies need to be understood and embraced by the workforce, 
including not only individuals playing primary roles in acquisition but their management and 
leadership as well. A baseline assessment against these competencies will be a critical first step 
to understanding how far along the path of digital transformation the workforce has come and in 
developing a plan to help the workforce continue to grow along this path. 
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Addendum 
Tables 4–8 display the specific competencies contained within the competency hierarchy shown 
in Figure 6.  






C1 Data Governance 
Data governance is a collection of practices and processes that 
help to ensure the formal management of data assets within a 
digital enterprise. Data governance practices help an enterprise 
gain better control over its data assets, including methods, 
technologies, and behaviors around the proper management of 
data. Data governance also entails security and privacy, 
integrity, usability, integration, compliance, availability, roles 
and responsibilities, and overall management of the internal 





Data management is applying policies, procedures, and 
information technology to plan for, acquire, access, manage, 
protect, and use data of a technical nature to support the total 
life cycle of the system. Data management includes verifying 
that all the data are secure, collected, documented, and 
archived along with descriptions of data to ensure 
completeness of data collected. Data management also 
ensures the distribution of data is in accordance with the data 
management plan for analysis.    
 







C3 Modeling  
Modeling is essential to aid in understanding complex systems 
and system interdependencies, and to communicate among 
team members and stakeholders. 
C4 Simulation 
Simulation provides a means to explore concepts, system 
characteristics, and alternatives; open the trade space; facilitate 






Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform 
tasks that normally require human intelligence. Machine 
Learning (ML) is the application of AI that provides systems the 
ability to automatically learn and improve from experience 
without being explicitly programmed. Machine learning focuses 
on the development of computer programs that can access data 
and use it to learn for themselves. 
C6 Data Visualization 
Data visualization is the creation of graphic representations of 
data, particularly to improve communication about that data. 
Data visualization is also the ability to identify patterns, trends, 
and correlations in the data and place them in a visual context 
to describe their importance. This entails building and managing 
data visuals, models, and artifacts. 
C7 Data Analytics 
This is the process of inspecting, cleansing, transforming, 
modeling, and simulating data with the goal of discovering 
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Table 6. Competencies in the Digital Engineering and Analysis Group in DECF v. 1.1. 




C8 Digital Architecting 
Digital architecture activities use digital models to define a 
comprehensive digital system model based on principles, 
concepts, and properties logically related to and consistent 
with each other. Digital architecture has features, 
properties, and characteristics that satisfy, as far as 
possible, the problem or opportunity expressed by a set of 
system requirements (traceable to mission/business and 
stakeholder requirements) and life cycle concepts (e.g., 
operational, support) and which are implementable through 
digital enterprise related technologies. Digital architecture 
competencies relate to the ability to create system digital 
models and required architectural products and digital 
artifacts for a system or system-of-systems in accordance 





Digital requirements modeling refers to being able to 
capture stakeholder high-level requirements by 
documenting stated needs in the form of a model, assist in 
the clarification and translation of need statements into a 
more digital engineering-oriented basis, create and derive 
system requirements, that are related to the system 
architecture definition. It is also used to establish 
requirements traceability throughout the digital model 
architecture; examine the relationships of requirements to 
digital artifacts, and trace design solutions to requirements; 
and ensure designs can be traced to the system capabilities 






Digital verification is the process for determining whether or 
not a product fulfills the requirements or specifications 
established for it, by using digital models and artifacts for 
testing and verification. Enabling this practice is important to 







Model-based systems engineering is the formalized 
application of modeling to support system requirements, 
design, analysis, verification, and validation activities 
beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing 








Digital model-based reviews define the series and 
sequence of model-based systems engineering activities 
that bring stakeholders to the required level of commitment, 
prior to formal reviews. It utilizes system models, artifacts, 
and products for analysis of design and technical reviews to 
execute trade-off and design analyses, prototyping, 





Project management is the planning, coordinating, and 
monitoring of the work activities needed to deliver a product, 
service, or enterprise endeavor within the constraints of 
schedule, budget, resources, infrastructure, and available 





Organizational development focuses on developing 
organizational policies, standards, and guidelines for model-
based systems engineering methods and artifacts. 
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Digital engineering policy and guidance focuses on 
identifying process improvements to model-based 
engineering methods and contributing to organization of 
system life cycle development standards and definition of 
best practices. It includes defining strategy and approach to 
be used for modeling and analysis of complex systems. 
C16 Configuration Management 
Configuration management refers to the development of 
configuration management strategies, policies, standards, 
and guidelines for digital engineering related artifacts in 
accordance with model-based systems engineering 
methods. 
 
Table 7. Competencies in the System Software Group in DECF v. 1.1. 
Subgroup # Competency Description 
S5 Systems 
Software  
C17 Software Construction 
Software Construction refers to the detailed creation of working 
software through a combination of coding, verification, unit 
testing, integration testing, and debugging. 
C18 Software Engineering 
Software Engineering is the systematic application of digital 
engineering approaches to the development of software. 
 
Table 8. Competencies in the Digital Enterprise Environment Group in DECF v. 1.1. 










A digital enterprise environment is an integrated digital 
development framework in which digital models and 
representations are interconnected such that the content and 
activities within it are managed to accomplish the 






Management in the digital enterprise environment aims to 
deliver a framework that ensures transformational processes 
in enterprises occur with pace, high-quality, and security. 
This is achieved through a set of IT solutions that are 
designed to make digital businesses fast, seamless, and 
optimized at every level. 
C21 Communications 
Communications include using digital model artifacts from the 
digital enterprise environment to investigate and manage the 
adoption of appropriate model-based tools, techniques, and 
processes for the operation of digital enterprise environment 
systems and services. Communications also establishes the 
appropriate guidance to enable transparent decision-making 
to be accomplished, allowing senior leaders to ensure the 
needs of principal stakeholders are understood, the value 
proposition offered by digital enterprise environment is 
accepted by stakeholders and the evolving needs of the 
stakeholders and their need for balancing benefits, 
opportunities, costs, and risks is embedded into strategic and 
operational plans. 
C22 Planning 
Planning in the digital enterprise environment includes 
establishing strategies to monitor and manage the 
performance of digital artifacts and services, in respect to 
their contribution towards enterprise performance goals. 
Planning ensures that a framework of policies, standards, 
processes, and practices is in place to guide provision of 
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Subgroup C# Competency Description 
digital enterprise environment services, and that suitable 
monitoring of the governance framework is in place to report 










Operations within the digital enterprise environment include 
creating digital models and simulation artifacts and 
technology roadmaps, and sharing knowledge and insights 
from processes and results, with others. It encourages 
adoption to changes in the digital enterprise environment 
process or technology. It includes setting parameters for the 
prioritization of digital resources and the changes to be 
implemented and the configuration of digital engineering 





Support within a digital enterprise environment includes 
abilities to develop, mature, and implement methods and 
processes to support digital enterprise environment activities 









Digital Environment Security includes developing policies, 
standards, processes, and guidelines to ensure the physical 
and electronic security of digital environments and automated 
systems. This includes performing security risk and 
vulnerability assessments, and business impact analyses 
related to security and information assurance in the digital 
enterprise environment. It is intended to provide advice and 
guidance on the application and operation of digital 
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Abstract 
The DoN is undergoing a digital transformation that is set to address the needs of sustaining fleet 
assets for extended periods of time, while maintaining a superior lethality. Within the engineering 
domain, the DoN is starting to identify model-based systems engineering (MBSE) tools and 
concepts to streamline processes and enhance capability. The capstone looked to lay the 
foundation for a conceptual system model development process that utilizes SysML and OOSEM 
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to produce system model data and artifacts derived from a single scenario. During the digital 
transformation, communication of system model data to stakeholders was identified as a need, 
and a SysML tool was used to generate model-based documentation from a formatted Microsoft 
Word document. With incoming digital product support capabilities from the MBPS program, 
communication from a MBSE environment is critical and requires XML-formatted data. Using the 
information collected in the completion of the scenario, it was discovered that SysML elements 
will lose their SE-specific stereotypes when converted directly into XML format. To counter this, 
the capstone developed UML instances derived from the S3000L UML class-based data model to 
be converted into XML format. The findings and developments of this capstone support the ability 
for organizations to standardize the way system modeling data is developed, collected, and 
communicated to other systems external to the engineering domain. 
Executive Summary 
Currently, there is an initiative to transform legacy logistics information technology (IT) 
systems to use a model-centric approach to support products that aims to increase system 
uptime and reduce support costs. Model Based Product Support (MBPS) is a single piece of a 
larger digital readiness vision that includes new capabilities, such as predictive analytics, data-
as-a-service, platform-as-a-service, process automation, and the integration of data across 
multiple platforms (SEA06L, 2019). This vision of a logistics digital transformation is shown in 
Figure 1. The new integrated product life-cycle management (PLM) platform supports the 
sharing of a standardized data model that enables the capability to perform logistics support 
analysis. The PLM platform inside the product support (PS) domain would have conduits with 
the engineering, maintenance, training, and other system life cycle communities to support 
better logistics models and better supported systems (NSRP, 2019). 
 
Figure 1. Logistics Digital Transformation Vision Overview (NSRP, 2019) 
The current transformation occurring in the PS domain is also being pursued within the 
engineering domain with the exploration and implementation of model-based systems 
engineering (MBSE) concepts. Department of Defense (DoD) strategic documents have 
expressed the need that as systems become more complex, the DoD will require more robust 
engineering practices to develop weapon systems and maintain superiority over our enemies 
(Engineering, 2018). For many years, the DoD has relied on document-based, stove-piped 
engineering processes and is now looking to incorporate digital engineering practices to work 
more efficiently. The incorporation of digital engineering will require investment in new methods, 
processes, and tools in order to enable systems to become more lethal and affordable 
(Engineering, 2018). The Department of Navy (DoN) has embraced the goals set by the DoD 
Digital Engineering Strategy by developing its own set of high-level strategic documentation that 
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discusses high-level implementation strategies and their alignment to the DoD documentation 
(DoN, 2020).  
One of the alignment goals set in the DoD Digital Engineering Strategy and envisioned 
in the DoN Digital Systems Engineering Transformation Strategy is the formalization of the 
development, integration, and use of models. Using the system modeling language (SysML) 
and SysML tools, the capstone group built a conceptual system model development process 
based off the object-oriented systems engineering methodology (OOSEM). The OOSEM is a 
top-down, scenario-driven approach that leverages object-oriented concepts and other modeling 
techniques to support in the development of a more flexible and extensible system architecture 
that can accommodate the constant change in requirements or technologies (Friedenthal et al., 
2012). The developed process encapsulates system modeling data within what is known in 
SysML as blocks, analogous to classes within the unified modeling language (UML).  
The conceptual system modeling process was developed, and an example scenario was 
completed in which an organization has a need to develop and implement a model-based 
system engineering environment; henceforth named the Digital Engineering Environment 
(DEE), locally within the organization. The scenario walks through the development of the 
conceptual system model and pieces of the logical system model prior to a request for proposal 
(RFP) where vendors would bid on to develop a physical product based off the information 
presented to the vendor in the conceptual system model. The conceptual data model, shown in 
Figure 2, displays the type of models and artifacts that make up the system model and how they 
contribute to the development of the system of interest. The information and artifacts captured in 
the data model are developed within the system modeling process described in this capstone 
report. 
 
Figure 2. Proposed Conceptual Data Model for Developing a Systems Model 
 
System model data collected over the design and development phases of a system must 
be capable of being consumed and of use to the PS domain to enable the reuse of system data 
for supportability analyses. The MBPS program overview presentation displayed the program’s 
use of the S-Series specifications developed by the AeroSpace and Defense Industries 
Association of Europe and Aerospace Industries Association (ASD/AIA). These specifications 
layout an extensible markup language (XML) schema with data classes useful for different types 
of PS efforts, including provisioning, maintenance task analysis (MTA), level of repair analysis 
(LORA), software support analysis, and other logistics support analyses. There is not a current 
mapping between the data elements within SysML to the UML data elements within the S-
Series specification; however, the developers of the specifications have developed a data 
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model, which can be consumed and useful to a model developed in a SysML toolset. As shown 
in Figure 3, element instances contain the useful PS data which, if contained within an isolated 
model, could be manually translated into XML and exported to the S-Series database for 
analysis use. 
 
Figure 3. SysML Instances Translated into XML File Format for MBPS Consumption 
 
Stakeholders were interested in verification of the system design which was supported 
with the presentation of system model data. Many stakeholders do not have experience in using 
system modeling tools but are familiar with many of the presentation formats within the model. 
Many system modeling tools have the capability of developing model-based documentation. 
Some of the presentation views within the developed model for the capstone’s scenario were 
utilized to develop a model-based concept of operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS document 
template was downloaded from public online sources and configured using the velocity template 
language (VTL) to place model presentation artifacts into the CONOPS, automatically, upon a 
click of a button (Department of Veteran Affairs [VA], n.d.). 
The model building process does explain the development of a conceptual data model 
but describes very little work on the development of a logical system model and does not 
approach the physical model development phase. More research is needed to understand the 
interfaces with other digital engineering tools and how related data can be used to further define 
certain aspects of the system model. The process completed a scenario in which useful 
products were developed for demonstration. To ensure its validity, verification and validation of 
the proposed process should occur using pilot projects to identify and fix any demonstrated 
gaps within the process. Future work should include the implementation of another scenario in 
which a fielded system wishes to undergo a system change. This scenario would require the 
system model to be updated and used to perform alternative analysis in both the engineering 
and PS domains.  
The resulting scenario provided a collection of data points that represents different SOI 
viewpoints and that could be used within alternate domains to perform analyses. The 
conceptual system model in this instance would solely be used to demonstrate a problem and 
need to a design team or vendor. The instance of a problem would be derived from the technical 
capability audit (TCA) within the developed process whose following steps would be used to 
collect data and build presentation views. With the emergence of system of systems (SoS) 
modeling, it is theorized that existing and anticipated emerging gaps could also be a source of 
problems in which a TCA could be utilized to determine the necessary solution type 
(Mohammadi et al., 2014). Future work could explore the use of a TCA to identify future 
capability gaps as a second scenario to validate SysML models presented in this capstone. 
Using SysML and tailoring a process derived from the object-oriented system engineering 
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methodology (OOSEM), enabled the encapsulation of system model data into a single SOI 
model element to communicate a design’s architecture, behavior, requirements, and verification 
and validation activities. Review of the data developed during the simulation and the S3000L 
data model shows that there is a need for engineering data (Aerospace and Defense Industries 
Association of Europe and Aerospace Industries Association [ASD/AIA], 2014). The capstone 
presented a way to translate information from SysML into XML, but more work is needed to 
develop a data mapping to the S3000L XML data model that could lead to an automated 
conversion process.  
Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
This project demonstrates a process that gives United States Navy (USN) organizations 
the capability to develop a conceptual system model, whose data can be used to initiate digital 
twin and digital thread capabilities. The process outlined in the appending pages is meant to be 
the foundation for creating the conceptual data model that would be created and matured over 
the life cycle of the system. This process utilizes the early steps of the object-oriented systems 
engineering methodology (OOSEM) approach, a model-based system design approach, as a 
guide in its design with the expectation that it will be used to assist Department of Navy (DoN) 
organizations in better defining and presenting conceptual system needs and requirements to 
design agents (Friedenthal et al., 2012). Process gaps within OOSEM were identified and 
tailored to better suit the needs of our stakeholders. For example, the project implements a 
data-driven approach to problem definition, something that is not included in OOSEM. To fulfill 
this capability, the technical capability audit (TCA) was added to the process. The TCA uses 
both quantitative and qualitative data from questionnaire or survey data to determine the type of 
problem the organization is facing (Mohammadi et al., 2014). Appended sections further expand 
upon this with the descriptions and applications of the technical capability audit (TCA) to 
perform problem analysis and parametric modeling for engineering analysis. At the conclusion 
of specified steps in the presented process, the modeler will have gathered enough data to 
enable the development of presentation artifacts. The systems modeling language (SysML) was 
utilized as the data model, while Cameo Enterprise Architecture (CEA) was used to produce 
SysML presentation artifacts. The produced artifacts were used as the process verification 
method and was performed using a generalized scenario, performing the outlined steps to 
create data points and artifacts that can be used to present to the system’s stakeholders or to 
provide information to external systems in order to enable their own capabilities. The report will 
discuss the steps and artifacts developed through each step of the developed process. A 
discussion will follow that demonstrates potential uses for the data to support the development 
of acquisition documentation and the analysis of data communication with systems external to 
the systems engineering boundary. 
Problem Overview 
The Department of Defense (DoD) produced the DoD Digital Engineering Strategy to 
help spark and align a digital transformation in the engineering community. More recently, the 
DoN and Marine Corps delivered Digital Systems Engineering Transformation documentation 
that describes the goals for model-based systems engineering (MBSE) and lays a framework for 
MBSE implementation (DoN, 2020). Currently, MBSE is still immature relative to model-based 
product support and the enterprise technical reference framework (ETRF) and a fully matured 
enterprise capability may be some time off. In this scenario, it is assumed that the need for 
better, faster, and centralized tools and process in the system engineering community has been 
identified, and MBSE is the identified solution. With MBSE being as immature within the 
enterprise as it is, the DoN is still researching for more information on the MBSE subject and 
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trying to identify how it will best be implemented alongside the product support digital 
transformation. There is not yet a formal standard set of processes, models, data and tools at 
the DoN enterprise level that align to all of the objectives in the Digital Engineering Strategy and 
local commands are beginning to develop their own local instances of MBSE environments. The 
lack of standardization of the processes, data formats and exchanges may lead to systems 
again becoming isolated and less efficient as their potential. 
Background 
As systems experience a never-ending increase in complexity, rapidly changing 
operational and threat environments, increased budget constraints, and more demanding 
schedules, the DoD needs more robust engineering practices. Current engineering processes 
are often document intensive and stove-piped. To meet their needs, the DoD is transforming its 
engineering practices to a digital engineering methodology utilizing model-based approaches, 
including MBSE (Engineering, 2018). MBSE is a subset of digital engineering and can be 
defined as the use of models to support the activities within systems engineering (SE) process, 
including requirements, architecture, design, verification, and validation (Giachetti, 2020). The 
implementation of MBSE has been theorized to enable new capabilities within the SE process 
(DoN, 2020). One of the primary objectives of implementing MBSE is to develop an integrated 
set of digitally integrated views that enables the capability of automating the engineering 
assessment of proposed designs. This automated capability would be able to identify risks and 
gaps through the simulation of operational scenarios. The digital environment would provide 
feedback data to enable the application of data-driven decision-making.  
To maximize the effectiveness of MBSE, an organization must find a cohesive set of 
modeling tools and methods. The process supporting these activities is laid out in the 
implementation of OOSEM, applying SysML as the model syntax. The OOSEM is a top-down, 
scenario-driven approach that leverages object-oriented concepts and other modeling 
techniques to support in the development of a more flexible and extensible system architecture 
that can accommodate the constant change in requirements or technologies (Friedenthal et al., 
2012). The activities within the OOSEM process reflect those of the fundamental SE process, 
including needs analyses, requirements analyses, architecture design, trade studies and 
analyses, and verification (Friedenthal et al., 2012). The primary output to the OOSEM process 
is a model of the system of interest (SOI). The collected data on the SOI is captured and 
encapsulated using a SysML block, an extension of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) class 
that includes allocated system elements describing different system views. This project explored 
a system’s architecture, behavior, requirements, and verification and validation (V&V) views. 
Each view contains a set of SysML diagrams, matrices, or tables to create a model of each 
system model view. These diagrams are presentation mechanisms to display different data sets 
of the system model to different stakeholders. 
Digital transformation inside the DoN is not only an interest within the engineering 
domain, but within the entire enterprise. The DoN has a vision for digital transformation, and it 
has begun in the logistics IT domain with the implementation of the ETRF. The ETRF vision will 
provide a framework that will generate scalable, interoperable, flexible, and fluid technology 
solutions that will provide access to information and data at anytime, anywhere. One of the 
major capabilities of the ETRF is the implementation of an integrated platform as a service 
(PaaS) environment that will unify all logistics applications internal to the ETRF system and will 
deploy a set of application programming interfaces (API) to integrate with future and legacy 
systems. The vision of the ETRF will contain many logistics applications that will be managed by 
the PaaS. Applications within the ETRF will fall into one of the following four key mission areas: 
integrated readiness, supply chain management (SCM), maintenance, repair, and overhaul 
(MRO), or product life-cycle management (PLM; Accenture, 2019).  
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There are currently two major programs sponsored by the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV), Model Based Product Support (MBPS) and Navy MRO (NMRO), that are 
developing the applications to meet the objectives of these mission areas. These applications 
will be developed to deploy new methodologies, including model-based approaches, and 
replace legacy systems with new systems that utilize digital tools and processes to replace the 
old capability set. One of these programs is MBPS, which spans across all four of these mission 
areas and is of special importance to this project. MBPS is an initiative within the Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA) with cooperation from the Program Executive Office (PEO) that 
will create and implement a digitally integrated environment focused on the support of Naval 
systems. The MBPS environment will support the production of many artifacts in the support of 
sustaining engineering, including reliability centered maintenance (RCM) artifacts, level of repair 
analysis (LORA), readiness at cost analysis, reliability block diagrams, fault tree analysis (FTA), 
and other product support documentation and analyses. An authoritative source of product 
support data, that will enable the supportability analyses listed above. The authoritative data 
structure will be established and MBPS and developed using industry standards to support the 
communication and exchange of data between systems internal and external to the MBPS 
environment (SEA06L, 2019). The integration of MBSE and MBPS is of great interest. It has 
been theorized that this integration could lead to systems that maximize availability, 
effectiveness, capability, and affordability (Kwon et al., 2018). 
In order to perform cross-platform verification and analysis, data must be accessible by 
both environments through an authoritative data source. Currently, there are two identified 
potential authoritative data sources within the ETRF that are being sponsored for development. 
Within MBPS, there is the Navy Product Data Management (NPDM) that is being established as 
the authoritative data source for all system technical data once a system reaches the operation 
and sustainment phase of the system’s life cycle. The ETRF will also be deploying the agile 
warfighter analytics readiness environment (AWARE) within NMRO. The AWARE is a data-as-
a-service (DaaS) platform to manage and communicate maintenance data from data collected 
by ship-based NMRO applications to the AWARE. Any data needed by the applications will be 
stored and transferred through at least one of these data sources. For MBSE, this has been 
identified as a major integration point between SE and product support (PS) capabilities which, 
in the future, will communicate and supplement the capabilities of one another (Accenture, 
2019). 
Problem Statement 
The USN has produced documentation describing the characteristics of a model-based 
engineering environment but has not yet realized a solution for a model-based engineering 
environment and how that environment would be implemented and integrated into the system of 
systems (SoS) enterprise digital transformation vision (DoN, 2020). A need has been identified 
by the SE community at the Naval Sea Systems Command, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC 
PHD) to implement a local model-based system engineering (MBSE) environment and to 
understand how the MBSE data set, capabilities and tools would integrate into the ETRF.  
With the MBPS capability set being more mature than the MBSE capability set, this 
capstone looked to identify potential avenues of implementation that aligned to the high-level 
objectives within the DoD and DoN strategic documents. With the development of a standard 
modeling process, the standardization of data sets, presentation artifacts, tool sets, etc. will 
follow, enabling many of the MBSE capabilities. A standardized set of data of system model 
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Project Objectives 
This capstone team had two high-level objectives: develop a formal process using SE 
methodologies that would be capable of developing a conceptual system model and compile a 
final report that will explain the problem space, describe the solution space and how it solves 
identified issues, describe and explain the processes used, present the developed artifacts, and 
provide recommendations for future work or action.  
The objective of the model is to provide a standard process for organizations to develop 
a conceptual system model that contains early system architecture, behavior, requirements, and 
verification and validation models. The conceptual model would be the starting point for a 
program’s digital twin and thread that would mature along with the design to include data from 
the logical and physical levels of the design. The process and development of system model 
data enables the capability of producing model-based documentation that supports the 
development of programmatic documentation from templates. The report will demonstrate and 
explain the process of how the capstone team developed and produced a model-based concept 
of operations (CONOPS) from a Microsoft Word template found in the public internet domain. 
To ensure the process satisfies the stakeholder objective and requirements, the 
capstone team applied the process to a development scenario to support the verification of the 
process. The model will be supplemented by a textual report that will further include 
explanations of the processes and recommendations for future work. 
Project Scope 
The scope of the capstone is set based on the scenario outlined in the Problem 
Overview section. Verifying the developed process with these scenarios will produce a set of 
artifacts that will be used to demonstrate to organizations how MBSE can be used. The 
documented process and developed artifacts are a part of the framework of this report, and the 
discussions that follow will be based off the development of the system model and the 
verification methods using the use case scenarios. 
Section Summary 
This section introduced the capstone, overall problem, background information, problem 
statement, scope, and objectives. This information is used in the understanding of the 
information and processes that will be discussed in the appended sections. 
Having identified the need to utilize MBSE concepts to enhance the DoN’s engineering 
capabilities, the capstone team documented a standard process. The process is used to support 
an organization’s capability to develop conceptual system models. The process was developed 
using the object-oriented SE methodology as a guide as to what data is required for the 
development of the system model and the presentation artifacts were produced using Cameo 
Enterprise Architecture. To provide examples of artifacts to the stakeholders and this report, a 
fictitious scenario was applied. The appending sections will provide more detailed explanations 
for each phase of the process and the artifacts that are consumed and produced by each 
phase. 
Problem Analysis 
Important Definitions and Terms 
Common definitions and terms are used throughout this report. These definitions were 
researched and established during the literature review. These terms are defined in this section 
to give the reader a general understanding of the topics to be discussed.  
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Model-Based Systems Engineering  
The use of models to convey SE concepts and data either in place of or in conjunction 
with traditional textual methods has gained wide acceptance in recent years. This was 
introduced by INCOSE in 2007 as follows:  
Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) is the formalized application of modeling to 
support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in 
the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life-cycle 
phases. MBSE is part of a long-term trend toward model-centric approaches adopted by other 
engineering disciplines, including mechanical, electrical and software. (INCOSE Technical 
Operations, 2007) 
Model-Based Product Support  
There is no official definition of model-based product support (MBPS) in literature, but 
the collective sources support a general definition. Model-based product support is a broad term 
that essentially translates to model-based electronic tools and information systems that enable 
the support of logistics functions such as training, maintenance, operations, and sustainment. 
Model-Based Product Support is the cooperative initiative between NAVSEA and PEO that will 
provide multiple digital logistics capabilities to the DoN. 
Architecture Framework 
The Architecture Framework defines how an architecture will be created and 
subsequently utilized through a set of rules and practices. It is defined by the MITRE 
Corporation as follows: 
An architecture framework is an encapsulation of a minimum set of practices and 
requirements for artifacts that describe a system’s architecture. Models are representations of 
how objects in a system fit structurally in and behave as part of the system. Views are a partial 
expression of the system from a perspective. A viewpoint is a set of representations (views and 
models) of an architecture that covers a stakeholder’s issues. (MITRE, 2015) 
Enterprise Technical Reference Framework  
The push to consolidate existing systems into a new common logistics platform that 
leverages new technologies and innovations is necessary in order to adapt to the Navy’s 
changing needs. The following two quotes describe this: 
The vision of Enterprise Technical Reference Framework (ETRF) is to enable and accelerate 
the overall objective of Navy Logistics IT. ETRF provides a digital logistics IT architecture that 
will generate scalable, interoperable, flexible and fluid technology solutions; maximizing access 
to information/data via applications anywhere, on any device at any time. (Accenture, 2019) 
The Enterprise Technical Reference Framework will leverage the Digital Transform Plan 
Services, Data, Technology, Security and Change Management strategies to provide a 
framework and roadmap to transform 1600+ current Applications and 5000+ data sources to a 
common unified logistics IT platform. (Accenture, 2019)  
Digital Information Technology (IT) Transformation  
The DoD digital IT transformation exists within the Joint Information Environment (JIE) 
framework that is comprised of a comprehensive Department-wide IT modernization that exists 
within the DoD Information Network (DoDIN). The JIE purpose is to “improve mission 
effectiveness, increase cybersecurity, improve interoperability, deliver capabilities faster, and 
realize IT efficiencies” (DoD, 2019). The DoD JIE framework is comprised of 10 Capability 
Objectives, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Alignment of DoD CIO Objectives to JIE Capability Objectives and Initiatives (DoD, 2019) 
JIE Capability Objective JIE Initiatives DoD CIO Objectives 
Modernize Network Infrastructure  
Optical Transport Upgrades, MPLS Routers Buildout, ATM Switch and low 
speed TDM Circuit Elimination, Satellite Communications Gateway 
Consolidation and Modernization, IPv6 Implementation  
• Modernize Warfighter C4 Infrastructure and Systems  
• Modernize DISN Transport Infrastructure  
• Modernize and Optimize DoD Component  
• Networks and Services  
Enable Enterprise Network 
Operations  
Establish global and regional operations centers, Establish the JIE 
Management Network, Converge IT Service Management (ITSM) solutions  
• Modernize and Optimize DoD Component Networks and Services  
• Shift from Component-Centric to Enterprise-Wide Operations and Defense Model  
Implement Regional Security  JRSS, JMS  • Modernize DISN Transport Infrastructure  
Provide Mission Partner 
Environment (MPE)  
Virtual Data Center, Applications and Services, MPE Transport, Mission 
Partner Gateways  • Strengthen Collaboration, International Partnerships, and Allied Interoperability  
Optimize Data Center 
Infrastructure  
Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) and Application Rationalization 
Initiative  • Optimize DoD Data Centers  
Implement Consistent 
Cybersecurity Protections  
Enterprise Perimeter Protection Capabilities, Operate Securely in the Cloud, 
Endpoint Security, Data Center Security, Cyber Situational Awareness 
Analytic Capabilities (CSAAC)/ Big Data Platform (BDP), Identity, Credential, 
and Access Management (ICAM)  
• Transform the DoD Cybersecurity Architecture to Increase Agility and Strengthen 
Resilience  
• Deliver a DoD Enterprise Cloud Environment to Leverage Commercial Innovation  
• Deploy an End-to-End ICAM Infrastructure  
Enhance Enterprise Mobility  Purebred for Mobile, Defense Enterprise Mobility-Classified Consolidation, DoD Mobile Application Store, Pentagon Mobility  • Improve Information Sharing to Mobile Users  
Standardize IT Commodity 
Management  
Enterprise Software Agreements, Enterprise License Agreements, Enterprise 
Hardware Agreements, IT Asset Management, Windows 10 SHB Fourth Estate 
Network Optimization  
• Improve IT Category Management • Transform the DoD Cybersecurity  
• Architecture to Increase Agility and Strengthen Resilience  
Establish End-User Enterprise 
Services  Enterprise Collaboration and Productivity Services  
• Optimize DoD Office Productivity and Collaboration Capabilities (ECAPS Capability 
Set 1)  
• Optimize DoD Voice & Video Capabilities (ECAPS Capability Sets 2 & 3)  
Provide Hybrid Cloud Computing 
Environments  Cloud Services  
• Deliver a DoD Enterprise Cloud Environment to Leverage Commercial Innovation  
• Optimize DoD Office Productivity and Collaboration Capabilities (ECAPS Capability 
Set 1)  
• Optimize DoD Voice & Video Capabilities (ECAPS Capability Sets 2 & 3) 
Systems Modeling Language (SysML)  
The Systems Modeling Language (SysML) is a general purpose MBSE language that 
uses “graphical modeling for specifying, analyzing, designing, and verifying complex systems 
that [include] hardware, software, information, personnel, procedures, and facility elements” 
(Object Management Group, n.d). SysML originated from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
2 framework. Further, SysML “provides graphical representations with a semantic foundation for 
modeling system requirements, behavior, structure, and parametrics, which is used to integrate 
with other engineering analysis models” (Object Management Group, n.d). 
Section Summary 
This section discussed problem analysis to include stakeholders, definitions, and a 
literature review. Definitions were introduced to familiarize the reader with MBSE and MBPS 
and the environment they operate within. Policies such as the ETRF and digital IT 
transformation explain how DoD policies affect both modeling areas. A list of stakeholders was 
presented that explained their functional area, their relationship to this project, and how they are 
impacted by this project. The literature review familiarized the capstone group with modeling 
efforts within SE and product support. The literature review presented an overview of definitions 
and applications of MBSE and MBPS. Furthermore, the literature reviewed focused on DoD 
specific applications of modeling, including 
• The USN’s legacy process being used at the time of this capstone.  
• The capability gaps of the legacy processes. 
• Future DoD-specific modeling trends in MBSE and MBPS. 
Model Development 
System Model Development Process 
The system model development process, shown in Figure 4, was developed to establish 
a standard procedure in developing conceptual system models early in a system or project’s life 
cycle. The model development process was created using the OOSEM as a guide for the 
phases within the process. The process begins in the problem definition and analysis phase 
where the problem was defined with stakeholder concurrence and analysis to determine a 
recommended solution. A decision is then made based on the maturity of the solution to either 
integrate the existing solution set, if it is mature enough, or to develop a solution if one does not 
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exist or is too immature. For this report is assumed that the decision has already been made 
that an immature solution will be pursued in the local implementation of the Digital Engineering 
Environment (DEE). 
 
Figure 4. Overall System Model Development Process 
 
During the model development process, the capstone team sought to meet the project 
objectives by utilizing the scrum framework with an iterative development approach. Team 
members were individually assigned diagrams through the sprint planning process. Completed 
diagrams were peer reviewed for content, flow, and formatting, and then were added into the 
master model. Periodic stakeholder reviews, including progress reviews, were conducted to 
gather feedback; feedback influenced model design and development to meet the stakeholder 
needs. Simulations of the model using a designed scenario were also performed iteratively 
throughout the development process to produce model data and artifacts.   
Simulation Scenarios 
The basis for the selection of the simulation scenarios and the corresponding activity 
diagrams were determined by the project objectives. Stakeholder analysis and the sponsor 
command objectives played a key role in the selection of the example scenarios to represent 
model function. The sponsor’s prime objectives for in-service engineering played a key role in 
the selection of the following scenarios:  
Addressing new business capabilities (Simulation Scenario): A new incoming business 
capability has been identified; or the command performs an internal audit which identifies a 
desired new capability. The capability set is immature, and there is not an existing system 
infrastructure that supports the capabilities. A system model is to be built from scratch to 
present conceptual information and high-level requirements of the desired solution. Post model 
development, the system model would be distributed to a development team for to be updated 
and refined as the system supporting the capability matures. 
Addressing new capabilities to an existing system (Future Simulation Scenario): This 
scenario would focus on the addition of a capability set to an already existing system. A system 
model or system of systems (SoS) model exists and would be utilized to perform alternative 
analysis on the change prospects. Updates to the system model would happen iteratively as the 
change design matures and is implemented.   
Activity diagrams were derived from these use cases. The pertinent activity diagrams 
were identified by determining the key aspects that affect the example scenarios. The activity 
diagrams that were modeled were:  
• Problem Definition and Analysis 
• Mission Requirement Generation Process  
• System Requirements Generation Process  
• System Integration 
 
 
Simulation Scenario 2 (Future Work): Mature 
technology or concept has been identified and 
NSWC PHD wants to utilize created system 
models to anticipate integrations efforts. 
Simulation Scenario 1 (Capstone Work): 
Immature technology or concept has been 
identified and NSWC PHD wants to build a 
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Object Oriented Systems Engineering Method 
This capstone has utilized elements of the Object Oriented Systems Engineering Method 
(OOSEM) found within the practical guide to SysML. “[The] OOSEM is a top-down, scenario-
driven process that uses SysML to support the analysis, specification, design, and verification of 
systems. The process leverages object-oriented concepts and other modeling techniques to 
help architect more flexible and extensible systems that can accommodate evolving technology 
and changing requirements” (Friedenthal et al., 2012). The OOSEM was created in 1998 and 
has been further refined by an International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) 
OOSEM working group (Friedenthal et al., 2012). It is an INCOSE accepted SE management 
process. Most of the capstone artifacts have been captured using MBSE and SysML artifacts. 
These artifacts include stakeholder requirements, system requirements, problem space 
architecture, solution spaces architecture, use cases, and parametric diagrams. Due to the large 
nature of model-based artifacts, this capstone chose to employ elements of OOSEM due to its 
applicability in both SysML development and SysML enabled management. Figure 5 shows the 
OOSEM steps that helped this capstone team design a tailored process for developing a 
conceptual system model.  
 
Figure 5. OOSEM Specify and Design Process (Friedenthal et al., 2012) 
 
The SE steps shown in the figures are set-up model, analyze stakeholder needs, 
manage requirements traceability, analyze system requirements, optimize and evaluate 
alternatives, define logical architecture, and synthesize candidate physical architectures. This 
process was tailored to not include the optimize and evaluate alternatives, define logical 
architecture or synthesize physical architecture. These steps were removed as this capstone 
will not produce a full logical or physical system and would be up to the development team to 
refine the model to include the architecture definition. Instead, the focus will remain on 
developing a conceptual SysML model that describes the objectives laid out in the simulation 
scenario: The need of a MBSE environment that provides digital SE capabilities and can 
exchange meaningful data with other platforms within the digital transformation domain.   
The model development utilized an iterative design process where incremental builds of 
the model were developed. These iterative builds incorporated a feedback loop to receive 
stakeholder input on the developed models. Stakeholder feedback has subsequently been 
incorporated into each iterative design of the model.   
Problem Definition and Analysis 
The problem definition and analysis phase, as shown in Figure 6, is meant to support the 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 55 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
help satisfy the needs. The process begins with a signal that triggers the first step in the 
process. The trigger can be scheduled or unscheduled, as in this process could be performed 
with a scheduled integrated product team (IPT) annually, every 6 months, etc., or it could be 
spontaneous, driven by innovation within the enterprise or based on direction provided by 
enterprise leadership.  
 
 
Figure 6. Problem Definition and Analysis Activity Diagram 
Once the IPT is formed, their first responsibility would be to perform the technical 
capability audit (TCA). The TCA is the process of analyzing technical capabilities within an 
organization in a data-driven way to identify potential problems and solutions to those problems 
(Mohammadi et al., 2014, pp. 5–8). Technical capability in this context is defined as an 
organization’s ability to utilize technologies in a way that is most useful to the organization’s 
goals and mission. Technologies in this case refer to the machines and processes that the 
people of an organization utilize to perform their daily activities. Technology capabilities are 
influenced by technological innovation and changes in organizational goals or missions (Strukelj 
& Dolinsek, 2011).  
The IPT develops a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators in which they can 
disburse to the workers of an organization to receive feedback. The indicators that form the TCA 
have four different aspects: hard, human, knowledge, and organizing and managing of technical 
capabilities. Hard aspects are the physical equipment, are the tools currently available to the 
workforce meet their needs. Human aspects relate to the skill set of the workforce and answers 
the question, “Does the workforce have the right skill set to perform this technical capability?” 
Knowledge aspects pertain to the understanding of the technological capability and is enough 
information known about it to make it a worthy investment. Lastly, organizing and managing of 
the technical capability is an aspect that focuses on how well an organization is structured, or 
funded, to develop new technical capabilities and the quality of the technical capability 
management process (Mohammadi et al., 2014, pp. 8–12). Feedback to the IPT from the 
workforce on the indicators can support the identification of problem areas where a solution is 
needed in order to satisfy the technical capability (Mohammadi et al., 2014, pp. 13–14).  
For this example scenario, it is assumed that the TCA has already occurred and the 
problem has been identified to be a lack of hard aspects that is causing the greatest deficiency 
in achieving a MBSE technical capability at the organization. Upon completion of steps 3 and 4, 
as shown in Figure 6, the IPT should have completed the development of the stakeholder 
analysis, viewpoints and contextual architecture presentation views. An example of the 
stakeholder analysis is presented in Figure 7, while examples of viewpoints and contextual 
architecture are shown in the following section in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. For the 
purposes of this capstone, a formal stakeholder analysis was not performed and the Unified 
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Architecture Framework (UAF) provided guidance on stakeholder composition, concerns, 
purpose and presentation methods (OMG, 2020). 
 
 
Figure 7. Analysis of the Stakeholders 
Based on the maturity of the solution, the acquiring organization decided whether the 
system model developing process needs to begin at the beginning or a system model or 
artifacts exist, and the solution will be integrated into the model. For the capstone’s scenario it is 
assumed that a new model describing the solution and the process will signal for the mission 
requirements generation process to begin. If the solution needs to be integrated into an already 
existing system model or SoS model, the model is consumed by the solution’s model project 
and any updates and refinements are made as the solution matures. 
Mission Requirements Generation 
The mission requirements activity diagram in Figure 8 provides a set of top-level 
requirements and traceability to the other aspects of the system model to support the 
management of requirements throughout the completion of the process. This diagram will be 
explained by showing expanded views of each section to enhance readability and to summarize 
key actions occurring in each section.  
 
Figure 8. Mission Requirements Activity Diagram 
 
The problem definition and analysis phase has several output object flows that are used 
as inputs to the mission requirement phase. The stakeholder viewpoints, recommended 
solution, and contextual architecture feed directly into various mission requirement blocks to 
further develop the system. The mission requirements diagram is the precursor to the system 
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specification derivation process. As the precursor diagram, all outputs and generated artifacts 
are utilized in the system specification derivation process activity diagram. 
The mission requirements generation process begins with a formed IPT analyzing the 
finding of the previous activities. The mission requirements phase initializes with the stakeholder 
viewpoints as well as the recommended solution from the problem definition and analysis 
phase. From the initialization, the IPT will enter a singular direction merge node, which allows 
for a repeat of the process should all requirements not be met. This merge node has no effect 
on the control flow of the process the IPT goes through from the initialization. 
The control flow continues into the development of mission requirements. Mission 
requirements are built from the understanding of the problem and stakeholder needs that were 
established in the previous phase. From the development of mission requirements, the control 
flow then goes into a SysML fork where the IPT would perform three data collection tasks 
simultaneously. To exit the fork node the IPT must generate a block definition diagram (BDD) 
for system context, retrieve and capture measures of effectiveness, and decompose the 
machine within the context of the BDD.  
The IPT will look to address the concerns of the stakeholders by the decomposition of 
the contextual BDD and the creation of the use case diagram that shows where the mission 
requirements will be met. The measures of effectiveness are captured to understand what the 
system of interest (SOI) will be tested against prior to deployment and implementation. The 
developed indicator from the TCA performed in the problem definition and analysis phase can 
be utilized to further strengthen the measures of effectiveness. From this block, the output of the 
BDD system context diagram is generated. This artifact is used to initialize the system 
specification diagram.   
The last block within the fork requires the IPT to decompose the SOI within the context 
of the BDD. The object flow needed to complete this task is derived from the contextual 
architecture of the problem definition and analysis activity diagram.  
With the satisfaction of the three proceeding taskings, the IPT control flow moves to join 
the control flows. The IPT will now be capable of defining the relationships between the solution 
contextual architecture and the mission requirements. As this development matures, the object 
flow output of a high-level system architecture transfers to the system specification derivation 
activity diagram.  
The final logical control of the mission requirements activity diagram is to ensure that the 
stakeholders needs are being achieved. If gaps in requirements are identified, then the control 
flow allows for a repeat of the process flow for the IPT. The exit criteria for the mission 
requirements activity diagram is for the IPT to review the stakeholder requirements against the 
generated mission requirements If the stakeholder requirements are sufficiently satisfied the 
control flow exits the mission requirements activity diagram.  
Mission requirements definition and refinement is an integral phase of the overall 
capability achievement of MBSE and/or MBPS within the digital engineering environment. The 
established object and control flows that this capstone project illustrates during the mission 
requirements activity diagram through the generated artifacts demonstrate the importance for an 
IPT to decompose and address the overall stakeholder need(s). The traceability aspect that 
OOSEM provides to the overall intent of the mission requirements diagram allows for further 
exploration of validation and verification that the system and component requirements satisfy 
the stakeholder requirements.  
This part of the process was verified by the development of the input and output artifacts 
to ensure the required system model data was being produced, the following sections will 
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discuss a selected number of these artifacts and will provide a short description pertaining to the 
artifacts importance to the overall presentation of the system model data. 
Simulation Results 
The process above describes an overall method for the second iteration of system 
model development. The process includes further refinement of the architecture facet of the 
system model, and it introduces the behavior and requirement viewpoints. In order to validate 
this method, scenario one was used as a use case and the system specification process was 
executed. The assumptions prior to moving into the process are that all required input artifacts 
have been completed from the previous activity diagrams. These input artifacts are displayed 
below as shown from the system context of the DEE and MBPS, where DEE is the SOI and 
MBPS is the identified external system. 
Mission Requirements Generation Inputs 
The first activity within the process requires the integrated product team (IPT) to revisit 
the information provided from the problem definition and analysis process. Other than the 
recommended solution, the IPT will be using the information provided in the stakeholder 
viewpoints as a guide to developing the different presentation views within the model. The 
stakeholder viewpoints represent different stakeholder perspectives and helps capture subsets 
of the model that are of interest to the stakeholder (Friedenthal et al., 2012). Shown in Figure 9 
is the actual resources viewpoint. This viewpoint is of interest to a few different stakeholders, 
including the solution provider, business architect, human resources, and the systems engineer. 




Figure 9. Stakeholder Viewpoint (Example) 
Figure 10 displays another input from the problem definition and analysis phase that is 
used to help support the decomposition of the SOI. This artifact will define what is being 
decomposed, but the majority of the information needed to support the development would 
come from other programmatic artifacts, like a concept of operations (CONOPS), that would 
give the modeler a better idea of the necessary sub-systems or components needed to support 
the requirements for the SOI. 
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Figure 10. Contextual Architecture 
Figure 11 represents an example of a set of stakeholder needs in diagram form. A 
diagram was chosen for this artifact, but a table is also an acceptable way for the same 
information to be displayed with the SysML syntax. The stakeholder requirements should 
always be the alignment mechanism during the development of systems and system models. 
SysML toolsets provide the platform for modelers to show stakeholders that their needs are 
being met and can provide traceable relationships to the modeled needs to ensure the designs 
are, in fact, meeting the modeled needs. An example of a requirement traceability matrix (RTM) 
is shown in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 11. Stakeholder Needs Model 
 
 
Figure 12. Example of a Requirement Traceability Matrix 
Mission Requirements Generation Outputs 
Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are captured in the model as shown in Figure 13. 
“[Measures of effectiveness] are mission-level performance requirements that reflect value to 
the customer and other stakeholders. They are derived from the stakeholder needs analysis that 
includes causal analysis and mission performance analysis” (Friedenthalet al., 2012). The 
MOEs help refine the black box behavior of the SOI by showing which properties and metrics 
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are used to evaluate the system. For example, MOE 12 “required storage space” implies that 
the system must have a capability of storing data and that the size of the storage is important to 
the system final capability. The MOEs are also used in the mission requirements diagram to 
evaluate recommended system solutions.  
 
Figure 13. Example MOE Table 
Another function of the MOEs within the system model can be to create a criterion to 
which the program can base its decision-making. Shown in Figure 14 is a parametric diagram 
that provides an example of how parametric diagrams can be used in the design selection 
process. Contracting firms may submit bids to design the system laid out in Figure 14. The 
organization that sent out the request could use engineering analysis criteria in the parametric 
diagram, based off the modeled MOEs, to establish a plan for evaluating each submission. By 
placing a value on each MOE based on how well the contractor met that MOE, the evaluators 
will determine an overall score based on the selection criteria. As mission requirements have 
been developed within the model, the system modeler will look to begin the decomposition of 
the system architecture, based off the understanding of what is required of the system. The 
program or project is still in the very early stages in this scenario and there may be little 
information. Our simulation scenario from the overall process description is based off a set of 
known, but immature, concepts and capabilities. As shown in Figure 15, like-capabilities were 
grouped inside the capabilities boundary and assigned to the different capability areas, they 
could be called sub-systems, within our SOI. These capabilities would support the development 
of the top-level objectives, to create model and document artifacts that reflect the SOI. 
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Figure 15. Boundary Decomposition 
 
Figure 16 shows the final output and focus of the mission requirements process. The 
complete list of mission requirements is captured in the model and the proceeding processes 
use this diagram as an input at the start of the next process, system specification process. 
 
 
Figure 16. Mission Requirements: Requirements Model 
 
With an understanding of the capabilities and requirements, the system modeler can 
begin brainstorming system use cases that will be later refined to describe behavior or be 
selected as a test case for system verification. Use case diagrams present the basic 
functionality of the system and its relation to performers or requirements. Figure 17 is the 
developed use case from the capstone’s scenario simulation. 
 
Figure 17. DEE Use Case Diagram 
 
System Specification Derivation 
The second activity that follows the mission requirements generation is the system 
specification derivation process. The purpose of the system specification diagram is to further 
mature the system model viewpoints, allowing for the further development of more mature 
requirements and a system specification. This activity is necessary to build an understanding of 
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how the SOI will behave within the context of external and internal systems. Some constraints 
imposed on this activity flow down as inputs created during the mission requirements 
generation. These constraints include mission requirements and a block definition diagram 
(BDD) system context diagrams of the machine. The output of the activity is a system 
specification, an encapsulation of the SysML elements that are allocated to or share 
relationships with the SOI. With a clear definition of system behavior and function, a modeler 
and stakeholder can use the process to develop a list of functional requirements that describe 
what the SOI is required to do. However, this diagram does not specify how the SOI will perform 
its functions. This process occurs earlier in the life cycle in the conceptual system design phase. 
The machine specified in the diagram is the SOI for which the functional requirements are being 
generated. An overview of the activity is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18. System Specification: Derivation Activity Diagram 
The diagram inputs in Figure 18, shown on the border of the diagram are: mission 
requirements, system architecture, external system model, MOEs, subject matter expert (SME) 
input, system behavior (functionality), and stakeholder needs. Many of these artifacts were 
developed in the previous phases and will not be discussed further. Artifacts consumed in this 
process that were not developed in a previous phase will be discussed in the simulation results 
for the system specification derivation phase. 
The first action of the process is to decompose the architecture of interfacing systems. 
The action focuses on defining touch points between the SOI and the external systems it will 
interact with. There are three inputs that facilitate this process: the architecture model, the 
external system model, and SME input. This first action involves searching for SMEs of external 
systems that can provide detailed interface diagrams and/or system models. The identified 
SMEs will also be presented with developed information for the SOI. In this manner, both 
groups will be able to identify potential points of integration and the types of data that will need 
to flow between the two. Once complete the next action is initiated, to deduce anticipated 
interfaces. In this action, the two groups will use the information found in the previous step and 
create an interface diagram within SysML. Internal block diagrams (IBD) of the external systems 
and SOI will assist in defining interfaces. Subsystems and subfunctions can help identify exact 
interface requirements between the systems. A model artifact is created, and the action outputs 
a developed interface diagram. Working through the rest of the diagram, the next actions 
support the development of the black box specification of the SOI. To accomplish this, system 
attribute needs are documented. This includes defining constraints, assumptions, measures of 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 63 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
performance, measures of effectiveness and data requirements. By defining the attributes of the 
system, the black box specification can be refined to fit the constraints and needs of the system. 
In addition to system attributes, behavior models are created to show high level behavior based 
on system needs. This is accomplished by creating common mission scenarios for the SOI and 
designating critical/common behaviors or functions that system is expected to perform. These 
functions lead to the creation of behavior diagrams show interactions between subsystems 
previously identified in the IBD. Using all these inputs and constraints, the black box 
specification is developed. This can be captured as a BDD that lists model properties including 
constraints, parts or subsystems, properties or system functions, references, and value blocks 
tied model such as associated MOEs.  
Lastly, the functional requirements are generated with the last two actions in the process 
in the functional requirements phase shown in Figure 18. The functional requirements are the 
main desired output artifacts of this process. and all other actions have led to its final 
production. This artifact is the focus of what the process is trying to create.  
Using all the information from the previous steps, the functional requirements are drafted 
and tied to mission requirements. The mission requirement feed directly into this action to 
ensure that the functional requirements are derived and traced back to higher level mission 
requirements. A detailed list of functional requirements is generated and captured either in a 
requirements diagram or table. These requirements are then reviewed with stakeholder in order 
to receive concurrence on the final product. This review also ensures that the stakeholder needs 
are accurately addressed and traced to the functional requirements. 
Simulation Results 
The process above describes an overall method for developing the system specification 
and decomposing top-level requirements into functional system requirements. It is assumed that 
all required input artifacts have been completed from the previous activity diagrams prior to 
moving into the system specification process.  
System Specification Process Inputs 
Artifacts developed in the mission requirements generation phase and presented in the 
previous section are fed into the system specification process from the mission requirements 
generation. Mission requirements are used in the system specification process to refine and 
constrain system behavior and is ultimately traced directly to the functional requirements output. 
The system operational behavior is derived from the basic functionality expressed in the use 
case diagram and allocated to systems and sub-systems. As shown in Figure 17, functionality is 
traced to a mission requirement, enabling the support of system verification later. This analysis 
ensures that the system function requirements, which are generated from the behavior 
diagrams, are also traced back to a mission requirement. 
The stakeholder needs in Figure 11 are compared against the developed functional 
requirements of the SOI. This is the last step in the diagram and is performed to ensure that the 
functional requirements align and address the previously created stakeholder needs. The 
mission requirements and stakeholder needs are reviewed with the stakeholder prior to finishing 
the process.  
The BDD in Figure 19 shows the subsystems and properties of the overall external 
system MBPS. The MBPS system is decomposed into four subsystems: NPDM, NCRM, 
NDART, and MBPS workbench. Each subsystem contains parts, properties and data values. 
This detailed view of the external system assists in identifying potential integration points with 
the SOI. Figure 20 displays a free form diagram (FFD) of the six common/critical mission 
scenarios (functional behaviors) the black box is designed to perform. The FFD contextually 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 64 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
allows for the presentation of various behaviors along all structured nested diagrams for 
exhibition. Each mission scenario has at least one decomposed diagram for further depth and 
relational exploration. For example, the scenario for communicate data with internal systems 
has three nested diagrams tied to its structure. Those diagrams are a sequencing diagram for 
the internal systems automatic updates, an interaction diagram for the internal systems manual 
update, and an interaction diagram for the internal systems save new data. One of these 
behavior diagrams, “updating se data points/artifacts” can be seen in Figure 21. Each functional 
behavior has a developed diagram as an artifact in the mode.  
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Model Output Artifacts 
The interface diagram is shown in Figure 22. This diagram describes various interfaces 
between the SOI and external systems. In this case it is showing the SOI (DEE) and how it 
interfaces with the three external systems: DoDIN, MBPS, and SE Database. The diagram also 




Figure 22.   Interface Diagram. 
 
The culmination of all the collected system data is shown in Figure 23 as the system 
specification. The system specification is an overview of the data elements contained within the 
SOI system model. The system specification displays the architecture information, allocated 
behavior, stored data elements, constraints, MOEs, MOPs, parametric information, and other 
related data items captured with the system model development process. The final artifact 
produced by this process is a list of functional requirements as shown in Figure 24. The 
functional requirements describe how the SOI needs to perform. When developed through the 
described process, these requirements can be directly traced back to mission requirements and 
are validated against stakeholder needs. 
 
Figure 23. DEE System Specification 
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Three process diagrams were reviewed; each following actions are performed 
sequentially, which result in having documents/artifacts created that provide the necessary 
information to address an incoming capability. At the conclusion of these processes, the 
problem has been defined and analyzed, mission requirements are generated, and functional 
requirements are developed. All the artifacts provide a concrete strategy of what is needed to 
provide the command a strategy to address an incoming capability or what is known as scenario 
one. The stakeholders will be able to use these artifacts to clearly define a solution that details 
the necessary actions/steps to prepare the command for integrating a new capability.  
Within each process are additional artifacts that help further document system 
architecture, expected behavior, parametric diagrams for analyzing the solution, and identifying 
interfaces between existing systems and incoming external systems. Together the models fully 
define the problem and an associate solution to that problem. After this point, the command will 
be able to start implementing the identified solution.  
Section Summary 
This section presented three process diagrams that describe the necessary actions to 
produce the required artifacts for developing the conceptual system model. The processes were 
explained through expanded diagrams and step by step instructions of walking through each 
process. Input and output artifacts were developed using a simulation scenario and summarized 
with provided descriptions that relate their usage within the diagram. After completing all three 
processes, the sponsoring command should have a clear understanding of the problem and a 
strategy ready for implementation to address that problem. As stated earlier, this project will not 
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result in the creation of a physical system but will provide all information to allows for the 
creation of the solution. 
Model Findings 
Data Exchanges Between Domains 
Findings on the MBPS program’s capabilities shows that the program is implementing 
the AeroSpace and Defense Industries Association of Europe and Aerospace Industries 
Association (ASD/AIA) S-Series standards to regulate the data necessary for their suite of 
capability. Shown in Figure 25, the logistics support analysis (LSA) data structure is the 
standard database and supports the other specifications (ASD/AIA, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 25. In-Service Data Analysis Process as an Example of S3000L Feedback. Source: ASD/AIA 
(2018). 
 
The S3000L LSA database is built over the life cycle of the developed product and its 
development is supported by the import of engineering technical data. Figure 26 shows how the 
development of the database consumes and produces data for the development of the physical 
product. The LSA database is structured according to the S3000L extensible markup language 
(XML) schema presented in the standard. Therefore, any data exchanges between the 
database shall be supported by XML. Currently, some SysML tools support the importing and 
exporting of XML, but during the conversion some data, like SysML stereotypes, are lost or 
converted to its Unified Modeling Language (UML) equivalent (No Magic, Inc., n.d.). For 
example, shown in Figure 27, user capacity is stereotyped as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) 
within SysML. When converted to XML, the type is changed to a UML property of the Digital 
Engineering Environment (DEE) class, shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 26.   S3000L Data Exchanges. Source: ASD/AIA (2018). 
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Figure 27.   User Capacity MOE Specification in SysML 
 
 
Figure 28.   XML Data Table of User Capacity. 
The S-Series specifications developed an importable XML file that contains the S-Series 
data model as UML classes. Instance elements, as shown in Figure 29, can be developed 
within a system model to create supporting data elements. Current XML exporting features only 
allow for a total model export. Due to this limitation, an isolated model containing the instances 
would be needed to ensure only required data is exchanged between systems. The creating of 
instances is currently a full manual process, which creates a lot of work if the system model is 
developed using processes that utilizes SysML and tool or process-specific stereotypes. The 
mapping of SysML-specific data types to the S-Series UML data model could support the 
creation of a translator that would drastically cut down the conversion time. Further work and 
research are needed to develop a data map that is able to automatically convert data from a 
SysML system model into elements capable of being consumed and useful within the PS 
domain.  
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Useful Engineering Artifact Creation  
Artifacts Supporting Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) & S3000L 
The LSA database interacts with the engineering community to gather engineering 
technical data to support the definition of the LSA database and performance of the system LSA 
(ASD/AIA, 2014). Shown in Figure 30, the engineering data set supports the performance of 
different reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAM-S) analysis and reports. The 
data set is also stored in the database for future analysis iterations. 
 
 
Figure 30.   The Uses of Different Domain Data Sets for S3000L Processes. Source: ASD/AIA (2014). 
 
A program’s system model is not going to contain the entirety of the required data sets. 
However, the data can be useful early in a program’s life cycle, when engineering drawings or 
three-dimensional models do not yet exist. For example, early level-of-repair analyzes are 
derived from the supportability failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which is derived from 
engineering inputs as shown in Figure 31 (ASD/AIA, 2014). When done correctly, a system 
model can be configured to output the elements required for these inputs, as shown in Figure 32 
and Figure 33. Iterated over all the identified failure modes, a full FMEA can be developed in a 
SysML tool. Similar tables and diagrams can be created for other engineering analysis to be 
imported into the LSA database from the system modeling tool.  
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Figure 32. Example of Functional Design FMEA within the System Modeling Tool. 
 
 
Figure 33. FMEA BDD within System Modeling Tool. 
 
Model-Based Documentation Generation 
Organizations will still require and benefit from creating documents throughout the SE 
process. A model-based documentation generation process can be utilized to extract model 
information and integrate it with current documentation templates to be supplemented with text, 
as shown in Figure 34. Currently, SysML tools allows for the automatic generation of reports 
based on an uploaded template. Once the template (*.docx file) has been configured with the 
correct dynamic code identifying where to find the correct model information, the user can 
generate reports based on that template. Shown in Figure 34, the capstone team developed a 
model-based document from a concept of operations (CONOPS) template using the velocity 
template language (VTL) to constrain which information is to be presented (Department of 
Veteran Affairs, n.d.). Using the stakeholder viewpoints developed early in the system model 
process, the modeler can present important stakeholder information in ways that is familiar and 
understood by the stakeholder without the need of understanding how to use and navigate 
through a new tool. For a command wanting to implement MBSE, it is recommended to build a 
library of VTL configured documents that enable the production of model-based documentation. 
To accomplish this, it is also recommended that a standard modeling format or a modeling style-
guide be developed to enable the reuse of the model-based documents.  
 
Figure 34.   High-Level Concept of Generating Model-Based Documents from the System Model. 
Section Summary 
This section discussed pertinent findings related to the interactions between the MBSE 
framework and exterior environments. Utilization of the of the XML schema, as defined by the S-
series specification, allows for an MBSE elements to be exported for use in alternate 
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applications. Three instances of export use were discussed, beginning with the prospect of a 
direct interface between the model-based product support and digital engineering domains that 
can be structured to facilitate express data exchange. Second, the export of data and 
information from MBSE diagrams can be translated to a structure of artifacts that support 
S3000L LSA database entries. The creation of and/or modification to data elements would be 
enabled by XML data transfers. Lastly, the MBSE framework can be coupled with document 
templates to construct documentation utilized by traditional SE methods, such as the 
development of a CONOPS document using a predefined template. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
A Summary of Project Objectives 
This capstone object was to develop a formal process using SE methodologies to 
develop a conceptual system model and compile a report that explaining our development 
efforts, findings and conclusions from simulations and research, and recommendations for 
future work. This section summarizes the major findings that support the project objectives. It 
also includes insights that emerged and recommendations for future work. 
Defining, Developing, and Importance of the System Model 
The process proposed utilizes a tailored approached based on the object-oriented 
system engineering methodology (OOSEM) and the systems modeling language (SysML) to 
capture system modeling data into a system model. A proposed conceptual system data model 
is shown in Figure 35. The center of the system model is the SOI. The SOI of the system model 
acts as a piece of the digital twin, containing the architecture, behavior, requirements, and 
verification and validation models.  
 
 
Figure 35. Proposed Conceptual System Data Model. 
 
Over time, it would be expected that the attributes within the data model would remain 
constant but the level of detail of the presented information would change. For example, shown 
in Figure 36, activities of systems and subsystems are created at the conceptual level. Once 
more information about the desired capabilities of the SOI are known, the modeler can provide a 
logical definition to how the conceptual behavior is performed. In the selected scenario, the 
capability of one of the subsystems is the ability to communicate data developed within the 
environment to external databases. From the modeler’s understanding of the current conceptual 
system architecture, contextual system of systems (SoS) architecture and public information of 
system-to-system data exchanges a logical definition allocated to the system architecture can 
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be formed. It would be up to the development team to further define these interactions at the 
physical level once the physical architecture is defined. As to the example, this would include 
the addition of computer coding that demonstrates how each interaction is performed. A block 
containing the coding information within SysML would be allocated to the signals displayed on 
the logical sequence diagram shown in Figure 36. Some SysML tools can auto generate a 
model from code developed outside of the tool, where inner model elements can then be related 
to different elements within the developed system model (Dassault Systems, n.d.).  
 
 
Figure 36. Transformation of a Conceptual Action into a Logical Sequence of Signals 
 
Establishing relationships and traceability between elements within the systems model 
during design and development is critical for the reusability of the systems model throughout the 
rest of the system’s life cycle (Friedenthal et al., 2012, pp. 349–352). System models developed 
using SysML can be used throughout system sustainment to support different changes to the 
system, including changes to design, mission, and maintenance procedures. For this to occur, a 
strong interoperability with the information technology (IT) systems in the PS domain is required. 
Data captured within the system model has the capability of being transformed into a 
presentation graphic that could be shown to stakeholders to display the data in a way that is 
understandable. This capability of presenting model-critical data to decision-makers is critical to 
ensure the design meets expectations (DoD, 2018). Generating documents using models does 
not necessarily mean that the developed templates used within an organization are useless. 
Demonstrated in this capstone, SysML tools can utilize an organization’s templates, as built, 
configure it to enable the document to collect model presentation artifacts, and embed them with 
the specified document area. Further developed could lead to auto generation of required 
programmatic documentation from the system model. 
Conclusions 
As systems are becoming more complex and more constrained, processes are going to 
have to become more streamlined. The MBSE stakeholders at the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) assigned the capstone group with the objectives 
to provide methods that would bring MBSE concepts to the command. From early research, it 
was determined that MBSE is early in its conceptualization with few processes being 
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implemented across the Naval enterprise. The capstone provided a proposed workflow that was 
designed to be independent of a single system modeling tool and capable of developing a 
conceptual system model and a partial logical system model. The capstone used SysML to 
capture and present the modeling data, but the verbiage inside the workflow was presented in a 
way that another modeling language (UML, LML, etc.) could be used.  
The stakeholders at NSWC PHD were also interested in learning about how an MBSE 
environment would integrate with another currently occurring digital transformation, the logistics 
IT (LOG IT) transformation. Data sharing is a major concern and an objective of the 
implementation of MBSE. With the current toolset and understanding of the systems within the 
LOG IT, out of the box data configurations would need to be translated in a suitable format in 
order to be usefully communicated across the domain. The MBPS program has established that 
their program would be setting up an LSA database based on the S3000L specification and an 
XML schema. Current importing and exporting capabilities in SysML limit the amount of data 
that can be converted and will convert all unmapped sources of data to its UML equivalent. The 
loss of data is not satisfactory, but information and artifacts useful to other domains could be 
created using instance elements within SysML and the UML classes that were developed by the 
S-Series specification authors. The data needed to be communicated can be exported to an 
isolated model, converted into an XML file, and consumed by the external MBPS system to 
develop analysis artifacts within its system. 
Model generated documents can be utilized by programs to develop programmatic 
documentation from their model. A template of a CONOPS was discovered by the capstone 
team through the public domain, configured using VTL, and uploaded to the selected SysML 
tool to generate a report with the developed system model artifacts from the process simulation. 
Any template can be configured and uploaded if it is a supported format and could be a very 
useful tool to present system model data to different stakeholders. 
Recommendations 
It has been identified that the artifacts and findings developed from this capstone are not 
as mature as they could be. The developed process had completed a single simulation 
developed for this capstone to present potential outputs, but more research and implementation 
are needed to verify and validate this existing process. The process’s implementation in pilot 
programs can help identify any unaccounted-for gaps and allowing for updates. 
The process also does not consider the data developed during more detailed design 
efforts, including a majority of the logical and the physical architecture. The introduction of 
computer aided drawings (CAD), computer aided manufacturing (CAM), computer aided 
software engineering (CASE), finite element analysis (FEA), and other computer aided 
simulation artifacts could help support further definition of the system model but further research 
on this implementation is needed. 
The conversion of instances supported in SysML to XML were mostly manual, and since 
the XML data format is in place to be the format of choice for existing systems, it would be of 
interest to look for ways to automate the data conversion and transmission. The process 
outlined in this capstone for conversion can support this automated process. Development of a 
standard system data model completed with data mappings to the S3000L XML data structure 
is the logical next step to automating the process. It is theorized then plug-in software or 
middleware could be developed that supports and automates XML conversion. 
With the increase in interest of studying system of systems (SoS), SoS engineering, and 
SoS modeling, researching the effect of SoS concepts have on the development of a system 
model could be of interest to many stakeholders. Capability gaps could be produced from 
emerging capabilities within the SoS, signaling a need for a solution and the start to the 
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capstone’s developed process. This fact was not considered, but its effect and further iterations 
of the process should include research into how the implementation of SoS modeling could 
affect the process. The system model development process did consider that building a new 
system is not always the best choice and some solutions require updates or refreshes to 
existing systems, but the process is currently incomplete and lacks simulation results. Further 
development of the process to include system changes and refreshes is recommended for 
future project work  
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Dr. Roshanak Nilchiani—Stevens Institute of Technology [rnilchia@stevens.edu  
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Abstract 
The study of “-ilities” in systems engineering has been fundamentally connected to the evaluation 
of system complexity in recent years. Complexity has been inherent in all defense acquisition 
programs where technology and human organizations interface. Complexity can be inherent in 
design of a defense system/System-of-systems, at the organizational layers of defense systems, 
and in the environment, every now and then imposing its unpredictability or non-linearity to an 
acquisition program. Increased knowledge and understanding of defense systems complexity can 
shed light on some various unknown and emergent behavior of such systems, as well as guiding 
us to better solution sets when facing major decisions or challenges. 
The goal of our research is to identify, formulate, and model complexity in technical segment of 
defense acquisition programs, as the increased level of complexity contributes to increased fragility 
and potential failure of the system. In another word, complexity measure is an indirect measure of 
risk in complex systems. The future direction of our research aims at replacing a large portion of 
subject matter experts’ opinions on technical systems risk assessment, with actual complex risk 
measures and therefore improve the decision-making process more objective. 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition programs are essential and fundamental to the goals of the United 
States in terms of defense and peace-keeping activities. The 2016 report on Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System states that long-time issues such as large cost growth, heavy 
changes in requirements, and responsiveness in initiating new programs, which have been 
addressed in years of research in acquisition management, are now under control (Kendall, 
2016). The same report warns future leaders to not neglect system “-ilities” when evaluating a 
system, claiming that well-engineered systems are more often effective. Reliability, availability, 
and maintainability are prerequisites to the system performing its function (Kendall, 2016). 
The study of “-ilities” in systems engineering has been fundamentally connected to the 
evaluation of system complexity in recent years (Enos et al., 2019; Fischi et al., 2017; Pugliese 
et al., 2018; Pugliese & Nilchiani, 2017; Salado & Nilchiani, 2013). Complexity has been inherent 
to defense acquisition programs where technology and human organizations interface. 
Complexity can be inherent to design of a defense system/system-of-systems, at the 
organizational layers of defense systems, and in the environment, occasionally imposing its 
unpredictability or non-linearity to an acquisition program. System “-ilities” such as flexibility, 
reliability, modularity, etc. are most successful when they are embedded in large-scale programs 
where a fundamental understanding of the complex structure and behavior of such systems 
exists. Therefore, it is necessary and urgent to better understand, model, measure, and formulate 
such defense programs considering their complex behavior. Increased knowledge and 
understanding of defense systems complexity can shed light on various unknown and emergent 
behavior of such systems, as well as guide us to better solution sets when facing major decisions 
or challenges. 
The goal of our research is to identify, formulate, and model complexity in technical 
segments of defense acquisition programs, as the heightened level of complexity contributes to 
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increased fragility and potential failure of the system. In other words, complexity measure is an 
indirect measure of risk in complex systems. The future direction of our research aims at replacing 
a large portion of subject matter experts’ opinions on technical systems risk assessment with 
actual complex risk measures and therefore improve the decision-making process by enabling it 
to be more objective. 
In software systems, complexity can be defined as “a measure of the resources expended 
by a system while interacting with a piece of software to perform a given task” (Basili, 1980). From 
this general definition many can be derived depending on the choice of the specific system 
interacting with the software under study (Mens, 2016). If the interacting system is a computer, 
we are looking at theoretical complexity, which can be of two types: algorithmic complexity, if the 
focus is on the time and storage space required to execute the computation, or computational 
complexity, if the focus is on the complexity of the problem at hand, regardless of the algorithm 
used to solve it. Efficient algorithms will have an algorithmic complexity that is close to the 
computational complexity of the problem at hand (Mens, 2016). If the interacting system is the 
user of the software system, then the corresponding complexity is complexity of use, usually 
referred to as a common system characteristic: usability (Mens, 2016). If the interacting system 
is a software developer, the type of complexity is structural complexity (Darcy et al., 2005). 
Software structural complexity focuses on the software architecture, defined as the 
organization of the components of the software and how they relate to each other. A structural 
complexity analysis is performed by looking at the source code of the software under study, and 
is therefore dependent on the programming language and on a specific implementation of the 
solution. Depending on the level of granularity at which the software is analyzed, this static 
analysis, as it is also known among computer scientists, can consider as atomic units of the 
system the modules or files, inner constructs, such as classes and functions, or single 
instructions. A finer level of granularity can lead to a more detailed understanding of the 
dependencies, but requires the software to be completed before this analysis can be carried out. 
Literature Review and State of the Research 
When looking at software architecture (SA) in its general form and where the architectural 
aspects originated from, the history shows that the first approaches that are now all combined in 
SA can be traced back all the way to the early 1970s. Especially over the last 30 years, software 
architecture emerged as an important field for both research and practice (Shahin et al., 2014). 
On a general level, SA can be defined as the representation and definition of software and the 
software system. Such a representation includes descriptive elements which cover the 
relationships between elements and sub-elements (Angelov et al., 2009; Avci et al., 2020; Garlan 
& Shaw, 1993). 
Early on in the 1960s and 1970s, research emerged that addressed data and data 
structures, which lead to an accentuation of certain structural elements above the level of the 
software code itself. This accentuation led to an abstraction and organizational understanding, 
and as a result, software architecture emerged in the following decades (Garlan & Shaw, 1993). 
The first appearances and mentions of SA can be found in the publication of Parnas in 1972. In 
this work, the author described the concept behind the module decomposition structure. 
Specifically, Parnas describes criteria that can be used to decompose the structure of systems 
into modules. Throughout the 1970s, Parnas published various other papers that outlined 
additional aspects of structures, and over time, the field of SA progressed and more nuances 
were added to differentiate between various forms of structures (Bass et al., 2012). 
From the aforementioned time till around 1990, architecture in scientific fields was mostly 
related to systems (Kruchten et al., 2006). Yet, SA as a separate discipline in research and 
science emerged in the 1990s (Kruchten et al., 2006; Perry & Wolf, 2000) and has been flourishing 
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since then, also including empirical research approaches (Qureshi et al., 2013). The first book 
about SA was also published during these beginning times in 1994 (Witt et al., 1994). 
Because of the pace increase, numerous approaches were developed in the 1990s in 
academia but also by companies, such as Lockheed Martin and IBM. Kruchten et al. (2006) lists 
various approaches that resulted from these efforts: Software Architecture Analysis Method 
(Kazman et al., 1994), the 4+1 view (Kruchten, 1995), Siemens’s four views (Soni et al., 1995), 
and numerous other patterns that address the design of SA (Buschmann et al., 1996) as well as 
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs; Shaw & Clements, 2006). 
Building upon the momentum, more companies started to participate in SA and its 
methodologies since the beginning of the third millennium. Two notable approaches for general 
architecture were standardized to unify certain efforts: RM-ODP (ISO/IEC, 1995; Linington, 1995; 
Putman, 2000) and IEEE 1471 (IEEE, 2000). Overall, a lot of pre-made platforms and 
architectures ready to use have been developed and are today available. Open-source software 
adds to this abundance. It is thus safe to say that SA has reached what Shaw and Clements 
(2006) describe as “popularization.” Therefore, new trends and explorations also must be 
considered since they are a natural continuation of the described state. 
Looking at the last 5 years, a few trends in SA emerge that are currently being pursued. 
The first of these trends is cloud and service related and addresses the question how SA is 
connected to such fields and how it can be utilized (Amal et al., 2018; Bahsoon et al., 2017; 
Hästbacka et al., 2019; Malavolta & Capilla, 2017). Second, a focus on intelligent architecture can 
be seen, which introduces topics such as machine learning into the field of SA and enables 
phenomena such as emergent architectures that only appear during runtime and are not pre-
managed or set (Woods, 2016). This trend also increases the reliance of SA on data and 
algorithms, which will require rethinking of previously mentioned approaches, such as the 4+1 
View, which did not originally include any views for data or underlying information (Kruchten, 
1995; Woods, 2016). Third, also related to the previous one, the use of SA in agile environments 
has become more and more important and has thus moved into the focus of research as well 
(Dingsøyr et al., 2018; Venters et al., 2018). Agile and SA propose different viewpoints with the 
former advocating for flexible as well as iterative implementation of changes and the latter 
standing for fundamental decisions that might even be deferred until they can be made in the 
most informed manner if they are not already defined up front (Dingsøyr et al., 2018; Hasselbring, 
2018). Hence, the integration of architecture into agile environments has been seen as a trend as 
well (Dingsøyr et al., 2018). Lastly, a focus on sustainability also in relation to longevity and 
scalability can be seen. Since scalability can be an issue with integrated databases due to their 
high coherence (Hasselbring, 2002), the applicability and longevity of SAs can become 
problematic if they are tightly vertically integrated. Thus, approaches such as Microservices 
(Francesco et al., 2017; Newman, 2015; Taibi et al., 2017) and other solutions to these problems 
(Capilla et al., 2017), which then also address sustainability (Cabot et al., 2019; Venters et al., 
2018), are being pursued. 
Lastly, for the research at hand, a categorization approach and characterization within SA 
is critical to allow for a methodological analysis. Thus, the most frequently used and applied 
structures were researched and are described hereinafter. On an overarching level, structures in 
SA can be seen as threefold (Bass et al., 2012): decomposition structure, use structure, and class 
structure. Each of these three categories can again be subdivided into more nuanced categories, 
but such detailed subdivisions can be strongly dependent on the case of application. Thus, for 
the work at hand, three of the subcategories of the module structure shall be outlined as they are 
directly related to the research presented as depicted in Figure 1: decomposition structure, use 
structure, and class structure. 
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Figure 1. Classification of Relevant Architectural Structures for Software Systems 
In this paper we analyze the source code of an open-source Python library, Snorkel. This 
is a static analysis that focuses on the module structure. In particular, the codebase is parsed to 
generate a class structure, which includes details about modules, classes, and methods. A series 
of relationships between these entities allow us to define a particular case of a use structure, 
which will be used as the basis of the static analysis. 
Methodology 
This paper presents a static analysis of the source code of a software package developed 
using the Python 3 programming language. The source code is parsed using the Abstract Syntax 
Tree (AST) module in the Python Standard Library. This module is based on the parser used in 
the native Python compiler and is continuously updated with any grammar change in the 
language. This parsing process leads to the creation of a graph where functions and classes are 
nodes and inheritance and functional calls are edges. 
The resulting graph is known as a module dependency graph and has been a subject of 
a number of graph-theoretical research efforts (MacCormack et al., 2006). The module 
dependency graph is a particular case of a use structure. In this research, the module dependency 
graph will be analyzed with a series of complexity metrics based on the eigenvalues of various 
representations of the graph (Pugliese & Nilchiani, 2019). These metrics are based on other 
metrics, such as graph energy (Gutman, 2001) and natural connectivity (Jun et al., 2010). 
The module dependency graph is built using an ad hoc model of Python objects and 
interdependencies. This version introduces function-level granularity, from file-level of the 
previous one, and is based on the Python AST module instead of simply parsing the code. The 
graph is built using the following rules: 
• A file that imports code from another file is dependent on that file. 
• A class that inherits from another class is dependent on that class. 
• A function that calls another function is dependent on that function. 
• A file that contains a class is dependent on that class. 
• A file that contains a function is dependent on that function. 
• A class that contains a function is dependent on that function. 
Figure 2 shows the types of dependencies among the elements of the graph. 
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Figure 2. Types of Dependencies Among Graph Elements 
 
The analysis of the module dependency graph is carried out using a set of spectral 
complexity metrics developed by our research group and represented using the following formula: 






where 𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥,𝑔𝑔1(𝑦𝑦) = |𝑦𝑦|,𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥) = ln 𝑥𝑥 ,𝑔𝑔2(𝑦𝑦) = 𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦 are the possible values for the functions 𝑓𝑓 
and 𝑔𝑔, the coefficient 𝛾𝛾 can be 𝛾𝛾1 = 1,𝛾𝛾2 = 𝑛𝑛−1, and the matrix representation of the graph can 
be either 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀2 = 𝐿𝐿,𝑀𝑀3 = ℒ, which have been defined in our previous publication (Nilchiani 
& Pugliese, 2016). 
Table 1 shows the metrics that can be derived from this formula through combinations of 
the described parameters. Two sets of functions, two values for the coefficient 𝛾𝛾, and three 
matrices yield 12 possible metrics. Throughout this paper, the metrics are referred to using 
acronyms: graph energy (GE), Laplacian graph energy (LGE), normalized Laplacian graph energy 
(NLGE), natural connectivity (NC), Laplacian natural connectivity (LNC), normalized Laplacian 
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Results 
This section presents the results of analysis on the module dependency graph for the 
Snorkel project published on GitHub. The project was selected due to its relatively small size of 
~2,600 commits and less than 300MB of code as of March 2021, which allows us to run our 
analytical programs on a laptop. The number of contributors (50), the history of commits, and the 
prevalence of Python code were other attributes that affected this choice. Future and optimized 
versions of the code will aim at analyzing larger codebases. 
The evolution of the graph at indicated time stamps is depicted in Figure 3. In these plots, 
the nodes are colored according to their type: file (blue), library (black), class (red), and 
function/method (green). These images suggest how even a relatively small project, such as 
Snorkel, can become eminently complex to manage and architect. 
  
Table 1. Twelve Examples of Spectral Structural Complexity Metrics 
 
Adjacency Matrix Laplacian Matrix Normalized Laplacian Matrix 
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Figure 3. Evolution of the Module Dependency Graph at Select Points in Time for the Snorkel Project. 
Snapshots are taken at intervals of approximately 530 commits. 
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Linear Correlation Analysis 
A linear correlation analysis of the metrics is described hereinafter. Using the Pearson 
correlation coefficient (r), it is possible to see if any of the metrics evaluated for the dependency 
graph are linearly co-dependent. These dependencies can provide insights regarding 
characteristics of the Snorkel code base. 
As shown in Figure 4, the following group of metrics show 𝑡𝑡 > .99 in all pairwise comparisons: 
GE, LGE, NLGE, n, m. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of GE, LGE, NLGE, Number of Nodes, and Number of Edges 
 
The linearity between number of nodes (𝑛𝑛) and number of edges (𝑚𝑚) can be seen as a 
symptom of localized development. The addition of a module to the source code is followed by 
the connection of this module to one or more others. If for each additional module a low number 
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of connections are made, it means that the module is only being used in that specific part of the 
code. While a percentage of additions are justifiably of this type, most modules might also be 
reused in other locations and therefore should create more additional connections. A long-lasting 
linear relationship between 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑚𝑚 suggests a need for refactoring. 
The linear relationship between GE and LGE is common in graphs with a close to uniform 
distribution of node degrees. In star graphs, GE would grow superlinearly with the number of 
nodes while LGE’s behavior would converge to linear. The dissimilarity between the current 
dependency graphs and graphs with highly skewed distribution of node degrees is also seen in 
NLGE, which would be zero for star graphs. 
Figure 5 shows a linear relationship (𝑡𝑡 > .99) in three pairwise comparisons between LNC, 
LNCn, and the maximum node degree. A linearity between LNC and LNCn is a characteristic of 
star graphs and wheel graphs. For graphs with more uniform degree distribution, the value of 
LNCn plateaus quickly with the number of nodes, while LNC’s growth slows down more gently. 
This result is in contrast with the insights found in Figure 4, and adds a new research question 
regarding the relationship between these metrics and fundamental graph characteristics. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of LNC, LNCn, and Maximum Node Degree 
The linear relationships of LNC and LNCn with the maximum node degree of the graph 
indicate that these metrics are connected to the size of the largest hub in the graph. This linearity 
is also found in star graphs, while in complete graphs, where there are no hubs by definition, and 
each node is equivalent to all the others, LNC would grow with a descending rate, and LNCn 
would plateau asymptotically towards 1. 
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Figure 6. Comparison of Uncorrelated Metrics 
Figure 6 shows the pairwise comparisons of all the metrics that do not present a clear 
linear correlation in the Snorkel code base. Some of these relationships are planned to be 
analyzed in subsequent research efforts, but an effort in narrowing the pool of metrics and towards 
a more purposeful metric design will be necessary to measure meaningful characteristics of 
software architectures. 
Trends Over Time 
The linear correlation analysis allows the connection of different metrics, in an effort to 
characterize the topology of the dependency graph. The actual development and creation of the 
codebase over the 5-year period can be analyzed by plotting some of these metrics over time. 
The evolution of the dependency graph presented in Figure 3 is depicted by the values of four of 
the metrics shown in Figure 7: GE, NC, GEn, and NCn. 
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Figure 7. Trends for GE, NC, GEn, and NCn Over 6 Years of Project Development 
Figure 7 presents a series of time plots for this select subset of metrics. For each metric, 
the green shaded area represents the frequency of commits in the project at a specific point in 
time. This frequency is not connected to the values on the y-axis. The plots show that the 
development of the project was very active in 2016 and 2017, with a smaller spike of activity in 
2019, when, according to the commits, the project underwent a small overhaul, with frequent 
additions and removals of code. This allows us to better contextualize the changes in each metric 
and see how they react when the codebase is changed. 
Graph energy (GE) quickly rises during the initial development, and fluctuates significantly 
during the overhaul, only to settle at essentially the same level afterwards. Natural connectivity 
(NC), on the other hand, rises also after the overhaul, suggesting that the changes made to the 
codebase in 2019 increased the cohesion of the whole project, without unnecessarily increasing 
coupling. 
The comparison between GE and GEn shows the effect of the normalization factor 𝛾𝛾 = 1
𝑛𝑛
, 
which was introduced to allow a comparison of graphs of different size (number of nodes). In this 
case, this normalization affects GEn to the point that the metric only seems to capture the 
frequency of the commits, and not the growth of the graph (as expected). This behavior is not the 
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Conclusion 
This paper presented a methodology to study the behavior of complex software systems 
in terms of their structural complexity with a focus on the modifiability of the code base. This 
approach is based on the parsing of the code and the creation of a dependency graph, a particular 
case of architectural structure that focuses on the dependency between software modules and 
the various ways they can call each other. 
The dependency graph has been analyzed through the evaluation of a series of spectral 
metrics, which have shed light on some characteristics of the graph and given insights on the 
quality of the development effort. It is important to note that this approach forgoes the analysis of 
the actual lines of code and the dynamic effects that they will have at runtime and is therefore to 
be considered limited in scope and applicability. 
In parallel to this analysis being carried out, the behavior of each metric is also being 
discovered, thus bootstrapping their applicability to the metrics. Behind the scenes, the metrics 
have been applied to conventional graphs, but the use case of a real software project is necessary 
to gauge the limitations of this approach. 
Future research will continue the effort of connecting these and other metrics to important 
attributes of software code bases. Improvements to our own software tools will allow for analysis 
of projects with larger repositories, and with a longer development time frame, where the effects 
of technical debt might be more pronounced. Additional improvements are also planned for the 
visual representation of modifiability in software systems. 
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Abstract 
This concept paper explores an innovative approach to detecting and managing software 
vulnerabilities in cyber-physical defense systems. Software-based vulnerabilities that hinder or 
preclude the maintainability and evolvability of combat systems are a pernicious form of technical 
debt that threaten all cyber-physical systems. The risks associated with technical debt across 
increasingly interdependent DoD cyber-physical systems will accelerate if left unchecked. Without 
changes in acquisition and maintenance practices, we can foresee cascading, potentially 
catastrophic cross-system failures. To illustrate the risk and possible solutions, we focus on the 
software embedded in combat systems that are subject to ongoing modernization efforts that 
extend their applicability to evolving operations. Our research revealed that software 
vulnerabilities in critical combat systems can threaten the reliability and readiness of those 
systems. These vulnerabilities provide an opportunity for the defense acquisition communities to 
create a new capability within their organizations, an Acquisition Technical Debt Team (ATDT) to 
help detect, manage, and mitigate technical debt. We explore risk classification by including 
interoperability into risk evaluation schemas. We then apply common distressed debt 
management models to suggest when and how the ATDT might help manage and mitigate 
technical debt to help rehabilitate an ailing system.  
Introduction 
Over the past 60 years the Navy’s critical combat, command, control, and 
communications systems have evolved into software-dependent technological ecosystems that 
combine weapon, communication, and detection systems. These cyber-physical systems rely 
on the tight coupling of computational and physical processes to create responsive, timely, 
accurate, and lethal deterrence capabilities. This coupling creates management challenges 
throughout a system’s life cycle. Physical defense systems are designed over multiple years, 
maintained for decades, and periodically re-engineered to meet evolving operational 
requirements. Modern software systems rely on adaptive development cycles to meet evolving 
cybersecurity, technical, operational, and interoperability changes. Legacy software in critical, 
networked defense systems can pose an increasing risk to the systems and the warfighters who 
rely on them. Modernization requirements for both the hardware and software often introduce 
further misalignments and vulnerabilities. Software incompatibilities, diminished systems 
interoperability, and direct cyberattacks are a few of the risks that system maintainers must 
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mitigate to ensure combat system readiness. These software vulnerabilities, commonly known 
as technical debt, arise throughout the life cycle of the system and are mostly due to trade-offs 
made to meet time, cost, and capability requirements.  
Technical debt is a software engineering term that characterizes the design or 
implementation trade-offs taken to meet short-term business and development requirements 
that create barriers to future changes, including the maintainability and evolvability of the 
system; it can make these future changes more costly or impossible (Krutchen, 2019, p. 5). The 
technical debt landscape depicts the software elements that contribute to evolution and 
maintenance challenges (see Figure 1). Combat systems interoperability requirements can 
occur at any time in the software’s life cycle and primarily impact the software’s internal, 
invisible, elements. Furthermore, networked warfare systems may be susceptible to software 
vulnerabilities that occur in one combat component but permeate across the network.  
 
Figure 1: The technical debt landscape depicts the visible and invisible software elements that contribute 
to evolution and quality challenges. 
(Kruchten, 2012, p. 19) 
The interdependence of cyber-physical combat systems and their need to function and 
adapt to changing environmental conditions and operational requirements led us to wonder if 
the methods used for dealing with technical debt in the private sector were adequate for 
managing technical debt for weapon systems. Our research surveyed current practices in 
technical debt detection, classification, and management in the private and public sectors 
through a literature review. We augmented this overview with discussions with software 
scientists, combat system engineers, and military leaders regarding current practices and 
challenges of managing technical debt in combat systems. The research questions were: 1) 
What methods are being used to detect, assess, monitor, and mitigate technical debt, and 
realign/re-introduce refactored code into existing systems; and 2) What program management 
practices can best meet the time and technical demands of maintaining platform reliability while 
addressing complex, embedded software reliability issues?  
This paper is organized into the following sections: 1) a brief review of the impact of 
poor- quality software and technical debt on the U.S. and world economies; 2) a literature 
review of technical debt practices and concerns; 3) an overview of the challenges of maintaining 
weapon systems while managing technical debt; 4) exploration of a technical debt program 
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Technical Debt Impact 
The Consortium for Information and Software Quality (CISQ) reported that in 2018 the 
cost of poor software quality (CPSQ) in the United States was $2.26 trillion and the future 
(deferred) estimated cost of technical debt was $580 billion. They estimate that $635 billion was 
spent on legacy systems. The top five global IT failures in the news in 2018 were Wells Fargo 
Bank, PSA Airlines, Uber Technologies, TSB Bank, and Welsh NHS IT (Krasner, 2019). The 
CISQ report for 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic, reported the CPSQ in the United States 
was $2.08 trillion and the future (deferred) estimated cost of technical debt was $1.31 trillion 
residing in severe defects that need to be addressed in the future. They estimate that $520 
billion was spent on legacy systems. The top five global IT failures in the news in 2020 were 
Home Depot, Iowa Caucus Smartphone app, NASA/Boeing Starliner, Heathrow Airport 
disruption, and the Google Plus Security glitch. The majority of the costs were aggregated from 
publicly available source material on the cost of poor software. However, most IT and software 
organizations do not currently collect cost of software quality data, making these figures an 
underestimate of the actual costs (Krasner, 2021).  
The CISQ 2020 CPSQ report estimated that worldwide cybercrime will cost companies 
an estimated $6 trillion annually by 2021. They conclude that software vulnerabilities across the 
IT industries in the United States are creating a fertile environment for cybercrime. The three 
cost contributors to this exploitable environment are $260 billion spent on unsuccessful projects 
($177.5 billion in 2018), $520 billion on legacy system problems ($635 billion in 2018), and 
$1.56 trillion spent on software failures in operational systems. Given that there could be 
overlap between legacy problems and operational failures, the report reduces legacy system 
failures by 50% and concludes with a total estimate of $2.08 trillion in U.S. CPSQ for 2020 
(Krasner, 2021, p. 24).  
Technical Debt Practices, and Concerns 
The results of our research revealed that IT professionals and academics across the 
public and private sectors are actively working to identify, assess, mitigate, and manage 
software technical debt. Technical debt vulnerabilities can be introduced at any time in the 
software life cycle and across the technical debt landscape (see Figure 1). A meta-study of 94 
technical debt research studies conducted from 1992 through 2013 identified 10 technical debt 
types, eight technical debt management activities, and 29 tools for technical debt management 
(Li, 2015).  
The Object Management Group (OMG), an international technology standards 
consortium, has developed an automated technical debt measurement (ATDM) tool to measure 
source code reliability, security, performance efficiency, and maintainability and then create a 
time estimate for remediations of the found weaknesses to help guide corrective actions (OMG, 
2017). Early efforts that use machine learning methods to detect technical debt through natural 
language processing (Rantala, 2020) and forecasting for technical debt evolution through the 
use of linear Regularization models and non-linear Random Forest regression (Tsoukalas, 
2020) are producing encouraging results.  
Federal IT professionals report that technical debt directly impacts their mission by 
limiting the speed with which new functionality can be delivered. The complexity of the code 
base makes it more difficult and time consuming to modernize and increases the probability that 
additional technical debt will be injected into software (Curtis, 2018). There is a growing concern 
that modernizing or developing software capabilities by using machine learning for prediction or 
other functions, though cost effective, introduces more complicated, hidden, and rapidly 
accumulating technical debt vulnerabilities into the system. Software engineers at Google, Inc., 
warn that machine learning integrated into a system’s design can result in specific risk factors 
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that include boundary erosion, entanglement, hidden feedback loops, undeclared consumers, 
data dependencies, configuration issues, changes in the external world, and system-level anti-
patterns (Sculley, 2015). 
For the Department of Defense (DoD), technical debt is complicated by a spectrum of 
requirements including specialized combat systems, extreme and changing environmental 
conditions, changing adversarial requirements, changing operation plans, longevity 
expectations, spending requirements, contractual agreements, and legal constraints. Military 
missions often require an array of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components for software 
and hardware modification. COTS requirements add another layer of complexity to technical 
debt due to system requirements differing from COTS capabilities. COTS and system 
mismatches include functional, performance, interoperability, configuration problems across 
versions, documentation, COTS evolution limits, interface differences, and COTS longevity 
maps. COTS requirements add additional technical debt detection and sustainment needs 
(Yang, 2018).  
Technical debt can result in vulnerabilities that can be exploited through a cyberattack. 
Weapon systems are cyber-physical systems of systems that are networked and rely on 
software integration and interoperability to perform critical functions. As the systems become 
more software interdependent and complex, the probability of cyberattacks increases. As 
weapon systems become more lethal, the need for sophisticated and trustworthy cybersecurity 
systems becomes more imperative (Chaplain, 2018).  
Managing Combat Systems and Technical Debt 
Our discussions with U.S. Navy leaders, software engineers, weapon systems 
engineers, and combat system maintainers revealed that they have been managing and 
working around technical debt issues for decades. Due to the specialized nature of weapons 
and weapon systems, many of their programs were early adopters of cyber-physical integration 
and have been in the forefront of developing these capabilities. Continual hardware and 
software modernization has resulted in complicated middleware processes to ensure 
interoperability across multiple systems. The need for increased capabilities without 
modernizing legacy code can create internal complexities and increase the probability of 
accruing additional technical debt. Sophisticated development and testing capabilities have 
been devised to maintain reliability and adaptability. Software architecture is a key component 
to interoperability, usability, and adaptability. Technical debt assessment needs to be broken 
down by components and interoperability patterns. 
Systems routinely undergo risk assessments and are scheduled for maintenance based 
on a standard risk scale that measures the severity against the likelihood of the risk. Technical 
debt may accrue because the assessed risk falls below the critical mark. Maintainers need a 
way to communicate the need for technical debt mitigation to program managers before 
functional or interoperability risks become critical.  
Maintenance and management of complex, integrated, and interoperable weapon 
systems suffer from technical and organizational constraints. Dealing with complex system 
interoperability issues across different generations of weapon systems is complicated, time 
consuming, and expensive. The acquisition requirements for meeting scope, cost, and time 
parameters are often in conflict with the realities of managing and mitigating legacy system 
technical debt.  
In summary, cyber-physical combat systems represent a special case of technical debt 
that falls outside of many public and private sector requirements. Their customized builds and 
configurations, the complexity of the systems, the age of some of their components, their 
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interoperability requirements, and the criticality of their functions make them more vulnerable to 
the risks of technical debt. These characteristics also make combat systems good candidates 
for the creation of a new acquisition capability designed to assist in reducing the defense 
specific risks associated with technical debt. Processes and practices acquired through this 
endeavor could save the Navy time and money by minimizing the current and future costs of 
technical debt while leveraging expertise within the Navy enterprise.  
Recommendation: Create a Technical Debt Program Management Capability 
Using Distressed Debt Practices 
Our recommendation argues that mitigating and managing combat systems’ technical 
debt risks during a system’s maintenance phase will require specialized and innovative teams 
within the acquisition community. The goal of an acquisition-based team is to assist combat 
systems managers and maintainers with the complexities of managing and mitigating technical 
debt across the component portfolio of their systems. By creating a specialized team that initially 
focuses on one combat system, program managers and combat systems experts can create 
and refine sustainable processes for technical debt assessment, reporting, management, 
mitigation, and reintegration. Ultimately the processes can grow into an acquisition capability 
that could be applied to systems across the Navy. A technical debt capability in acquisition 
could help mitigate technical debt at early stages and throughout the life cycle of cyber-physical 
combat systems.  
The U.S. bankruptcy codes and distressed debt management practices present a 
starting point for developing assessment and mitigation processes. The codes and practices 
have evolved to evaluate the “type” of debt-related stresses a company is under and methods to 
best rehabilitate the company or liquidate their assets. The basic goal is to realize that there is 
value in the larger cyber-physical system that can be rehabilitated if the ailments due to 
technical debt are mitigated. Creating mitigation strategies based on both the severity of the risk 
and the interoperability of the system is akin to treating the whole system rather than a single 
symptom. The initial focus on combat systems includes an inherent portfolio approach that 
combines integrated and interoperable systems whose dependencies may exhibit technical debt 
through association. The following is a conceptual framework whose intent is to serve as a 
starting point for future exploration, creation, and refinement. 
Create an Acquisition Technical Debt Team 
Create a cross-organizational Acquisition Technical Debt Team (ATDT) with expertise in 
acquisition processes and an initial focus on a pilot combat system that has been dealing with 
technical debt due to the interoperability of legacy systems. The team should include members 
of the combat system’s engineering and managerial staff, program managers who have 
experience with the system, and external experts familiar with the technological and operational 
needs for the system. The purpose of the team is to develop ways of assessing the health of the 
combat systems and identifying the processes needed to manage and resolve technical debt 
issues. The team could initially include external experts versed in assessing, managing, and 
liquidating distressed debt companies.  
Assess and Manage System-Wide Risks Associated with Technical Debt 
Given the integration and interoperability requirements of combat systems, we have 
created a risk cube that places interoperability along the z-axis (see Figure 2). The incorporation 
of interoperability into the assessment of technical debt risk will help determine the associated 
risk to external components and associated vulnerabilities that extend across the greater 
system. The goal of this approach is to create a classification schema, similar to the U.S. 
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bankruptcy codes, to helps the combat system’s resident team determine when to report the risk 
to the program manager and when to request a transfer of the problem to the ATDT.  
 
Figure 2: The Inclusion of Interoperability in a System’s Risk Assessment Charts the Degree that 
Technical Debt or Component Failure Effects the Greater System 
In practice, the risk cube would be generated using data from the combat system, its 
repair history, and relevant vendor or industry models. Multiple signals at the ATDT level over a 
short period of time, operational shifts, fielding of new capabilities for that combat system, etc., 
could place the system at a level where the ATDT should take over for the program manager 
until the risks are mitigated. 
In Distressed Debt Management (DDM), a distressed business performing “below 
investment grade” is determined to be either undervalued or about to default on their loans. A 
company may become distressed because of excessive debt, but other factors that can threaten 
the company are declining profitability, loss of competitive position, or changing business 
climate. There are three management strategies that depend on the type of debt the company is 
dealing with and the time horizon for recovery or liquidation. The three management strategies 
are as follows (Jain, 2011):  
1. Active Control—the business process is taken over by the management team 
with an exit timeline of 2–3 years and a profit target of 15–25% per year.  
2. Active Non-Control—the management is actively involved with existing 
management but does not take over the business with an exit strategy of 1–2 
years and a profit target of 12–20% per year. 
3. Passive—the management company invests in the existing company to create 
financial buffers with an exit strategy of 0.5–1 year, and a profit target of 12–15% 
per year.  
These management strategies can be extrapolated to the type and degree of involvement the 
ATDT would pursue to manage and mitigate the risks from technical debt on a combat system 
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and the systems reliant on it. The time horizons and profitability parameters could be used as 
guides for ATDT involvement and follow-on savings and/or estimated extended use of the 
combat system.  
Using the categorizations from the interoperability risk cube we can classify the type of 
involvement of the ATDT as follows: 
A. No ATDT Involvement—if the severity and the likelihood of a vulnerability are high 
but interoperability is low (HHL), then there is no need to elevate the problem to the 
ATDT. The risk should be dealt with by the combat systems managers and engineers. 
B. ATDT Passive Involvement—if the severity, likelihood, and interoperability of a 
vulnerability are moderate (MMM), the problem should be elevated to the program 
manager for that combat system, who would monitor the progress and might ask for 
guidance from the ATDT specialists.  
C. ADTD Active Non-Control—if the severity is low, the likelihood is moderate, and the 
interoperability of a vulnerability is high (LMH), the program manager and ATDT 
should be notified.  
D. ADTD Active/Non-Control or Active Control—if the severity is high, the likelihood is 
moderate, and the interoperability of the vulnerability is high (HMH) the ATDT might 
want to monitor the risk, or if there have been several risks reported, they could take 
over the management and mitigation of the technical debt of the system from the 
program manager and return the authority when interoperability risks have been 
mitigated and components replaced or refactored.  
E. ADTD Active Control—if the severity, the likelihood, and the interoperability of the 
vulnerability are high (HHH), the ATDT would take over the program management of 
the system and work in tight coordination with the combat system’s management and 
engineering team. Once the debt has been mitigated and the system has been 
restabilized (or retired), the management would be returned to the original program 
management team.  
Conclusion and Next Steps 
The effects of technical debt on software-based systems are creating a global concern 
and costing trillions of dollars in recovery and mitigation. The vulnerabilities inherent to complex 
systems and those reliant on legacy architectures are creating a fertile ground for cyber 
criminals and other adversaries. The DoD weapon systems are complex cyber-physical 
systems. These systems have been subject to ongoing requirements to modernize and modify 
both their physical and software systems to meet changing environmental factors and 
operational requirements. These modification pressures result in technical debt that their 
managers and maintainers have been contending with for decades. The risks associated with 
technical debt across increasingly interdependent DoD cyber-physical systems will accelerate if 
left unchecked. Without changes in acquisition and maintenance practices we can foresee 
cascading, potentially catastrophic cross-system failures. We suggest that the acquisition 
enterprise help manage and mitigate these risks by creating cross-functional teams dedicated to 
classifying and managing technical debt. We have used distressed debt management practices 
from the financial sector to seed an acquisition-based conversation. 
Suggested next steps: 
• Select a combat system that is already engaged in working through technical debt 
issues to learn existing technical debt evaluation processes and create a risk cube 
from their data. 
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• Create a cross-functional team familiar with the combat system and the technical 
issues that are contributing to vulnerability concerns. 
• Evaluate the interoperability risk cube and the technical debt management 
strategies suggested here to learn the relevance of these models to the combat 
system’s needs. 
• Continue this research to refine these concepts with the acquisition community. 
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Abstract 
The U.S. Air Force has traditionally acquired software through the military acquisition process. This 
acquisition process is used broadly for diverse types of purchases and requires considerable time. 
Concerned that this approach is not ideally suited for the acquisition of rapidly evolving, innovative 
software, the U.S Air Force re-assessed its previous make or buy decision regarding software and 
stood up Kessel Run. Kessel Run is an innovative, in-house software development organization, 
intended to assess the viability of “re-insourcing” software development. This research reports on 
a case analysis of Kessel Run. We explore why and how the Air Force developed Kessel Run and 
offer insights into its operation. Our results suggest that, while cost-reduction goals certainly 
facilitated Kessel Run’s origin and cost reduction has remained a benefit, the primary driver and 
benefit of re-insourcing Kessel Run is capability development. This finding seems to support a 
resource-based logic to insourcing. Our results also show that the leaders of Kessel Run 
succeeded in establishing the organization by relying on commercial start-up concepts, which 
allowed the organization to attract talent, develop capabilities, and meet customer needs far faster 
than typical acquisition approaches. We identify lessons learned and implications for other re-
insourcing opportunities. 
Background 
Software is a critical component of defense weapon systems, but “some of the costliest 
failures in military procurement have been blamed on software … [and] … billions of dollars 
continue to be spent on software projects that are way over budget and behind schedule” 
(Erwin, 2018). Software development, when successful, may take years in the traditional 
procurement process, from requirement inception to software deployment in the operational Air 
Force (see, e.g., Wallace, 2018). Software development delayed the F/A-22 aircraft (National 
Research Council, 2007) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) canceled the Expeditionary Combat 
Support System with more than $1 billion of sunk obligated funding, when it determined another 
billion dollars would not salvage the program (Kanaracus, 2012). While the rest of the Air Force 
and the DoD are still outsourcing most of their innovative acquisitions, including software 
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development—contractors are responsible for the bulk of U.S. defense software development 
(Jones, 2002)—the Air Force’s Kessel Run, an internal software development organization, has 
decreased the time to field software substantially from years to weeks.  
Because the DoD’s operation and support costs have not commensurately declined with 
the ongoing personnel reduction since the Cold War, the DoD resorted to outsourcing or buying 
functions that are not considered core competencies (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 
1983). Software development is one such outsourced function, traditionally occurring through 
legally binding instruments governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Air Force 
Installation Contracting Center (AFICC) guidance, and other regulatory bodies (Air Force 
Installation Contracting Center, n.d.; Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], n.d.). Three common 
methods of procuring custom software exist: the procurement of custom software as a 
commodity using typical contracting approaches, the procurement of software as a service 
(SaaS) using typical contracting approaches, and the procurement of custom software utilizing 
Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs; OTA Brief, 2016). While all three methods rely heavily on 
industry efforts, the former two options are subject to the FAR as opposed to OTAs (OTA Brief, 
2016).  
With the addition of Kessel Run, a modern approach has altered the software 
development process and enables the Air Force to self-develop software. Kessel Run has 
significantly reduced software development lead time by applying agile software development. 
Agile development is an “extreme” form of programming, used for “complex, volatile” 
requirements that include “erratic” changes (Highsmith, 2002). By re-insourcing software 
development and applying agile software approaches, the Air Force has reduced software 
development cycle times in some cases from years to weeks; however, this is not an easy 
transition because insourcing requires the Air Force to revamp training for active-duty members 
and defense civilians in coding and cyber defense core competencies that are unfamiliar to the 
current workforce (Williams, 2018). 
The Air Force has traditionally relied on outsourcing software development but has taken 
a new direction with Kessel Run. This case study explores Kessel Run, and seeks to 
understand its insourcing approach and how that approach benefits its customers, when 
compared with the traditional outsourcing acquisition approach. 
Background and Literature Review 
Make or Buy Decisions 
The decision to make or buy supplies or services within an organization can be complex, 
but it is one of the most important decisions to make; it is fundamentally a decision on how an 
organization will manage its supply chain, and thus, it impacts many other decisions and 
processes (Henriksen et al., 2012). Organizations engaging in strategic make or buy decisions 
must identify their core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). By examining any competitive 
advantages that arise from those competencies, organizations can litmus test their continued 
relevance to the organization (Leonard-Barton, 1992). If competencies remain relevant to 
competitive advantage, the organization should retain these competencies in-house (“make” 
them). If irrelevant to competitive advantage, the organization should consider the competency 
with the bulk of other tasks that may potentially be outsourced (“buy”). Then, the organization 
must conduct transaction cost analysis to better discern what tasks should be kept in-house and 
what may be outsourced (Williamson, 1996). To this basic framework, Quinn and Hilmer (1994) 
add that organizations must also consider their vulnerabilities if markets fail in providing 
outsourced products and services, and how best to mitigate those vulnerabilities. 
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Core Competencies and Competitive Advantage 
At its essence, a core competence embodies the strength of an organization and is 
typically something the organization has dedicated itself to perfecting. It is “a harmonized 
combination of multiple resources and skills that distinguish a firm 1[or an organization] in the 
marketplace” (2013, p. 117). In industry, a core competence must meet three criteria (military 
analogs are straightforward): 
• It must provide access to a wide variety of markets 
• It must make a significant contribution to the perceived consumer benefits 
• And it must be difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  
An organization’s competence must meet all three criteria, and the organization must 
continuously develop and invest in the competence, to maintain its benefits.  
Being integral aspects to their strategies, firms do not intentionally outsource core 
competencies (Hudgens, 2008). Although in some cases circumstances may change and a core 
competency is either unnecessary or harmful, core competencies must be performed 
organically. Leonard-Barton (1992) defines harmful core competencies as “core rigidities” (p. 
188) and explores how previously beneficial competencies can hinder the development of new 
or innovative capabilities. An organization would be well served to abandon, or limit the 
influence of, any competencies that have become problematic as they create problems 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). When an organization is able to grow and maintain core competencies, 
competitive advantages arise that give it an edge over its competition (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990).  
Transaction Costs 
Transactions costs are the costs incurred by an organization in the process of 
conducting business (Chen, 2019). More specifically, transaction costs refer to costs associated 
with searching, communicating, and bargaining activities (Klein, 2013). Firms and organizations, 
including the Air Force, need to consider transaction costs when making decisions on how they 
conduct business.  
The Nobel economist Ronald Coase first conceptualized the idea of transaction costs in 
his article “The Nature of the Firm” published in 1937 (Klein, 2013). While Coase’s purpose for 
his article was to define the term firm that, at the time, was widely used but apparently ill-
defined, he succeeded in doing more. As Coase explained, “the main reasons why it is 
profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism” 
(1937, p. 390). The price mechanism to which Coase refers is the “invisible hand” specter that 
guides market transactions so that resources may flow to where they may be most efficiently 
utilized. Coase gives his abstract cost reference body by providing examples. The first such 
example is the cost of determining germane market pricing that, while able to be minimized 
through specialization (e.g., third-party pricing databases), cannot be avoided (Coase, 1937). 
Negotiating contracts for each transaction also represents a cost that firms can streamline 
although not eliminate completely (Coase, 1937). Coase does not explore every possible 
 
1 Some core ideas come from literature on business, management, and industry, and thus refer to firms; 
the ideas typically apply directly to other organizations, particularly the military contexts in this paper. This 
is especially true given the discussion focuses on whether to insource or outsource a function, which would 
involve the military (here, the Air Force) interacting with industry as part of its proposed supply chain for 
any outsourced goods or services. 
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transaction cost, but he explains that executing transactions come at a cost, and firms may 
reduce these transactions (Coase, 1937). 
Oliver Williamson (1981) expanded on Coase’s exploration of transaction costs in “The 
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,” where he described these costs 
as the economic counterpart to friction. While one may look to moving mechanical parts of a 
machine and the friction experienced where parts meet to judge its efficiency, Williamson (1981) 
explains that economic friction may arise in how cooperatively, or uncooperatively, parties 
interact. Williamson (1981) opined that “transaction cost analysis is an interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of organizations that joins economics, organization theory, and … 
contract law.” Transactional costs are more than just a reason for the existence of firms; they 
drive the way firms make decisions.  
Williamson (1996) stated, “Whether a firm makes or buys—that is, produces for its own 
needs or procures a good or service from an outside supplier—turns largely on the transaction 
costs of managing the transaction in the firm, as compared with mediating the transaction 
through the market” (p. 25). As discussed, these transaction costs represent the costs required 
to conduct business with outside vendors or to maintain the support infrastructure to fulfill the 
requirement organically. If filled organically, transaction costs can include training personnel, 
maintaining equipment, or similar costs (Coase, 1937). If outsourced, costs may be incurred for 
monitoring vendor performance or conducting lengthy negotiations (Coase, 1937). An 
organization must include this assessment of transaction costs in any make or buy decision. 
Government Policy on the Make or Buy Decision 
Government and DoD outsourcing policy is rooted in United States Code. Further 
regulations and policies are implemented through national defense authorization acts passed by 
Congress and through Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (OMB, 1983; RAND, 
1997). OMB Circular A-76 addresses the make or buy decision, authorizing insourcing in four 
distinct circumstances: there are no satisfactory commercial sources available, matters related 
to national defense, patient care, and lower cost (OMB Circular, 1999). The OMB (1999) 
clarifies that “the general policy of the Government [is] to rely on commercial sources to supply 
the products and services the Government needs” (p. 1). The OMB also states that “it is the 
policy of the United States Government to: achieve economy and enhance productivity, retain 
Governmental functions in-house, and rely on the commercial sector” (OMB Circular, 1999, pp. 
1–2).  
The DoD relies on the national defense insourcing language to exclude 58% of 640,000 
positions conducting commercial activities from outsourcing (RAND, 1997). The same report 
cites several studies that identify savings, both from insourcing and outsourcing activities, 
ranging from 20%–35%, although inconsistencies related to actual versus projected savings 
may exist (RAND, 1997). DoD-specific policy is driven by two DoD Directives: 4100.15 
Commercial Activities Program (DoD, 1985a) and DoD Instruction 4100.33 Commercial 
Activities Program Procedures (DoD, 1985b; RAND, 1997). Directive 4100.15 (DoD, 1985a) 
essentially parrots OMB Circular policy and assigns specific responsibilities to government 
positions while Directive 4100.33 (DoD, 1985b) describes the procedures for determining 
whether government personnel or commercial sources should satisfy needs. More recently, 
DoD Directive 1100.4 Guidance for Manpower Management (DoD, 2005) detailed policy that 
“assigned missions shall be accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel (military, 
civilian, and contract) consistent with military requirements and other needs of the Department” 
(p. 3).   
Policy indicates that commercial activities not subject to OMB’s four general exceptions 
should be outsourced to commercial activities. However, DoD Directive 1100.4 goes further and 
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mandates that personnel address military needs with the least costly mix of labor. While the 
policy does note that the “least costly” approach must be consistent with military requirements, 
which presumably would include requirements driving a need to keep core functions in house, 
this directive seems to encourage outsourcing for cost reduction versus attempting to focus on 
core competencies.  
Air Force Policy Directive 38-1 (Department of the Air Force, 2019) echoes DoD 
Directive 1100.4 by also requiring the least costly mix of personnel to meet military and Air 
Force needs. Supporting this “least costly” argument, the Government-Wide Category 
Management Guidance Document (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015) contains no 
reference to core competencies or competitive advantages while returning 91 instances of “cost” 
and 48 instances of “saving.” Through the policy documents, directives, and the current focus 
on category management in government acquisition, it would appear that government make or 
buy decisions are primarily driven by cost reduction objectives instead of core competency 
objectives. 
Research Approach 
This study seeks to understand why and how the Air Force stood up the Kessel Run 
organization to internally develop (insource/make) software in lieu of the traditional method of 
procurement by contracting (outsource/buy). This case study focuses on an explanatory 
analysis (Yin, 2018) of Kessel Run to provide background and rationale for its beginning. An 
explanatory case study is a study whose purpose is to explain how or why some condition came 
to be (e.g., how or why some sequence of events occurred or did not occur; Yin, 2018). Studies 
asking “why” and “how” questions typically seek more explanatory results, which supports the 
use of the case study, history, or experiment as the preferred method of research (Yin, 2018).  
The case study is designed around qualitative analysis of Kessel Run as an 
organization. The qualitative analysis extracts data in three forms: 1) information provided 
directly by the Kessel Run staff and leadership, including information posted on U.S. Air Force 
official websites, 2) information collected from interviews from Kessel Run members, and 3) 
information posted publicly by those outside of the organization. Because Kessel Run is a new 
organization, our four interview included participants whose experience in the organization 
ranged from 7 months to 2 and a half years. 
Kessel Run: The Organization 
The Air Force wanted their new organization to be fast and agile. They chose the name, 
Kessel Run, from the movie Star Wars and specifically the scene where Han Solo is showing 
his starship, the Millenium Falcon, to Obi-Wan Kanobi. Han tells Obi-Wan that his starship is so 
fast that it did “the Kessel Run in less than 12 parsecs” (Kelman, 2019).   
Although Kessel Run stood up as an independent organization in May 2018, its inception 
started back in August 2017 and was initiated by the Targeting & Geospatial Intelligence 
(GEOINT) (T&G) Modernization Program and the [recently terminated] Air Operations Center 
(AOC) 10.2 program (Kessel Run, n.d.). According to the Kessel Run Acquisition and 
Contracting Playbook (2019), Kessel Run was originally developed to fill a specific goal which 
was to:   
Deliver Air Operations Center (AOC) 10.2 Dynamic Targeting Mission Thread, 
including modern platform and automating associated 3rd party systems, 
alongside AOC 10.1 at 609th (AFCENT) in <12 months; initial delivery within 90 
days of letting contracts...nominally six (6) applications in initial phase. (Kessel 
Run, n.d.)  
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Kessel Run quickly expanded to T&G’s and AOC’s entire portfolio, which was a direct reflection 
of the value they provide. Now, they are a detachment within the Air Force Life Cycle 
Management Center (AFLCMC/HBH; 2019).   
According to the Kessel Run Acquisition and Contract Playbook (2019), the mission of 
Kessel Run is to “continuously deliver war-winning software our Airmen love.” Additionally, the 
vision of Kessel Run is to “Build a software company that can sense and respond to conflict in 
any domain, anytime, anywhere” (2019). Upon reading the mission and vision, it is apparent the 
mission reads similar to civilian software development agencies, like Google, which highlight the 
importance of employee satisfaction and its correlation to productivity and creativity (Forbes 
Technology Council, 2018). The vision is closer to the typical military vision, which incorporates 
the wartime (“conflict”) mission and rapid (“anytime”) deployment. 
Kessel Run practices “Lean Product Development,” “Extreme Programing,” and “User 
Centered Design” (Kessel Run, n.d.). Being lean allows them to, “validate our assumptions and 
mitigate risk at every turn”; extreme programing allows them to, “always feel confident to go fast, 
forever”; and their user-centered approach ensures that they “are always delivering value to our 
users” (Kessel Run, n.d.). The development process follows an 11-step process that includes 
predictable steps such as “Value Stream Mapping,” “Product Scoping,” and “Testable,” but also 
such non-military steps as the “Vader Sprint” (a risk-mitigation step) and the final step, “Joyful,” 
which focuses ensuring users adopt the product joyfully and plans for the sunset of the software 
in its eventual legacy state (Sanders, n.d.). 
Is Kessel Run’s process working? It reports software development results that include: 1) 
average time from concept to operations of approximately 4.5 months, 2) reduction of lead time 
from 5 years to 3.5 days, 3) the ability to push continuous authority to operate to the secure 
network in less than one hour, and 4) an observed production deployment frequency (capabilities 
to operations) of 42 capabilities per month, among other improvements and accomplishments 
(Sanders, n.d.). During our study, we analyzed one project that was completed—from concept 
inception to operation—in 88 days, or just under 3 months. 
Analysis 
We wanted to understand why and how the Air Force stood up Kessel Run, so we explored 
its origin, its purpose, and possible make or buy decision motives, as well as factors that explained 
Kessel Run’s organization and culture.  
Kessel Run Origin: A New Hope 
Kessel Run rose from a previous failure. When asked, “Why was Kessel Run created?” 
three of four respondents mentioned AOC 10.2. One respondent reported, “Kessel Run was 
built out of the ashes of a $500 million effort to modernize the AOC Weapon System, originally 
called AOC 10.2. After spending 10 years and $500 million and delivering absolutely nothing, 
Congress cancelled the program” (Participant A). Another interview response was “The failed 
10.2 program [AOC 10.2] opened the door to prove out a different way of software development 
and delivery” (Participant C). Third, “AOC 10.2 failed to deliver any working software in 10 
years.… Rather than continue the old way of doing things, we decided to take the bull by the 
horns and build software in partnership with industry. That way, the government owns the code 
and can modify the code as necessary without contracting actions” (Participant D). AOC 10.2 
was a project the Air Force contracted for with Northrop Grumman to upgrade the Air 
Operations Center network (Insinna, 2017). After not receiving a finished product in ten years 
and spending over $500 million, Congress decided to quit funding the program and the Air 
Force cancelled the project to seek an alternative solution (Innis, 2017). Flowing from this 
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failure, the USAF launched AOC Pathfinder which would include “industry best practices” and 
“incorporate an agile software development technique called DevOps” (Insinna, 2017). Per the 
interview responses, one respondent explained that Kessel Run was formally known as AOC 
Pathfinder. Furthermore, one respondent clarified, “the AOC Pathfinder, now known as Kessel 
Run” (Participant A). 
Why Make the Kessel Run? Software Development Spending 
Given, Kessel Run arose from a failed $500 million investment, we expected costs would 
be a strong motivation to re-insource software development. We first performed a spend 
analysis which revealed that costs of traditionally procured software development have 
increased tremendously in recent years. We used the Computer Program and Software 
Development North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 541511 because we 
concluded that it was most aligned with Kessel Run’s mission. Furthermore, we used NAICS 
code 541511 because the alternative Product and Service Code (PSC) classification system 
was more confusing and did not provide a clear PSC for software development. The spend 
analysis was conducted with Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and Air Force Business 
Intelligence (AFBIT) Competency Cell data (“Air Force Business Intelligence Lite - Profile | 
Tableau Public,” n.d.; “Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation,” n.d.). While 
FPDS contains data for all sectors of Government contracting, the data pulled from FPDS only 
included the Contracting Office Agency identification code 5700, which represents Air Force 
contracting offices. Both FPDS and AFBIT data were separately sorted in chronological order 
and adjusted for inflation. We converted the raw FPDS and AFBIT data into 2017 and 2018 
dollars, respectively, by factoring in the appropriate Consumer Price Index (CPI) figure from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). Furthermore, we plotted each 
data on a graph where the Y-axis shows the obligation or spend amount and the X-axis 
represents years pertinent to the data. A trendline and equation were generated to define the 
slope that provides the average change in obligation or spend amount and the best-fit R-
squared value for each sample. Figure 1 represents FPDS data measured by obligated dollars 
from FY2011 to FY2017 and concluded with an average increase of approximately $90 million 
per year with an R-squared value of 0.7745. 
 
Figure 1: FPDS Data (USAF Data from Federal Database) Spend Analysis of NAICS 
541511 from FY11–17 with a Trendline 
Figure 2 represents AFBIT data measured by spend amount from FY2014 to FY2018 and 
concluded with an average increase of approximately $100 million per year with an R-squared 
value of 0.9392.  
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Figure 2: AFBIT Data (USAF Data from USAF Database) Spend Analysis of NAICS 541511 
from FY14–18 with a trendline 
 
The second spend analysis with AFBIT data verifies the Air Force’s aggressive increase 
in average dollars per year spent on software development under NAICS code 541511. While 
both sets of data have relatively high best-fit R-squared values, which indicates that the 
trendlines are more representative of the data than not, we noted that the available data for the 
overlapping years between the two samples are inconsistent. This discrepancy calls the sources 
of the data into question and provides the appearance of data manipulation before we extracted 
the data. That said, these are the official data sets that document government spending for the 
federal government and the Air Force respectively, and thus represent the best sources of data 
available. Additionally, both sets of data presented an indisputable, substantial increase in Air 
Force computer programming and software development spending over the years at an average 
$90 million to $100 million per year. The spend analysis yields compelling results that could 
explain the adoption of more agile software development methods, such as the creation of 
Kessel Run. 
Why Make the Kessel Run? Organizational Purpose 
Federal policy states that commercially available requirements should be contracted out 
and cost comparisons should be conducted to the maximum extent practicable to determine the 
best organization for fulfilling a requirement (OMB, 1983). As our spend analysis shows, 
software development costs are increasing generally, and combining that general trend with the 
specific sting of the failed $500 million AOC 10.2 effort might justify a pilot test to re-insource the 
capability. However, our study suggested a competing motive.  
According to Kessel Run’s official website, the organization’s purpose and mission is 
“Continuously delivering war-winning software our airmen love” (Kessel Run, n.d.). Additionally, 
none of our interview participants mentioned costs as a primary motivation. When asked “What 
is the purpose of Kessel Run?” interview respondents offered similar responses for the 
organization’s purpose: changing the way the Air Force delivers software by continuous delivery 
and delivering software the warfighters love. According to one interview response, “Kessel Run 
is modernizing the Air Operations Center Weapon System through user-centered design, lean 
start up management and other industry best practices. Our mission is to build and deliver 
software that warfighters LOVE [emphasis in original response]” (Participant A). Another 
interview response claimed to purpose was “to change the way the Air Force and DoD delivers 
software” (Participant B). Furthermore, the third interview response agreed the organizational 
purpose was “to continuously deliver war winning software that the warfighter loves” (Participant 
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C). Finally, the last interview respondent reported, “To build the capacity to sense and respond 
to a changing threat environment with software. While we build products that warfighters love, 
we could throw those products out the window and still have the ability to deliver combat 
capability. That is the true power of Kessel Run” (Participant D).  
Making the Kessel Run: Building Organic Capability 
Interestingly, developing an organic capability might have been more coincidental than 
intentional (Kelman, 2019). Program Executive Officer, Digital, Steve Wert was more concerned 
with improving agility no matter the mix of government and contractor blend (Kelman, 2019). He 
elaborated, “We were primarily looking to demonstrate that modern commercial practice could 
be successfully applied at scale with the DoD” (Kelman, 2019). That re-insourcing became the 
preferred approach appears to be a happy consequence. Owning the work and intellectual 
property and knowing software development practices is instrumental in Kessel Run’s 
effectiveness. As one of our respondents reports, “Having in-house expertise ensures that the 
Government owns the code baseline and the product development.… The other element is that 
when we do contract with companies to provide service-based support, we have the in-house 
technical ability to assess whether a company is performing appropriately” (Participant A). 
External observers seem to agree. Kelman (2019), for example claimed Kessel Run 
leverages “both the use of agile and an increasing role for organic capacity in software 
development—two issues that are not so related but are being pursued together under the 
moniker ‘Kessel Run’” (Kelman, 2019). Industry adopted these processes about a decade ago 
(Pomerleau, 2019), and our data suggests the DoD is well aware its software development 
practices are outdated and unable to effectively enable the mission. The Defense Acquisition 
University Powerful Example Library (2019) notes, “Its [Kessel Run’s] non-standard approach is 
designed to do two things, speed up the acquisition process and turn the Air Force into a 
software company that happens to fly planes.” 
The agility and organic capability appear to be important to Kessel Run and represent a 
completely different approach to how the DoD normally develops software. Cost does not seem 
to be a major point of concern when it comes to agility; however, interview respondents were 
frankly concerned that the slow delivery of software through traditional approaches which 
hinders the warfighter from obtaining relevant software. An interview respondent explained, 
“The information we’re planning off of has changed and may no longer be valid or important” 
(Participant B). Another respondent answered, “Traditional acquisitions lends itself to a waterfall 
approach, i.e., requirements, contract award, development, test, security, compliance, and then 
fielding. This sequence of events takes more than 10 years on average. This means that the 
warfighter goes 10+ years without the software they need” (Participant D). The fact that the 
warfighter is not supported appropriately because of acquisition bureaucracies and inefficiencies 
is extremely alarming and the USAF has recognized this deficiency.  
Making the Kessel Run: It Takes a Different Approach 
The Air Force seemed to realize that achieving Kessel Run’s goals of speed and agility 
would require cultural changes, essentially “building a software lab in Boston that was modeled 
after successful Silicon Valley companies” (“Air Force teaming with Pivotal to rapidly deploy 
software worldwide,” 2019). According to one participant, “Kessel Run utilizes industry and 
Silicon Valley best practices like lean start up management, user-centered design, and 
DevSecOps” (Participant A). One respondent emphasized that The Lean Startup “was 
essentially our Bible [sic]” (Participant D). Participants referred to, far more than to government 
instructions, a list of references that would be comfortable on the shelf (or in the digital library) of 
any Silicon Valley startup: Start Up Way, Development and Software Operations (DevOps) 
Research and Assessment (DORA)—State of DevOps, Accelerate: Building and Scaling High 
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Performing Technology Organizations, Sense and Respond, How Google Works, Lean 
Enterprise, The Lean Startup, Extreme Programming, and Design Thinking. One participant 
summarized the startup mentality: “We were very scrappy” (Participant D). 
A different culture meant adopting different management practices. One of the interview 
participants noted: 
things like psychological safety are valued so the most optimal decisions can be 
made. The traditional military hierarchy that enabled Platoon leaders to navigate 
the jungles of Vietnam don’t [sic] work for a modern software organization. The 
highest ranked person doesn’t always have the context or knowledge to make or 
inform the decision; our flat management structure at the product team level 
allows decisions to be made by the right people. (Participant 4) 
Psychological safety appears to be very important to the organization and its success. 
We asked for a list of potential interview participants, including an explanation for why they 
could provide key insights; a key informant responded, “At Kessel Run, we don’t concern 
ourselves with rank. We put the best people in the roles, whether they are an E-5 or a 2Lt 
(Second Lieutenant)” (participant, email to author, October 1, 2019). One outside observer 
collaborated this observation, “it is not every 36-year Air Force old-timer who is willing to listen 
to kids in hoodies, and even to allow them to name a pet project after a favorite Star Wars trope. 
(Kudos to the Air Force as well for not squelching this name.)” (Kelman, 2019). This enables 
Kessel Run’s innovation and ability to obtain useful information from any source without dealing 
with the same bureaucracy witnessed in the rest of the USAF and DoD. 
To build this new start up, Kessel Run was challenged to interface with and develop 
methods to attract the “New Workforce,” which: 1) was born between 1980 and 2000, 2) prefers 
cities or large towns, and 3) would trade other benefits for better workspace (Newell, 2018). 
Furtado explains, “We’re battling industry, especially in Boston, for top end tech talent. … You 
can’t ask people to hey come and take a $30,000 pay cut, also it’s going to be a bad 
environment and you’re not going to be happy here” (Pomerleau, 2019). Consequently, Kessel 
Run operates out of a “brightly lit We Work office” in Boston (Ward, 2019). Alongside startup 
companies, “T-shirt-and-jeans-wearing airmen milling around its fully-stocked kitchenette” might 
be indistinguishable, other than “[sounding] a bit different from their similarly dressed office 
mates” (Newell, 2018). 
Admittedly concerned about competing with industry for hiring and retaining talent, the 
Air Force first invested in developing its own coding talent, recruiting Airmen from around the Air 
Force and putting them through 6 months of agile coding training (Kelman, 2019). 
 Interview participants reported training Airmen in software development provided several 
benefits over outsourcing software development: 
• Owning the software and intellectual property 
• Reducing the contractor’s competing goals 
• Government open-source model enables sharing between teams 
• Efficient tactical strategic execution with Government code repository 
• Ability to assess contractor performance (Participants A, B, and D) 
Not only did the USAF adopt industry’s practices to attract top tech talent, Kessel Run 
also took a page out of industry’s coding practices by employing continuous delivery methods 
(Johnson, 2019). The waterfall approach of traditional acquisitions takes years. Continuous 
authority to operate (ATO) is a best practice adopted from industry which replaces the process 
of testing all of the code at the end of the project and makes developing software quicker 
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(Pomerleau, 2019). Essentially, Continuous ATO allows Kessel Run to constantly be working 
instead of waiting for approvals which can take time.  
According to an interview response, “There are numerous companies who continuously 
deliver software. Even though we’re the government, why couldn’t we get to a state where we 
were also able to do it. Companies, such as Amazon, Google, and Pivotal, have provided 
numerous lessons learned that we can use to grow” (Participant D). Using continuous user 
feedback loops, continuous delivery means software is delivered in weeks and is reiterated to 
make it better throughout its use. It is not a final end-product that takes years to deploy without 
effective feedback mechanisms (Johnson, 2019). Colonel Oti, the Detachment Commander for 
Kessel Run, explained, “Continuous testing of increments of software is crucial to speeding up 
deployment, and prevents the do-loop of software not being tested till the end, problems 
discovered, and a cycle of fixes and re-tests. It is never perfect the first time around, but 
changes can be made based on feedback from initial use” (Kelman, 2018; Kessel Run, n.d.).  
The continuous delivery method is aligned with DevOps, an approach which initially 
produces a “minimally viable product” (Rosenberg, 2019). According to Chaillan, the co-director 
of the DoD Enterprise Development, Cyber Security, and Software Operations (DevSecOps) 
Initiative, “When you add cybersecurity experts to this process, working alongside both the 
developers and the users/operators from the beginning to ensure the code isn’t easily hacked, 
DevOps becomes DevSecOps” (Rosenberg, 2019).  
Is It Fast Enough? Is That Good Enough? The Metrics 
Our interview participants all noted four Software Delivery Performance Metrics from 
Accelerate: 
• Deployment Frequency 
• Lead Time 
• Mean Time to Restore 
• Change Failure Rate  
Kessel Run’s metrics clearly focus on time, and it is interesting that Kessel Run does not 
include cost as a significant metric. We had initially expected cost might be an important metric, 
based on our spend analysis results, but that is not the case. The organization may be 
performing cost efficiently, such that that cost is not a significant concern to them, or they might 
be leveraging improved practices to reduce costs; regardless, cost is not a top metric Kessel 
Run uses to run its organization.  
Kessel Run does, however, include two additional core metrics. The first is called “The 
One Metric That Matters (OMTM).” This metric answers the question posed by the chief of staff 
of the Air Force, “What combat capability are you delivering?” One of the interview respondents 
defines it as, “‘the ‘north star,’ which determines whether a product is bringing user value” 
(Participant A). Finally, one respondent expressed interest in Kessel Run’s personnel turnover 
rates because “I want to make Kessel Run the place where people want to come and work” 
(Participant D). Given a need to develop and retain talent as part of this new competency, this 
metric makes sense.  
Outrunning the Imperial Starships: A Few Obstacles 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the interview respondents primarily keyed in on the obstacle of 
gaining senior leadership’s trust. Interestingly, the challenge most interviewees disclosed was 
communication among all of the stakeholders. 
The obstacle most mentioned in the interviews was gaining USAF acquisition leaders’ 
trust in taking a new approach in DoD software development. As stated by one respondent, 
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The hardest part was gaining senior leaders trust on a completely different 
approach. … Not doing requirements-based development was a radical change 
for them. We had to convince leadership to allow us to talk to our users, cloud 
enabled IT can provide mission assurance, test and security can be incorporated 
into the development process, and we should use commercial IaaS 
[Infrastructure as a Service] and PaaS [Platform as a Service] instead of trying to 
build our own. Also, had to be honest with them that our culture and 
infrastructure suck so bad it’s impending success for innovation, culture sucks 
because we have way too many gates before we can get to the user (lack of 
trust) and engineers are just watching people work and infrastructure because 
we can’t develop software and attract top talent in our crumbling infrastructure at 
Hanscom AFB [Air Force Base] (both networks and facilities) [sic]. (Participant C) 
Another respondent shared, 
Fear of the unknown. Most of the senior leaders in AF acquisitions have been in 
their profession a long time. As people grow in their careers, they generally 
become more risk averse because there is no incentive to take risks. Taking risks 
is actually a disincentive. A shift from being completely requirements driven to a 
combination of what I call big “R” requirements (as laid out by ACC) and small “r” 
requirements (gathered through user-centered design) was met with much 
skepticism. Accepting that we don’t know everything upfront was quite the 
mindset shift. We learn more as we iterate. We had to educate senior leadership 
about how not knowing everything upfront and then building things in small 
increments buys down the level of risk you incur. In addition to fear of the 
unknown, we had a culture that didn’t optimize for doing the best thing for the 
user. Recognizing that culture had a lot of room for improvement allowed us to 
make the necessary changes to be more user-focused, attract top talent, and 
make decisions based on ideas and context, not rank. (Participant D) 
As previously mentioned, Kessel Run is taking a new approach to software development, both 
USAF- and DoD-wide. While it may seem like the obstacle Kessel Run faced is nothing special, 
it is a considerable stumbling stone when trying to be agile. As another interview expressed, “it 
makes it difficult sometimes to get things done” (Participant A). 
They Made the Kessel Run? So What? 
In addition to clear wins in terms of development speed, when asked “How has Kessel 
Run impacted the Air Force’s software development capabilities?” many of the respondents 
noted that Kessel Run pioneered a different way to deliver software to the Air Force and former 
Kessel Run members launched more software factories in the Air Force, including Section 31, 
BESPIN, LevelUp, and SpaceCamp (Participants C and D). One respondent answered, “The 
largest impact is the conversation Kessel Run has started” (Participant B). By leading the way 
for change in Air Force software development, Kessel Run has started the conversation of 
operating differently and adopting industry’s best practices and enabled the potential for more 
radical changes in the military. 
Conclusions 
We set out to understand why and how the Air Force established Kessel Run, and how 
its insourced approach benefits its customers when compared with the traditional outsourcing 
acquisition approach. 
One of the research questions we wanted to answer in this case study was, “Why did the 
Air Force decide to internally develop (insource) software using the Kessel Run organization in 
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lieu of the traditional method of contracting for software (outsource)?” Initially, we believed that 
rising software development costs drove the desire to create Kessel Run. Viewed through the 
lens of the make or buy decision, it appeared that the decision to insource made sense from a 
cost perspective. Based on spend data analysis, the cost of contracting for software 
development has increased dramatically over the last 5 years. As the failed AOC 10.2 project 
demonstrated, the cost of capabilities the Air Force sought to procure far outpaced the actual 
value of the end result. In an era of ever-tightening budgets and fiscal hawks seeking to cut 
costs, any budget item that shows increasing costs gets put in the crosshairs—sighted up for 
elimination. The spend data analysis supports the idea that software procurement costs are 
rising, and we anticipated interview responses to identify costs as a reason for establishing 
Kessel Run.  
Despite the costly and doomed-to-fail AOC 10.2 program giving Kessel Run the 
opportunity to exist, and the general increasing trend in costs for software development, our 
analysis discovered that cost metrics were not a primary focus of the organization. Indeed, cost 
savings appear to be more of a welcome but unintended side effect of Kessel Run’s success. 
Based on our analysis of official communication, interviews with Kessel Run members, and 
external sources, Kessel Run was created to continuously deliver war-winning software for the 
warfighter at an unprecedented pace (Kessel Run Acquisition and Contracting Playbook, 2019). 
Delivering capable and responsive capabilities to their end user is the motivator for Kessel Run 
personnel. Kessel Run, it appears, was created to re-insource and develop capabilities. 
The second research question was, “How did the Air Force develop the Kessel Run 
organization?” Traditionally, military bureaucracy is slow to act and slow to change. In this 
organization, steeped in hierarchical structures and procedurally based actions, new initiatives 
take time to develop. Federal policy appears to prioritize commercial activity contracting versus 
competing with the private sector as well as cost reduction versus a core competency focus. 
However, Kessel Run sought to return software development capacity back to the military. 
Seemingly somewhat out of line with federal policy, the organization prioritized competency 
development with no direct goal of reducing costs.  
Based on analysis of Kessel Run’s published literature, personnel interviews, and 
information from outside of the organization, Kessel Run circumvented the traditional 
bureaucratic organizational structure by learning and imitating industry best practices. Founding 
members leaned heavily on startup literature such as The Lean Startup to establish the 
organization’s identity. Organizing and behaving like a startup company instead of a traditional 
military organization enables Kessel Run to attract talent, swiftly respond to customer needs, 
and deliver capabilities at a rate unmatched in traditional government procurement.  
Recommendations 
Why does Kessel Run matter? Because the end-user and the Air Force mission matter. 
Kessel Run has adopted a proven civilian method to develop, administer, and maintain software 
in a very short amount of time and at a cost much lower than the traditional method of 
procurement.   
The most impactful aspect of Kessel Run’s success is the organization’s delivery, 
administration, and maintenance of effective software for the warfighter. The organization’s 
ability to overcoming the shortfall of the AOC 10.2 program through continuous capability 
development is an example of the support the warfighter deserves. Kessel Run is built around 
the Air Force’s mission and a dedication to the warfighter. It is apparent that they pride 
themselves on their ability to rapidly deliver innovative state-of-the-art software in any domain at 
any time.   
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The second take-away is that Kessel Run has shown that alternatives to the traditional 
procurement cycle can be effective and can work within the Air Force. Kessel Run was able to 
circumvent the typical military bureaucracy by adopting the practices and methods of new-age 
startup tech companies as well as large established tech companies, like Google. Removing or 
reducing red tape and embracing an agile, innovative structure can deliver positive products, 
reduce timelines, and save money. Kessel Run is proof that deviating from the standard 
operating mode of military software development is possible and can benefit both direct end 
users and the Air Force as a whole. 
Kessel Run has proven that a nontraditional organization can benefit the Air Force. 
However, that does not mean that a Kessel Run–type organization is the right response to all 
procurement shortcomings. Based on our findings, however, the Air Force should explore areas 
where vulnerabilities might exist if the market fails outsourced needs (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994), 
and that failure would represent unacceptable risk to mission execution and determine if 
insourcing the capability is a viable alternative. Although a startup-structured organization may 
not be the best way to insource in all situations, asking the question of whether something 
should be insourced will force the Air Force to identify areas of outsourced risk to mitigate. 
Our review of federal policy revealed that policy prioritizes commercial contracting, 
except in specific circumstances, and prioritizes cost minimization. With that being said, Kessel 
Run appears to do the exact opposite; the organization has insourced previously outsourced 
capabilities and prioritized metrics that do not track cost. The benefits of focusing on developing 
software competency through insourcing has led to better, timely-delivered products. Further 
research should be done to review other federal government contracting efforts related to 
outsourcing capabilities to determine if the efforts are in line with federal policy or if they could 
benefit from deviating from policy as Kessel Run has done.  
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More than ever, nations and their citizens demand clear evidence as to the benefits of defence 
spending and any subsequent value created. The opportunity cost of defence expenditure against 
other sectors is constantly queried, and the question of how to measure value remains highly 
contentious. Similarly, it is challenging to find consensus amongst traditional economists, policy-
makers, and other stakeholders on how to measure value in the context of defence, where most 
outcomes are intangible. Hence, this article attempts to offer solutions using the case study of 
Malaysia, a maritime nation in Southeast Asia. The study uses a hypo-deductive approach 
underpinning qualitative research methodology. Primary data sources include open-ended and 
semi-structured interviews to produce a thematic discussion, as well as secondary resources 
such as journal articles, government reports, and online sources. The author argues that it is hard 
to appraise defence value, as measurements are case-specific, and even successful attempts 
cannot be generalised. Rather, the paper will use a novel “Triple-Defence Value Framework” to 
argue that value can be measured by dividing the role of defence into a primary level: for 
protection and safety; a secondary level: for socio-economic prosperity; and a tertiary level: for 
soft power projection. The paper concludes by using the framework to measure the value derived 
from the Malaysian defence sector. 
 
Key words: defence value, defence spending, defence economics 
Setting the Scene  
Is Adam Smith’s (1776) statement that “defence is more important than opulence” still 
relevant today? There is continuous debate justifying defence spending, which is often seen as 
unnecessary and providing poor return on opportunity costs compared to other sectors. In the 
United Kingdom (UK), for example, taxpayers continue to question the government’s highly 
controversial decision to maintain, let alone replace, the Trident nuclear submarine fleet. 
Nonetheless, we have witnessed an ongoing and significant rise in global defence spending since 
the Second World War. In 2018, global defence spending totalled approximately U.S. dollars 
(USD) $1.8 trillion (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Globally, the United 
States of America (USA) remains the largest defence spender at USD $648.8 billion (3.2% of 
GDP),1 followed by China at USD $250 billion (1.9% of GDP; Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2020). Figure 1 shows the world’s top defence spenders in 2018 (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Traditional economists argue that defence is one 
of the few areas requiring “the expense of sovereign and commonwealth,” justifying state 
intervention in the economy. Hitch and McKean (1960), in their seminal piece, The Economics of 
Defense in the Nuclear Age, also highlighted the deliberate choice that has to be made between 
a nation changing its national budget and reshaping its armed forces as long as that change 
appears to gain more than its costs (Hitch & McKean, 1960).  
 
1 Since September 2001, Congress has apportioned an additional discretionary $2 trillion as emergency 
requirements for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT). 
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Figure 1. Top Countries by Total Spend in Million USD (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2018) 
The attractiveness of an assessment of the value derived from defence expenditure is 
self-explanatory but difficult to define. There is constant debate over the nuances encompassing 
value and the importance of measuring the input, output, and impact derived. Some have also 
questioned the difference between value-creation and value-extraction (Mazzucato, 2018). The 
topic of value becomes even more complex when seen in the context of defence expenditure. An 
oft-mentioned term in defence is the concept of “value for money” (VFM), which is used to justify 
defence procurement activity and relies on evidence-based claims utilising in-depth evaluation 
and current research findings.  
Most studies have addressed this topic from an economic perspective, discussing the 
subject from a principal–agent model or cost–benefit analysis, often struggling to integrate the 
hard evidence of value derived from defence expenditures. Practitioners in the field have 
attempted to address this topic from a more pragmatic angle, but nonetheless apply several 
economic principles to explain the concept of value and the rationale behind measuring value 
from defence expenditure. Therefore, the author has applied the proposed theoretical framework 
to the real-world example of Malaysia. This choice was due to the author’s familiarity with the 
Malaysian defence context and, subsequently, greater ease in obtaining data, which can be 
extremely difficult in the defence sector.  
The framework has considered input from various sources including academic papers, 
government reports, and news articles, supported by interviews with experts in the field, policy-
makers, commercial stakeholders, and military personnel. The author was indirectly involved in 
providing input and guidance to senior stakeholders when the government developed its 2020 
Defence White Paper (DWP; Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). This article is divided into three 
sections. The first section critically analyses the meaning of value, theories that relate to value, 
and the concept and complexity of measuring value in the defence context, and proposes a 
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theoretical framework on measuring value. The second section briefly outlines Malaysia’s DWP 
and evaluates why measuring value is important for the Malaysian defence sector. The third 
section evaluates how the Malaysian defence sector is delivering value to taxpayers. This section 
also critically discusses the challenges faced by Malaysia in delivering value and raises some 
intriguing questions on how Malaysia can more effectively boost defence value through defence 
spending.  
Measuring Value in the Defence Sector  
What is Value?  
The concept of value received less attention in the field of economics. The theory of value 
originated in the 17th century when Francis Quesnay, a French economist, formulated the first 
systematic theory of value, displaying how value was being created and circulated in the 
economy. The 18th century economics associated value to land and agricultural productivity and 
farmers as creating value. The 18th and 19th century classical economists, including Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, measured value by labour invested in an activity and the successful 
adoption of new technologies (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). However, the 20th century 
neoclassical economists defined value as a function of demand and supply and saw value as 
utility, or perceived property.  
What is value? How and from whose perspective is value being measured, and against 
what? Value can be direct, numerically-measured (quantifiable), or indirect, such as intrinsic 
value. Value can be labelled as shared value, VFM, or added-value, and even sometimes 
measured by one’s conduct and behaviour. The theory of value examines the subject from several 
perspectives, including ethics, politics, economics, and philosophy. From a utilitarian perspective, 
the greatest value lies in that which provides the greatest utility to the greatest number, whilst in 
a business context, value for a shareholder can reside in profit maximisation, as opposed to other 
stakeholders who may find greater value in innovation. Overarchingly, it is often argued that any 
definition of value and how it is measured is prescriptive. 
At the core of economic thinking, value is defined as price set by supply and demand. 
Hence, when an activity results in a payment, this is seen as value. Value can also be seen as an 
intermediary process or “flow,” such as adding value to a manufacturing supply chain or creating 
new knowledge bases (Porter, 1998). Then there are further riddles as to how these outputs are 
produced, how they are shared across society, whether production is useful, and what is done 
with subsequent earnings. 
Value Derived by Governments  
The public sector is often castigated by some commentators as being “unproductive” in 
delivering value, as government expenditure is funded by taxing the productive parts of the 
economy. However, these critics do not fully recognise public sector contributions in value-
delivery. The simplistic view posits government as an acute example of an unproductive sector. 
Others argue that government expenditure in delivering value should be seen as a process, or 
intermediary, that creates the conditions for a peaceful state, connected through infrastructure, 
police, national defence, and the rule of law that allows for production and services, all of which 
contribute to a nation’s prosperity. Intrinsic value generated through government intervention 
cannot be analysed in the same way as other sectors of the economy. Even traditional economists 
have recognised the important role of government in providing sufficient investment into sectors 
such as the military, judiciary, and other essential public services, as they provide the basic 
institutional and physical infrastructure necessary for economic growth. The public sector then 
pursues identified goals, manages the inputs, and convinces taxpayers of the value delivered 
through spending (United Kingdom HM Treasury, 2017).  
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Valuing the Impact of Defence and Armed Forces  
Valuing the impact of defence is complex, often sparking a debate over the benefits and 
tangible outcomes derived from defence to a nation. Defence is often considered an opportunity 
cost dilemma, with some suggesting it has limited direct economic benefits. Therefore, the 
challenge is in demonstrating the value of defence and effectively communicating this to civil 
society. This value may be intangible: How do you measure risk and protection? How can you 
convincingly prove a negative that defence spending results in threat deterrence? Can we argue 
that defence is essential in delivering the requisite protection and safety to conduct business and 
create order? In defence, measuring direct and indirect value is tedious and often becomes 
subjective. What is being measured? Is it the costs and benefits, inputs and outputs, outcomes 
or impacts? Defence has to articulate how activities improve the quality of life for every citizen, or 
it will fail to adequately justify defence expenditure or prove the existence of viable returns to 
taxpayers (Paul et al., 2015). A common dilemma arises when considering the optimal size of 
national armed forces and defence budget allocations as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Figure 2 shows the proportion of defence budget against GDP for the top 20 countries 
with the highest defence spending in 2019. For example, military spending in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) represents 8.8% of its GDP, one of the highest in the world (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2020). Despite the fact that the KSA remains embroiled 
in an ongoing war in Yemen, is this spending rational relative to the KSA’s overall national 
income? Disproportionate defence spending at the expense of other sectors can diminish overall 
value. In order to be treated as critical, the defence sector and the armed forces must invest in 
the value-creation process in order to demonstrate that their services are essential in both war 
and peacetime.  
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Defence Budget Against GDP for the Top 20 Countries (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2019)  
Several defence economists have questioned the efficiency of national defence 
represented by the armed forces and domestic defence, and whether they provide value for 
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money (Benoit, 1973; Hartley, 2012; Melese et al., 2015). Defence inputs were identified as 
personnel, equipment, and supporting infrastructure, as part of a defence spending policy. 
Defence output includes measures such as the protection of citizens and their assets, businesses, 
economic infrastructure, national institutions, and natural resources, but also as deterrence, 
warfighting capability, disaster and humanitarian relief, as well as economic contributions to 
employment and possibly even exports. By contributing to international peace and stability, 
defence enables globalised trade, exchange, and foreign direct investment, thus contributing to 
national prosperity through endeavours such as the safeguarding of shipping against piracy. 
Prosperity impacts from defence spending include innovation and spin-offs, human capital 
investments, local economic impact, and long-term influences on local labour markets. 
There are several government reports that have tried to incorporate value into how 
defence policies can impact society. The 2017 UK Defence Industrial Policy (DIP) referred to 
defence delivering “wider economic, international value and national security objectives” 
(Williamson, 2017). The report highlights how defence procurement strengthens productivity 
(especially at the local level), boosts exports, and contributes to national prosperity on a 
sustainable basis (UK Defence Industrial Strategy, 2017). The Philippe Dunne (2018) report titled 
Growing the Contribution of Defence to UK Prosperity was the outcome of an enquiry by the 
National Audit Office (NAO) on the outcome and impact of defence spending to British citizens. 
The report attempted to validate the national contribution of defence and the armed forces and 
measured the contribution of defence to economic growth, national life, people, ideas and 
innovation, and location, five core factors used to justify UK defence spending (Dunne, 2018). 
Again, the 2018 UK Ministry of Defence document titled Mobilising, Modernising, and 
Transforming Defence identified three key themes. It scrutinised defence value through broad 
national security objectives: to protect our people; to project our global influence; and to promote 
our prosperity (3P; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2018). This concept of value was also 
discussed at a January 2020 workshop titled “Prosperity and Value: What is Defence’s Triple 
Bottom Line?” organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in conjunction 
with the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) at the Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom (IISS, 2020). The workshop represented various stakeholders yet managed only 
to scratch the surface in terms of consensus on a definitive qualitative measure for the outcome 
and impact of defence spending as tied to UK prosperity (Wylie, 2017). 
Technological innovation and spin-offs to the civil sector have always been cited as a 
major contribution from defence spending. Many major innovations from the past were spin-offs 
through investment in defence research and development (R&D). The internet was originally 
developed for secure military communication. ATM machines, from which most of us receive 
cash, rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) for theft protection—originally developed for 
U.S. military communication. Flat screen televisions, radar, laptops, tablet computers, and touch-
screen mobile phones use liquid crystal displays, another invention made possible by past military 
R&D. More recent examples of technology crossing over from military to civil use are autonomous 
cars, the voice assistant SIRI, and thermal imaging. The defence sector has also significantly 
invested in education and training. If effectively utilised, this investment into human capital should 
be translated into knowledge and capabilities that increase a country's productive capacity and 
aid overall potential growth. 
In the context of this paper, the TDV framework as seen in Figure 3 is used to measure 
value derived from defence spending. TDV is a suggested policy framework that could be applied 
by policy-makers and practitioners to measure the value outcome from defence spending. The 
framework was developed using a variety of sources ranging from secondary literature and 
government reports to interviews with stakeholders and workshops attended by the author. The 
data gathered to measure value in this context were mostly qualitative, as it can be difficult to 
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obtain quantitative data in a defence context. The model is mainly aimed at measuring the 
outcomes of defence spending, though it can be argued that specific processes in defence can 
also be counted as producing value. For example, the act of defence diplomacy is a process that 
is highly valuable as it requires complex negotiation and networking to thwart war. Unfortunately, 
such processes do not get captured when measuring value in defence.  
 
Figure 3. Triple-Defence Value Framework (TDV) 
In the context of this paper, we measure the outcome from defence activities as opposed 
to the processes in defence. The primary role of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence is 
to protect citizens at home and abroad, protect critical infrastructure, prevent conflict, secure 
national borders and overseas territories, and ultimately deliver peace. In order to achieve these 
roles, the armed forces require the ability to access and anticipate future security threats, 
including direct military action and terrorism or cyber-threats, and the subsequent ability to plan 
around specific capabilities required to face identified threats. These capabilities would include 
equipment, training, information, concept and doctrine, personnel, infrastructure, organisation, 
and logistics. The defence budget is then used either to procure the required capability, fund 
indigenous production through the allocated R&D budget, or to enter into collaborative 
partnerships. In the context of the TDV framework, primary value could be derived as the level of 
readiness of units, their warfighting capability, and their subsequent deterrent effect. However, 
empirical measurement of these primary value indicators poses a significant challenge as data is 
either not available or confidential.  
The secondary level of value in this framework is national economic benefit from defence 
spending and benefits to society. The economic benefit of defence spending is derived from 
factors such as the contribution to technological innovations, exports, employment, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), foreign direct investments, industrial partnerships and offsets, regional 
development through building regional clusters and technology parks, and a number of small and 
medium size industries (SMEs) supported through defence activities. Societal benefit is 
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to conduct business, and an overall reduction in GDP. In economic terms, this is also known as 
protection adjusted life years (PALYS). Second, the volume and extent of participation of the 
armed forces in peacekeeping missions, engagement in disaster relief, border control, sea patrol, 
rescue missions, and humanitarian aid, as well as conducting crisis management such as during 
a pandemic or incidents caused by climate change. The defence sector’s other ancillary societal 
value also includes its ceremonial roles, supporting veterans and their families, contributing to 
armed forces pensions, and adding value through civil–military integration during crisis and 
reconstruction phases.  
The tertiary level of value is defined as soft power projection. Value in this context is 
defined as capacity-building measured through training and education programmes (including 
their quality and relevance); the numbers of trained military personal; and promotion of 
universities, strategy-oriented think-tanks, and other defence-related institutions, both 
domestically and internationally, that can help establish credibility. Soft power is also used to 
promote the “rules-based international order” and may be measured through numbers of bilateral 
and multilateral defence co-operation agreements and alliances, joint-military exercises, 
participation at defence exhibitions, air-shows, and international defence conferences or fora.  
Measuring Defence Value: The Case of Malaysia  
The Defence White Paper  
The Malaysian government published its first Defence White Paper (DWP) in January 
2020 (Parameswaran, 2019). The Malaysian Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) highlighted three very 
ambitious reasons for drafting the DWP (Cheng, 2020): first, to foster a transparent leadership 
process through change in how the government delivers value to the public (Abbas, 2019); and 
second, to inform the Malaysian public on the role of the armed forces, but also to promote 
Pertahanan Menyeluruh (HANRUH; Hamzah, 2016)—or total defence,2 a concept introduced to 
express the collective responsibility of government and civil society in managing security and 
handling crises. The third and most relevant reason is specifically to inform the Malaysian public 
on the value derived from defence spending.  
The DWP was drafted based on consultation and dialogue (Balakrishnan, 2019) amongst 
various governmental agencies, extensive meetings with defence and security circles, overseas 
governments,3 and members of the public (Chwee & Hamzah, 2019). Formulation was 
spearheaded by the Malaysian Institute for Defence and Security (MIDAS) together with the 
Strategic and Policy Planning Division of MINDEF, a technical team from the Armed Forces, 
academics, and the defence industry sector. The final version of the DWP was tabled on 
December 2, 2019 (New Straits Times, 2019). The DWP explains the ministry’s vision, strategy, 
and implementation of defence policy, and has a timeline of 10 years (2020–2030; Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020). The policy document is aligned to the National Security Policy (NSP),4 
National Foreign Policy (NFP; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2019), and the National 
 
2 The concept of total defence or comprehensive defence was used by Singapore (1984), modelled after 
countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. The six pillars of total defence include military, civilian, 
economy, social, psychological and digital defence. For further details, see What is Total Defence?, 
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about.html. 
3 During the interview with Vice Admiral Dato’ Ganesh Navaratnam, president at the National Centre for 
Defence Studies (PUSPAHANAS), he stated that the DWP was closely modelled after the 2016 Australian 
Defence White Paper. Malaysia had also consulted other overseas countries such as the UK, New Zealand, 
France and Germany on their experiences of formulating the DWP. 
4 The National Security Policy (NSP) was formulated under the National Security Council Act 2016 (Act 
776). Refer to National Security Policy, 2017, https://www.pmo.gov.my/2019/07/national-security-policy/ 
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Defence Policy (NDP).5 Nonetheless, the DWP has faced criticism in that the content is not 
significantly different from the 2010 Defence Policy Paper.6 Others argue that the DWP has 
“loopholes” and that it has failed to address the real challenges facing Malaysia, and some say 
that the paper has failed to demonstrate empirical value derived from Malaysia’s defence 
spending (Rodzi, 2019). However, there seems to be strong support from stakeholders in 
adhering to the DWP and proposed plans. 
How does the Malaysian government define value? Is this different from general value 
terminology? There is no hard evidence regarding its usage of the concept of “value,” except the 
term “value for money” in procurement policies. The Ministry of Finance’s treasury circular refers 
to the Outcome Based Budget (OBB) introduced since the 10th Malaysia Plan (2010–2016), used 
to measure outcomes from government spending. Each Malaysia Plan is a 5-year comprehensive 
economic development blueprint prepared by the Economic Planning Unit within the Prime 
Minister’s Department (Portal Rasmi, 2020). Unfortunately, the results are yet to be available in 
the public domain. Hence, the value derived from Malaysia’s defence spending based on the 
DWP in this paper is measured using the TDV model.  
Defence Context  
It is contentious whether defence spending has added-value and contributes to Malaysia’s 
prosperity. It is often argued that Malaysia’s internal security counters more immediate threats, 
and hence is more critical than defence. However, defence is still seen as an integral component 
of Malaysia’s comprehensive security environment. The 2010 Malaysian defence policy specified 
that the primary role of defence is to protect and defend the nation’s strategic interest, with 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic wellbeing as core factors.7 Malaysia is a 
parliamentary democracy with a multi-ethnic population of around 32 million, located strategically 
within sea lanes between the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, the Andaman Sea, and the Straits of 
Malacca, through which 30% of global seaborne trade passes (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 
2020). As a small littoral state with limited defence capability, Malaysia projects a defensive 
posture whilst actively promoting defence diplomacy as the first line of defence through bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations at ASEAN, regional, and global levels (Noor & Qistina, 2017). 
However, the DWP recognises there are imminent, immediate, and future threats facing the 
country and that a substantive level of deterrence capability is essential. Hence, a credible 
defence force is crucial to protect East and West Malaysia’s land, sea, and air borders.  
Defence Strategy  
According to the DWP, the Malaysian defence strategy is grounded on three pillars: 
concentric defence, comprehensive defence, and credible partnership (Malaysia Ministry of 
Defence, 2020). The first pillar refers to the concept of concentric deterrence that divides strategic 
interests into base, extended, and front-line areas (Noor & Qistina, 2017). The second pillar refers 
to the role of the “whole of government” and “whole of society” and emphasises the importance 
of internal cohesion in building defence resilience. The third pillar refers to building, strengthening, 
and widening collaboration and external relations through bilateral and multilateral platforms. 
However, the document is vague on strategic priorities, how these strategies will be 
operationalised, or the targeted resources required for this purpose. 
 
5 Noor Hisham (director general, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, MIDAS, Kuala Lumpur), in 
discussion with the author, February 4, 2020. 
6 The National Defence Policy (NDP) is a classified document produced in 1971 and reviewed several times 
in 1979, 1981, 1986, 1993, and 2006 prior to the DWP. An open version of the NDAP was published in 
2010. 
7 Ahmad Nadzri (deputy secretary general [Policy], Ministry of Defence, Malaysia), in discussion with the 
author, January 15, 2020. 
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Defence Spending and Budget Allocation  
The question remains whether Malaysia has targeted sufficient and effective investment 
towards its defence budget. Figure 4 illustrates Malaysia’s defence spending over the past 10 
years with a total figure of USD $3.827 billion (1% of GDP) in 2019. Average defence spending 
(highest in 2003 at around 2.3% of GDP) has been constantly declining to around 1–1.5% of GDP 
since 2014 (Subramaniam et al., 2018). This figure is still higher than many other ASEAN 
countries, but lower than Singapore and Indonesia. This downward spiral is mainly attributed to 
overall government budgetary constraints and the country’s economic turmoil, but will now be 
further exacerbated by the financial impact of COVID-19. This negative trend has certainly been 
a concern considering the Malaysian Armed Forces’ (MAF) lagging defence capabilities and the 
country’s inability to address some of the critical security challenges both facing Malaysia and 
looming in the region (Hosoyo, 2020).  
 
Figure 4. Malaysia’s Defence Spending (2009–2019) in USD (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2020) 
Figure 5 illustrates the bulk of Malaysia’s defence budget, of which 77.5% is allocated to 
operating expenditure (OE; Subramaniam et al., 2018). The development expenditure (DE) of 
22.5% is allocated to the procurement of equipment and services, infrastructure development, 
R&D, and other procurement-related costs (Economic Planning Unit, 2018). In the DWP, there is 
mention of long-term funding streams and efforts to reduce the existing funding gap in the MAF. 
However, the budget lacks clarity on projected future allocation, priority of expenditure as per 
services and sectors, and sources of funding. The white paper would have been more effective 
had it shown greater clarity in identifying top priorities. Further, as defence management is 
currently under the purview of the federal government, there must be greater co-operation 
between the federal and state levels in order to realise the concept of “whole of government.” 
Nonetheless, each state has devolved powers to run administrative functions and manage 
revenue and budgets. Going forward, the lack of transparency on levels of future defence 
spending may have an adverse effect on commitments to procuring and maintaining military 
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capability, especially in the post COVID-19 era, unless the government continues to see the 
importance of defence as contributing to national security.  
 
Figure 5. Malaysia: Defence Expenditure by Development (DE) and Operational Expenditure (OE; 2014–
2019) (Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, 2020, https://www1.treasury.gov.my/index.php/fiskal-ekonomi/data-
ekonomi.html) 
Strength of the Armed Forces  
Malaysia possesses a reasonable body of active military manpower, retaining the fourth 
largest military establishment within ASEAN. Figure 6 shows a detailed breakdown for the three 
services of the MAF between 2017 and 2019.  
 
Figure 6. Malaysia: Size of the MAF by Services and Para-Military (2017–2020) (IISS, 2020)  
The ceiling for military personnel has slightly increased from 109,000 in 2017 to 113,000 
in 2020, mainly due to the intake of some 4,000 navy recruits (IISS, 2020). Figure 7 illustrates 
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this to several other ASEAN countries. The army is still considered the backbone of Malaysia’s 
defence and the core of civil–military integration, as well as providing support to the police during 
internal disorders and crisis situations, which are equally important. However, the strength of the 
navy has become increasingly critical in the past 5 years, as Malaysia views itself as a maritime 
nation becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenges to its territorial waters and resources, 
increasingly due to escalated tensions between major powers in the South China Sea. There is 
no mandatory conscription service, though National Service for youth aged 18 was introduced for 
a short while from 2009–2017. Still, since its abolition, there has been interest in whether another 
structured programme should be developed to engage youth into defence.8 Despite a multi-ethnic 
population, Malays form 95% of the MAF and the civil service, with senior MOD officials claiming 
that it is hard to attract and recruit non-Malays into government positions.9 The greater 
involvement of youth and non-Malays in the defence force may be vital in realising diversity and 
inclusion involving the whole of society in order to best deliver value through defence in Malaysia.  
 
Figure 7. ASEAN: Total Number of Military Personnel per Capita of 1,000 People (IISS, 2020)  
Security Challenges  
Unlike some of its other neighbours in Southeast Asia (SEA), Malaysia has thus far 
enjoyed a continuous benevolent security environment with only minor flash points.10 Hence, 
some argue that the prosperity, stability, and peace-dividend being enjoyed by Malaysians is due 
to the government’s continuous investment in diplomacy, international engagement, and defence 
to create a strong and robust internal and external security environment (Noor, 2019). It is also 
 
8 The National Service (PLKN) was introduced in 2003 for Malaysian youth 18 years of age to encourage 
friendship between Malaysian youth of different races and ethnic groups to address serious concerns of 
the country becoming increasingly divided along racial lines. PLKN was halted in 2018 and abolished in 
August 2018. 
9 Malay bumiputra and other indigenous people of Malaysia are also called the “son of the soils.” 
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argued that the threats and challenges facing Malaysia are built on common interests and issues 
within ASEAN, the wider region, and globally (Laksmana, 2018). However, some contend that 
this is also attributable to Malaysia’s “soft approach” in dealing with its adversaries, where it 
refuses to be openly confrontational. There are various perspectives on the external threats facing 
Malaysia, considering both its strategically valuable land and sea borders, as well as the fact that 
East and West Malaysia are divided by the South China Sea (SEA). This paper discusses 
Malaysia’s major external security challenges and issues in the context of the DWP and several 
other sources (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
First, the largest impact on Malaysia and SEA remains the major power rivalry between 
China and the United States. U.S.–China interaction, their positioning, and their competition for 
influence and dominance in the region pose the greatest strategic and diplomatic challenges 
(Blasko, 2015; Chang, 2015). The issues range from flexing of presence, violation of international 
maritime law, and encroachment into the South China Sea and countries’ exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs; Storey & Yi, 2016). The issue is exacerbated by the presence of middle powers 
such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, and the pressure to take sides through the 
formation of alliances, or regional caucuses. Another potential source of external security 
challenge comes from Malaysia’s common issues and disputes with its neighbouring ASEAN 
countries. This especially pertains to land and border issues, such as human, drug, and animal 
trafficking (often through cartels), poaching, and other effects from conflicts within neighbouring 
states (spill-over), such as an influx of refugees (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). It is 
estimated that Malaysia loses approximately RM 366 million in tax revenue from cigarette 
smuggling (Sebastian, 2020), RM 6 billion from illegal fishing, and around 980 thousand tonnes 
of sea-based produce annually (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). Another major issue is the 
long-term poor health and economic disruption due to haze from illegal logging and deforestation, 
especially in Borneo. These threats are not exhaustive, and Malaysia’s rich natural resources, 
diversified economy, and strategic geopolitical location will continue to raise security threats.  
Procurement Strategy  
Malaysia is a net procurer, importing almost 95% of defence equipment and services. Pre-
Cold War, Malaysia mostly purchased Western products, primarily from the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and the United States. However, since the 1990s, as per Figure 8, Malaysia’s 
procurement trend has hugely diversified to include purchases from countries including Russia, 
Poland, Turkey, Brazil, and of late, South Korea and China. Within ASEAN, Malaysia has also 
procured equipment from Indonesia. Government-to-government processes and restricted 
tenders have been a more popular option than open tender in defence procurement decisions. 
There is an emphasis on VFM and seeking the lowest procurement cost, though this may not be 
the case in practise where technical specification and offsets can also be the deciding factor. 
Offsets or industrial collaborative programmes (ICP) are mandatory as part of international 
defence procurement above a specific threshold. Since 2009, several large contracts, such as 
the 8-by-8 armoured vehicles and the littoral-combat ship (LCS), were awarded to local prime 
contractors, with the expectation of a faster rate of technological absorption and a scaling up of 
indigenous capability.  
However, Malaysia’s defence procurement environment still struggles due to a lack of 
knowledge in threat assessment, which leads to a subsequently poor understanding of military 
requirements. Other procurement issues include acknowledging the wider whole-life-cost of a 
capability and compatibility during systems integration processes. Another consideration is the 
need to balance between total dependence on a single source and the procurement strategy of 
purchasing a small number of platforms and systems from a diverse range of contractors. 
Integrating all of these systems to make them work could be logistically challenging, hugely 
expensive, and inefficient.  
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Figure 8. Malaysia: Import of Defence Equipment by Country (2010–2019) (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2019) 
How has Defence Demonstrated Value in the Malaysian Context?  
Delivering Value at the Primary Level: Protection and Safety  
The DWP states that the primary role of the MAF is to defend the nation’s interests and 
protect its people against any form of external aggression. Articles 74 and 77 of the 1972 Armed 
Forces Act establishes the roles and functions of the three services—army, navy, and air force 
(Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). Malaysia’s primary defence value and the ability to deter 
aggression from foreign nations is measured through the state of readiness of units and platforms 
(Young, 2019). The concept of readiness itself is highly contentious. For the purpose of this 
discussion, readiness is defined as the ability to engage at a short notice in active operations. All 
three services of the armed forces follow a readiness matrix. The inspector general’s office is the 
caretaker of the performance management system, which has been developed primarily using 
the balanced score card method. By nature, it is hard to obtain detailed measurement indicators 
that are currently being used to measure the state of readiness, as nothing is available in the 
public domain.11 Such information is still treated as highly confidential by the MAF. However, 
Table 1 demonstrates an approximate picture of basic measurement indicators for the three 
services. The relevant information was sourced through interviews with senior military officials at 
MINDEF and from the wider defence industry.  
Table 1. Malaysian Armed Forces Readiness 
ARMY  NAVY  AIR FORCE  
 
11 Dato’ Ganesh Navaratnam (vice admiral, president of National Centre for Defence Studies 
[PUSPAHANAS]). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, January 20, 2019. 
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Situational force 
scoring matrix is used.   
- One collective training 
and at least one live-
fire field exercise per 
year.  
-Brigade HQ to 
undergo infield training 
exercises (FTX) 3 to 4 
times a year 
-Command Post 
Exercise (CPX) to 
demonstrate that they 
can conduct command 
and control.  
-Navy strategy map provides the 
mechanism for ensuring 
readiness on a daily, weekly, 
monthly and annual basis 
(DiRaja, 2013). 
-This is monitored by the 
operational commanders as well 
as the navy inspector general’s 
office. 
-Flying hours for helicopters, 
transport and fighter aircraft 
at minimum of 10 hours per 
month to maintain qualified 
pilots who are operational 
ready  
-Quarterly test provides 
additional qualification  
-Additional biannual 
qualification (not 
compulsory), mainly long 
distance flying and physical 
assessments 
- Annual checks on overall 
operational and physical 
fitness of the pilot  
 
The armed forces organise war games and simulations on the probability of attack or 
aggression from a foreign state or non-state actors. The objective is mainly to use mathematical 
modelling and scenario-planning to measure the level of threat, identify gaps, and ensure that the 
military has sufficient capability to deter aggression. The armed forces aspire to have well-trained 
personnel who can understand and provide accurate analysis to senior military commanders, who 
can feed this information to the National Security Council within the prime minister’s office. 
Despite current efforts, the question remains whether the army, navy, and air force are sufficiently 
trained and equipped to be operationally ready.  
There are several key challenges facing the MAF in achieving readiness. Firstly, there are 
difficulties in mobilising the whole of the MAF and civil service to be capable of conducting joint 
operations. The military is still stove-piped in its defence capability planning, procurement 
practices, and budgetary planning, with a “top down approach” within each service. There is also 
a strong sense of boundary control and inter-service rivalry, which remains difficult to dissolve. 
Mistrust still exists between the MAF, civil servants in MINDEF, and other agencies (Anandhan & 
Inderjit, 2014). This contributes to a lack of understanding on how to develop a real threat 
assessment within the MAF, leading to poor prioritisation when determining the capabilities 
required for war-fighting.12 Further, capability requirements constantly change due to the 
competing costs of maintaining existing equipment versus purchasing new equipment.13 Figure 9 
illustrates the fighting capability across the three services, with MINDEF investing heavily in 
traditional platforms such as ships, armoured vehicles, and aircraft systems, as opposed to air 
defence systems, sensors, or missiles.  
 
12 Azhar Mohamad (lt colonel [ret.], director of business development, BAE Systems, ex-commanding 
officer, Air Force College Malaysia). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, February 25, 2020. 
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Figure 9. MAF Fighting Capability of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (USD) (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2019) 
These challenges are exacerbated by buying an assortment of these packages from a 
variety of sources, leading to a subsequently high cost of maintenance and logistical support. The 
last MINDEF budget sanctioned for this purpose 5 years ago was insufficient and did not factor in 
the escalating cost of maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) activities. For example, the air 
force remains unable to conduct modern air operations with the existing overly diverse range of 
aircraft. Therefore, the government must undertake a severe restructuring of the air force with a 
view to reducing the variety of frames in their inventory. 
The DWP has identified a long shopping list of platforms and systems to be acquired by 
the MAF to close this capability gap. These items are focused on emerging technologies such as 
artificial intelligence; cyber capabilities; robotics; Network Centric Operations (NCO); and 
Command, Control, Communication, Computers, intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). However, meeting these 
requirements is costly and requires significant investment, especially to upgrade or buy new 
platforms and sub-systems. This leads to the current situation, where the Malaysian government 
must consider if it can fulfil its military capabilities with only 1% of GDP allocated to defence 
spending (Daim & Harun, 2019). Malaysia’s recent defence spending pattern seems to contradict 
the previously mentioned aspirations, with major budget reductions followed by an overall 
reduction in defence spending. Hence, hard decisions must be made to balance investments 
between operational training, equipment, systems, and other areas.  
Delivering Value at the Secondary Level: Socio-Economic Prosperity  
It is harder to measure value from defence at the secondary level. The DWP mentions the 
role of the defence industry as double-pronged: a platform to support the MAF at the frontline of 
defence, but also as a medium that contributes to highly skilled employment, economic 
redistribution through regional cluster development, opportunities for diversification through the 
enhancement of supply chains, and SME development, growth, export, and innovation 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 132 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(Balakrishnan, 2010). It is also argued that the offsets policy is useful for defence industry growth, 
economic diversification, and foreign direct investment. The offset value for 50 programmes and 
250 offset projects amounted to RM 32 billion between the periods of 2015–2020. It is estimated 
that around 3,000 jobs were generated; 1,000 engineers were trained for high skilled work; and 
500 local companies benefitted through new business opportunities (Defence Industry Division, 
Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). 
Figure 10 provides a detailed breakdown (2015–2020) in terms of offsets distribution, 
where 51% of the offsets credits were allocated to local content or industrial development, 35% 
towards technology development, 9% to investments in marketing and branding, 3% to capability 
development and MRO, and 2% to education and training (Defence Industry Division, Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
 
Figure 10. Malaysia: Distribution of Offsets Credit Value (2015–2020) (Defence Industry Division, 
Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020) 
Since 2005, MINDEF has made a concerted effort to increase defence R&D funding. Table 
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& Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), a government research organisation 
under MINDEF. Although there is a significant increase from RM 2.2 million in 2005 to RM 92.2 
million under the 11th Malaysia Plan (2016–2020), this is still a meagre sum compared to the total 
defence R&D budget of countries with a strong innovation culture, such as Singapore, South 
Korea, and Israel (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). That said, the total R&D figure does not 
capture the R&D budget of the defence industry and universities undertaking defence or dual-use 
research in Malaysia. Currently, STRIDE, National Defence University Malaysia (NDUM), and a 
few other universities and research organisations are involved in defence R&D. Considering the 
negligible size of government defence R&D investment, it is unsurprising that there is little hard 
evidence of patents, licenses, key technology spin-outs, or start-ups, let alone publications of 
international standing. Overall, defence R&D investments have not yielded substantive benefits.  
Table 2. Malaysia’s Defence Spending (Science, Technology, Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), 
Ministry of Defence, 2020) 
Malaysia Plan  Development Budget for STRIDE 
8th Malaysia Plan 
2005 – 2010 
RM2.2 million 
9th Malaysia Plan 
2006 – 2010 
RM17.5 million 
10th Malaysia Plan 
2011 – 2015 
RM10 million 
11th Malaysia Plan 
2016 – 2020 
RM92.2 million 
 
Malaysia has yet to penetrate the defence export market but has made headway with dual-
use exports. Offsets have been used to enter the international defence supply chain for large 
OEMs, with companies such as Composite Technology Research Malaysia (CTRM), Contraves 
Advanced Defence (CAD), and Sapura Defence exporting parts and components (Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020). The defence sector has also been a catalyst to the development of 
several industrial clusters around Malaysia, including a maritime cluster in Lumut, an aerospace 
cluster in Subang, and an automotive cluster in Pekan. These clusters contribute mainly towards 
dual-use industrial activities that assist in creating wider socio-economic impact and long-term 
multipliers. However, the sustainability of these clusters is highly contentious. Participation from 
commercial entities, the level of civil-defence integration, assessing the real value of collaborative 
activities, and the level of integration within these clusters all pose challenges. Several SMEs 
were outsourced work through defence contracts and offsets agreements.  
Hence, there is the question of whether defence spending allocations towards R&D, 
offsets, and sustaining a defence industry are commensurate with the expected outcomes. 
Despite arguments against the economic value of defence to the Malaysian economy, Malaysia 
has been successful in using defence spending for dual-use activities and in capturing commercial 
business and technology. The defence industrial sector that began with a strong footing in the 
1980s and 1990s, and seemed to be on an upward trajectory, has slipped in the past 10 years 
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due to a lack of vision and focus, poor leadership, and mismanagement of funds within the 
defence environment (Balakrishnan, 2008). The defence industrial sector has had difficulties in 
adapting to the changing defence ecosystem, struggling to embrace the adoption of new 
innovative ideas in developing the sector (Balakrishnan, 2008). Overdependence on the 
government as the single source of contracts, corrupt procurement practises, a lack of appetite 
for investment in innovation, and low technological absorption capability have combined to create 
a gloomy outlook for this sector (Hughes, 2011).14 Despite huge investments into the defence 
industry sector, R&D, as well as offsets, there is an overall lack of compelling evidence that there 
have been substantive contributions to the economy from defence (Bitzinger, 2017). Despite more 
than 20 years of investment into offsets, Malaysia’s defence industry sector has not progressed 
and is still hugely dependent on foreign suppliers. Furthermore, recent controversial decisions 
around the trading of commodities such as palm oil for defence equipment may further erode the 
chances of rebuilding the defence industrial base via government-to-government technology 
transfer agreements, offsets, and industrial collaboration programmes (Grevatt, 2019).  
As Malaysia has a relatively small defence industry, stretched in terms of budget but 
hugely concentrated in high-technology sectors including electronics and semiconductors, the 
economy will see significant benefits if the defence industry focuses its efforts and investments 
into dual-use technology fields such as autonomous vehicles, systems integration, data science, 
cyber security, radars, space technology, and battery technology (Lele, 2013). Defence 
technology should be strategically positioned not just for deterrence, but also for contribution to 
overall national industrial policy focused on dual-use technology. There is a need to engage larger 
defence companies (primes) with SMEs to tap into commercial technologies and encourage open 
innovation, as most technological innovation today is a spin-off from smaller SMEs and start-ups. 
The Defence Industry Blueprint is said to address some of these shortfalls and encourage the 
development of strategic drivers to focus on how the defence industry could be more effective, 
but this is yet to be seen (Balakrishnan & Matthews, 2009). There is also mention that 10–15% of 
all nominal offsets value from industry collaboration will be allocated for R&D purposes (Malaysia 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
However, there are many unanswered questions concerning the implementation of 
allocated funds and whether there will be similar commitments from the industry in the form of 
matching grants to access the funding. Further issues lie in accountability, disbursement criteria, 
as well as selection of projects. Perhaps now is the time to develop a separate technology-based 
entity to support human capability development in emerging technology areas, such as C4ISTAR 
and NCO, by reaching out to non-traditional defence suppliers, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and academia, as well as traditional defence suppliers, in order to develop new 
capabilities for Malaysia’s defence sector (United Kingdom - Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory, 2018).  
As current trends demonstrate that most of the emerging technology innovation originates 
from the commercial sector, defence must strive to gain access to such technologies as robotics, 
autonomous vehicles/vessels, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and space. The offsets funding 
allocated to defence R&D should be governed appropriately and used for defence-specific 
technologies that cannot be offered by the commercial sectors, such as radar, missile 
technologies, weapons technologies, and ammunition. The R&D allocation could be more 
effectively utilised by introducing more attractive incentives, such as the patent box scheme 
 
14 Chris Hughes (2011), in his paper, discussed three major challenges for Japan: budget to meet the 
long-term military demand, procurement management and international collaboration as solutions for 
Japan’s revival of its defence industrial base, and “techno nationalism.” 
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whereby companies receive tax credits in return for money spent on R&D (United Kingdom 
Government, 2020).  
Furthermore, the civil offsets programme requires restructuring in order to maximise 
technology transfer from civil prime companies. This is necessitated by the fact that emerging 
technologies in civil sectors reside with tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, 
and Uber. The government should also set up an organisation (United Kingdom - Innovate UK, 
2020) that funds and capitalises on innovation to support Malaysia’s defence prosperity and value 
(United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2019). This should be supported by the building of an 
innovation network consisting of government, private sector, academia, and industry to fund and 
supply emerging defence industry and SMEs with both human and physical capital, as well as 
developing innovative ideas that can be translated into products and services (United Kingdom 
Ministry of Defence, 2020).  
The Malaysian defence sector also performs secondary roles in delivering valuable 
societal services such as carrying out humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue, and 
non-combatant evacuation operations as part of the United Nations (UN) charter and protection 
of critical national infrastructure. Malaysia is part of the ASEAN Humanitarian Aid and Disaster 
Relief (HDRF) military readiness group. In 2010, Malaysia wanted to demonstrate leadership as 
part of UNHRD and set up a World Food Programme (WFP) logistics centre at Subang airport, 
acting as a centre for humanitarian relief items within 48 hours of crisis. The armed forces also 
collaborate with the Federation of Red Cross, Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the 
International Council of Red Cross (ICRC) to strengthen international humanitarian law. For 
example, the military was called to support Rohingya refugees by lending the A400M aircraft to 
transport medical personnel to Bangladesh in 2017 (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, 2020). The 
MAF have been involved in 40 peacekeeping missions, the first in the Republic of Congo (1960–
1964), and most recently in Yemen (2019) until now. Other active missions include Darfur and 
South Sudan since 2007, Liberia since 2003, West Sahara since 1991, Philippines since 2004, 
Lebanon since 2007, and Bangladesh since 2017 (United Kingdom - Innovate UK, 2020). The 
COVID-19 pandemic also highlighted how the military supports the police force and medical 
professionals during a national crisis through patrols, use of military hospitals and doctors, as well 
as military equipment for airlift and fast transportation.  
The immediate value question is whether Malaysian taxpayers should fund humanitarian 
aid and peacekeeping missions in distant places. What value does this create for the citizens? 
One argument is that these activities demonstrate that Malaysia is a mature and reliable nation 
capable of contributing to collective world peace and international order.  
Delivering Value at the Tertiary Level: Soft Power Projection  
Despite being a small maritime nation, Malaysia aspires to be a SEA lynchpin for the wider 
region (Subramaniam et al., 2018). Strategically, it remains firmly supportive of the international 
world order and democratic values and objectives whilst retaining a deep historical suspicion of 
Chinese objectives and intentions in the region. Malaysia attempts to exert its values through 
bilateral and multilateral engagement, joint-training exercises, and by sending military and civilian 
MOD officials for training overseas. Malaysia has also built traditional partnerships with non-
ASEAN countries in the region, such as with India, Pakistan, and Japan, focused on joint 
exercises and training.  
As part of defence diplomacy, Malaysia has established defence bilateral co-operation 
with individual ASEAN countries to enhance primary capability and save money through the 
sharing of capabilities. Malaysia’s history of defence bilateral co-operation began with Thailand 
(1965) and Indonesia (1972) through the Government Border Control (GBC) agreement. Since 
then, it has signed a dozen other bilateral defence MOUs with Brunei (1992), Philippines (1994), 
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Vietnam (2008), Cambodia (2018) and Laos PDR (2019). It is in the interest of the armed forces 
to build strong defence links and negotiate for the procurement of common platforms and 
systems, which can then lead to better interoperability.  
The FPDA, or the Five Power Defence Arrangement (1971), is the only apolitical, 
multilateral platform formed predominantly for joint-military exercises amongst the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The FPDA is said to contribute to 
Malaysia’s primary defence value, as the platform is used for integrated air defence capability, 
the sharing of resources and intelligence, as well as maintaining existing assets.  
At the global level, the Malaysian Armed Forces have also built defence co-operation with 
the United States, China, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, mainly focused on 
combined military exercises, courses, training, exchange of visits and intelligence discussions.15 
Platforms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus are used to 
communicate the importance of enhancing national security and expressing how each nation 
views the others’ power projection on overlapping conflicts.16 Malaysian military personnel mostly 
attend courses at local universities, with some also attending courses and undertaking degree 
programmes using government and foreign-funded scholarships to prestigious universities in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and France.17 Military personnel are seen as a high 
value human resource—especially in the technology sector—assuming that the average military 
career is less than 10 years in length. However, if it is significantly longer than that, the value of 
retiring military personnel to the civil sector may be reduced.  
Conclusion  
This paper set out to measure the value derived from defence spending. Historically, this topic 
has proven to be challenging and problematic, but this does not imply that the armed forces and 
the defence sector do not have to prove that value is derived from defence spending and make 
efforts to improve the overall impact of defence. Unfortunately, few countries have tried to 
measure this. To do so, we constructed the TDV framework. The TDV framework, divided into 
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, can be applied to analyse any country’s defence 
investment. Extrapolations using this framework should be modified by each nation according to 
its context. One has learned through its application that it becomes increasingly harder to 
demonstrate value as we move down the value-chain from the primary to the tertiary level. The 
paper argues that at the primary level, the most critical value measurement is associated with the 
level of protection and safety that is provided to a nation and its citizens by the armed forces and 
defence sector. This is determined by the ability of the armed forces to deter aggression, 
precipitated by ensuring readiness and building sufficient capability. At the secondary level, value 
is measured through socio-economic prosperity, and finally, at the tertiary level, value arises 
through soft-power projection to demonstrate the criticality of a nation in its geopolitical and 
strategic positioning. 
Covering Malaysia, the paper applied the TDV framework to analyse the value derived from its 
defence spending. The TDV was a useful evaluation tool to understand Malaysia’s current value 
from defence spending at all levels. However, insufficient public data made objective analysis and 
determination of what and how to measure value challenging. The DWP is the first public 
 
15 Hisham Noor (director for the Malaysian Institute for Defence and Security, Ministry of Defence, 
Malaysia). Interviewed by Kogila Balakrishnan, May 4, 2020. 
16 The ADMM includes ASEAN plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, Republic of Korea, and China. 
17 The most popular overseas universities and colleges include those such as Sandhurst, Berkshire, Royal 
College of Defence and Security (RCDS), UK Defence Academy, Naval Postgraduate School United 
States, U.S. Military Academy (West Point), Australian Defence Force Training Centre (ADFA) and 
Australian Defence College. 
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document that has discussed the value derived from defence spending to the Malaysian public, 
despite claims that the content differs little from previously classified defence policy documents.  
In the case of Malaysia, the primary role of defence was measured by the state of readiness of 
the MAF. There were several challenges beyond the author’s limitations in obtaining sufficient 
data, such as operational activity irregularity in the systematic and consistent collection of such 
data, as well as tenuous political will in investing resources to attain higher levels of readiness.  
The outcome from the secondary role of defence concerning socio-economic prosperity resulting 
from defence spending has also been minimal. After almost 50 years of government investment 
into defence industrialisation, offsets and R&D, results have been modest. There is a lack of 
appetite for enhancing innovative capability, addressing competitiveness and penetrating the 
global market within the defence industry sector. Positive outcomes include spin-offs from 
defence spending to developing commercial supply chains and skills development in high-
technology sectors. Further, outcomes from HRDF activities were positive where the MAF has 
successfully supported critical missions abroad.  
Finally, outcomes from the tertiary role of defence regarding soft power projection has led to an 
increased status for the Malaysian defence sector in defence diplomacy, such that this successful 
projection as a friendly nation means it is often invited by major powers to broker peace talks in 
the region. In recent years, Malaysia has also increased its level of joint exercises with 
neighbouring ASEAN countries and major powers in the region and globally. Malaysia has been 
very successful in keeping alive the dynamics and contributing actively to multilateral platforms 
such as ADMM, ADMM Plus and FPDA.           
The valuation framework can be very fuzzy, and their respective explanations are subjective—
they require careful scrutiny and are not a “one-size-fits-all” framework. Further, the framework is 
culturally and socially dependent on what each country would like to identify as value derived from 
defence spending. We still have problems appraising value when it comes to buying defence or 
deterrence. Hence, this framework is not perfect and represents a general template that may 
provide a useful starting point when initiating value measurements for the defence sector. As 
previously mentioned, it is hard to measure value in public service delivery, let alone defence. 
These indicators provide guidance that should be used selectively and modified to the strategic 
context of each country.  
There are several issues that the defence sector should consider when attempting to improve 
value measurement in the future. First, it is important to critically evaluate existing policy and 
processes that are in place to capture and manage data. Data could be highly sensitive and will 
require careful handling and classification. It is also necessary to have at least a basic platform 
with the right architecture to capture data on the value of defence spending. Success in this area 
would be seen through the ability to publish yearly reports on value derived from defence spending 
based on systematic analysis. However, the overall process of realising the importance of 
communicating value from defence spending must be driven by strong leadership that believes 
such efforts are vital. At the same time, there must be a bottom-up process that works to minimise 
the implementation gap that hinders defence value maximisation.  
The TDV framework could be used as a preliminary model by other countries in Southeast 
Asia, the region, and globally to examine defence value, understand the strengths and 
weaknesses that arise from the value evaluation process, and use the outcomes to develop or 
improve on existing defence policy and implementation. The defence community, especially 
politicians, policy-makers and the armed forces must recognise the importance in demonstrating 
value from defence spending, especially in a world where defence budget allocations are 
increasingly contested. The TDV framework is a work in progress and can be a useful public 
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policy tool used by the defence community to drive the idea of demonstrating value through 
defence spending. 
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Abstract 
To respond to China’s military–civil fusion (MCF) strategy, the United States needs a prioritization 
framework. The United States must determine what technologies to protect and capabilities to 
develop. These determinations must be informed by U.S. goals, accounting for relative strengths 
and weaknesses. The determinations must also be informed by the adversary: how China 
operates, to what ends, and with what resources.  
This paper leverages the technological demands of China’s National Defense Science and 
Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams in order to begin to address those questions—
and to provide an example of the sort of data sets that might be used to answer them more 
comprehensively moving forward. Beijing’s MCF innovation ecosystem clearly prioritizes 
information technology, broadly. More specifically, entities charged with fusing commercial and 
military innovation appear to prioritize autonomous systems (e.g., UAVs, UUVs), sensing and 
network technologies to dock into and connect them, and information aggregation and analysis 
platforms. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature prominently in the surveyed data set. 
These findings can inform U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition. Defensively, Beijing’s 
priorities and commercial dependencies should shape the DoD’s efforts to protect. Offensively, 
the insight this data provides into Chinese capabilities can assist U.S. efforts to identify and 
exploit weaknesses.  
Introduction 
We no longer require National Defense Strategies to signal that the United States and 
China are locked in a great power competition. And Beijing’s military–civil fusion (军民融合; 
MCF) strategy—once a niche, technical concept reserved for fora like this one—has become a 
widely recognized component of today’s great power contest (de La Bruyere & Picarsic, 2019). 
Discussion of MCF appears everywhere from U.S. policy documents to mainstream media 
coverage (e.g., Swanson, 2020). With this growing awareness of MCF comes growing 
awareness of the strategic asymmetries it portends, namely Beijing’s ability to weaponize its 
integration into the international commercial ecosystem both to obtain resources and project 
power.  
This diagnosis of the United States–China competition, and the role of MCF within it, is 
long overdue. Yet however accurate, broad diagnosis neither ensures an appropriate strategic 
response to China’s challenge nor resolves the asymmetries of Beijing’s competitive approach. 
MCF entails the integration of military and civilian resources, actors, and positioning for the sake 
of comprehensive, and international, power. The strategy is designed to take advantage of the 
twin trends of information technology and globalization. With innovation flowing relatively freely 
across national borders, Beijing siphons advanced research and development from abroad in 
order to bolster its own military and economic apparatus (de La Bruyere, 2020). In a world 
dependent on multinational supply chains, Beijing develops positions of relative control over key 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 142 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
nodes within them—and then converts that control into coercive leverage (Bradsher, 2010). As 
international systems come to depend on information and its flow, Beijing works not only to 
collect superior information but also to build and to control emerging global information 
infrastructures (e.g., telecommunications, digital payment systems, surveillance networks). 
Beijing does so across military and commercial domains, for fused military and commercial 
advantage (de La Bruyere & Picarsic, 2020). 
There is no easy response to China’s approach. The U.S. commercial sector innovates, 
including in dual-use domains. That innovation circulates relatively freely at home and abroad. 
Washington can neither stop such circulation nor move domestic innovation into the isolated 
confines of government operations. Nor can Washington re-shore, or allied-shore, all supply 
chains over which China might exert coercive leverage—or match Beijing point for point in all 
emerging infrastructures everywhere.  
Rather, the United States must prioritize. In military as well as in commercial and civilian 
competition, Washington will have to develop a prioritization framework—of what technologies 
to protect, what resources and manufacturing capabilities to develop, and through what 
infrastructures to compete. That framework should be derived from U.S. goals, factoring in U.S. 
strengths and weaknesses, including relative standing vis-à-vis China. The framework must also 
take into account the adversary’s framework—how China operates, to what ends, and with what 
resources—including 
 
• those technologies and applications that Beijing prioritizes for the emerging great power 
competition; 
• those technologies for which Beijing relies on the civilian sector; and 
• those actors within the Chinese system that play the most critical roles in the process.  
 
These are large questions but not impossible ones. Reliable open-source indicators exist 
to benchmark comparative analysis and map out answers. This paper leverages one data set in 
particular: technological demands of China’s National Defense Science and Technology 
Innovation Rapid Response Teams since 2018. This data set by no means reflects the entirety 
of the MCF innovation ecosystem. Neither it nor the analysis presented in this paper is 
exhaustive. Rather, they are offered as examples of the sort of open-source data, and analysis 
of it, that can fuel the requisite understanding of Beijing’s systems and priorities.  
The Rapid Response Team data set suggests that the MCF innovation ecosystem 
places particular emphasis on information-related technologies and applications. Among notable 
examples, those include autonomous vehicles—for air, ground, and maritime deployment—as 
well as the sensing and network capabilities to be docked into them. They also, and perhaps 
most significantly, include networks or platforms through which collected information can be 
integrated and analyzed. Those networks and platforms, and the power that they promise, apply 
to military as well as to civilian domains: MCF fuses both civilian and military inputs to develop 
outputs that are applied in traditional military domains. This much is already well documented in 
U.S. analysis. The MCF innovation effort, as reflected in this sample, also uses fused civilian 
and military inputs to develop outputs that are used to project power in civilian domains. These 
civilian domains those conventionally seen as cooperative rather than competitive. In other 
words, not only are military and civilian inputs to be fused, but military and civilian outputs are as 
well. 
National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams 
In 2018, the Science and Technology Committee of China’s Central Military Commission 
established the first National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response 
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Team, known as the Rapid Response Team. That team was based in Shenzhen (Office of the 
Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, 2018).1 Since, additional teams in Chongqing and Dalian have been 
established.  
These Rapid Response Teams might be thought of as the Chinese equivalents of the 
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). As the Office of the Military-Civil Fusion Development 
Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the CCP puts it, the Rapid Response 
teams “link advanced commercial technologies and products to national defense capabilities.” 
Their main task is to “pay close attention to advanced commercial technologies, concepts, and 
models; actively discover and quickly respond to commercial technologies and products with 
military application potential; and build a bridge between the frontiers of military and commercial 
innovation” (Office of the Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the Shenzhen 
Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2018). To that end, the Rapid Response 
Teams 
• study advanced commercial technologies, monitoring new developments for applications 
to national security, including through monthly field research; 
• solicit fast, innovative commercial solutions based on national defense needs, generally 
with a 6-to-12-month timeline for delivery; and 
• use military-oriented demonstrations of technologies and their applications to build a 
communication platform for the military, innovative companies, innovative teams, and 
investment vehicles (Office of the Military–Civil Fusion Development Committee of the 
Shenzhen Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2018). 
 
Since 2018, the Rapid Response Teams have issued requests for at least 57 
technological solutions (see Appendix) and have organized at least six technology competitions 
or challenges (see Table 3). The technology solution requests tend to have timelines ranging 
from 6 to 12 months for delivery, with the exception of three directly related to COVID-19 
response, which call for 5- to 30-day turnaround. In some but not all cases, the technology 
solution requests state explicitly that the projects should “give priority to domestic materials, 
equipment and systems.”2 
This paper uses the set of requests and challenges as a proxy for assessing those 
technologies and applications around which China’s commercial-based MCF innovation efforts 
revolve and for identifying associated actors. Of course, the Rapid Response Teams and their 
projects do not reflect the entirety of China’s national defense science and technology project or 
the MCF apparatus. By any metric—funding, employees, projects—these constitute a relatively 
small program. However, they do exist at a ripe intersection of MCF and innovation. The insight 
they provide might not be exhaustive, but it is unusually valuable. 
Rapid Innovation with Chinese Characteristics 
The National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams’ 
technology requests and challenges reveal a decided focus on information-related technologies, 
namely autonomy and sensing. Nine of the Rapid Response Teams’ 57 known technology 
requests relate directly to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and another three relate to 
 
1 Shenzhen is considered China’s high-tech hub (see, for example, Borak & Xue, 2021).  
2 See, for example, the shipborne 3D printing intelligent rapid repair manufacturing technology and the 
high voltage, high current pulse inductor coil assembly projects. 
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unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).3 Those are matched by a similar number of requests 
for sensing and network capabilities that could be docked into them. Maritime examples include 
video-based maritime intelligent target recognition technology, shallow surface target detection 
technology, software-defined multifunctional sonar, environmental perception adaptive 
underwater acoustic mobile ad hoc network technology, and underwater distributed optical fiber 
sensing technology. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature prominently in this data 
set. That may be a function of information availability (e.g., stricter confidentiality protocols 
around their development) or time frame (i.e., they may require more lead time and therefore 
not fall under the purview of rapid innovation). The gap could also reflect a difference in 
prioritization (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1. Rapid Response Teams Requests and Challenges, by Technology Focus 







Operations and Maintenance 1 
Flight 1 
 
Table 2. Rapid Response Teams Requests and Challenges, by Domain Focus 
Domain  Project Count 
Maritime 16 
Air 14 
Energy  7 
Advanced Materials 6 
Ground 6 
Information Space 6 
COVID-19 4 
Electronics and Circuits 4 
 
Across the board, regardless of the focus domain or technology, the data set reveals an 
emphasis on information collection, integration, and operationalization. This emphasis is evident 
in the host of technology requests focused on autonomy and sensing (e.g., video-based 
maritime intelligent target recognition technology). The emphasis is even more evident in the 
Rapid Response Teams’ technology challenges.  
 
3 In what might reflect an asymmetry of technological approach, the technological requirements for one of 
these projects, the “hand-thrown micro aircraft,” requested in January 2020, note that the communication 
module should “later provide the connection function with the 5G communication network.”  
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Table 3. Rapid Response Team Challenges: 2018–2020 
Date Name Additional Organizing Entities Description 
Dec 
2018 
Exoskeleton quick sprint 
project 
- Execution period of 3 years (2018.12 ~ 2021.12); carried out in 
three 12-month stages, including two application sprints (6 




Remote Sensing Data 
Intelligent Processing 
Algorithm Competition 
Harbin Institute of Technology (Shenzhen); Aerospace 
Dongfanghong Satellite Co.; Changchun Institute of 
Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (Chinese 
Academy of Sciences); Shenzhen Pusheng Intelligent 
Technology Co.; Zhuhai Orbit Aerospace Technology 
Co.; China Yuan Jinxin (Dalian) Information 
Technology Co. 
Promote the development of massive optical remote sensing 
satellite data processing technology, aim at in-orbit applications, 
and support the realization of massive remote sensing data 









National Defense Science and Technology Innovation 
Special Zone Expert Group, National Space Science 
Center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute 
of Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.  
Focus on detection and recognition needs of ground targets in 
complex urban scenes through algorithm performance 
comparison tests based on real-environment video data sets; 
the goal is to enhance the intelligent recognition and real-time 






National Defense Technology Innovation Special Zone 
Expert Group  
Focus on the needs of security prevention and control in the 
core area of the city and the detection and identification of 
ground threats, as well as to promote and lead the innovative 
development of the AI security field; the goal is to select new 
solutions for intelligent image/video analysis in natural 










National Defense Technology Innovation Special Zone 
Expert Group, China Academy of Ordnance Science, 
PLA Army Research Institute, Chongqing High-Tech 
Zone Feima Innovation Research Institute, Chongqing 
University of Technology, China Ordnance Industry 
Testing Research Institute, Chongqing Science and 
Technology Bureau 
Based on large-scale activities in the urban environment, 
explore the multi-scenario, multi-node dynamic communication 
group in the urban environment based on the complex 
geographic environment, electromagnetic environment, and 
dynamic movement of people in the city.  
Jan 
2020 
Accurate Aerial Docking 
Technology of “Range 
Go” UAV Challenge 
National Defense Technology Innovation Zone Expert 
Group, China Aerospace Science and Industry 
Corporation, The Third Institute of Aerospace Science 
and Technology of China, China Electronics 
Technology Group Corporation Electronic Science 
Research Institute, Shanghai Jiaotong University, 
University of Electronic Science and Technology, 
Xidian University, Yuanwang Think Tank, Shanxi 
Datong Aviation Sports School 
This challenge focuses on the drone aerial docking process, 
including precise flight control of drones against aerodynamic 
interference, precise identification and tracking of docking 
points, the efficient approach strategy for air pre-docking, and 
collision avoidance and obstacle avoidance technology. 
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Of the six known challenges held since December 2018, four revolve around information 
collection, processing, and analysis, and a fifth on aerial docking of UAVs (see Table 3). A host 
of other entities cooperate with the Rapid Response Teams in organizing those challenges, 
suggesting a breadth of data types, collection methods, and applications—as well as of 
players—involved in the MCF information innovation process. For example, the organizing 
entities for the January 2020 Unlimited Smart Communication Challenge span military, 
industrial, academic, and government units. They include the China Academy of Ordnance 
Science and China Ordnance Industry Testing Research Institute, both of which exist under 
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), one of China’s centrally state-owned 
defense industry conglomerates; the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Army Research 
Institute; the Chongqing High-Tech Zone Feima Innovation Research Institute (重庆高新区飞马
创新研究院), a research institute dedicated to the development of dual-use technology and 
housed within a MCF-focused industry zone (Chongqing University Graduate Employment 
Information Network, n.d.); as well as the Chongqing University of Technology and the 
Chongqing Science and Technology Bureau (National Defense Science and Technology 
Innovation Rapid Response Team [Shenzhen], 2020). 
That 2020 Unlimited Smart Communication Challenge also points to another core aspect 
of the MCF information project reflected in the Rapid Response Team data set: These requests 
and competitions do not simply entail converting civilian inputs to military use cases. They also 
suggest an effort to use civilian outputs to project military-relevant power. The 2020 Unlimited 
Smart Communication Challenge revolved around using flexible broadband communication and 
dynamic networking capabilities in an urban environment. Participating teams connected 
competition equipment—distributed in buildings, across city blocks, and in underground 
passages—to a test access platform; their scores were determined by video and voice 
transmission capability as well as average transmission delay. (National Defense Science and 
Technology Innovation Rapid Response Team [Shenzhen], 2020). This contest took place in a 
civilian environment, leveraging commercial technology, but was organized by military entities 
under the mandate of national defense innovation.  
The Ground Sentinel Challenge, also held in 2020, tells a similar story. The Rapid 
Response Team’s description of the competition describes it as “focusing on the needs of 
security prevention and control in the core area of the city and the detection and identification of 
ground threats.” Accordingly, the challenge revolved around intelligent video and image analysis 
solutions in “natural surveillance scenarios” to “promote the rapid development of smart security 
technology” for urban areas. Goals included unconstrained face recognition, suspicious object 
recognition, and dangerous behavior recognition. In determining the participating entities, 
priority was given to applicants who had past histories of supporting national ministry and 
provincial security systems (National Defense Science and Technology Innovation Rapid 
Response Team, 2020). This contest, too, took place in a civilian environment, focused on 
civilian subjects, leveraging commercial technology. 
This blurred line between national defense innovation and civilian-focused applications is 
by no means surprising. It underlines a critical nuance of China’s MCF strategy. MCF is not only 
about fusing military and civilian inputs for the sake of Beijing’s power projection—using 
commercial UAV technologies in military operations, for example. The MCF project also fuses 
military and civilian outputs, whether industrial positioning or technological applications, in order 
to bolster China’s power projection. In this data set, China’s smart city technology, information 
collection, and control stands out as a ripe example. The point applies more broadly, especially 
across emerging infrastructures, networks, and platforms (de La Bruyere, 2020b). 
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The Rapid Response Teams’ technological requests also point to the other direction in 
which MCF can work: transfer of resources from the military to the civilian. Four of the requests 
issued in 2020 focus on technologies to be used in COVID-19 response, ranging from personal 
protective equipment to UAVs for operation in areas affected by the epidemic (see Table 4). 
Perhaps the most interesting element of these requests is their timeline: The vast majority of 
other technological requests call for delivery within a 12-month window. The shortest time frame 
for non–COVID-19 relevant technological requests, appearing only on three occasions, is 6 
months. However, three of the four COVID-19 relevant requests call for delivery in a matter of 
days, including as few as 5. These requests provide an example of Defense Production Act–like 
Chinese acquisition. They also suggest the timing with which such rapid acquisition might take 
place.  
 
Table 4. COVID-19 Relevant Technology Requests 
Date Request Timeline 
(months)  
1/30/20 Research on the prediction of the spread of harmful microorganisms 6 
2/8/20 Emergency operation UAV in epidemic area >1 (5 days) 
2/11/20 A batch disinfection system for personal protective equipment that 
can be quickly deployed 
>1 (30 
days) 
2/11/20 Protective clothing that can be re-sterilized and used >1 (20 
days) 
 
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Acquisition 
An appropriate response to the asymmetric threat of China’s MCF strategy will require a 
prioritization framework. The United States, and the U.S. acquisition system, will have to 
determine what technologies to protect, what resources and manufacturing capabilities to 
develop, and through what infrastructures to compete. Those determinations must be informed 
by U.S. goals, factoring in U.S. strengths and weaknesses—what is effective and ineffective, 
efficient and inefficient in the U.S. system.  
The determinations must also be informed by the adversary—by how China operates, to what 
ends, and with what resources. The United States must understand 
• those technologies and applications that Beijing prioritizes for the great power 
competition; 
• those technologies and applications for which Beijing relies on the civilian sector; and 
• those actors within the Chinese system that play the most critical roles in the process.  
This paper leverages the technological demands of China’s National Defense Science 
and Technology Innovation Rapid Response Teams in order to begin to answer those 
questions—and to provide an example of the sort of data sets, and analysis, that might be used 
to answer them more comprehensively moving forward. This single data set and this paper’s 
findings are only one piece of the overall puzzle. Still, direct implications emerge for an 
adversary-informed prioritization framework. 
• Beijing’s MCF innovation ecosystem clearly prioritizes information technology, broadly. 
• More specifically, entities charged with fusing commercial and military cutting-edge 
technology appear to prioritize autonomous systems (e.g., UAVs, UUVs), sensing and 
network technologies to dock into and connect them, and information aggregation and 
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analysis platforms more specifically. Advanced algorithms and software do not feature 
prominently in this data set. That may be a function of information availability (e.g., 
stricter confidentiality protocols around their development) or time frame (i.e., they may 
require more lead time and, therefore, not fall under the purview of rapid innovation). 
The gap could also reflect a difference in prioritization. 
• The MCF innovation ecosystem relies on participation and support from a range of 
government, industrial, and academic players, both military and civilian—local 
governments as well as military organs; state-owned defense industry conglomerates 
(e.g., NORINCO) as well as private, commercial companies (e.g., Shenzhen Pusheng 
Intelligent Technology Co., a subsidiary of Guangzhou Hengchuang Intelligent 
Technology Co.); state and military research institutes (e.g., the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences) as well as universities. 
These findings can directly inform DoD acquisition processes. Defensively, the DoD 
might take particular efforts to protect those technological areas that Beijing both focuses on 
and leverages the commercial sector in developing. Defensive measures can include screening 
of commercial DoD partners (e.g., Small Business Innovation Research [SBIR] applicants). 
Defensive measures can also include more systemic efforts, like the Trusted Capital Program. 
The DoD might also use the taxonomy of players contributing to MCF innovation efforts to 
inform monitoring of, and restrictions on, Chinese entities, including expansion of the companies 
identified under Section 1237 of the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act and 
corresponding actions. More offensively, these findings—and the more granular details of the 
technologies being requested and developed—might assist U.S. efforts to identify, and exploit, 
weaknesses of the Chinese defense apparatus.  
Today’s great power competition has been described as a technological race. Before we 
start running, let’s figure out where the finish line is. And how to stop our adversary from drafting 
off of us.  
Appendix. Rapid Response Team Technology Requests, 2018–2020 
Date Request Timeline 
(months) 
4/11/18 Conformal antenna and circuit integration rapid manufacturing technology 12 
4/11/18 High-pressure hydraulic control terminal control technology 12 
4/11/18 Video-based maritime intelligent target recognition technology 12 
4/11/18 High voltage, strong pulse current flexible coaxial cable 12 
4/11/18 High-precision, high-reliability, low-cost servo drive controller 12 
4/11/18 Intelligent human–computer interaction module 12 
4/11/18 Micro system heat sink 12 
7/24/18 Shipborne 3D printing “first aid kit” intelligent rapid repair manufacturing 
technology 
- 
6/3/19 Deepwater heavy-duty manipulator 12 
6/3/19 Deep water, high power density, high reliability, brushless propulsion motor 12 
10/15/19 Low-cost small air-to-surface missile technology - 
11/12/19 Low-cost small aircraft that can be deployed at high altitudes - 
11/12/19 High-altitude flying technology research - 
11/12/19 Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft dense and rapid deployment system - 
12/23/19 Self-protecting solder paste for high-reliability three-dimensional packaging - 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 149 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
12/23/19 0.6-inch high resolution silicon-based OLED microdisplay - 
12/23/19 Strong special-shaped tempered glass - 
12/23/19 Servo for high-overload low-cost missiles - 
12/23/19 Research on low-cost, high-temperature, infrared and low-radiation technology 
for vehicles 
- 
12/23/19 High rigidity and impact resistance precision reducer - 
1/7/20 Long-distance fishing net detection technology - 
1/7/20 Wide temperature semiconductor laser research - 
1/7/20 High voltage, high current pulse inductor coil assembly 6 
1/7/20 High-reliability DC brushless special motor with hollow cup - 
1/7/20 Anti-strong magnetic field and high overload DC brushless special motor - 
1/13/20 Integrated communication system and terminal for indoor distributed 
communication and positioning based on illumination light 
12 
1/13/20 Hand-thrown micro aircraft - 
1/21/20 Shallow surface target CT system 12 
1/21/20 Research on shallow surface target detection technology 6 
1/30/20 Research on the prediction of the spread of harmful microorganisms 6 
2/8/20 Emergency operation UAV in epidemic area >1 (5 
days) 




2/11/20 Protective clothing that can be re-sterilized and used >1 (20 
days) 
2/24/20 Software-defined multifunctional sonar 12 
2/24/20 Research on the preparation technology of ceramic-based material metal 
coating microstructure 
6 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” drone detection technology in urban complex environment 12 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” drone agile disposal technology in complex urban 
environment 
12 
3/9/20 “Low, slow, small” UAV link takeover technology in urban complex environment 12 
3/12/20 Development and application of on-site fatigue damage testing technology 
under extreme conditions 
- 
3/12/20 High-speed UUV near-field track electromagnetic passive measurement 
system 
12 
3/12/20 New aircraft anti-bird strike coating 12 
3/20/20 Formation collaborative navigation technology of underwater man-machine 
hybrid system 
12 
3/20/20 Environmental perception adaptive underwater acoustic mobile ad hoc network 
technology 
12 
3/20/20 Multi-domain and cross-media integrated communication and networking 
technology 
12 
3/20/20 Intelligent detection and recognition technology for typical targets of divers 12 
3/20/20 Smart diving mask integration optimization technology - 
3/26/20 UAV rapid obstacle avoidance technology 8 
3/26/20 UAV rapid target recognition and tracking technology 12 
3/26/20 Enhanced low-light scope 12 
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3/26/20 Personnel identification technology in dark environment 12 
4/16/20 Configurable RF chip 12 
4/16/20 Modular robot 12 
4/26/20 Underwater special connector 12 
4/26/20 Lightweight high-performance electromagnetic shielding paint 9 
4/30/20 Underwater distributed optical fiber sensing technology 12 
4/30/20 High-performance four-quadrant laser receiver components 12 
4/30/20 High-performance high-voltage DC/DC power supply module 10 
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Abstract 
The time required to complete a software development or upgrade, like any other project, 
depends on the content of the project, how it is managed, and its preexisting conditions. 
The factors limiting the speed of software acquisition and enhancement fall into these 
principal categories, in rough order of importance:  
1. Required functionality—what you need the software to do (and not do)  
2. Architecture—the organizing structure of the software and its operating 
environment  
3. Technology maturity—to what extent the intended design uses novel 
solutions  
4. Resources—the people, skills, funds, data, and infrastructure needed to do 
the work  
5. Testing strategy—acquiring the information to fix defects early in 
development  
6. Contract structure—the alignment of contractor incentives with DoD 
satisfaction  
7. Change management—the processes for trading off performance, schedule, 
cost, and sustainability  
This paper considers this taxonomy and examines how each category affects the pace of 
development. 
Introduction 
Improving the agility of defense acquisition is a high priority goal for both the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments. Improving the 
speed at which the Department of Defense (DoD) can develop, deploy, and update 
software-enabled capabilities would enable more general acquisition agility, given 
modern defense systems’ critical dependence on software. This point was emphasized 
in both a 2018 Defense Science Board report and in the 2019 Defense Innovation Board 
(DIB) Software Acquisition and Practices (SWAP) study. 
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There is now widespread consensus that software development is the pacing 
activity not only in traditional information systems acquisition, but in all major defense 
systems acquisition. As early as 20 years ago, the Naval Postgraduate School was 
already teaching students that “software is now acknowledged as sitting on the critical 
path of most major weapon systems and is widely regarded as the highest-risk element 
in an acquisition” (Nissen, 2019). Other recent research has confirmed this insight (Tate, 
2016). If we want our acquisition enterprise to deliver capabilities more quickly and 
upgrade them more frequently, we need to speed up defense software development. 
Given this universal interest in accelerating software acquisition and sustainment, 
it is important to understand the fundamental factors that limit how quickly software can 
be developed, deployed, and upgraded. These factors fall into seven principal 
categories; in rough order of importance, they are: 
1. Required functionality—what you need the software to do (and not do) 
2. Architecture—the organizing structure of the software and its operating 
environment 
3. Technology maturity—to what extent the intended design uses novel solutions 
4. Resources—the people, skills, funds, data, and infrastructure needed to do the 
work 
5. Testing strategy—acquiring the information to fix defects early in development 
6. Contract structure—the alignment of contractor incentives with DoD satisfaction 
7. Change management—the processes for trading off performance, schedule, 
cost, and sustainability  
This paper considers each category in this taxonomy in turn and examines how each 
affects the pace of both initial development and future upgrades. 
Required Functionality 
The time to develop and field a software-enabled capability is primarily 
determined by what the software needs to do and in what context—the content of the 
software. This seems obvious and has been common knowledge with regard to the cost 
of systems for decades, but it is still common for schedules to be imposed on software 
development efforts independent of their content. 
Although content is often thought of in terms of requirements, it is important to 
note that, historically, not all mandatory performance attributes have been managed in 
the same way. In particular, “negative requirements” that describe outcomes the system 
should avoid are often handled outside the primary requirements management process 
once development begins. They are thus at risk of being neglected as the design 
evolves or of being waived or relaxed when programs face time pressure. Negative 
requirements include cybersecurity specifications, safety standards, 
reliability/availability/maintainability (RAM) thresholds, interoperability requirements, and 
other aspects of system suitability.  
Current software development best practices (notably agile and DevOps) specify 
successive releases of a software product to implement an increasingly complete 
solution. The first mission-capable release of the software is called the minimum viable 
capability release (MVCR). DoD Instruction 5000.87 “Operation of the Software 
Acquisition Pathway” says defining the MVCR is the responsibility of the PM and the 
sponsor and is the earliest release that will meet the “initial warfighting capabilities to 
enhance mission outcomes” (DoD, 2020). It further says the MVCR “must be deployed 
to an operational environment within 1 year after the date on which funds are first 
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obligated to acquire or develop new software capability including appropriate operational 
test.” As will be discussed under Architecture, this may be a tall order for major defense 
systems that must be structured to withstand decades of sustainment and enhancement. 
We may learn whether large, long-lived systems can be granted an exception to this 
rule. 
The minimum time to operationally deploy the first version of a new software-
enabled system is therefore driven by the content of the MVCR. What counts as “initial 
warfighting capability” is a stakeholder decision that involves trade-offs between lead 
time and capability—discussed further in the “Change Management” section. Minimum 
standards for the negative requirements must also be included in the definition of the 
MVCR. Note that a system that is not secure or cannot work with real data cannot be the 
MVCR—it is not yet useful for any actual operational mission. 
The MVCR is the first build that can be released to operations, but earlier builds 
are also important. In particular, the minimum viable product (MVP) plays a key role in 
development. DoDI 5000.87 defines the MVP as “an early version of the software to 
deliver or field basic capabilities to users to evaluate and provide feedback on. Insights 
from MVPs help shape scope, requirements, and design” (DoD, 2020). It is possible that 
the MVP may also serve as the MVCR, although an iterative development would likely 
first release an MVP to achieve consensus among users, sponsor, and developers to 
ensure that the product is on track to supply the expected capabilities. As will be 
discussed under Architecture, it may not always be sensible to enhance an MVP to 
obtain an MVCR. An MVP may be a prototype for demonstration or user involvement 
purposes only and might ignore important design decisions about security, 
maintainability, or other qualities that are essential aspects of the underlying architecture 
of a system. If this is the case, project cost and schedule estimates should account for 
any technical debt incurred by the choice of an MVP that is not a subset of the MVCR. 
For any software increment, there is a theoretically ideal staffing profile that 
would achieve the most efficient compromise between maximizing work rate and 
incurring unnecessary technical debt. Trying to go faster than this ideal schedule often 
leads to significant redesign, rework, and delay. Going slower than the ideal schedule 
(e.g., due to resource constraints or overly conservative limits on technical debt) also 
leads to unnecessary delay and inefficient use of labor resources. 
The length of the ideal schedule depends on how tightly coupled the software 
subsystems (modules) are. Software designs that do not explicitly enforce independence 
of subtasks1 can lead to systems that are not modular enough to support full 
parallelization of development efforts, resulting in longer development schedules for 
future increments. 
It should be noted that agile/lean methods (where feasible) are (at best) modestly 
faster than traditional waterfall development for a software increment with fixed 
requirements. The time savings realized by agile development come mostly from not 
implementing functions that turn out not to be critical—the savings are due to work 
avoided, not higher productivity. Thus, the effort to complete the MVP and MVCR will be 
roughly the same as for a traditional waterfall development approach to that much code. 
 
1 Architectural enforcement of subtask independence is sometimes referred to as “separation of concerns” 
in the computer science literature. 
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Architecture 
As noted previously, software and hardware architectures for platforms and 
systems strongly influence how rapidly and effectively new capabilities can be added. 
Therefore, the selection of an architecture for a new defense system has important 
consequences throughout the acquisition process. For major defense systems, 
achieving an MVCR that is structured to support decades of ongoing agile improvements 
can require years of initial architecture, design, and development effort. 
Every software-enabled system requires some architecture and design prior to the 
beginning of coding. The amount of effort needed for an architecture depends on a 
number of factors: 
• How important is it for the system to be upgradeable in the future? 
• How fast/cheap/frequent/extensive do those upgrades need to be? 
• What is the intended lifespan of the platform or system and its upgrades? 
• How portable/reusable does the software need to be? 
• What other systems will the new system need to interoperate with? 
• What are the cybersecurity needs of the system? 
• How much is the cyber threat environment expected to change over time? 
• How close to the cutting edge of current technical capabilities is the system 
intended to operate? 
The answers to these questions help determine the appropriate software 
architecture for the new system, which (combined with hardware architecture) in turn is a 
determinant of the required cost and schedule to implement the MVCR. Systems that 
must be easy and cheap to modify over a long-life cycle require more architecture effort 
(and thus more content in the MVCR and a longer initial development increment). In 
particular, the more you want to use agile/lean/DevSecOps methods for ongoing parallel 
system improvement of large systems, or to complete upgrades among multiple 
vendors, the more you need a modular architecture. 
Thus, the architecture is part of the MVCR content. An early increment (such as 
the MVP) with an architecture that does not support MVCR (and future) requirements is 
just a prototype but may be useful to demonstrate intended functions and elicit user 
feedback. In particular, systems with significant cybersecurity concerns must address 
those concerns in the MVCR architecture and design requirements. Adding security later 
does not work. For some mission needs, a quick-and-dirty architecture that supports 
current (but not future) requirements might be appropriate, providing some needed 
capability quickly at the expense of future sustainment and upgrades. This choice to field 
an MVCR that has limited ability to support future upgrades should be a conscious 
decision at design time, with its implications understood by stakeholders. 
Similarly, when adding new capabilities to a legacy system whose architecture 
was not originally designed to support ongoing upgrades, stakeholders need to decide 
whether it is more important to implement specific new capabilities quickly or to make 
the system more rapidly upgradeable in the future. In some cases, it may be preferable 
to accept cost and delay today to re-architect and re-write the legacy code to enable a 
longer and more agile future upgrade path.  
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 156 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Technology Maturity 
Whenever system designs involve technologies that are less than fully mature, 
the software and hardware design processes contain an element of experimentation and 
exploration. This can lead to a redesign that changes the nature of the software required 
or one that shifts functions originally envisioned as being performed by hardware into 
software. This adds both new development and regression testing burdens to the 
software project and lies on the critical path for the program. As a result, technologies 
with a current Technology Readiness Level (TRL) lower than 6 (as defined in Title 10 
U.S. Code, § 2366b(a)(3)(D)) can contribute to software delays. 
At the same time, critical software technologies tend to be overlooked in 
Independent Technology Readiness Assessments. Past examples where this has led to 
major program delays include sensor fusion algorithms, ad hoc network management, 
and automated traction control for off-road vehicles.2  
The DoD has recently stated in multiple venues that several new software 
technologies, including machine learning, artificial intelligence, and autonomous 
systems, will be key enablers of future U.S. military capabilities. These are immature 
technologies that impose novel burdens throughout the acquisition life cycle, including 
learning how to specify requirements that are testable, how to validate and maintain 
training data sets for machine learning, and how to assess the effectiveness and 
suitability of machine cognition and human-machine teaming concepts (Tate & Sparrow, 
2018). 
It is important to remember that, for TRLs greater than 4, technology maturity is 
always measured relative to a specific set of requirements and intended operational 
environments.3 A technology can be mature (i.e., TRL 6 or higher) for certain operational 
uses or environments, yet immature for others, as demonstrated by the traction control 
example. This is just as true of software technologies as it is for lasers, engines, or 
sensors. Failure to recognize that a given software technology is critical to success, or 
that it has not yet been successfully demonstrated in the intended operational role and 
environment, can lead to costly delays in development down the road. (For an annotated 
list of TRL definitions, see DoD, n.d.) 
Resources 
Software development is about sufficient skilled labor, appropriate infrastructure, 
and (increasingly) adequate data. As a result, the most important potential resource 
issues that software projects can face are a shortage of appropriately skilled personnel 
(either through insufficient funding to purchase their labor or lack of access to the right 
talent), or insufficient access to platforms or data sets needed to implement the desired 
capabilities. These challenges are time-phased—you need to simultaneously have 
enough of each of these things at the right times to support the ideal schedule of the 
project. Valid input data is often needed early in development. For machine learning, 
 
2  Traction control algorithms used in commercial vehicles assume that the vehicle is driving on a hard 
surface. They do not perform well in off-road situations where the loss of traction is due to surface 
failure (e.g., mud or sand) rather than being due to low friction with the road. 
3  TRL 4 requires “Component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment,” which is 
independent of requirements or intended operational environments. TRL 5 requires “Component and/or 
breadboard validation in a relevant environment,” which explicitly compares the environments where 
the technology has already been demonstrated against some intended environment.  
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obtaining a sufficient quantity of accurately labeled training data can be a bottleneck in 
capability development. 
An adequate supply of appropriately skilled developers is not a given. The supply 
of cleared software professionals is not keeping up with the demand for national security 
software (Tate, 2017). As a result, programs often have trouble hiring and retaining the 
required quality and quantity of software talent. Staffing shortfalls cause delays, and 
project staff turnover and loss of institutional knowledge cause additional delays. 
Mergers and acquisitions, common in defense industries, sometimes exacerbate this 
problem. Either not having enough people or not having sufficiently talented people as 
part of an experienced team can cause program delays. 
Similarly, funding instability or mismatches between planned spending profiles 
and actual workloads can lead to inefficient use of labor resources and subsequent 
schedule delays. This is particularly true for projects with significant experimentation and 
discovery during the development of the MVCR, as the duration and cost of the 
experimentation cannot be predicted with accuracy. Such projects should ideally be 
identified in advance and provided with significant levels of contingency funding, but this 
is politically difficult in many cases. 
For many software-enabled defense systems, the direct costs of software 
development are a relatively small fraction of total program costs. However, as noted 
previously, software delays tend to be on the critical path, resulting in delays that add 
cost at a roughly constant burn rate. For major programs, this represents not merely a 
delay in achieving the desired capabilities, but also a large opportunity cost, wasting 
funds that could have been used elsewhere. 
It is important to note that the majority of software development effort (and 
cost)—often as much as 80% of total effort—occurs after the system has initially been 
fielded. Software deployment generates an ongoing future workload that lasts as long as 
the system is in use. The resources needed to perform future upgrades and integration 
are generally the same resources needed for initial development. This means that future 
enhancements compete with new systems for people, as well as for dollars. 
In addition to people, many advanced software capabilities also require 
specialized infrastructure and data. These can include supercomputing resources, 
labeled training data sets, modeling and simulation support, and test ranges with 
specialized instrumentation. Shortfalls in any of these areas can also lead to significant 
fielding delays. 
Testing Strategy 
Although it is theoretically possible to do “too much testing” in a software-
intensive development program, this is nearly unknown in practice. Finding and fixing 
defects can be the most expensive identifiable software cost driver, and high defect 
levels are the primary reason for software schedule and cost overruns (Jones & 
Bonsignour, 2012). Software development success is strongly correlated with a 
commitment to continuous, rigorous testing from day one, identifying defects early—
while they are still relatively easy to isolate and correct. 
While it is hard to do too much testing, it is easy to do testing wrong. In order to 
realize the benefits of continuous testing and early defect elimination, the test strategy 
for the program must ensure that the right information is collected at the right times and 
fed back into the development process efficiently. Unaddressed defects have cascading 
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effects—they interfere with development of additional capabilities, mask other defects, 
and complicate the required fixes. Past research has found that the average cost to 
remedy a defect grows by an order of magnitude between the design phase and the 
implementation phase and grows by another order of magnitude between 
implementation and post-deployment maintenance (Kan, 2003). Bear in mind here that 
“defects” can include flaws in requirements, inaccurate documentation, adherence to 
inappropriate architectural specifications or standards, or other issues that are not 
necessarily “bugs” in the code. 
The most common (and costly) testing error by far is not testing early enough. 
For example, the Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) underwent an initial 
operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) in May 2012, with planned full-rate production 
(FRP) scheduled for September 2012. IOT&E revealed numerous problems that should 
have been caught much earlier in testing, including poor network stability, poor 
performance, and poor reliability. FRP was deferred until after a follow-on operational 
test and evaluation (FOT&E) could be conducted. That FOT&E revealed continuing 
problems, leading to another schedule slip. The system finally entered FRP in June 
2015. 
When testing is done right, test activities make the project cheaper and faster 
than it otherwise would have been. Delays “due to testing” are almost always actually 
delays due to not testing—that is, extra time required to fix defects that were discovered 
late in development (when testing is expensive) or after fielding (when testing is very 
expensive) because of insufficient early testing. Defects discovered after fielding are 
often due to incorrect or misunderstood requirements. Finding ways to incentivize 
contractors (and program offices) to perform adequate testing is challenging. 
For new systems, or for modifications of legacy systems that are intended to 
transition to agile development for future increments, it is important to develop the 
associated agile test strategies and automated testing infrastructure during MVCR 
development. This should involve all stakeholders and be done in parallel with (and be 
informed by) MVCR design and implementation. 
Contract Structure 
Typically, a small percentage of the overall profit on a major defense system 
comes from software development. At the same time, the future upgrade and 
maintenance contracts for a software-intensive system can provide an open-ended 
source of future revenue. This is analogous to losing money on each laser printer sold, 
but making big profits on the toner cartridges. This gives contractors a strong incentive 
to erect barriers to sustainment competition that all too often also function as barriers to 
efficient upgrades and modernization. 
The DoD would prefer that all software be modular, reusable, and open to 
enhancement by third-party vendors. It is very difficult to write a contract that requires, or 
even incentivizes, the prime contractor to make that happen. Modular design makes it 
easy for competitors to break the prime’s monopoly on sustainment; reusable code 
makes it possible for competitors to benefit from the prime’s work and potentially to gain 
access to their proprietary technologies. For these reasons, contractors prefer to restrict 
government data rights as much as they can. As Van Atta (2017) notes, “There is a vast 
legacy of defense systems, amounting to billions of dollars in sustainment costs, for 
which the necessary [intellectual property] data and rights for organic depot or 
competitive sustainment were not acquired.” 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 159 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
The services are sometimes complicit here—for example, by waiving statutory 
requirements for modular open systems architecture (MOSA) on the grounds that 
requiring MOSA would delay initial fielding and cost too much. Even if this were true, it is 
a false economy—the delays and costs of fielding subsequent upgraded capabilities for 
a major system will easily outweigh the original savings. As an example, the AWACS 
Block 40/45 upgrade program, intended to migrate the hardware and software 
architectures and applications on the E-3 AWACS aircraft from legacy proprietary 
systems to new open architecture hardware and software, has now been struggling for 
nearly 20 years to match the existing operational capabilities of the legacy Block 30/35 
aircraft.  
Admittedly, it is hard to write requirements for modularity, openness, and data 
rights that are verifiable at the time of system delivery and that actually make it likely that 
future upgrades will be easier and cheaper. This is similar to the problem of writing 
software quality requirements that are enforceable. Although quality requirements can 
sometimes be enforced through user participation in agile development teams, during 
development it is hard for users and other stakeholders to tell whether the choices being 
made will actually facilitate future upgrades as desired. Furthermore, current law 
prohibits making access to intellectual property rights a condition of contract award 
(although access to data rights can be an evaluation factor).  
The DoD often struggles with aligning contractor incentives with service interests, 
so that the contractor profits more only when the service gets more of what it really 
needs (including agility). There is no free lunch—firms will require more compensation 
up front for initial system development if they cannot count on monopoly profits during 
sustainment. If the services are serious about wanting to speed up deployment of future 
capabilities, they must accept this and plan for it by developing contracting strategies 
that will allow them to realize the benefits of open system architectures. 
Change Management 
There is a widening disconnect in the defense acquisition world between the 
people who control system requirements and the people who actually develop and field 
systems. This is true of all requirements, but especially true of software requirements 
(and system requirements that end up being implemented in software). In theory, the 
process looks something like this: 
1. Characterize the future fight and define mission needs. 
2. Identify capability gaps and alternative ways to mitigate them. 
3. Analyze the alternatives and select a preferred alternative. 
4. Set threshold requirements. 
5. Develop and field a system that meets those requirements. 
In practice, there are problems with how this is realized. Translating future 
warfighting concepts into specific mission needs is hard, and translating mission needs 
into threshold performance requirements for individual systems is even harder. 
Thresholds are often set at aspirational levels, rather than at genuine threshold levels 
below which there would be no military utility. Changes during development concerning 
what to implement in hardware versus what to implement in software can lead to 
changes in system architecture that break other parts of the development or hinder 
future maintainability. Seemingly minor changes in the intended use of machine learning 
subsystems can require retraining from scratch or even development of entirely new 
training data sets. 
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As a result, some programs are unexecutable as envisioned. Faced with 
unexecutable programs, program managers must make trades. The realities of annual 
funding make it easy to accept future costs and operational shortfalls (e.g., due to poor 
reliability or architecture violations) in order to save money and minimize delays in initial 
deployment. Similarly, deferring important testing is a common way to save time and 
money in the short run but at the expense of greater delays and costs later. 
Worse yet, program managers generally do not have the authority to relax key 
requirements. They must appeal to a variety of senior stakeholders and achieve a 
consensus that relaxing a requirement is the best way forward for the program. This 
need for consensus also adds friction and delay to the process. Furthermore, once a 
program has funding authority, the services seldom step back and reconsider whether 
the system being developed is still the preferred alternative, given what they now know 
about costs and capabilities. 
Agile software development methods depend on empowering a coalition of 
developers and users to decide what functionality is most useful on an iterative and 
ongoing basis. As noted previously, the services have historically been unwilling to 
confer that level of decision authority to development teams or to ensure embedded 
stakeholder support (including actual users) in program offices. This is especially true for 
systems that are not “pure” software systems—it is much easier to devolve authority for 
user interface design and database transactions than it is to devolve authority to change 
the operational specifications of weapon systems. Nevertheless, to realize the benefits 
of agile development, programs will need to have significantly more authority to prioritize 
and trade requirements, to enforce architectures, and to deny external change requests 
than is typically delegated to them. 
Summary 
Software development takes time. As with any other kind of project, how much time it 
takes depends on the content of the project, how it is managed, and the preexisting 
conditions: 
• How much software is needed? 
• How complicated or novel is the software to be developed? 
• What is the software expected to do (today and tomorrow)? 
• What resources are available for the work? 
• What are the contractor’s incentives? 
• What change management authorities does the development team have? 
• Is this an initial development, or an upgrade to an existing system? 
• If it’s an initial development, 
– How easy to upgrade does it need to be? 
– What is the minimum viable capability release? 
– Have testable MVCR requirements been clearly specified? 
– Does the test strategy support early discovery and correction of defects? 
• If it’s an upgrade, 
– How well does the legacy architecture support insertion of new capability? 
– What data rights does the government own? 
– What institutional knowledge from the original development still exists? 
– Are agile development processes and tools in place? 
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For programs to field new software-enabled capabilities quickly, someone must 
have spent the time and money in the past to create an environment that supports rapid 
capability insertion. Ideally, this environment would include a modular (and preferably 
open) software architecture, adequate data rights, platforms with excess space and 
power available, and an industrial base that can provide enough people with the right 
skills, curated input and training data, and developmental test infrastructure (including 
modeling and simulation resources where appropriate). For agile development, this 
environment must also include localized change management authority within the 
developer/stakeholder team. 
Putting these enabling environmental features into place will often require 
accepting delays and up-front expense, as well as reduced capability in the initial 
increments of those platforms. Unless service leadership accepts this reality and 
empowers new system developers to preserve these features even when faced with cost 
overruns, schedule delays, and demands for greater capability up front, they will not be 
implemented. Absent this kind of empowerment, software capability insertion will 
continue to be as slow, expensive, and unreliable as it is today.  
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense’s approach to building and deploying software-intensive systems is 
constantly under revision. In parallel, the tools and methods to model and test architecture 
representations of candidate products have also evolved. We investigate the adaptation of value 
engineering (VE) methods into the acquisition of software-intensive weapon systems where the 
candidate product architecture can be modeled and used to guide implementations throughout 
the lifecycle. Aligning model-based engineering with VE will accelerate innovation in the 
development process (De Graaf et al., 2019). When used with a process performance baseline, 
this method can establish a comparison framework for cost-benefit analyses of alternative 
approaches.  
VE is used to evaluate different approaches or processes to improve the end product cost 
(including future, unaccounted for cost overruns), performance, or quality. We believe that VE can 
be applied to the development of software-intensive weapons systems as well. To date, the cost 
to perform system modeling and virtual integration in early product development stages has been 
traded off against showing early results. The benefits of virtual integration are significant, 
especially in the long-term value of being able to evaluate system upgrades and changes both 
while in development and after the system transitions to sustainment.  
Keywords: Value Engineering, Architecture Centric, Virtual Integration, Model Based 
Engineering, Model Based Systems Engineering, Software Engineering, Hardware Engineering, 
Systems Engineering, Functional Decomposition, Design Patterns, Integration, Modularity, 
Acquisition, Contractual Incentive, System of Systems, Cyber-Physical, Real-Time, Safety-
Critical, Cyber-Secure, Maintainable, Automated Testing 
Introduction 
The intent of this paper is to stimulate out-of-the-box thinking about what we can do to improve 
the status quo of acquiring cyber-physical systems (CPS). We will explore how to incorporate 
VE principles as a means to stimulate new ways of developing and sustaining the embedded 
computing resources of a complex CPS. VE is a structured, multidisciplinary approach to 
improve contract performance (International Council on Systems Engineering [INCOSE], 2015). 
In short, a traditional VE approach would have the U.S. government and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) provide additional funds to a contractor as an investment in their product 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 163 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
development process. The investment is recouped over the life of the contract in one of several 
ways (e.g., reduced manufacturing cost, higher quality, etc).  
When we use the term VE principles, we mean 
1. to use VE as a means to motivate changes to the workflow of organizations that develop 
computing platforms for CPS 
2. to reward innovations that reduce the acquisition risk of embedded computing systems in 
DoD CPS 
3. that we need to reward innovations based on a new way to count value that identifies and 
mitigates “showstopper” defects early in the lifecycle as a leading indicator of traditional VE 
values (e.g., cost, schedule) 
The basic structure of this paper is as follows:  
• We begin by characterizing the status quo for the acquisition of these types of embedded 
computing resources, which seems to need improvement.  
• We then make the point that if we continue to do things the same way, we should expect the 
same (or similar) results.  
• We introduce Architecture Centric Virtual Integration (ACVI), a proven means for identifying 
issues in embedded computing resources as a way to try a different approach.  
• We emphasize the need to reward the “right kinds of behavior” to try to get the ACVI 
process integrated into the contractor’s workflow—to reward honest effort as opposed to 
checking the box.  
• We describe how important it is for the contractor to establish a measurement program 
focused on early identification (and resolution) of showstopper issues.  
• We construct a notional means of financing the costs associated with the additional 
modeling effort (the value).  
• We point out that we do not know enough about the contractor’s operations to be 
prescriptive, but we have general guidance.  
• We describe the need to create an environment that allows the contractors to fail without 
penalty (current status quo) yet rewards the right behavior.  
• We conclude by providing some examples of how contracts could be written to provide the 
right kinds of incentives and some ideas for how contractors could integrate ACVI into their 
workflow.  
• Finally, we make some recommendations for acquirers and contractors. 
The Status Quo 
In the development of software-intensive systems, more specifically CPS employing 
embedded computing resources, we are not aware of the construct of VE ever having been 
used. One limitation imposed by a VE approach is the inherent lack of accuracy in software cost 
estimation on which to make VE trades. A key element of VE is to recoup an investment, and it 
is hard for a contractor to commit to a reduction in cost if they can’t predict the cost with 
confidence.  
Other formal approaches, such as those found in the Society of American Value 
Engineers (SAVE) or the International Council of Systems Engineers (INCOSE), have a 
standard set of activities (SAVE International, n.d.) We will not attempt to map those process 
steps precisely to this study but to reflect on the strategy of capturing value in making product 
and process improvements as a mechanism for managing the lifecycle of a software-intensive 
system (Defense Innovation Board, 2019). These are VE principles, not the actual wording of 
the VE contract language. 
Unlike hardware systems, software systems are produced as they are designed and are 
continuously updated and changed over time. Even products that do not require functional 
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change have to be updated to manage vulnerabilities in the products that make up the overall 
software system or through managing technology obsolescence. As such, the context of 
managing the classic hardware lifecycle cost does not precisely map to software-intensive 
systems. What is worth considering are the major functional elements of VE (e.g., establishing a 
baseline, developing a plan for the process improvement, and monitoring the process to identify 
the opportunity for incentive as they apply to embedded computing systems).  
 
Model Based Engineering (MBE) and digital analysis are well-developed practices for 
physical products. For example, decades-old technology exists for modeling and analyzing 
physical properties (thermal, mass, structural, dynamic, electrical) and electro-magnetic 
interference. These models and analyses have demonstrated their value many times over and, 
to some extent, these techniques are widely accessible and used by all. However, rigorous 
equivalent application of MBE for cyber-physical/embedded systems with integrated computing 
has not achieved widespread adoption. Abstracting and 
modeling inherently abstract designs like embedded 
computing systems can lead to over-application of 
functional or system decomposition. In order to advance 
the state of the practice for modeling and analysis of 
embedded computing systems, there must be more 
process rigor employed when developing and using 
models and analyses. Models of the system components 
that interact with each other can virtually verify integration 
issues and intra-/inter-product interoperability properties. 
To establish this practice will require both new 
requirements and new incentives to drive innovative, 
alternative behaviors.  
Let’s think about the introduction of microwave cooking technology. When first 
introduced, homeowners did not fully know how to use the microwave nor what it would be best 
applied to do, but the potential was clear. To take the union of VE and MBE all the way through 
the development cycle, there is a need to develop methods and techniques that take advantage 
of this potential. To use an architecture model as a pivotal piece of design that is established 
and nurtured throughout the lifecycle of a product has its uses, but it is not going to apply to 
everything all at once, at least not at first (Clements et al., 2012). Professionals who have seen 
development fads come and go are reasonably skeptical at the beginning. Such was also the 
case with microwave cooking technology. When microwaves were first introduced in the 1970s, 
there were people that thought that placing a microwave radiation emitter in their kitchen would 
cause harm. Juxtaposed to those concerns were the staunch advocates that thought it could be 
used for everything. Fifty years later, nearly everyone has a microwave oven in the home; we 
know how to use it, and we are comfortable with it. Who could have predicted then that most of 
America today would end up using a pre-sealed pouch to make popcorn? Equally important to 
adopting a new approach is that we also learn when not to use a new tool. Many of us have 
subsequently found, for example, that a microwave is not optimal for reheating pizza. 
Effective use of tools—such as MBE, architecture analysis, and digital twins—will reduce 
acquisition risk and are not minor adjustments to workflows but are fundamental changes to 
what we do and how we work. 
One author was recently a judge for a 
middle/high school regional science 
fair for the category of engineering. 
Several students used a combination 
of physical modeling and additive 
manufacturing to fabricate 
components for their entries or to do 
virtual prototypes to model their 
designs before full implementation. 
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Changing the Results 
Over the past 20-plus years, few would argue that the track record of the U.S. 
government’s acquisition of CPS has met expectations. For example, a recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report on the F-35 stated,  
In 2020, the F-35 program resolved 33 of the deficiencies it had identified in 
developmental and operational testing but it continues to find more. Of the 872 
open deficiencies, the program characterizes 11 as category 1 (critical in nature 
and could jeopardize safety, security, or another requirement), and 861 as 
category 2 (could impede or constrain successful mission accomplishment). This 
represents two more open category 1 deficiencies than we reported in May 2020. 
According to DOT&E officials, additional new discoveries are due to quality 
problems with the F-35 software, resulting in a high rate of deficiency discoveries 
during operational testing and by pilots in the field. According to program officials, 
seven of these open category 1 deficiencies will be resolved prior to the completion 
of operational testing. Four will not be addressed until the third quarter of 2021. 
(GAO, 2021, p. 16) 
The report went on to say,  
In recent years, program officials did not identify nearly a quarter of all defects until 
they were already delivered to test aircraft. Ideally, according to the program office, 
the contractor would identify defects in the software lab or before the software is 
fielded to the developmental test aircraft [emphasis added]. However, a November 
2020 analysis conducted by a third-party consulting firm on behalf of the program 
office found that between December 2017 and September 2020, 656 software 
defects (or 23 percent of all software defects) were identified after the software 
was delivered to the test aircraft.  
 
As illustrated above, the heart of the problem of acquiring CPS are issues identified late 
in the program lifecycle (GAO, 2019). These issues arise when physical devices are provided for 
integration, and the embedded computing systems do not behave as expected (Chilenski & 
Kerstetter, 2015). In addition, as a result of the late changes needed to make the system work, 
efforts to attain certification (safety, airworthiness, security, etc.) can be delayed. These delays 
increase the overall program schedule, which most often is tied to program budget. The 
objective is to avoid being on the long list of acquisition programs that have significantly 
exceeded schedules and budgets or have even failed to deliver, such as the Future Combat 
System, Ground Combat Vehicle, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and Comanche. 
Other services have had their impact felt in the dramatic reduction of the number of items 
produced, like the F-22 and DDG-1000 (Rodriquez, 2014). The impact of delays, overruns, and 
cancellations hurt the taxpayer with higher costs to maintain the national defense.  
Figure 1 is a graphic that illustrates the issue that this paper seeks to address. The x- 
and y-axes represent the schedule and cost budgets of the program. The blue area represents 
the expected capability of the platform as it evolves. In CPS acquisitions, it is typically the case 
that we get to the end of the schedule having spent all the money, but the system does not work 
as expected. Additional funding and schedule are needed to complete the platform. One leading 
cause for this is that the program is funded assuming “normal” integration issues will be found. 
As the program progresses and gets to the point where the program should be finished, 
unexpected issues cause delays, and the acquirer must expend more funds to finish the 
program. The program may also choose to sacrifice planned capability or attempt to do a 
balance of both an increase cost and a reduction in delivered capability. The value we seek to 
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capture (e.g., the reduction or possible elimination of unforeseen future costs) is illustrated with 
the bullseye. The extra funding is a direct hit to the DoD budget and impacts other programs, as 
this additional funding is unplanned. The extra schedule is a direct hit to the warfighter, as the 
delay impacts when the platform can actually be deployed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Identifying the Opportunity, the Value Bullseye 
 
However, it does not have to be that way. The accepted colloquial definition for a risk is 
“an issue that has not yet happened.” Integration issues are going to happen, so at this point 
they can be characterized as risks that are highly likely to occur, more specifically as embedded 
computing system integration risks. Software system integration issues are the largest single 
factor on recent new aircraft systems (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research 
and Engineering, 2018). Also, 50% of the system development effort goes to software rework, 
and 80% of the software issues in system development are found in integration (Hansson et al., 
2018). This means that status quo approaches do not effectively find these issues, leaving 
programs exposed to these risks if they do not address them overtly and early in the lifecycle. 
These embedded computing system integration risks apply to the acquisition of all CPS 
programs. The acquirer can choose how to mitigate these risks. One way that has potential is 
the Architecture Centric Virtual Integration Process (ACVIP).  
ACVIP: A Different Approach 
ACVIP focuses on analysis of embedded software computing systems, using 
architecture artifacts instead of a fully implemented design. ACVIP provides methods and tools 
to address product development and integration challenges where computing execution runtime 
sensitivity, safety, and cybersecurity are critical. A major source of system development 
schedule growth in these systems is the increasing complexity of interactions between the 
application software, the embedded computer system, and interfaces with physical systems. 
ACVIP provides a virtual integration environment that enables the detection of defects not 
typically found until much later. This is frequently accomplished by employing the Architecture 
Analysis and Design Language (AADL), continuous verification throughout the entire 
development lifecycle, and a single model that supports the analysis domains (e.g., safety, 
security, resources) that impact architecture and integration. 
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ACVIP begins with requirements verification and proceeds through actual system 
integration with the goal of identifying defects as early as possible. By incorporating virtual 
integration throughout the lifecycle, system and software engineers are able to prevent these 
defects from propagating (including side effects of change), and removal reduces future defect 
insertions. The early discovery of defects improves quality, reduces schedule (and cost) for the 
development and qualification of these systems, and ultimately enables fielding capabilities 
earlier. Even for defects that escape ACVIP analysis in the design phase, when physical 
integration issues arise, the design specification crafted in AADL speeds root cause analysis 
and predicts side effects of resolutions, enabling efficient resolution rather than multiple “test 
and fix” cycles.  
The use of ACVIP has shown utility and benefit from previous U.S. DoD and non-DoD 
projects. It is certain that the additional effort to build the product models (to enable ACVIP) will 
be higher than to not make that investment. However, since as much as 80% of the defects are 
not found until physical integration when using traditional methods, early discovery and 
remediation will result in signficantly lower overall cost as a result of using ACVIP. Additionally, 
establishing and maintaining the virtual environment that is required to use ACVIP will reduce 
the cost of future block upgrades to the platforms. 
Reducing risk likelihood is generally achieved through a set of engineering and 
management activities in a step-wise progression that does not reduce the risk consequence. 
By incorporating an ACVIP approach, the program also reduces the consequence of problems 
that can impact cost to complete or reduction in delivered functionality. Figure 2 depicts how 
virtual integration and related analyses could impact both the likelihood of integration risk and 
late-stage discovery. The governance and workflow integration of ACVIP also reduces the 
consequence when those risks are realized by finding them early and working through design 
and integration problems well before the design is finalized. 
ACVIP works for capability changes injected into the program throughout the lifecycle as 
well. Once a product is matured through initial fielding or Minimum Viable Capability Release, 
ACVIP continues to positively impact the program—as long as the models and analyses are 
kept up to date with the fielded implementation. We show this transition from metaphysical 
certainty and dire impact (i.e., it happens to nearly every program) to moderate likelihood and 
manageable consequence. It would be irresponsible to assert low likelihood or consequence of 
these risks until these practices have been put into place and quantitative analysis on affected 
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Figure 2. Value Engineering Goals for ACVIP 
ACVIP augments and enhances model-based systems engineering (MBSE), along with 
the Systems Modeling Language (SysML), as a systems engineering practice. While SysML 
applies broadly to the entire system, ACVIP applies primarily to the runtime analysis of 
embedded computing systems. ACVIP uses model entities described in SysML together with 
model components expressed in AADL and augments them with the structure and additional 
properties that result in the specification of the software and hardware system. This formal 
representation of the architecture allows a precise and repeatable analysis capability that will 
verify a set of system quality attributes expressed as requirements, especially those about an 
implemented software deployed onto one or many computing platforms. The analysis capability 
spans a number of crosscutting system qualities that include safety, reliability, cybersecurity, 
resources, and performance in terms of signal latency and computing resource utilization, 
among others. The associated MBSE SysML models, along with other models that have been 
analyzed and updated because of performing ACVIP analyses, will have higher quality and will 
integrate with fewer issues or defects. 
One of the ways that ACVIP would benefit a systems engineer is the representation and 
analysis of interface descriptions that trace down to the run-time level. The ACVIP analysis 
helps the systems engineer to understand the dependencies between systems and subsystems. 
Failing to identify interfaces, or failing to precisely specify their properties, is a common reason 
for products to fail and not to meet stakeholder expectations. Missing or incorrectly defined 
interfaces are a major cause of cost overruns and product failures (Chilenski & Kerstetter, 
2015). 
Similar issues caused the stability control system of the Lexus SUV to not slow the 
vehicle when it entered a turn at a high speed. In another example, the explosion of the Ariane 5 
rocket’s first test occurred because of a malfunction in the control software. This is an example 
of a failure to represent interfaces consistently between two pieces of software. The cause was 
a data conversion/representation issue among two software components. This resulted in the 
system detecting an out-of-bounds pressure on the rocket, causing the rocket to self-destruct 
(Inquiry Board, 1996). 
These are examples of interface defect types that can be detected with ACVIP. Analysis 
of the architecture model identifies interface inconsistencies that include data type, data format, 
data update, data number, data range, and data units. These types of errors are detected 
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continuously, beginning with the construction of the initial model, throughout the entire model as 
pieces become integrated—ensuring consistency at software and hardware integration time. 
Where’s the Value? 
Figure 1 showed a bullseye, representing the time and money that we put on contract at 
the end of the project to finish the project. For the F-35 program, there were billions of dollars of 
cost and years in schedule borne by the government (GAO, 2021). Of course, we cannot 
ascribe all of the cost overruns and schedule delays to embedded computing system issues. 
There will also be late changes to the scope (or late changes to the design), to the components, 
and possibly a reallocation of functionality.  
However, significant value to the acquisition stakeholder will come from the early 
identification and elimination of the showstoppers that arise late in lifecycle. Showstoppers are 
best characterized as issues that force a rewrite of the software, most likely due to a safety 
concern or a certification issue. Figure 3 summarizes issues from several safety critical 
systems.  
Despite best build-then-test practices, system-level faults due to software have 
increasingly dominated the rework effort for faults discovered during system 
integration and acceptance testing. Several studies of safety-critical systems show 
that 70% of errors in embedded safety-critical software are introduced in the 
requirements (35%) and architecture design phases (35%). At the same time, 80% 
of all errors are not discovered until system integration or later. The rework effort 
to correct a problem in later phases can be as high as 300-1,000 times the cost of 
in-phase correction. Therefore, it is desirable to discover such problems earlier in 
the lifecycle and increase the chance of tests passing the first time around. (Feiler 
et al., 2013) 
Our claim is that the extra time and money (the bullseye) we spend at the end of the 
contract to “finish” the system should be planned for and managed as part of the acquisition 
risk. Instead of doing emergency appropriations for money in future years, to the detriment of 
other programs, program managers should avoid risk realization through virtual integration. “We 
believe that fully embracing an ACVIP approach is effective risk mitigation for the inevitable 
unknowns that surface late in all cyber-physical system development projects” (Boydston et al., 
2019).  
Find and Resolve Showstoppers Early 
The acquisition community in general, and programs that build highly interoperable 
CPSs in particular, should acknowledge the near certainty of schedule and cost overruns and 
build in reward mechanisms that incentivize behavior that avoids them. If, for example, we can 
identify and address 90% of the showstoppers during system development, allowing us to 
achieve the baseline schedule with no increase in funding or compromise in capability, we 
should reward that behavior significantly. For example, if we were to avoid a $100 million cost 
overrun, we should be able to perform a risk-sharing initiative that would harvest some smaller 
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Figure 3. Cost Impact of Late-Stage Discovery (Feiler et al., 2013) 
 
Figure 3 shows an analysis of the status quo of CPS development (Feiler et al., 2013). 
As much as 80% of issues are detected after unit test. It is hard to argue that this is the kind of 
result that we should be satisfied with when it comes to identifying and resolving problems early 
in lifecycle (when they are affordable to fix). As a result, we wind up paying many times more 
than what was estimated to resolve these issues. There is little direct financial incentive for the 
contractor to change associated behaviors because the government will make up the difference 
in total cost to get the project completed. A cynic would argue that the contractor is actually 
motivated to not change their development process. A comparison could be made to the 
acceptable quality level of an automobile manufactured in the United States up to the 1980s. 
Consumers would routinely accept substandard product quality and get their identified issues 
repaired after the initial purchase and hopefully during the warranty period. There was no 
incentive for the U.S. automotive manufacturer to update their process, and there was no public 
outcry for better cars. We just accepted the status quo. By contrast, Japanese companies 
during that time showed the world how to manufacture automobiles without quality issues and 
were rewarded with large changes in market share. This forced a change to everything in the 
U.S. automotive manufacturing industry. The expectation of the consumer had been changed. 
To get that kind of change in the environment for CPS, we need a different kind of forcing 
function through DoD policy changes to improve engineering processes and to insist on better 
outcomes through VE. A related change in the defense industrial base is needed to encourage 
risk-taking as well as rewarding attempts to improve.  
So, in the context of VE for ACVIP, the U.S. government can incentivize the contractors 
to adopt ACVIP as part of their process (i.e., as a means to identify showstopper issues earlier 
in lifecycle). If the modeling and analysis is implemented in the right way, the contractor will 
avoid a significant number of showstoppers late in the lifecycle, which can be subject to risk-
sharing incentives that benefit them and the government (Wrubel & Gross, 2015). This 
translates into reduction of acquisition risk. This will raise the bar for CPS developers.  
Reward the “Right Kinds” of Behavior 
We believe that contractors will not be motivated to change their process without 
incentive. We believe that there is plenty of opportunity to improve the status quo. This is what 
brings us back to the original concept of VE. We need to stimulate innovation within the 
contractor community by incentivizing changes to their workflow that take advantage of these 
novel methods. We want the incentive to reward the right behavior—that is, if the contractor is 
successful in avoiding showstoppers late in the lifecycle, there should be a significant reward. 
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We are not attempting to prescribe anything other than guiding principles, as we do not yet 
know enough to be prescriptive. We do know that we are talking about potentially hundreds of 
millions of dollars and a significant change to the development process. There are many ways 
that the rewards and incentives could be realized, which is a topic for future research. 
Bridging the Systems Versus Software Divide 
A long-standing hallmark in DoD system development is the mismatch between systems 
development activities and software development activities (Sheard et al., 2019). While we do 
not think that adopting ACVIP will break the cultural clash, we do think that it is a step in the 
right direction. MBSE is an established discipline. Potentially critical flaws in the system design 
can be found much earlier using a similar model-based approach for the design and 
implementation of the embedded computing system, allowing much more time for the evaluation 
of alternative approaches.  
While the adoption of ACVIP by itself will not force an improved collaboration, the 
development of an architecture-centric virtual integration model will lead to the potential for a 
common ground for systems and software engineers to reach agreement. We refer to this as 
the “authoritative source of truth” (ASOT). Assumptions, constraints, and dependencies are all 
things that need to be represented and incorporated into the model, which will be fed by both 
the systems engineers and the software engineers. The ASOT will serve as a clearinghouse for 
the design issues. As the model evolves, with increasing fidelity over time, the model will serve 
as a fundamental resource for both groups, providing an environment that facilitates the rapid 
resolution of the showstoppers.  
Contracting and Managing Incentives for ACVIP 
One of the most effective communication tools that the U.S. government has with 
industry is its requests for information (RFI) and requests for proposals (RFP) and the resulting 
contracts. The structure of the requirements, evaluation criteria, and incentives send a strong 
message about what is important enough to be the difference between winning and losing. One 
challenge of managing a program is to balance the drive to perform as soon as possible with the 
hard decisions of increasing near-term costs for long-term gains. For this discussion, there will 
be a focus on cost-type contracts, which are best suited for development of cyber-physical 
products where there is an inherent lack of precision on which the outcomes can be predicted 
(Kendall, 2013).  
The projected future cost of any contract is analyzed up front through mechanisms like 
the government’s Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) that is developed prior to releasing an RFP. 
These projections are, in large measure, validated by the range of responses provided by 
industry to those solicitations. The cost structure of those bids goes through rigorous cost 
modeling and price justification internally before being presented as a part of the company’s 
response to the RFP. These activities could set the benchmark from which incremental and final 
VE incentives can be set. The appropriation to fund VE incentives would need to be added to 
the program budget and included with the overall funding appropriation. Anecdotally, we have 
seen cost overruns that exceed 50% of the original ICE (GAO, 2020). It seems reasonable to 
set an initial threshold for the incentives at 25% of that. Notionally, if the idea works, the 
program would save 75% of their overrun.  
There are a variety of contract award and incentive structures applicable to the activities 
needed to manage the technical and business objectives of building major weapon systems 
(DoD Open Systems Architecture and Data Rights Team, 2013). Development of new products 
is, by its nature, uncertain with respect to the input requirements and ultimate design synthesis. 
As such, the guidance is focused on cost-plus contracts and structures associated with awards 
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that are aligned to the type of work being performed. The recommendations associated with 
integration contracts are especially valuable to consider. 
While any new RFP released by the DoD is a communication tool, the evaluation criteria 
for the contract award is the part of the vehicle that speaks the loudest. To make ACVIP and VE 
effective in driving positive outcomes across the contract period, evaluation criteria must show 
that performing virtual integration will be rated very highly as a discriminator for award. In fact, 
typical evaluation factors include cost and performance. It is likely that ACVIP could be a 
significant contributor to both of these. 
To ensure that industry remains engaged in using ACVIP, contract incentives should be 
in place for continuing to reward the right behavior: identifying showstoppers and reducing 
acquisition risk. Incentive Fee type cost contracts are suitable, but Award Fee types may 
provide the most utility. In such contract types, there is usually an award fee board that can 
adjust the criteria to match the state of the program and the types of performance improvements 
that are most sought after by program management. The best carrot should be at the end of the 
contract period, where the VE improvements captured during the contract period can be 
evaluated in the near hindsight of contract closure to the mutual benefit of both parties. 
Well-established patterns of schedule slippage and cost overruns in software programs 
can also be mitigated through incentive structures. Metrics generated from performing ACVIP 
during early stages of the design process can be used to inform contractor fees, incentives, and 
terms. Programs can use these early design and synthesis stages to reduce program execution 
risk, and the contractor can benefit financially through the incentive structures—a win-win 
environment of transparency and collaboration. 
There is a great degree of creativity in this space where customer and supplier can seek 
to deliver the greatest product for the money. However, the thrust of ACVIP is primarily focused 
on avoiding future unforeseen cost, not for reducing the profit available to industry. Juxtaposing 
total cost management with reasonable profit motives requires thoughtful attention in order to 
avoid unintended consequences of artificially inflated starting bids or short-sighted cost cutting 
measures, both of which ultimately hurt program execution and reduce taxpayer value.  
Integrating ACVI Into Workflow 
The introduction of a new technology generally provides opportunity for success and for 
failure. We learn from our mistakes, and many failures are often experienced before success 
can be claimed. In the context of the acquisition of CPS, ACVIP has been applied with mixed 
results. One significant lesson learned is that the ACVIP modeling and analysis has often been 
applied too late in the development process to have had a significant impact on the outcome. 
ACVIP is performed primarily with embedded computing systems because these systems 
require attention to CPS interaction, are timing constrained, have specific security and safety 
requirements, and require resource and performance analysis throughout their development. 
ACVIP specifically addresses these qualities. We believe the early surfacing of issues in these 
areas will translate into a more predictable and easier product development process. 
Recommendations for Acquirers and Contractors 
The context of the application of ACVIP strongly influences the planned workflow. 
Consider a contractor-oriented scenario where ACVIP analyzes process threads that are loaded 
on to a processor to optimize throughput and assess potential component deployment options. 
Compare this to a use case for ACVIP being applied by the U.S. government to support an 
acquisition. For example, a potential acquisition scenario would be to acquire a new and 
improved widget (e.g., a new global positioning system device) for integration into a legacy fleet. 
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In the acquisition scenario, ACVIP could be applied by the acquirer prior to the contract award 
to assess the likelihood that there will be problems during system integration and test. 
Contractors and acquirers will need to determine how to apply ACVIP to their existing 
development or acquisition processes, which are highly context dependent. 
ACVIP practices are not widely adopted by the DoD’s CPS contractors. There is an 
awareness of the benefits of ACVIP, and some contractors have more experience than others, 
but for the most part, the level of ACVIP expertise within the contractor community is low.  
As contractors think about how to modify their workflow to take advantage of ACVIP, 
they will need to consider what (and how) they plan to measure the impact of ACVIP on their 
process. Both for their own purposes, and for their government customer, industry will need to 
measure the effect of a change to their workflow on their process baseline. It should be noted 
that actual, validated process performance baselines that would support this type of analysis are 
rare within the contractor community. Instrumentation and metrics are essential to provide the 
opportunity to analyze the anticipated workflow for the project and strategically insert the ACVIP 
practices as early as possible in the product lifecycle to try to achieve maximum effect.  
A popular way to facilitate process instrumentation is to write down questions that one 
would want to be able to answer with the collected data. This is the key activity in the Goal 
Question Metric Approach (Basili et al., 1994), as it ties the measured data to the achievement 
of a business goal. As the questions are elaborated, it becomes clear to the developer whether 
their existing process instrumentation provides the data needed to answer the questions. This 
might generate an entire activity by the developer to establish a baseline for their process, the 
required first step before embarking on any process improvement. In the case of ACVIP, the key 
benefit is the ability to identify showstopper defects and issues earlier in lifecycle, and with an 
established baseline, some possible questions might be 
• Were the defects identified by the new workflow not identifiable by previous methods (i.e., 
not normally detectable until physical devices were present)? 
• Should the defects that escaped the new workflow (i.e., not detected until physical devices 
were present) have been detected by ACVIP? If so, why weren’t they? 
Figure 4 shows the key activities that we expect would benefit from ACVIP and where 
the data come from (or goes) for each activity. There is an intentional open aperture for 
delineation between organization (U.S. government, contractor, subcontractor) or by role (e.g., 
system engineer, software engineer, hardware engineer, test engineer) to open flexibility to 
alternative implementations and evolving practices. So there are a lot of options for how to 
actually integrate these practices or modify them to take advantage of the new process 
capability. There are nontrivial issues to consider, such as 
• product line considerations 
• proprietary data 
• government furnished information (GFI) detail 
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Figure 4. Workflow Activities and Repositories 
 
Road to ACVIP Adoption 
Adoption of any new approach must have the enabling environment set and be mature enough 
to be ready for full use. The enabling environment is in place: 
• The Army and Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (CMU, SEI) have 
evolved the concept and practice of ACVIP.  
• The SAE International® has nurtured the AADL, which is in use by a variety of international 
industries. Supporting tools have matured and include commercial products that facilitate 
the use of the Object Management Group’s SysML standard; the Open Source AADL Tool 
Environment (OSATE) has been developed and released to the public by CMU, SEI and an 
array of international participants. 
Adoption will inform the target community of the opportunities that are available to them along 
with the standards and associated tools.  
• There are a set of training resources available to the community to aid in understanding the 
enabling environment elements such as AADL, SysML, VE methods, and associated tools.  
• VE principles are robust and well-used practice in a variety of industries and government 
organizations but need to be tailored for ACVIP. 
Adoption of these practices are mutually beneficial. As discussed in the contracting and 
incentive section above, this could be done by incorporating ACVIP as a contract award 
criterion. This would require the contractor to challenge their status quo and come up with 
creative and novel applications of ACVIP. Similar to the adoption of the microwave oven (as 
described above), technologies, tools, and techniques will evolve to shape ACVIP over time. 
The ACVIP content would appear in multiple places within the proposal document and be 
threaded through incremental and final contract evaluation activities.  
We need to build some experiments that have hypotheses; producing data enables the 
evaluation of alternative implementations (with/without ACVIP) to verify/validate the hypotheses 
(i.e., demonstrate the value). 
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Bumps in the Road to Adoption 
The synergy needed between software, hardware, and systems engineers will need to 
evolve in ways that have not been emphasized in the past. ACVIP has its greatest advantage 
when models are throughout product development and sustainment. Therefore, we will need to 
extend the discipline of creating and managing embedded computing systems engineering 
artifacts.  
Putting these kinds of efforts into areas of the lifecycle, where they have not traditionally 
been, will require a change in culture. Changing culture is hard and takes time through shaping 
and supporting new behaviors. Incentives can be instrumental in helping to achieve those shifts 
in behavior. Integrating a mindset of seeking out value improvements as a part of daily work 
must replace environments where people feel like they are only supposed to follow the 
documented requirements. Success for this transformation will be built on trailblazers trying new 
approaches and showing that the high likelihood for a payoff for both customer and supplier 
transitions into added value that all sides can benefit from. The trailblazers need to be 
recognized for making good faith efforts, even if some do not pay off. 
Transformations, by their nature, are initially unsettling to a status-quo environment. 
Committing to a new process can lead to underperforming before those approaches can wring 
out implementation challenges (often referred to as the learning curve). For any such initiative 
there are always start-up and scaling issues that need to be worked through (Dubner, 2020). 
Teams must be allowed to work on small improvements that can be scaled and grow such that 
they will eventually show skeptics positive examples that illustrate how to apply new 
technologies and process improvements focused on adding value.  
Summary and Recommendations 
After a time, repeated behavior patterns need to be accepted as a highly likely future 
event. Cost and schedule overruns for these highly complex and integrated cyber-physical 
systems are going to happen unless we change the way we acquire these products. The 
consequences of schedule slips and unfulfilled performance goals are manifold and widely 
known. This future cost realization can be turned into a value-benefit bogey such that mutual 
needs are met: improved business performance for industry and on-schedule acquisitions that 
fully deliver desired capability. 
In CPS, “software is never done” (Defense Innovation Board, 2019) for three reasons: .1 
capability changes are relatively affordable to introduce, 2. constant vigilance is needed to stay 
abreast of cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle of the product, and 3. software 
development is a constantly changing field where new methods and tools are also in motion. As 
such, process improvements will need to be managed for any CPS and should be accomplished 
in a way that is mutually beneficial to both supplier and customer. VE is a proven framework that 
can be extended into CPS to evaluate and introduce innovative new methods as a win-win 
partnership between industry and government. 
Evaluating VE initiatives in an MBSE and ACVIP model-based environment will reduce 
uncertainty and risk for incorporating capability and process changes as well as clarify the VE 
benefits of the innovation. ACVI is a robust process that is supported by mature standards and 
tools on which to perform VE improvements. Embracing ACVIP also reduces design and 
integration risk for initial product development and for follow-on fact-of-life cybersecurity 
challenges and periodic capability improvement throughout the lifecycle (Chilenski & Kerstetter, 
2015).  
Integrating VE and ACVIP into the workflows of customers and suppliers engaged in 
developing CPS must be woven into the technical and business dimensions of the combined 
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enterprise. This would include impacts to contract types, statements of work/objectives, 
development and operations processes, cost estimation, incentive mechanisms, and business 
processes.  
Combining VE and ACVIP in this way is novel. As such, our first recommendation is to 
build a process performance baseline to be used to establish the rate at which showstopper 
defects escape the established process controls (e.g., peer reviews, unit tests, and hampering 
project execution). The data would be used as a reference to measure improvements, such as 
ACVIP implementations, that would be rewarded by VE. VE can only work when there is a solid 
reference point from which to measure. Even if you do not implement ACVIP, root cause 
analysis of the defects that escaped (and also analysis of the ones that were not detected) 
should be an essential part of all process improvement initiatives. 
Our second recommendation is to pilot the application of ACVI and VE on selected 
acquisition programs to work out the details of the most effective metrics to be used, the most 
impactful analysis to be performed, and the value to be gained by all stakeholders. That pilot 
data will help develop measures and criteria for defining subsequent successful scaling of the 
initiative into other programs. Many innovations that have pleasing initial outcomes collapse 
under the weight of being fully deployed due to issues with scaling for wider use (Dubner, 2020). 
Our third recommendation is to perform VE analysis at the enterprise level to determine 
the processes and products used for cyber-physical products operating in common domains 
and across related organizations to identify duplication and opportunities to gain greater 
efficiencies. Comparisons can be made to evaluate where points of leverage add overall 
portfolio value and determine systemic reuse strategies. VE can also be used to evaluate the 
positive or negative impacts of using/declining common products, modules, infrastructure, 
development, security, operations tools, and so on. 
Taking on any process reengineering or transformational effort is fraught with risks and 
challenges, but they are worth doing where the benefits are high enough. We have identified 
areas to address and methods to employ that are replete with even greater benefits than the 
costs to bring them about. 
Research Issues 
• VE concepts can be applied to software development strategies. 
• Products are developed across multiple organizations, but integrating across a wide array of 
actors makes it very difficult to get everyone on the same page. 
• Value of virtual integration is harder to address due to different constituencies. 
• Costing the scale for software teams is inconsistent and best-guess approach. 
• Better systems engineering up front will ensure there is less expense in the long run. 
• VE has yet to be connected to CI/CD for weapon systems. 
Results 
This analysis identified the aspects of VE that can be applied to the acquisition and 
lifecycle of CPS employing embedded computing resources. Programs will be able to identify 
the future cost of change and will have the ability to ensure that investments in modeling and 
analysis are preserved instead of traded off in the early stages of an acquisition when they do 
the most good. 
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Abstract 
The application of the five production management levers addresses software projects as 
production systems, allowing for the application of well-established operations science techniques 
to improve throughput and predictability throughout the project life cycle. Traditional project 
management triple constraints of cost, schedule, and performance have long been the 
cornerstone of Department of Defense (DoD) software project management. Often, these 
constraints are managed independently, using past performance data to assess and predict 
future project performance, leading to highly variable outcomes. Traditional waterfall models for 
software project delivery exacerbate this variability and limit the ability to delivery capability at the 
speed of relevance. By treating projects as a production system, a deeper understanding of 
planning variables (product design, process design) and execution variables (capacity planning, 
limiting work in process, and variability) can be achieved and close the gap on project delivery 
performance. Further, the study connects industry best practices across software, manufacturing, 
and construction to improve DoD software project delivery. Operations science and production 
management principles and techniques are foundational to the agile and lean movement. The 
software industry has already adopted many of the operations science and production 
management techniques (such as limiting work in process, capacity-based sprint planning, 
software factories, etc.). A succinct process to apply, monitor, control, and report out on the five 
levers can encourage adoption and clarify execution of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, DoD 
Instruction 5000.02, Software Acquisition Pathway. 
Keywords: agile, production management, software 
Introduction 
The application of the five production management levers addresses software projects 
as production systems, allowing for the application of well-established operations science 
techniques to improve throughput and predictability throughout the project life cycle. Traditional 
project management triple constraints of cost, schedule, and performance have long been the 
cornerstone of Department of Defense (DoD) software project management. Often, these 
constraints are managed independently, using past performance data to assess and predict 
future project performance, leading to highly variable outcomes. Traditional waterfall models for 
software project delivery exacerbate this variability and limit the ability to delivery capability at 
the speed of relevance. By treating projects as a production system, a deeper understanding of 
planning variables (product design, process design) and execution variables (capacity planning, 
limiting work in process [WIP], and variability) can be achieved and close the gap on project 
delivery performance. 
Further, the study connects industry best practices across software, manufacturing, and 
construction to improve DoD software project delivery. Operations science and production 
management principles and techniques are foundational to the agile and lean movement. The 
software industry has already adopted many of the operations science and production 
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management techniques (such as limiting WIP, capacity-based sprint planning, software 
factories, etc.), while large capital construction projects are adopting production management to 
improve delivery on billion-dollar projects (Project Production Institute [PPI], n.d.). With a 
plethora of data both within the DoD and industry, a succinct process to apply, monitor, control, 
and report out on the five levers can encourage adoption and clarify execution of the Adaptive 
Acquisition Framework, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Software Acquisition Pathway. 
Agile frameworks have been around for more than 20 years in software development. 
Providing a link between the operations science community in the manufacturing and 
construction industry and the software development communities is another step on the path of 
continuous improvement and delivery. It has been widely recognized that disconnected planning 
and execution affects project performance and acquisition throughout the DoD and beyond. This 
study helps the DoD take the lead within industry and revolutionize the way software projects 
are developed and delivered. 
Research Issue Statement  
This proposed study aimed to apply the five levers of production management—product 
design, process design, capacity, WIP, and variability (PPI, n.d.)—to the Adaptive Acquisition 
Framework, DoDI 5000.02, Software Acquisition Pathway to achieve increased control and 
monitoring within agile software development projects. Research questions included, Do current 
agile projects within the DoD (i.e., Agile Pilot Programs) currently employ any of the production 
management levers to manage and control software delivery? How can the production 
management five levers be applied to support agile software projects? How can the five levers 
be applied to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(OUSD[A&S]) agile metrics? 
Research Results Statement  
While this research is the subject of the author’s PhD studies at the University of 
Maryland, the study is ongoing. However, expected results are (1) processes to apply the five 
levers to improve cost, schedule, and performance monitoring and control, and (2) guidelines to 
apply production management levers to achieve OUSD(A&S) software metrics reporting 
requirements. This paper will share the progress made to date toward these objectives. 
Technical Concept 
The DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, published on 
January 23, 2020, led to incorporating Change 8 of the DoDI 5000.02T, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System,” on September 15, 2020. The practices and standards within the 
DoDI 5000.02T are being updated incrementally to apply the adaptive framework, specifically 
for the software acquisition pathway. Major changes for the pathway were the elimination of the 
traditional waterfall Systems Engineering Technical Review (SETR) milestone decisions for an 
iterative, incremental delivery approach focused on minimum viable product (MVP) and 
minimum viable capability release (MVCR) deliveries (DAU, n.d.).  
Within the updated DoDI 5000.02, there is a lack of detail related to how agile, lean, and 
DevSecOps approaches can be leveraged to improve monitoring and control of software project 
delivery, specifically during planning and execution. While a preliminary approach and concept 
for acquisition and project management documentation has been identified, a detailed approach 
to agile project management to support agile software development is needed. Agile software 
development is the application of the agile manifesto values and principles within development 
frameworks (i.e., Scrum, XP, etc.) and practices (i.e., pair programming, test driven 
development, etc.) to produce a software product. Agile project management is the application 
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of the agile manifesto values and principles to project delivery (i.e., focusing on delivering value 
early and iteratively to customers; Agile Alliance, n.d.). 
Application of Production Management 
The proposed research develops processes to apply the production management five 
levers to improve cost, schedule, and performance monitoring and control during planning and 
execution, supporting an agile project management approach to software development. This 
effort will also establish guidelines to apply production management levers to achieve 
OUSD(A&S) software metrics reporting requirements by identifying how the five levers can be 
used to monitor and control software project planning and execution. The Adaptive Acquisition 
Framework software development and acquisition processes in the current DoDI 5000.02 are 
conceptual and do not fully address how agile, DevSecOps, and lean can be applied to a 
software development acquisition. Detailed processes to address how programs can tailor a 
software acquisition to adopt an agile framework, DevSecOps best practices, and lean 
techniques to achieve rapid development and deployment of software with cybersecurity built in 
are still needed. Specifically, the incorporation of combined planning and execution through the 
adoption of production management techniques, wherein planning occurs iteratively through the 
life cycle by the “doers” of the work; requirements are only defined as a need (what a user 
needs and why, not how); and schedule is timeboxed. Contrary to waterfall, in agile projects, 
time is fixed (timeboxed), cost and resources are fixed (capacity-based planning), and scope is 
flexible. 
By framing the software project as a production system and applying agile frameworks 
and processes, project managers can achieve improved integrated planning and execution. The 
five levers to adopt agile project management include product design, process design, capacity, 
WIP, and variability (PPI, n.d.). Product design relates to what the product or project requires; in 
agile software development projects, these requirements are developed iteratively throughout 
the life cycle of the project. Process design is focused on the actual process and procedures to 
accomplish the work. Too often, the detailed processes required to accomplish individual tasks 
within a project are not well understood. Capacity-based planning is focused on planning work 
based on resources (personnel, materials, information, etc.) available versus planning to a hard 
date or milestone. This allows for more detailed work estimation and execution, reducing cost 
and schedule variability over time. WIP is the work that is in flight, meaning that work has 
started but is not yet finished. WIP represents tied up resources and capital; until WIP is 
released, it does not result in a direct outcome or value to the stakeholder. Finally, variability 
relates to anything that affects the overall outcome and performance of a project. Variability is 
largely driven and affected by the other levers previously mentioned. Controlling project 
variability, especially when it relates to cost and schedule, is a challenge on all projects, 
software or otherwise. Understanding the five production management levers forces project 
managers to look beyond the traditional “iron triangle” of cost, schedule, and performance. 
Instead, project managers need to understand the detailed level planning, design, and 
execution to control variability and improve overall project monitoring and controls. 
Implications on OUSD(A&S) Software Metrics 
The second expected result of this study is to provide guidelines for software project 
managers to apply production management levers to achieve OUSD(A&S) software metrics 
reporting requirements. OUSD(A&S) Software Policy Guidance identifies the following as a 
minimal set of metrics for software projects: process efficiency metrics, software quality metrics, 
software development progress, cost metrics, and capability delivery/value metrics (Brady & 
Rice, 2020). This study will provide guidelines on how the production management levers can 
be controlled to achieve the OUSD(A&S) metrics. For example, workforce capacity planning can 
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be achieved using feature/story points. Variability can be controlled by tracking team velocity—
adjusting story point commitments during a sprint as the team capacity flexes. 
The proposed research is directly tied to the DoD National Defense Strategy 2018 goals 
and objectives to deliver performance at the speed of relevance, prioritizing the speed of 
delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades to pace the threat (DoD, 2018). 
There have been multiple efforts within the DoD to support agile DevSecOps acquisitions, 
including the establishment of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) and Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) guidance for the Agile Pilot Programs: Software Acquisition Strategy: Agile 
Guidance (OUSD[A&S], 2019e); Contracting Considerations for Agile Solutions (OUSD[A&S], 
2019d); Agile 101: An Agile Primer (OUSD[A&S], 2019c); Agile Software Acquisition Guidebook 
(OUSD[A&S], 2020); Minimum Viable Product (MVP) and Product Roadmap (OUSD[A&S], 
2019a); Agile Metrics Guide (OUSD[A&S], 2019b); and DevSecOps Best Practices Guide 
(Brady & Rice, 2020; DoD, 2020). The rewrite of the DoDI 5000.02 to reflect all of the lessons 
learned and to reflect an adaptive acquisition framework to support software projects is needed 
to ensure programs can adopt and execute agile principles and practices within the DoD 
acquisition environment. The application of production management levers through process and 
guidelines will further strengthen the agile initiatives within the DoD and transform not only 
software development but agile project management. The inclusion of production management 
levers and processes is aligned with the agile and lean movements seen within industry and 
provides the foundation needed within the acquisition community to understand and adopt agile 
principles and values for software delivery. 
Research Questions and Objectives 
Table 1. Research Questions and Objectives 
Research Question Objectives 
Do current agile projects 
within the DoD (i.e., Agile 
Pilot Programs) currently 
employ any of the 
production management 
levers to manage and 
control software delivery? 
Identify production management levers in use by Agile Pilot 
Programs and determine level of maturity 
Compare impacts to cost, schedule, and performance by 
assessing the throughput (delivery cycle time) of software 
deliveries 
How can the production 
management five levers be 
applied to support agile 
software projects? 
Determine how product and process design works in an 
iterative, agile approach 
Determine how fixed capacity planning results in increase 
control and throughput 
Identify how limiting WIP increases throughput 
Identify how variability can be controlled, not just monitored, 
by treating software projects as production systems 
Create a guideline for understanding software projects as a 
production system 
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How can the five levers be 
applied to the OUSD(A&S) 
agile metrics? 
Identify how OUSD(A&S) metrics for agile software 
projects can be met using the production management 
levers 
Map the production management levers to the 
OUSD(A&S) metrics 
Research Methodology 
The initial phase of this research is focused on conducting a literature review of the Agile 
Pilot Program publicly available data. Since the introduction of the Agile Pilot Programs in the 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), multiple DoD projects have 
adopted agile principles and values with varying levels of maturity and success. Phase 1 will 
focus on a detailed literature review of the current state of agile adoption within the pilot 
programs, as well as interviews with the Agile Pilot Program offices to collect information related 
to application of production management levers. 
There are multiple resources to review related to the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, 
the application of agile to DoD software projects, and the current state of agile adoption within 
the DoD. Additionally, there are potential data points from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) that could provide additional lessons learned. The objective is to identify how the DoD 
has started adopting an adaptive framework for agile software projects; lessons learned 
regarding adoption; how production management levers are being used today; and their impact 
on OUSD(A&S) software metrics/success criteria. 
The following is a list of materials that will be the basis for the literature review. 
Additional resources will be reviewed as identified during Phase 1 of the proposed research. 
• DoDI 5000.02: Operation of Adaptive Acquisition Framework 
• Software Acquisition Strategy: Agile Guidance (OUSD[A&S], 2019e) 
• Contracting Considerations for Agile Solutions (OUSD[A&S], 2019d) 
• Agile 101: An Agile Primer (OUSD[A&S], 2019c) 
• Agile Software Acquisitions Guidebook (OUSD[A&S], 2020) 
• Minimum Viable Product (MVP) and Product Roadmap (OUSD[A&S], 2019a) 
• OSD DevSecOps Best Practices Guide (DoD, 2020)  
• AiDA: Acquisitions in the Digital Age (MITRE, n.d.) 
• Project Production Institute research (Arbulu et al., 2016; Shenoy, 2017; Shenoy & 
Zabelle, 2016) 
• GAO reports on agile within the DoD and the DHS (GAO, 2020a, 2020b) 
• Defense Innovation Board SWAP report (Defense Innovation Board, 2019) 
Research Results 
This research is the focus of the author’s PhD studies at the University of Maryland, the 
results of which are ongoing. The goal of this paper is to share the preliminary results of the 
literature review using publicly available data and well-established production management and 
operations science techniques. 
Importance of Flow 
Production management is the application of operations management and science to 
production systems (PPI, n.d.). Traditional project delivery is focused on productivity measures. 
However, productivity does not equate to throughput or outcomes. Projects can have very high 
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productivity measures and still fail to deliver (Shenoy & Zabelle, 2016). This is the result of poor 
flow through a system, failure to address and exploit bottlenecks, and failure to control WIP. 
To improve project cost, schedule, and performance, a deeper understanding of what 
happens throughout the life cycle of a project is needed. The current approaches to project 
management largely adopted by the DoD and supported by organizations such as the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) have broken project management into siloed areas of responsibility, 
often creating large communication gaps that lead to project failures (Zabelle et al., 2018). The 
approach used today, even in some projects that have adopted agile, still often reflects the 
results of Conway’s Law, which states that organizations’ design systems mirror their 
communication structures. In other words, if the organization is not cross-functional, then the 
system or products will not be cross-functional, likely resulting in more changes late in the 
development process (Skelton & Pais, 2019). 
To understand how this is all related to project performance, it is important to understand 
what is happening when projects are not delivering within cost and schedule. Little’s Law 
explains how WIP impacts overall throughput and project performance. Limiting WIP (not 
eliminating) can provide more consistent results for throughput over time, as variability in cycle 






TH = throughput (items/unit time) 
WIP = work in process (# of items) 
CT = cycle time (time units/item) 
Production Management Levers 
Production management is the application of operations science techniques to the 
management of the project or production process as a system. The idea is to look at project 
execution as a whole system, not as individual phases (Shenoy, 2017). It is a well-established 
concept that has been in practice within the manufacturing industry for decades (PPI, n.d.). It is 
also foundational to agile project management, which focuses on cross-functional, collaborative 
approaches to achieve a desired outcome or product. Too often projects are focused on 
productivity; however, productivity is not indicative of throughput or outcomes. An example of 
this would be classic project management monitoring and control tools used by the DoD today, 
such as Earned Value Management (EVM). Like any monitoring and control system, it is based 
on data, including estimations of work, cost, and value. The trouble is that these estimations are 
often made years in advance without the input of the people who will actually perform the work. 
The further the estimation is made, in both time and resources, the greater the variability in the 
measurement will be. At a certain point the data become nothing more than a point for 
contractors and government to argue over performance, providing little actual value or control. 
One possible solution to these challenges is to leverage the five levers of production 
management throughout the life cycle of a project and to adopt a more agile framework to 
project management and execution. The five levers of production management include product 
design, process design, capacity, WIP, and variability (PPI, n.d.). 
Product Design 
Product design focuses on controlling the scope of a project through product 
requirements (PPI, n.d.). Specifically, product design focuses on developing the busines case, 
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including the potential use cases and value it will deliver to the end user. Traditional project 
requirements are well defined and detailed up front as part of the planning phase. However, in 
agile software projects, the requirements start as a business case and user needs and are 
detailed and defined through iterative and incremental development cycles, improving over time 
based on user feedback (Agile Alliance, n.d.). Establishing processes to apply agile to the 
product design will lead to improved innovation and earlier user feedback, reducing the cycle 
time for software product delivery. Further, a set of guidelines on how to identify and define 
MVP from a DoD perspective would assist with software project planning.  
Use Within the DoD Today 
A full study of the applications in use within the DoD today is ongoing and currently 
limited to the results of publicly available data. However, based on the preliminary literature 
reviews, the following was found to support and demonstrate the use of the product design 
lever, specific iterative development of software requirements within DoD agile projects. 
Many existing projects that have adopted agile practices still follow waterfall 
development practices when it comes to requirements, spending time and resources up front to 
develop and define detailed requirements a year in advance of when they will be developed. 
This is evidenced by the Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment, published in June 2020, 
which stated that while many programs stated they were following agile practices, it was often 
more like a hybrid waterfall-agile approach (GAO, 2020b). In addition, while the statutory 
regulations have been modified and relaxed for certain types of programs, not all have made the 
transition and are still bound by contractual limitations, such as stage gate reviews, forcing less 
agile cadences and delayed releases. However, not all programs are experiencing these 
limitations to their agile approach, with many taking advantage of policy changes that allow for 
early prototyping (GAO, 2020b). 
Application to OUSD(A&S) Agile Metrics 
The OUSD(A&S) metrics include process efficiency metrics, software quality metrics, 
software development progress, cost metrics, and capability delivery/value metrics (Brady & 
Rice, 2020). Product design supports software quality metrics and agile product metrics. It also 
influences cost metrics and capability delivery/value metrics.  
Product design supports software quality metrics by incorporating the user and 
stakeholders early and often throughout the product design and development activities. 
Recidivism, first-time pass rate, defect count, test coverage, and number of blockers all are 
informed or result from product design decisions. Capturing the rate of rejection or return on 
developed work provides project managers with the ability to monitor product design 
performance. Repeat issues, such as poor test coverage, can then be swarmed by the team to 
identify the root cause and make a change to the design approach to fix the gap (OUSD[A&S], 
2019). 
Process Design 
Process design is key to understanding communication channels, flows, queues, and 
sequencing of work. There are many well-established agile frameworks that support this 
concept as a way to control and monitor throughput. Agile process design and practice adoption 
is a stepping stone to achieving DevSecOps continuous integration and continuous delivery of 
software. It is critical to establish processes and guidelines from a software acquisition adaptive 
framework standpoint. In the future, this study aims to provide a framework for process mapping 
within software projects to understand how technology, automation, and people can deliver 
software capability incrementally and iteratively. 
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Use Within the DoD Today 
A full study of the applications in use within the DoD today is ongoing and currently 
limited to the results of publicly available data. However, based on the preliminary literature 
reviews, the following was found to support and demonstrate the use of the process design 
lever within DoD agile projects. 
A study published in the DAU’s Defense Acquisition Research Journal looked at five 
successful agile adoptions with the DoD. A common theme across the projects was the 
investment in agile coaches and process development. Understanding the flow of information 
and identifying bottlenecks and non–value-added activities within existing processes was critical 
to the success of the project’s agile transformation (Kramer & Wagner, 2019). Further, 
according to the 14th Annual State of Agile Report, which surveyed over 40,000 agile projects 
across industry and government, over half of respondents are implementing some form of value 
stream management as projects are adopting agile beyond software development, applying 
agile to their core business operations and project management as well (Digital.ai Software Inc., 
2020). 
Application to OUSD(A&S) Agile Metrics 
OUSD(A&S) agile metrics identify a number of agile process metrics that aim to support 
the estimation, measurement, monitoring, and control of tasking at the lowest level possible. 
Metrics include story point estimation to support velocity calculation within small agile teams. 
Story points measure the estimate time and complexity of a task, taking into account 
dependencies, risks and unknowns, and skills required of a resource. The monitoring and 
control of theses metrics allows for greater predictability, as teams are responsible for 
estimating their own work, are accountable for documenting their progress, and are 
continuously reviewing and iterating to improve overall processes to support delivery 
(OUSD[A&S], 2019). 
Capacity 
Understanding capacity of not only the technologies employed but also the people 
assigned to do work is critical to creating an integrated approach to software development. 
Technology capacities related to software development and DevSecOps tools are well 
established and have been documented in the DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design 
Version 1.0, published August 12, 2019. However, workforce planning capacities are less 
understood within the current workforce. Years of waterfall development have created long 
workforce cycle times. Resources are often split between projects and efforts; throughput is 
stalled as people switch from task to task; the cycle time and takt time to deliver capability is 
measured in years, not hours. This study will focus on how software project managers can use 
agile thinking and processes to increase throughput and deliver quality software more frequently 
and reliably. Workforce planning, when done at the worker level, results in increased throughput 
and less variability of product outcomes, making it easier for project managers to track 
performance, cost, and schedule (actual vs. estimated). 
Use Within the DoD Today 
A full study of the applications in use within the DoD today is ongoing and currently 
limited to the results of publicly available data. However, based on the preliminary literature 
reviews, the following was found to support and demonstrate the use of the capacity lever within 
DoD agile projects. 
The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) Army project tracks the capacity 
of their teams across the enterprise through story point analysis. Further, they have 
implemented a quarterly review to track overall performance using story points to estimate their 
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team velocity. Velocity is then used to adjust their planning for the next increment (Kramer & 
Wagner, 2019). Capacity planning is a well-established method to support project monitoring 
and controls within agile projects. However, it is a major shift from the waterfall approach of 
surging resources to achieve scheduled dates. Further, while there are many policy guidelines 
across the government that have been modified in the last 5 years to recommend or encourage 
capacity-based planning, it is unclear how many programs are actually utilizing it today. 
Application to OUSD(A&S) Agile Metrics 
Capacity based planning most directly relates to velocity predictability and the cost 
metrics from the OUSD(A&S) metrics (OUSD[A&S], 2019). Planning work within the limitations 
of capacity allows for greater predictability when it comes to project cost and schedule. 
Individual team velocity normalizes over time, reducing variability and uncertainty and providing 
greater predictability of project performance. This supports the shift from traditional scheduling, 
which is often done separately by those independent of execution. With increased predictability, 
cost impacts and estimates become better over time. 
Work in Process  
WIP is a major driver of variability within any project, not just software. WIP ties up 
resources, slows down progress, and decreases throughput. It creates unnecessary 
dependences within a production system that can hinder delivery. However, WIP isn’t all bad. 
Understanding how WIP can be used to drive results is key to software delivery (PPI, n.d.). 
Using agile and lean tools, such as Kanban boards, sprint planning, and so on, software project 
managers can improve project predictability for delivering a capability. 
Use Within the DoD Today 
A full study of the applications in use within the DoD today is ongoing and currently 
limited to the results of publicly available data. However, based on the preliminary literature 
reviews, the following was found to support and demonstrate the use of the work in process 
lever within DoD agile projects. 
While there are few data available on how programs are managing or governing WIP 
within their projects, there are some data available on the use of Kanban boards to control flow. 
The RCAS Army project used Kanbans for their program management office–related work 
(Kramer & Wagner, 2019). Kanban boards alone do not make a project agile. However, they are 
often used when there are continuous flow or continuous delivery releases (Rehkopf, 2021). In 
DoD projects, Kanbans can provide a way for programmatic and support activities outside of 
traditional developer teams to support an agile culture and approach for delivery. 
Application to OUSD(A&S) Agile Metrics 
There is overlap with many of the recommended OUSD(A&S) agile metrics, as WIP is a 
fundamental concept for supporting flow throughout the project. The guide specifically calls out 
WIP, cycle time, and throughput as flow metrics related to Kanban. However, WIP is a shared 
production management lever and agile concept that can be used in scrum and other agile 
applications as well. Controlling WIP will have a direct impact on the DevSecOps metrics related 
to deployment frequency and lead time. Further, WIP is also directly related to the Agile Product 
Metrics of delivered features/capabilities, as increased WIP will delay overall throughput and 
delivery of the desired features/capabilities. This is especially true if developer teams are 
constantly being re-tasked throughout the sprint due to emergent stakeholder needs. Careful 
planning and adherence to agile cultural changes is needed to ensure teams can limit WIP 
(OUSD[A&S], 2019). 
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Variability 
Variability comes in many forms for software projects. The largest source of variability on 
any project is humans. No matter how standard or common processes, procedures, 
requirements, and so on are made, there is always variability during execution. The goal of 
using variability as a lever is to understand, monitor, and control variability at the source. 
Traditionally, variability was monitored (not controlled) using tools such as EVM. 
However, there are limitations to this commonly used tool when it comes to software projects. 
EVM assumes that a project has a detailed list of established requirements up front, a detailed 
integrated master schedule (IMS) for the life cycle of the project, and detailed cost estimates. 
The issue with these assumptions and trying to apply tools such as EVM to software projects is 
that interactive and incremental development does not start with all this information up front. So, 
unless the project manager re-baselines every increment, there will be large variability in the 
EVM metrics. Further, the planning and execution resources are often independent of one 
another, making the cost estimates, schedules, and work breakdown structure disconnected 
from the people doing the work. If project managers want to truly control projects (not just 
monitor), then the estimates for the schedule and resources need to come from the lowest 
delegated level possible (“the doers”). 
Similar to how the DoD has adopted risk, issues, and opportunity management as a way 
to account for the good and bad of variability, production management treats variability as a way 
to address detrimental and beneficial variability within projects (Morrow, 2017). Sources of 
project variability include process variation/quality, time variations, and product variation. A 
common example of detrimental variation within a software project is rework of a product due to 
quality and testing issues; a common example of beneficial variability is completing work early 
or being able to pull work forward from the backlog (PPI, n.d.). 
Use Within the DoD Today 
A full study of the applications in use within the DoD today is ongoing and currently 
limited to the results of publicly available data. However, based on the preliminary literature 
reviews, the following was found to support and demonstrate the use of the variability lever 
within DoD agile projects. 
There are multiple projects that are leveraging scrum and Kanban approaches. 
However, it is unknown how many are leveraging agile metrics, such as recidivism to track 
rework and impacts on quality. Additional surveys and data will need to be collected to 
understand how mature the agile applications within the DoD actually are, as many projects that 
reference agile as their approach also reported following traditional waterfall project 
management monitoring and control techniques, which is not aligned (GAO, 2020; Kramer & 
Wagner, 2019). 
Application to OUSD(A&S) Agile Metrics 
The OUSD(A&S) quality metrics are most closely related to the variability production 
lever. Specifically, recidivism (i.e., work returned to a team for rework), first-time pass rate, 
defect count, and test coverage are all examples of metrics that track detrimental variability. 
Beneficial variability will be captured via story completion rate, cumulative flow diagrams, and 
release burnup charts within the agile process metrics (OUSD[A&S], 2019). There are 
opportunities to add additional beneficial variability metrics. However, these will be heavily 
dependent on the agile approach and individual project applications. 
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Next Steps and Future Work 
This paper represents the initial research and results to apply production management to 
agile projects within the DoD, as well as their adoption to support the application of the 
OUSD(A&S) software project metrics. Further research includes data collection related to the 
specific applications of agile within the DoD and related government projects. While guidelines 
and policy are being updated, there is little reporting available to demonstrate how programs are 
being held accountable for implementing agile. As evidenced by the latest Defense Acquisitions 
Annual Assessment, there are many programs (22) that claim to be practicing agile but are not 
delivering anywhere near the industry standard for iterative and incremental releases (GAO, 
2020b). 
Agile Pilot Program Interviews 
A review of the DoD Agile Pilot Programs, their successes and lessons learned with 
agile frameworks, will be necessary to understand the level of maturity and success adopting 
agile. While there are some data available on programs that have adopted an agile approach or 
tools, there are few data published on the agile metrics being captured. Measures of agile 
performance and health are needed to understand where agile adoptions are failing within 
government projects. One-on-one interviews with project management, government product 
owners, scrum masters, and development teams are needed to understand the current 
application of production management levers in DoD project, including agile processes and 
metrics. 
To support this objective, this study will create a standard set of questions to be shared 
with the Agile Pilot Programs to identify how production management levers and agile principles 
and values have impacted project cost, schedule, and performance. Challenges related to the 
delivery cycle time and throughput of software to the end user will be captured and used to 
identify processes for product and process design. Further, information related to agile software 
metrics for process efficiency, software quality, development progress, cost, and value will be 
assessed to identify enablers and challenges to agile adoption in the adaptive framework. 
Process Development to Apply Production Management to Agile Software Projects 
After Phase 1 has been completed and all data have been collected, a process to 
integrate production management levers for software project monitoring and control will be 
identified. The process will address how to apply product and process design, how to control 
WIP to increase throughput, and how to manage process, product, and resource variability to 
achieve throughput objectives for software incremental delivery. Additional guidelines to apply 
production management levers to deliver on the OUSD(A&S) software project metrics will be 
created, establishing a clear framework to achieve the full benefits of agile software delivery. 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach for metrics. However, it is important that they are well 
understood and applied properly within the acquisition community, especially within contracts. 
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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires operational systems via major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs). An average MDAP today will take about 8 years to deliver a new system (or 
new capabilities) to the operating forces using existing acquisition processes.  
Cycle time is the duration between the start of system development until it is available for use. 
Programs can execute as planned when program cycle times are shorter than the pace of 
technology and adversary change. The pace of technology and adversary change is pushing the 
DoD to streamline acquisition processes and deliver products faster.  
This paper presents a subset of research performed. It provides an overview of significant factors 
related to schedule and schedule growth. It classifies program acquisition strategies into three 
groups and identifies cycle time–related factors for these strategy groups. 
Keywords: Acquisition strategies, Major Defense Acquisition Programs, program cycle times, 
decision frameworks, program management, predictor variable selection quantitative data 
analysis 
Introduction 
Former Secretary of Defense Mattis (2018) emphasized the need to deliver new 
capabilities at “the speed of relevance” (p. 10). The Department of Defense (DoD) will fast-track 
certain projects and focus priorities and resources to execute these projects. This research 
speaks to programs in the rest of the portfolio—those developing new capabilities that must 
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accommodate changing priorities and resources and still deliver products on time and as 
promised. 
Programs can execute as planned when program cycle times are shorter than the pace 
of technology and adversary change. However, the pace of technology and adversary change is 
pushing the DoD to deliver some capabilities sooner,1 which often requires leadership 
involvement, greater risk, cost, effort, and acquisition process modifications.2 These accelerated 
programs compete with other acquisition programs for resources and priorities, meaning some 
still-required programs will deliver required systems to the operating forces later and in smaller 
quantities than initially planned, unless they can make changes to reduce their cycle times. 
Research Scope 
This research focused on selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)3 
active between 2007 through 2018 within the context of a defense-unique market with multiple 
government stakeholders and increasing demand for reduced cycle time4 and capability 
delivery. Major policy changes5 enacted between 2007 and 2018 provide context for the 
quantitative analysis of cycle time.6  
Research Questions and Objectives 
The research investigated policy and management issues related to accelerating DoD 
acquisition processes and addressed the following questions: 
1. What data reported in publicly released reports are significant predictors of program 
cycle time and schedule change? In this research, cycle times are in months, and 
program start means approval to commence engineering and manufacturing 
development (also called Milestone B). Schedule change is the relative percent 
change relative to original cycle time since program start. 
2. How do these predictors change with acquisition strategies? Acquisition strategies 
are detailed plans mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR 7, 2021). 
They are typically not publicly released but are inferred from observables such as 
solicitations, contract awards, budget and reporting documentation, and public 
reports of significant issues and events such as test failures and declaration of Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC).  
The research produced several databases from publicly available sources suitable for 
research. These are available for research upon request from the authors. Simple regression 
 
1 Rapid Acquisition Offices can deliver interim solutions within 2 years of request. 
2 This is called streamlining or tailoring. 
3 MDAPs are weapon system programs with research and development expenditures greater than $300 
million or procurement expenditures greater than $1.80 billion indexed to Fiscal Year 1990 constant 
dollars (MDAP, 2007).  
4 Cycle time is the duration between the start of system development until it is available for use, 
commonly identified by terms such as Initial Operational Capability (IOC) or Required Asset Availability 
(RAA). 
5 Specifically, the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the 2016 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), and policy changes prior to January 2020 showcase this increasing demand 
for reduced cycle time. 
6 For example, the 2016 NDAA Section 804 changes require capability delivery within 5 years of program 
start to use these authorities.  
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models of cycle times and cycle time changes identified factors affecting cycle time reduction 
and growth from historical data.  
We examined how these factors change with different acquisition strategies. This paper 
continues with an overview of recent literature, methodology, a summary of results, and 
conclusions.  
Overview 
The DoD executes MDAPs as life-cycle programs, where activities may be binned 
between development (which includes acquisition), procurement, and operations and support 
(O&S) phases of life. The F-14 spent 6 years in development, was produced for 22 years, and 
was operational for 33 years (“F-14 Tomcat,” n.d.), or about 17% of its life in development, 61% 
in production, and 92% in service.7 Platforms such as ships, aircraft, and vehicles are typically 
produced using hardware-based facilities with finite production capacities. For example, the 
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program has a planned production buy of 58,306 vehicles (Dodaro, 
2019). Full rate production at current budget levels is about 2,500 vehicles per year 
(Department of the Army, 2019), meaning production to meet inventory requirements could 
continue for over 20 years.  
Acquisition Strategies 
The DoD buys products, tangible and intangible items, and services collectively 
described as a capability. Acquisition strategies are developed by program offices and approved 
by senior leadership, and contain a statement of need for the capability, an estimated cost and 
schedule, and the contracting and support plans. Acquisition plans are statutory and regulatory 
documents that explicitly describe the contracting and competition8 approaches (FAR 7.105, 
2021). Specific statutory requirements vary depending upon the contracting strategy and include 
additional detail such as market surveys, performance criteria, and plans and requirements for 
technology development and risk management, test and evaluation, and security (FAR 7, 2021). 
Schoeni (2018) defined three types of government acquisition strategies: coercion, 
public–private partnerships, and Competition using Open System Architectures . He found that 
only competition results in innovation (Schoeni, 2018). 
The DoD categorized9 acquisition strategies as acquisition models (Kendall et al., 2015). 
These include common structures such as hardware and software development, production, 
and operation and significant program phases and milestones. Programs are encouraged to 
tailor these models to the planned MDAP’s “unique character” (Kendall et al., 2015). The GAO 
found variations within these models, such as planning to declare initial operational capability 
before completing initial operational test and evaluation (Dodaro, 2019).  
An acquisition strategy defines production and performance requirements delivery plans 
spanning single-step or incremental schedules. Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) describe 
and document production and performance requirements delivery, including production 
(hardware production line or software replication) and requirements fulfillment (complete or 
 
7 The F-14 program overlapped development and production and had concurrent production and 
operational service.  
8 The Federal Acquisition Regulations emphasize full and open competition and fixed-price contracts 
(FAR 7.105, 2021).  
9 This research was prior to implementation of the Agile Acquisition Framework. 
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incremental). Incremental upgrades10 are production expressions of evolutionary acquisition 
strategies (Sylvester & Ferrara, 2003). By managing production and deployment configurations, 
incremental upgrades can be used to align production lots with deliveries of capabilities that 
mature between production versions (Mortlock, 2019). 
 Mortlock (2019) examined acquisition strategy development based upon assessed 
technical risk, approved requirements, and planned funding—using data from an actual program 
history, leading participants through decisions that a program office would make during program 
strategy development. He found that affordability concerns drive cost and schedule constraints, 
and despite preferences for single step acquisitions, incremental development is one of few 
choices for managing risk (Mortlock, 2019).  
Acquisition strategies may include multiple acquisitions operating with varying degrees 
of coordination and interaction, such as unconstrained or complex systems (Stuckey et al., 
2017). Rendon et al. (2012) identified system-of-system–related acquisition issues, such as 
control and program office staffing, and how these issues translate into modifications to 
contracting and organizational structures.  
Georgiev (2010) analyzed defense acquisition strategy from a national perspective as a 
method to achieve policy goals. He classified defense acquisition strategies into those seeking 
technology innovation (active or offensive) or those adapting strategies to the current 
environment (passive or defensive) and the intended technology position (leader, follower, or 
outsider). He provided a hybrid of strategic and balanced scorecards to improve management 
decisions and results.  
 Existing regulations and statutes11 define DoD rapid acquisition strategies. These limits 
result in limited scope and quantified objectives, senior leadership support and oversight, 
resource prioritization ahead of other programs, and extensive customization of existing 
processes to achieve program objectives. Tate (2016) postulated that only a few acquisition 
strategies are capable of rapid fielding—specifically, using already mature or developed 
systems, incremental development and production of limited or narrow capability improvements, 
and modular upgrades.  
Acquisition strategies are generally not publicly available; however, some elements are 
in publicly available documentation,12 such as single-step or evolutionary acquisition, technical 
maturity choices, and constraints on cost, schedule, and performance.  
Schedule Growth Predictors 
Better Buying Power was a process improvement initiative started by Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates in 2010 (Layden, 2012) and expanded by the under secretary of defense 
for acquisition, technology, and logistics, Frank Kendall, in 2014 (Kendall, 2014)—with policy 
and direction to “buy more with no more” (Sethi, 2015). The initiative emphasized incentive-type 
contracts, affordability, and cost savings and realism (Kendall, 2014). Three parameters 
important to Better Buying Power are procurement quantities, unit cost, and cycle times; this 
research considers these the functional objectives of an acquisition strategy.  
Cost growth is related to acquisition strategy factors such as prototyping, contract 
incentives in development and production, production competition, schedule concurrency, and 
 
10 Incremental upgrades are also referred to in the literature as block upgrades or release versions. 
11 See https://aida.mitre.org for more information. 
12 These include SARs, annual reports, and budget submissions. 
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schedule slip (Arena et al., 2006). Foreman (2007) identified longitudinal cost and schedule 
predictor variables based on SAR data. He showed that cost growth changes are related to 
procurement quantity changes and depend weakly on schedule growth between production 
decision (Milestone C) and IOC.  
Lorell et al. (2017) compared six MDAPs with extreme cost growth and four with low cost 
growth and identified five salient program characteristics.13 They noted, “Most of the extreme 
cost-growth programs’ problems stemmed from a gross underestimation of the complexities and 
uncertainties … in designing, developing, integrating, and producing very challenging 
technological systems” (p. 97).  While their findings are specific for cost growth, technical 
maturity and integration complexity are also related to schedule growth (Kamp, 2019).  
Holloman et al. (2016) used SAR summary variance data to create cost, time and 
technical system-level degree of difficulty indicators and GAO Annual Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Systems maturity assessment data to indicate achieved technical performance. Using 
these indicators enables program managers to characterize acquisition performance risk during 
execution from monitoring and control processes such as Earned Value Management.14  
Jimenez et al. (2016) conducted a literature review to find historical schedule growth 
predictors and identified statistically significant schedule-related predictors from MDAP SARs. 
Two variables were positively correlated to schedule growth between program start (Milestone 
B) and a production decision (Milestone C): research and development funds at program start, 
and program start on or after 1985. Two additional variables were negatively correlated with 
growth between Milestones B and C: percent research and development funds at program start, 
and program being a modification of an existing program or system (Jimenez et al., 2016).  
Random forest methods have been used to create predictive contracting performance 
models (Gill et al., 2019) and provide an efficient method to identify important variables for use 
in a regression model (Grömping, 2009). Specific implementation issues are in the Methodology 
section of this paper. Wauters and Vanhoucke (2017) applied K-nearest neighbor methods to 
forecast project schedule and control methods and found that K-nearest neighbor methods work 
best for repetitive projects or those with accurate variability estimates. They also found that 
earned value/earned schedule approaches are best for controlling projects with high 
uncertainty.  
This research fills the gap relating schedule prediction to acquisition strategies and will 
test two research hypotheses: 
• Program cycle time may be predicted from programmatic resources and acquisition 
strategy decisions (H1).  
• Percent change in program cycle time may be predicted from programmatic structural 
changes (H2). 
 
13 These are “insufficient technology maturity and higher integration complexity than anticipated;  unclear, 
unstable, or unrealistic requirements, unrealistic cost estimates, adoption of acquisition strategies and 
program structures that lacked adequate processes for managing risk through incrementalism or through 
provision of appropriate oversight and incentives for the prime contractor, (and) use of a combined MS 
B/C milestone (assuming) that little or no RDT&E is required” (Lorell et al., 2017, pp. ix–x). 
14 Earned value tools relate project cost and schedule at the work breakdown structure level For a discussion of 
Earned Value Management, see Wei et al. (2016).  
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Program Functional Objectives 
Program functional objectives—the cost, time to deliver, quantities delivered, and system 
performance—are the planned outcomes or results of the acquisition strategy. Cantwell et al. 
(2012) used a systems dynamics model to examine different cost-reducing strategies; all 
resulted in performance reduction and fewer delivered systems, three of four responses 
reduced total cost, and three of four achieved required schedule. This research used cycle time, 
unit cost, and procurement quantities as explicit program functional objectives. 
Capili (2018) developed a system dynamics model of how factors such as contract 
types, schedule, and requirements and policy issues15 can affect the ability of the government to 
implement Agile software development. Agile contracting scopes the number of requirements or 
story points during a fixed period of performance and cost (level of effort). Adding requirements 
during the Agile process results in trades and reductions of story points delivered to stay within 
schedule and cost constraints. Capili argued that the government acquisition constraints 
eliminate the ability of Agile processes to adapt to program changes.  
Blair et al. (2011) provided examples from National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) systems development and fielding and argued that most problems16 in 
aerospace systems are due to problems with technical integration or system engineering 
deficiencies and failing to understand interactions. However, they also showed that institutional 
mandates, such as minimizing crew risk, bound what may be eliminated and add time and cost 
to acquisition strategies.17  
Wong (2016) argued that the Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle program was 
delayed due to two institutional factors: validating the urgency of need and the decision to 
acquire systems meeting a long-term need or reacting to an urgent threat. These are analogous 
to Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) deliberations and approvals 
of new capability requirements (McKenzie, 2018). 
Methodology 
This section reviews the research data collected, summarizes the response and 
predictor variables, and explains the supporting quantitative methods used in the research. 
Research Design Overview 
The study used data from publicly available reports on MDAPs from 2007 to 2018, from 
both the GAO annual assessments and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
annual reports. We used Minitab 18, SPSS, and selected R libraries for statistical analyses. All 
data sets are in comma-separated variable formats and available from the authors upon 
request. 
Data Collection 
The data set contains 162 observations in an Excel spreadsheet. Observations had 
reports from both the GAO and the DOT&E during the fiscal year. This reduced the quantity of 
 
15 As an example, information assurance may be at the same time a story point, a policy, and a contract 
requirement. 
16 Blair et al. (2011) assert that 80% of problems are due to integration or system engineering failure 
without substantiation. 
17 They also provided several examples where designs were limited by physics or system engineering 
maturity (Blair et al., 2011, pp. 87–98) and required extensive systems engineering efforts to deliver the 
intended system performance. 
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observations but ensured two independent assessments of program status. SAR data and SAR 
summary data supplemented GAO information.  
The data set was cleaned, filtered, and tested for consistency, correlation, and 
independence (Marshall & Russell, 2018). These were inspected by variable for correct entry 
and tested using Dixon’s r22 outlier test (Minitab, n.d.) for outliers. 
Statistical Methods 
We characterized variables and their distributions by means, medians, standard 
deviations, and skew, kurtosis, and proportions (for categorical variables). We also calculated 
correlation coefficients and significance for continuous and categorical variables. We used 
graphing for qualitative data assessment. 
Ensemble modeling (Ray, 2017) using the R randomForest package (Liaw, 2018) was 
used to identify important predictor variables. We compared variable importance from three R 
random forest packages—randomForest, cforest (Hothorn, 2020), and VSURF (Genuer, 
2019)—to estimate variable importance and regression model performance (Grömping, 2009).  
We created regression models in Minitab and SPSS relating cycle time to predictor 
variables. We adjusted models to maximize the predicted coefficient of determination (R-
sq[pred]) with the fewest number of terms and inspected residual plots to identify any trends and 
verify regression assumptions. We tested association and independence of categorical factors 
to shorter or longer cycle times using chi-square tests. Finally, we used K-means clusters to 
classify acquisition strategies, subsetted the data into groups, and created regression models by 
groups to interpret differences in significant variables. 
Results and Analysis 
Cycle Time and Percent Change Cycle Time Regression Results 
Random forest analysis identified starting predictor subsets for cycle time and percent 
change in cycle time regression models. We created a validation data set with a random draw of 
44 (27%) of the full data set. A manual step-wise regression on the remaining 118 observations 
removed predictors with p values greater than 0.05 one at a time. Variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) were all less than 5, indicating no collinearity issues. The final models satisfied all 
regression assumptions. Table 1 summarizes significant predictors. 
Table 1. Significant Regression Predictors 
Cycle time 
(factor unit change = ∆ months) 
% cycle time change 
(factor unit change = % ∆) 
R&D budget: (+) Procurement budget % ∆ (+) 
Software approach Agile (-),  
Hybrid/NA (-) [relative to Waterfall] 
DoDI 5000.02 Acq model: Model 4 (-), 
Models 2,5,6 (+) [relative to Model 1] 
Joint (-) 
Depends on other MDAPS (+) 
SVC Army, DoD (-), Navy (+) [relative to 
AF] 
Reuses in-service technology (-) 
Uses commercial technology (-) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) (+) 
Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) 
Restructured (+) 
NM Breach (+)  
R-sq(pred)~ 58% R-sq(pred)~ 59% 
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Factors marked as (+) are associated with increasing cycle times. The factors 
highlighted in green and yellow are structural factors. Factors in red are either external or 
caused by external issues. Factors marked as (-) are associated with shorter cycle times. 
Strategy structure factors associated with reducing cycle time include execution as a 
joint program use of an Agile or hybrid (including incremental) software development strategy, 
use of commercial technologies, and reuse of developed military technology. These factors may 
be changeable by program offices during execution.  
We divided the data set cycle times into four quartiles to test categorical factor 
associations to MDAP cycle-time historical performance. We used chi-square association tests 
to test the trained regression model categorical predictors against cycle-time quartiles (Q1 = 1st 
quartile, Q4 = 4th quartile).  
One factor, DoD acquisition model, was retired during this research. Table 2 
summarizes the results of testing the association of the now-retired DoD acquisition model 
types18 to cycle-time quartiles. 
Table 2. DoD Acquisition Plan by Quartile 
 5000,02 model Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 P 
1 21 20 22 26 0.000 
2 0 1 2 6   
4 4 0 0 2   
5 10 16 17 4   
6 8 1 1 1   
  xx  overrepresented in Q   
  xx  underrepresented in Q   
 
 Model 3, Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program, is not in this table as the 
data set had no such programs. P is the p value for the likelihood ratio test and shows a 
statistically significant association between cycle-time quartiles (columns) and DoD acquisition 




18 One example of a now-retired DoD acquisition model type is Model 1, “Hardware Intensive Program” 
(Kendall et al., 2015). 
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Table 3. Quartiles Versus Regression Factors: Full Data Set 
Factor Category Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 P 
Software approach Waterfall 17 15 20 26 0.001 
 Agile 21 23 20 7  
  Hybrid/NA 5 0 2 6  
Joint no 32 29 34 34 0.475 
 yes 11 9 8 5  
Depends on other  no 28 12 14 7 0.000 
MDAPs yes 15 26 28 32  
Reuses in-service no 12 19 13 15 0.176 
technology yes 31 19 29 24  
Uses commercial no 21 21 31 35 0.000 
technology yes 22 17 11 4  
Financial  no 27 15 15 6 0.000 
instability yes 16 23 27 33  
 
Two factors, joint and reuses in-service technology, did not show an association 
between the factors and cycle-time quartiles (P greater than 0.05). Programs with Waterfall-type 
software approaches were associated with longer cycle times (Q4). Programs using Agile and 
Hybrid-type19 software approaches were associated with shorter cycle times (Q1). Commercial 
technology use was associated with shorter cycle times (Q1); programs that did not use 
commercial technology had longer cycle times (Q4). Finally, two program factors were 
associated with shorter cycle times (Q1) when they were not present: (a) dependence on other 
MDAPS and (b) financial instability (i.e., budget change greater than 10%).  
Predictor Change with Acquisition Strategies 
We classified the research data set into three acquisition strategies using K-means 
clustering with standardized variables on the functional objectives of cycle time, unit cost, and 
procurement quantities,20 as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Acquisition Strategy Clustering Summary 
Mean 
Cycle time 
(mo) Unit cost ($M) 
Procurement 
quantity Count 
High-End 168 2,833 364 56 
Focused 92 175.8 274 64 
Volume 99 1.4 56,044 42 
Each row represents a functional objective, and the mean functional objective value is in 
the respective column. The maximum value of each column is in bold. Two of the three clusters 
 
19 “Hybrid” included incremental and mixtures of Agile, incremental, evolutionary, or some other approach. 
20 Clustering was on cycle time and the natural log transform of unit cost and procurement quantities. 
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align with column maxima—acquiring exquisite (“high-end”) capabilities and high unit cost, and 
acquiring product in large quantities (“volume”). The third cluster represents balancing functional 
objectives (“focused”) to deliver a capability requiring intermediate quantities and costs. The 
count column shows the number of observations in the data set in each cluster. Figure 1 shows 
this strategy grouping.  
 
 
Figure 1. Acquisition Strategy Clusters 
 
This classification strategy is dependent upon the values of the functional objectives and 
would be different if the classification used other objectives or used different approaches—such 
as weighting objectives or changing the clustering method. We tested factor significance using 
the same factors as in Table 1. Table 5 summarizes significant predictors by strategy. 
 
Table 5. Cycle Time Significant Factors by Acquisition Strategy Cluster 
High-End Focused Volume 
R&D Budget (+) R&D Budget (+) R&D Budget (+) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) 
R-sq(pred): 27% 
No Box-Cox transform 
No outliers removed 
R-sq(pred): 46% 
Box-Cox rounded λ = 0.5 
One outlier removed22 
R-sq(pred): 82% 
Box-Cox rounded λ = 0.5 
Two outliers removed21 
* Relative to Waterfall 
  
 
21 The outliers were removed to meet regression residual linearity assumptions. 
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 Crossed-out and red factors (example) were not significant. Two groups had fewer 
significant predictors and a similar or better R-sq(predicted). The High-End group needed 
additional factors to improve model performance.22 Table 6 shows percent cycle-time change 
for these same groups with the same coding as before. 
Table 6. Percent Change in Cycle Time for Strategy Groups 
High-End Focused Volume 
Procurement Budget Change (+) Procurement Budget Change (+) Procurement Budget Change (+) 
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (+), Army, DoD (-) 
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (+), Army, DoD (-) 
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (-), Army, DoD (-) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
R-sq(pred): 61% 
Two outliers removed 
R-sq(pred): 55% R-sq(pred): 48% 
 
 Use of commercial technology, dependence on other programs, the number of critical 
technologies, and research budgets tended to differentiate between High-End, Focused, and 
Volume strategies. Volume strategy cycle time and change in cycle time were not related to 
research budgets and procurement budget changes but did reflect software development 
process differences. High-End strategies were not sensitive to the number of critical technology 
elements. Focused strategies were sensitive to financial instabilities. 
Conclusions and Future Work. 
Conclusions 
Initial structural and strategy decisions affect cycle-time outcomes. Program cycle times 
are related to program resources and acquisition strategy decisions, and percent change in 
program cycle time is related to program structural changes. Significant cycle-time predictors 
include the size of research and development budgets, deciding to use commercial or reuse 
existing in-service technology, and avoiding dependency on other programs. Schedule change 
 
22 In this case, unit cost (+) and change in unit cost (+) were significant predictors for High-End programs. 
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(as measured by percent change in cycle time) was related to changing procurement budgets, 
the number of critical technology elements in a program, and financial (budgetary) stability.  
Classifying MDAP acquisition strategies based on functional objectives of cycle time, 
unit cost, and procurement quantities highlighted how different factors, such as use of 
commercial technology or reuse of existing technology, were associated with reduced cycle 
times and early program decisions. We showed how significant cycle time and schedule growth 
predictors changed with acquisition strategies. 
Relevance and Contribution to the Practice 
 This research provided quantitative insight into acquisition strategy factors affecting 
program cycle times and cycle-time growth. The associations between objectives and structural 
factors affect cycle times and identified significant acquisition strategy choices made during 
program development related to cycle-time outcomes. 
Recommendations 
 These results reflect the use of public data and may not apply to non-MDAP programs. 
Future research should re-perform this research on a larger government-controlled data set and 
internal program documentation and compare findings with open-source results. 
This material is based upon work supported by the Acquisition Research Program under 
Grant No. HQ00341910004. The views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or 
made by speakers, moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of 
the Department of Defense nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, or 
organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. government. 
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Abstract 
This paper is part of a research agenda outlined in Franck et al. (2016) directed toward improving 
the realism of defense acquisition schedules. Defense acquisition schedules have long been a 
difficult problem. In this particular effort, we consider primarily the case of the 737MAX, which has 
been a fortuitous example of the risks of scheduling-by-fiat. We analyze the 737MAX 
misadventure using Systems Dynamic and Root Cause Analysis methods. 
Introduction 
Interest in project management estimations—cost and scheduling—remains strong in 
the academic world, driven by the sometimes-spectacular cost and schedule overruns in 
general, but defense projects in particular. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the effort, projects 
continue to fail and overrun every established metric. Nevertheless, we continue to study in the 
hopes of a breakthrough—a cure—for all that ails the defense acquisition world.  
No one believes it is possible to accurately estimate a schedule so there are no 
overruns. Sometimes we get scheduling right, but often we get it wrong. After the fact, we can 
determine what went wrong and why; however, we have not yet been able to prevent failure. 
However, we believe we must do better not only to stay on schedule, but to answer the 
overriding imperative in defense acquisition to deliver systems as fast as possible that work. 
There are many hypotheses about the why, but it could be we are ignoring the one constant 
factor in project management: the human being with all the complexity and imperfections. 
Humans tend to think about project management in the context of cause and effect 
(Dörner, 1996). We consider cost and associated variables during the project planning process. 
We do the same when developing a schedule. The planning process allows us to visualize how 
the development will unfold. Once we start executing, however, our ability to visualize the 
interplay of variables, from stakeholder demands to supply chain issues to requirements 
changes, is limited. We then react to events in a serial “cause and effect manner,” solving the 
immediate problem, but often neglecting to consider feedback and second order effects of those 
decisions. Newton’s Third Law of Motion states, “For every action, there is an equal and 
opposite reaction.” In human activities from engineering to war, a corollary to that law adds the 
idea of a counteraction, or response to the reaction. This concept is well understood in military 
planning and is a basic concept in wargaming, but in planning for and managing projects we 
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identify the cause and effect relationships, action-reaction, but don’t consider the action-
reaction-counteraction sequence.  
Scheduling is unique as studies by operational research experts, systems analysts, and 
even mathematicians attest (Boyd & Mundt, 1995; Herroelen & Leus, 2004, 2005; Rodrigues & 
Williams, 1998; Vandevoorde & Vanhoucke, 2006). In fact, we can explain schedule—the how 
and the what—using mathematics. We can also use the same mathematics and probability to 
develop schedules. What we haven’t been able to do is apply mathematics and probability to 
get scheduling right. System dynamics provides the opportunity to consider scheduling and 
schedule execution from the people perspective. 
System dynamics was conceived and developed by Forrester in the 1960s (Forrester, 
1971). In many ways, Forrester’s approach was like that of Dörner in that both recognized not 
only the limitations in human ability, but also that social systems were far more complex and 
difficult to understand than any technology. Further, both saw the world in terms of systems. 
Although we may not always think of it, we treat a development project, whether commercial or 
military, as a system with both inputs and outputs, as well as constraints and mechanisms. 
Inputs represent those management, budget, policy, materials, and other variables that are 
transformed by the system into outputs. Constraints are those regulatory, legal, fiscal, and time 
variables that restrict the system. Mechanisms are the people and processes used by the 
system to transform to the outputs. 
If a project plan is a mental model of a system development, it represents the project 
team’s shared assumptions of how the development will proceed. It represents a system 
structure (Forrester, 1971). Forrester also recognized that the human mental model (including 
that of a system development) often fails because the human mind often draws the wrong 
conclusions about the consequences of that model. System dynamics thinking and a recognition 
of the criticality in considering the role and thinking of the human in project management in 
general and scheduling in particular offers a tool to examine the execution of aerospace system 
developments. 
The Boeing 737MAX: Background  
The reader is entitled to ask why a commercial project, like the 737MAX, is a legitimate 
topic for defense acquisition research. We believe the answer is in the three parts. First, the 
Boeing airliner is an aerospace program with technical, program management, and scheduling 
issues. Second, the 737MAX program (particularly the aircraft accidents) have been highly 
publicized. This public discussion has produced a fairly extensive airing of the relevant facts, 
and also some excellent analyses (which make research in some depth both possible and 
potentially illuminating). Finally, the 737MAX is a superb example of what can happen when 
program duration is dictated by considerations outside the development program.1 
The Boeing Corporation and Airbus SE, a duopoly, are the largest commercial and 
defense aircraft producers in the world. Boeing’s first successful commercial jet was the Boeing 
707 (first flight 1957). Airbus became a major commercial aircraft player with the A320 (the 
major Boeing 737 competitor) in 1987. In a very real sense, the Boeing 737MAX was a product 
of the Boeing-Airbus competition. Boeing has been continuously incorporated (albeit under 
different names) since 1916; Airbus since 1970. 
 
1 This is what we term an “aspirational” schedule estimate, which we define more specifically later.  
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That rivalry has not been especially friendly. It has featured World Trade Organization 
complaints2 and some hard-fought contests in various market segments. These have included 
aerial tankers (Boeing KC-46 vs. NG/Airbus A330 MRTT). However, the center of their 
competition has been narrow-body civil airliners—the contenders being the Airbus A320 and 
Boeing 737 families. Both have been major commercial successes and significant contributors 
to both companies’ profits. Deliveries by year are shown in Figure 1. While the competition has 
been intense, both companies have been highly successful in the narrow-body market—so far.  
 
Figure 1. Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 deliveries by year (since A320 first flight) 
 
By 2010, Boeing had reason to believe the Boeing 737 was becoming obsolescent, and 
was considering a new, clean-sheet replacement aircraft. The most promising enhancements 
then available were new turbofans, but they offered fuel efficiency improvements that were likely 
in single-digit percentages, certainly no more than 15% (Aviation Week, 2010). Boeing 
management reckoned that prospective customers would not be sufficiently interested in 
recapitalizing their fleets to purchase airplanes of this sort. 
Thus, the near future for the narrow-body competition likely featured continued 
production of essentially the same aircraft (Boeing’s 737NG) and the most recent versions of 
the Airbus 320 family. The next generation of narrow-body passenger airliners would appear 
around 2020. 
At the time, that position was plausible, but proved to be wrong. New engines available 
(CFM International Leap 1B and the Pratt & Whitney PW 1000G) offered fuel efficiency 
increases of about 14%, and customers were indeed interested in the fuel efficiencies the 
A320neo (new engine option) offered. At the Paris Air Show of 2011, Airbus presold 667 
A320neos in one week. This, and related developments, convinced Boeing of a time-sensitive 
need to respond to the re-engined Airbus models. In response, Boeing promised in 2011 to 
deliver a narrow body fairly quickly (Gelles et al., 2019). 
Boeing entered development of a new narrow-body product (named the 737MAX) at a 
double disadvantage. First, Airbus had started its program sooner. Second, the Airbus 320 (first 
flight in 1987) was a newer design than the Boeing 737 (1967). In particular, it had more vertical 
distance between the (wing) engine mounts and the tarmac. This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
2 This dispute has surfaced again recently, with U.S. threats to impose tariffs on EU goods because of a WTO finding of 
illegal subsidies for Airbus (Peker & Zumbrun, 2019). One previous chapter in this long-running story is recounted in 
Franck et al. (2011, pp. 8–9). 
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Basically, Boeing found itself in the position of having to produce a new narrow-body 
airliner that would be ready (soon enough) close to the A320neo launch with fuel efficiency 
improvements that were sizeable (good enough) to cause customers to remain with Boeing 
rather than moving to Airbus. Airbus was going to have the A320neo available by 2017, with 
12–15% improvement in fuel efficiency (relative to the A320). Boeing’s response was to promise 
quick delivery of a new model 737 with a new fuel-efficient engine.  
 
 
Figure 2. Engine ground clearance on A320 family vs. Boeing 737 family (bing.com/images) 
 
In summary, the logic that appears to have driven the Boeing 737MAX strategy is as follows: 
• Competitive pressure from Airbus for single-aisle aircraft forced Boeing to do 
something quickly in order to remain in that line of business. 
• Fuel efficient engines are necessary to sell passenger jets in the current global 
market. They were also necessary to tempt airline customers to buy new aircraft. 
• The schedule would be driven by the perceived need for an in-service time as close 
to the Airbus A320 neo as possible. 
• The schedule, over cost and performance, seems to have been Boeing 
management’s driving factors, rather than being driven by the time required for the 
necessary engineering.  
• Use of 737 airframe meant lower production costs, simpler FAA certification, and 
lower training costs (driven by pilot familiarity with existing 737 fleet). 
• Larger engines did not fit on the existing 737 wings, so design modifications were 
needed. 
• Engine modifications changed the aerodynamics of the airplane.  
• However, the airplane needed to match the pilot qualification requirements of in-
service B737 aircraft so that aircrew training did not significantly delay introduction to 
commercial service. (This last constraint proved to be particularly consequential.)3  
It appears the modifications to this aircraft originally designed in the late 1960s to make 
it a competitor in the 2010s were greater than originally anticipated. Relocated, more powerful 
engines significantly changed the aircraft handling characteristics in some flight regimes. Any 
new requirements resulting from the changes probably should have driven new requirements 
 
3 This would mean that the 737NG and 737MAX would carry the same “type rating” and pilots could be qualified to 
fly both. Campbell (2019) explains all this succinctly and well. 
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which would have increased the schedule an unacceptable amount of time. This management 
reaction to competitive pressure seems a classic case of what we call an aspirational schedule. 
Figure 3 shows a system view of the 737 upgrade. The arrows show the interrelationship of the 
system variables, as well as the feedback those variables can cause.  
 
Figure 3. The 737 Upgrade “System” 
 
The Race to the Swift 
Completing development of the Boeing aircraft to the Airbus timeline was a schedule 
challenge, as shown in Table 1. The major program objective was to deliver a more fuel-efficient 
narrow-body airliner quickly and at a relatively low cost before the market was saturated by 
Airbus.  
The new engine was larger in diameter than those on current 737s.4 This difficulty was 
overcome by modifying the nose landing gear and positioning the new engine forward and 
upward relative to the wing. The overall effect was to keep the same ground clearance while 
taxiing. However, moving the engines changed the flight characteristics of the aircraft.  
Table 1. Major Milestones (Actual) for the Airbus A320neo and Boeing 737MAX 
EVENT A320 neo 737MAX 
Program Announced December 2010 August 2011 
First Aircraft Produced July 2014 December 2015 
First Flight September 2014 January 2016 
First Customer Delivery January 2016 May 2017 
 
4 The 737 was well designed for a low-bypass turbofan, like the JT8 (48” in diameter). A high-bypass turbofan like the 
CFM-56 (60”) necessitated an oval cowling to preserve ground clearance. An advanced high-bypass turbofan like the 
LEAP 1-B (69”) also necessitated repositioning the engine for the 737MAX family. 
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Schedule Pressure: Speedy Execution 
The schedule pressure had technical ramifications, but also impacted the work 
environment. According to several published reports (e.g., Broderick, 2019; Gelles et al., 2019; 
Nicas et al., 2019), the 737MAX development program proceeded on something of a forced 
march schedule. Boeing employees perceived a compelling need to finish within the company’s 
time frame.  
In search of faster progress, an approach described as “compartmentalized” came into 
being.5 (This, of course, raises the question whether this approach contributed to the 
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System [MCAS] problems that arose later.) Some 
concluded in retrospect that the development schedule had been “stretched to the breaking 
point” (e.g., Campbell, 2019). 
The Problematic Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System  
Scientists and engineers seem able to predict only a fraction of the difficulty 
they are likely to face in a specific project. Much of it simply crops up 
unexpectedly. (McNaugher, 1987, p. 66) 
In fact, even programs intended to be simple can have complications, and the 737MAX 
was deceptively complicated. The A320neo is mostly a re-engined A320. The new 737MAX 
required more complex modifications to reduce drag and a need to reposition the engines. The 
new engines (LEAP 1B) were almost 40% larger and weighed almost double those of the 
737NG (CFM-56). The new plane was longer and had a wider wingspan. What Boeing couldn’t 
change was the height above airport ramps without having to redesign the landing gear, which 
would have threatened both the development schedule and quick FAA certification (Tkacik, 
2019).  
A later part of the testing program revealed the aircraft tended to pitch up, because the 
Center of Gravity (CG) and the Center of Lift (CL) were too close together due to the new 
engine location (Coughlin, 2020). The change in engine position is shown in Figure 2.  
Acknowledging the challenges with the engine repositioning, one proposed solution 
involved modifications to the airframe itself (Langewiesche, 2019). However, given the schedule 
pressure, Boeing chose instead a software solution.6 It was named the Maneuvering 
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS; Gelles, 2019; Broderick, 2019). The first version 
of MCAS (MCAS17) was intended to input automatic, corrective control inputs to situations 
involving relatively high airspeeds (and G forces, in the form of 0.6 degrees of pitch-down trim 
applied in 10 seconds, with maximum trim change limited to 5 degrees; Gates, 2019).  
However, later flight tests also revealed some difficulties at normal G forces and low 
airspeed. This led to increased realm of engagement parameters to include low speeds, high 
angles of attack (AoAs) and “normal” G-loadings. MCAS pitch changes were increased to 2.5 
degrees (Campbell, 2019). Moreover, the resulting MCAS2 could engage any number of times 
(Gates, 2019; Langewiesche, 2019). The overall effect was to make the MCAS2 “more 
aggressive and riskier” (Nicas et al., 2019). 
 
5 This is analogous to problem decomposition in the operations research literature, and also bears resemblance to 
“concurrency” in the acquisition literature. 
6 There were, however, other reasons to favor a software solution. 
7 We term the earlier version as MCAS1 and the later (more aggressive version) as MCAS2. This is our own terminology 
and adopted for expository clarity. 
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From a software engineering perspective, Johnston et al. (2019) suggest there were four 
key errors in the development and fielding of MCAS: poor documentation, a rushed release, 
delayed software updates, and humans out of the loop. The poor documentation refers to not 
only the lack of documentation on MCAS, but that the documentation was printed instead of 
digital. MCAS1 was regarded (correctly, we think) as an “innocuous” feature that could or would 
seldom emerge as a problem. And, should it occur (in either version), treating the incident as a 
runaway-trim malfunction would solve the problem. Thus, the flight crews involved in the Lion 
and Ethiopian accidents had little, if any, knowledge of MCAS2 operation or potential 
consequences should an AoA indicator malfunction. According to Pastzor (2019): “One senior 
Boeing official said the company had decided against disclosing details about the system that it 
felt would inundate the average pilot with too much information—and significantly more 
technical data—than he or she needed or could realistically digest.” 
The rushed release was a product of the marketing driven strategy Boeing pursued—
release a product so as not to lose business (Johnston & Harris, 2019). Statements attributed to 
Boeing employees assigned to the project included “intense pressure cooker,” “fast turnaround” 
environment, and work at “double the normal rate.” One technician reported that he had 
received “sloppy blueprints” with a promise of future fixes. However, that remedy was still 
incomplete in early 2019 (Gelles et al., 2019). 
The delayed software updates were affected by some things Boeing could not control; 
the U.S. government shutdown in 2017 caused updates to be delayed by at least 4 months 
(Johnston & Harris, 2019; Pasztor, 2019). In at least one case, Boeing submitted a software fix 
to the FAA for certification 7 weeks before the Ethiopian Airlines crash. It is impossible to know 
whether a less rushed, more robust software design process would have made a difference 
(Johnston & Harris, 2019). 
The fourth issue, the “human out of the loop” problem, resulted from the MCAS2 being 
activated by a single AoA sensor (Nicas, 2019). Choosing to rely on one indicator when two 
were readily available could only be regarded as a “bewildering mistake” in retrospect 
(Langewiesche, 2019).8 A related mistake was allowing the more powerful MCAS2 to be 
activated an unlimited number of times. As Langewiesche (2019) noted, “No one I spoke to from 
Boeing, Airbus or the N.T.S.B. could explain the reasoning here.” 
It is clear in hindsight that Boeing’s haste led to mistakes or miscommunications. Those 
out of the loop were not limited to pilots. For example, relevant FAA officials were not informed 
(Gates, 2019); discussion of the MCAS system was deleted from the 737MAX pilot manual 
(Tangel, 2019); and furthermore, the more aggressive version, MCAS2, was not well shared 
with interested parties, including airworthiness certification authorities (Tangel, 2019). 
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Figure 4. How the B737Max Came to Be 
Our summary of the 737Max story is shown in Figure 4. The key drivers were time 
perceptions based on the market rather than engineering estimates. It’s worth noting that getting 
to “MCAS decisions” include both technical and communications issues (especially not fully 
informing the pilots). Figure 5 shows our assessment of the dynamics of the development.  
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THE 737MAX CRASHES 
 
Figure 6. Hypothesized Causes of 737MAX Mishaps. 
(Langewiesche, 2019; Pasztor, 2019; authors’ interpretations) 
The circumstances of the Lion and Ethiopian Air accidents with the 737MAX have been 
discussed extensively. For those interested in learning more about the events surrounding the 
crashes, we recommend Langewiesche (2019) and Tangel et al. (2019) as good starting points. 
In addition, reports by various agencies (e.g., House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 2020; JTAR, 2019; NTSB, 2019) are very informative. 
Overall Comments on This Case 
1. What trades were made? 
• Schedule got major (close to exclusive) emphasis—with attendant design 
constraints. Strict (at least fairly strict) adherence to original schedule was 
pervasively enforced. 
2. Consequences of the trades (results of schedule emphasis)? 
• A new narrow-body type was conclusively ruled out; schedule constraint dictated 
a 737 variant with a new, but already developed model. 
• In development there was a lack of overall program review and oversight. 
• In at least some cases, multiple concurrent tasks were completed with insufficient 
regard for overall aircraft safety. (Nothing apparently went wrong with 
“performance” or apparently with cost.) 
• Time pressures throughout the 737MAX development effort. 
• Some steps were skipped. 
• Some steps were done concurrently. 
• Most notable specific example of unknown work (ex-ante) is that a bigger engine 
on old airframe design resulted in pitch-up problems noted at low speeds and 
high angles of attack. 
• Although not intended, the program pace detracted from the operating safety of 
the airplane delivered for commercial service. 
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3. How and why were the trades made? 
• Schedule emphasis due primarily to commercial success of A320neo, which put 
Boeing at a major strategic disadvantage in the narrow-body airliner market. 
• Recovery strategy focused on a quickly developed 737 variant. 
4. What is the evidence or rework? Primarily responding to the pitch-up problem:  
• MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, part of 737MAX 
software suite) was changed to deal with aircraft handling issues in high-speed 
flight.  
• Further rework arose with the need to resolve pitch-up problems at low speed 
with high power settings. A solution (MCAS2) appeared late in the game (within 
the corporate-dictated schedule). Good information on this issue (both quality 
and quantity) is available in publicly available sources. 
Some Further Observations 
An interesting, but so far somewhat neglected, question was how Boeing was caught 
wrong-footed in 2011 with the Airbus 320neo underway, with no planned response until 2020. 
One report (Broderick, 2019) has it that the A320neo family was originally intended as a 
defensive response to the potential threat from Bombardier’s Canadian Regional Jets.9  
If that is indeed the case, then why did Boeing not feel a similar need to likewise defend 
itself? For Boeing, like Airbus, the narrow-body airliner family is its leading source of profit. How 
did Boeing look at the same market environment (with the same contestability concerns) and 
reach a very different conclusion—especially when the B737 design was closer to the end of a 
long run than was the A320. The bottom line might well be that the fundamental root cause of 
the current 737MAX difficulties was a strategic miscalculation a decade in the past. 
As noted, this miscalculation led to a difficult problem for Boeing in two parts: (1) coaxing 
additional competitive life from a half-century-old design, and (2) doing so in a manner 
responsive to the threat posed by the Airbus A320neo. This first part was due primarily to an old 
design originally intended for low-bypass turbofans. The second part would have been less 
difficult had Boeing not made the strategic miscalculation noted previously and had started its 
737-replacement program sooner. 
In short, Boeing launched a program which (like all new programs) had both competitive 
and technical aspects. In this case, a timely response to the A320neo dictated the form (re-
engining) of its narrow-body program at a pace driven by the A320neo family. The MCAS 
consequences were partly a matter of bad luck, but the design team might well have made other 
miscalculations for which the consequences have been nonexistent or less serious. 
Finally, and most relevant to our current purpose, is that the 737MAX case is an object 
lesson concerning the hazards of aspirational schedules, especially if they’re taken too 
seriously.  
 
9 This seems unlikely at first glance but is understandable. For example, Franck et al. (2012) contains an analysis of 
various potential competitors to the Boeing-Airbus narrow-body duopoly – of which Bombardier and Embraer 
regional jets were reckoned the most serious. This hypothesis is supported, inter alia, by Airbus acquiring the 
Canadian Regional Jet production facilities, and Embraer’s regional jets now being a joint venture with Boeing 
(which holds an eighty-percent interest). 
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A Final Word—Aspirational Schedules 
While this study examined a commercial aircraft project, the similarities of complex 
system development are strikingly like the broader aerospace and defense (A&D) sector. 
Indeed, Boeing is both commercial aircraft manufacturer and defense contractor. We posit the 
aerospace-defense world practices two inherently different kinds of system development 
scheduling. There are two kinds of scheduling. The first is based on a structured planning (e.g., 
Critical Path Method [CPM] or Program Review Evaluation Technique [PERT]). The second kind 
of scheduling is that described in this paper—aspirational scheduling. We define an aspirational 
schedule as one defined by a political or business desire, aim, or goal rather than accepted 
scheduling techniques.  
Aspirational schedules are driven by political and commercial processes and decisions. 
It is an example of making engineering development fit a strategy, rather than allowing the 
engineering discipline to define the time needed. In and of itself, the idea of political or 
commercial events driving developments is not new. Developments from the Manhattan Project 
to the Lockheed U-2 to Polaris are examples of political requirements driving development. 
What may be lacking in this latest move to aspirational schedules, however, is 
acknowledgement of the challenges of aspirational scheduling and an acceptance of the 
necessity for reasoned trades in a development.  
Aspirational schedules now appear to be highly fashionable, and they have also 
attracted powerful institutional advocates. One recent example is the Air Force’s Digital Century 
Series initiative. Its chief advocate is the current Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, Will Roper. He advocates rapid development and production of a series of fighter 
aircraft, such as the Air Force procured starting in the 1950s. His rationale includes a more agile 
response to peer competitors, enabled by new generations of design simulation software 
(Freedburg, 2019). This is to take place in a less risk-averse acquisition culture. With these 
technologies and development of new combat aircraft types in 5 years or less, this looks a lot 
like a large-scale adoption of aspirational schedules (Insinna, 2019).  
A second example emerging is the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (Minuteman ICBM 
replacement). The program has been declared “late to need,” and is proceeding apace despite 
potential complications with an ongoing Federal Trade Commission investigation (Censer, 2019; 
Clark, 2019; Erwin, 2018; FTC, 2018).  
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Abstract 
Agile project managers have a difficult time communicating schedules in traditional formats. For 
example, integrated master schedules, work breakdown structures, and so on are expected by 
project leadership, especially if they are new to agile. Agile does not include detailed level 
planning, years in advance. Instead, it focuses on small increments and iterates on the scope 
until the stakeholder need is met. Detailed planning is only done within the confines of an 
increment. Higher level milestones are captured for future efforts, but the detailed level planning 
is not done until nearing start of the work. Limitations of traditional project management 
techniques are nothing new. However, management of such projects still has not changed or 
significantly improved upon monitoring and controlling methods since their inception. The 
traditional Critical Path Method (CPM) is an example. CPM has the following known limitations. 
There is an assumption that durations can be accurately estimated and forecast. Estimates are 
based on historical data and made by separate planning departments, not the “doers”—the 
people closest to the work. Interdependencies are not always clear up front—they evolve as more 
information becomes available and work is further broken down, making it difficult to differentiate 
between scope creep and scope refinement. This can result in lengthy and costly contractual 
battles between the contractor and developer. Schedule logic in CPM is largely driven by finish-
to-start dependencies, making other types of dependencies difficult to forecast and the critical 
path difficult to identify without software. Software requires user training/results in a designated 
“scheduler,” removed from the work. Management assumes projects can add resources to speed 
up completion, failing to account for learning curves, increased complexity, and additional 
bottlenecks. By applying production management and agile principles, projects can improve on 
the critical path method and develop specific agile applications. 
Keywords: agile, software, cpm, production management 
Introduction 
Traditional project management processes aimed to monitor and control cost, schedule, 
and performance are based on rigid estimating techniques applied to a single baseline early in a 
project life cycle. An agile approach allows for rolling-wave planning and execution, resulting in 
decreased variability and improved forecasting. This paper explores how agile principles of 
iterative and incremental planning and execution applied to traditional monitoring techniques for 
cost and schedule, such as Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling can benefit from an iterative, 
agile approach. When projects are treated as a system, planning and execution are not siloed to 
respective parties; production design and processes are better understood, leading to improved 
capacity-based planning, reduced variability, reduced work in process, and increased throughput. 
ISE and agile share many common principles and methodologies. Applying these to project 
management results in improved monitoring and control. 
Research Issue Statement  
How can projects use CPM in an agile project to create a detailed enough plan for 
project managers? Forecasting is only as good as the data you put in. However, if projects 
adopt an agile approach to CPM, projects can leverage the benefits of iterative, incremental 
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develop to forecast progress and completion. Many traditional project management 
organizations that adopt agile try to impose traditional methods of control (CPM, Earned Value 
Management [EVM], etc.). They can be applied, but they must account for the iterative 
approach of agile. Applying an agile approach to CPM could improve on the method and 
provide agile project managers another means of measuring and presenting schedule data. 
Research Results Statement 
A deeper understanding of the process design, production design, capacity planning, 
inventory control, and variability is needed in order to improve CPM. Production process and 
design should be used to develop the scheduling model accounting for capacity of resources 
(people, equipment, etc.). Capacity-based planning and velocity-based planning need to be the 
drivers behind the scheduling duration estimates (rates drive dates). By adopting agile, projects 
can adapt the CPM approach to account for rolling-wave planning, iterative development, and 
incremental changes, resulting in improved project performance. 
CPM Background 
The critical path method (CPM) is defined as “a method used to estimate the minimum 
project direction and determine the amount of schedule flexibility on the logical network paths 
within the schedule model” (Project Management Institute [PMI], 2017b). CPM uses a schedule 
network analysis technique, independent of resources, to calculate the estimated project 
duration based on early start/finish and late start/finish activity dates. A forward and backward 
pass is conducted to determine the earliest start/finish and late start/finish based on the project 
activity estimated durations and sequencing. By creating a network diagram of activities based 
on predecessor and successor requirements and estimated task duration, the critical path and 
float (flexibility) of a project can be estimated (PMI, 2017a). 
Schedule Logic and Precedence Diagraming 
There are four types of logical relationships and dependencies in CPM that affect the 
project schedule duration. The following definitions summarize the relationships (PMI, 2017a): 
• Finish-to-start (FS): predecessor activity must finish before successor activity 
can start 
• Finish-to-finish (FF): successor activity cannot finish until a predecessor activity 
has also finished 
• Start-to-start (SS): successor activity cannot start until predecessor activity has 
also started 
• Start-to-finish (SF): successor activity must start before predecessor activity 
can finish 
In a schedule network diagram, an activity node will contain the activity name, early 
start, early finish, late start, late finish, total float, and duration (see Figure 1). 
 
Early Start Early Finish 
Total Float  Duration 
Activity Name 
Late Start Late Finish 
 
Figure 1. Activity Node in CPM Network Diagram 
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Float 
Float, or slack, is the amount of time an activity can be delayed without an impact on the 
downstream activities within a schedule. There are two types of float: total float and free float. 
Total float is the “amount of time that a schedule activity can be delayed or extended from its 
early start date without delaying the project finish date or violating a schedule constraint” (PMI, 
2017a). Free float is the “amount of time a schedule activity can be delayed without delaying the 
early start date of any successor or violating a schedule constraint” (PMI, 2017a). Since the 
critical path is the longest path through a project schedule, the critical path will have zero float. 
Limitations of CPM Methods 
CPM activity durations and network diagrams are based on estimates to create a 
baseline schedule to monitor project performance against. Ideally, this should allow project 
managers the opportunity to control the project performance by allocating additional resources 
and crashing or fast-tracking activities to complete a project on time. However, in practice this is 
very difficult to achieve. CPM has the following known limitations (Fischer et al., 2020): 
• There is an assumption that durations can be accurately estimated and forecast. 
Estimates are based on historical data and made by separate planning 
departments, not the doers—the people closest to the work (Habibi et al., 2018). 
• Interdependencies are not always clear up front; they evolve as more information 
becomes available and work is further broken down, making it difficult to 
differentiate between scope creep and scope refinement. This can result in 
lengthy and costly contractual battles between the contractor and developer 
(Quah & Prabhakar, 2008). 
• Schedule logic in CPM is largely driven by finish-to-start dependencies, making 
other types of dependencies difficult to forecast and the critical path difficult to 
identify without software. Software requires user training/results in a designated 
“scheduler,” removed from the work (Ouelhadj & Petrovic, 2009). 
Management assumes that projects can add resources to speed up completion, failing to 
account for learning curves, increased complexity, and additional bottlenecks (Brooks, 1975). 
Approach 
By applying agile principles to the CPM approach, a modified approach to CPM can be 
used for agile software projects. However, this approach may not be appropriate for all projects; 
there is a continued need to have integrated schedules and milestones within government 
projects. Often, an agile software project only represents one piece of an overall system of 
systems, making it critical for agile software projects to have a method or approach to address 
CPM. 
Agile is not a process but rather an umbrella term used to refer to several methodologies 
that emphasize the four agile methods and 12 principles of the Agile Manifesto developed in the 
early 2000s. Agile focuses on iterative and incremental development and improvements by 
embracing change as new information becomes available (Agile Alliance, n.d.). Traditional 
change management approaches are too slow and do not allow projects to respond to change 
rapidly. 
Agile also promotes collaboration and self-organization. This means that individuals are 
empowered to self-organize and take ownership of their work. Decision-making is delegated to 
the lowest level of authority possible to enable the people doing the work to make more realistic 
estimates about the time and resources required to accomplish the work. To apply agile 
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methods to project controls, CPM has to account for rolling-wave and capacity-based planning, 
iterative development cycles, and incremental changes. 
Production Management Concepts 
All CPM schedules start with a basic list of tasks, predecessors, and durations. A 
network diagram to capture the overall flow of work is used to demonstrate the process from the 
end to end. The limitations of CPM, as listed in Limitations of CPM Methods, create the need for 
deeper understanding of the work that is planned and estimated to be accomplished. In order to 
achieve this level of detailed planning in an iterative, agile approach, production management 
concepts such as the production design, process design, capacity planning, inventory or work in 
process (WIP) control, and variability need to be taken into account during CPM planning 
(Project Production Institute [PPI], n.d.).  
Production and process design are closely related. Production design is a compilation of 
the requirements that will be used to design and build a product (PPI, n.d.). In the case of an 
agile software project, the requirements are often user-based and developed in an iterative 
manner over time, incorporating user and stakeholder feedback throughout the design and 
development process. Process design is the design of the processes and procedures to 
accomplish the work within the project (PPI, n.d.). In the case of agile software projects, the 
agile ceremonies and cadences of sprint planning, execution, demo/review, and retrospective 
are examples of processes that support the development of a product. You cannot fast-track or 
shortcut these processes to deliver a product faster; they are necessary for achieving the 
requirements in a cost-effective and iterative manner. In the case of CPM, production and 
process design impact the overall workflow and network diagram used to build the schedule. An 
understanding of both the product requirements and the process requirements is needed to 
capture all the applicable work within a timebox, such as a sprint. 
Capacity planning is the approach of developing sprint plans based on resource 
availability (PPI, n.d.). It requires estimation and assignment of work based on the inputs 
available (data, models, etc.), the number of hours available by each team member, and the 
complexity/scope of the work to be accomplished. Work is estimated and planned to the 
appropriate scope within the sprint based on the team’s capacity (Cohn, 2005). In the case of 
CPM, capacity drives the duration estimates, accounting for resource hours available, 
dependencies of the work within the network, and possible blockers (such as external reviews). 
By adopting agile principles, project managers can redesign the CPM approach to 
account for rolling-wave planning, iterative development, and incremental changes, resulting in 
improved project performance. 
Rolling-Wave and Capacity-Based Planning 
Rolling-wave planning is an iterative and incremental approach to project cost and 
schedule estimation. The estimate is done progressively over time, refined through rolling-wave 
planning methods that deliver cost and schedule estimates at the task level just in time. As more 
information becomes available and plans become more detailed, the estimate is updated and 
refined (Slinger, 2012). Capacity-based planning is the delegation of task estimation to the 
individuals conducting the work. This allows for a more detailed estimate based on the 
individuals’ hours available, skill sets, and personal understanding of the work complexity.  
Story point analysis involves assigning story points, a unit of measurement for 
expressing a software development effort, a point value for the effort to complete the item. The 
individual values are not important. However, the relative value that the software development 
team assigns to the story points reflects the effort of the tasks involved. Something that is 
assigned a 2 should be roughly twice as much effort as something assigned a 1 (Cohn, 2005). 
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There are many agile estimation techniques, such as story point estimating, that allow for task 
estimation to account for not only the estimate hours, but also the complexity and risk 
associated with the task requirements (Agile Alliance, n.d.). For example, if a task is not well 
defined and an individual does not have the experience associated with the task, the estimate 
would be high, indicating to the project manager that there is an immediate need to spend more 
time on the task definition. Before the work even starts (resources, cost, etc.), the project 
manager can control the project direction by addressing the issues in real time versus finding 
out about it later in a monthly CPM report. 
Iterative Development Cycles and Incremental Changes 
Iterative development cycles and incremental changes are similar to Plan-Do-Check-Act 
(PDCA) cycles. An example of an agile application of PDCA is through the scrum sprint cycles 
(see Figure 2). A sprint is a timeboxed period to do work, usually between 2 to 4 weeks long. A 
sprint starts with a planning session focused on near-term and priority work from the project 
backlog. Capacity-based estimates are used to determine what resources are available and 
how much work to plan into the sprint cycle based on the hours and skills available. The team 
then commits to a set amount of work for the sprint and works down the sprint backlog until the 
sprint ends. Even if all the work is not completed, the sprint will end on a set date. At the end of 
the sprint, the team reviews their work completed with their stakeholders, providing an 
opportunity to either continue forward or make an incremental change. This allows for rapid, 
responsive changes before too many resources and too much time have been committed to a 
flawed or problematic solution. It also provides an opportunity for stakeholders to clarify their 
requirements as more information becomes known, allowing for a collaborative solution to be 
developed (Agile Alliance, n.d.). 
 
Figure 2. Scrum Sprint Cycle 
Work in Process, Inventory/Backlog, and Resource Controls 
Planning work in sprints allows projects to better manage and control WIP, inventory, 
and resources. Large amounts of WIP leads to less throughput, as too many tasks are started 
but not necessarily finished. This commits resources, time, and money unnecessarily and 
inefficiently, which increases project variability. As project variability increases, monitoring and 
control methods lose their effectiveness to control, becoming historical snapshots (backward-
facing), instead of forward-looking. In addition, large amounts of inventory also tie up resources 
and drives up project costs, as inventory requires space and resources to store, track, and 
manage. Finally, since agile promotes rolling-wave and capacity-based planning, work is 
committed based on resource availability, skill set, and capacity. Resource surges may still be 
needed on occasion, but they are the last resort, relying instead on the people doing the work to 
only commit to what they are capable of achieving within the sprint. 
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Agile Approach for CPM 
An agile approach for CPM also begins with rolling-wave planning. It is unlikely that most 
projects can produce a detailed level sequence of activities months and years in advance. 
However, creating the network diagram during a sprint timebox will generate less variability 
because resources commit to work based on their capacity and skill set. Sequencing of 
activities also improves because the inputs/outputs of near-term work must be well understood 
to estimate and commit to a sprint. If there is uncertainty related to a specific activity, then it is 
raised to the attention of the project manager during planning, which can then be communicated 
back to the stakeholders. This iterative approach to problem solving continues until the team 
reaches an understanding of what the requirements are and can commit to a path forward. 
The critical path can be determined at the sprint and project level but is tracked 
differently. At the sprint level, the estimated duration can be inferred from the story point 
estimates for each task. The earliest start/finish and late start/finish are calculated the same way 
but require that tasks within a sprint have a network diagram in place as part of planning. This 
means identifying the predecessor and successors of each task within a sprint. It does require a 
modification to traditional CPM, though, in that the resources and their capacity are directly tied 
to a task and its story point estimate, which will affect the network diagram development and 
requires review as part of the sprint planning session. Further, traditional scheduling tools, like 
integrated master schedules, are often outdated before they are even finished. A roadmap is an 
agile approach for long-term planning that captures high level milestones and project targets but 
is constantly updated from sprint to sprint based on how the work is progressing and based on 
feedback from stakeholders. 
Application to Software Projects 
Software Development Tools That Support Agile CPM 
There are many software tools available that can provide an agile CPM approach for 
software development projects. Listing of these tools is not meant as an endorsement but rather 
a demonstration of how agile CPM can achieve meeting the needs of both the project team and 
stakeholders. According to the 14th Annual State of Agile Report, Jira remains the most popular 
agile project management tool across industry (Digital.ai Software Inc., 2020). Jira allows 
projects to plan, organize, and track work throughout the life cycle of project. Work breakdown 
and dependencies are captured and managed in real time within the Jira environment, allowing 
the team to see what is happening in a connected (versus disconnected) state (Atlassian, n.d.). 
This is a significant improvement over previous project management tools such as Microsoft 
Excel or Project. 
Further, Jira plugins such as SoftwarePlant’s (2021) BigPicture and ALM Works’s (n.d.) 
Structure both allow software development projects to pull project tasking into a Gantt-style 
chart/network diagram view. An agile work breakdown structure provides the basis for 
organizing and breaking the work down. Tasks can be linked in various relationships—such as 
end-to-end, end-to-start, start-to-start, and start-to-end—similar to Microsoft Project or 
Primavera scheduling software. Milestones can be added, and work can be connected to these 
dates, allowing project managers to pull reports on the critical path. These data are captured 
and updated in real time as teams work within the system to update their tasking, eliminating the 
disconnect of having separate planners and doers. 
Applications Within Government Software Projects 
According to the latest Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment, while 22 of the DoD’s 
weapons programs reported agile development as their software project delivery approach, 
there were inconsistencies across the programs in terms of execution and delivery (GAO, 
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2020). Out of the 22 programs, only six met the industry standard for agile delivery practices, 
which is delivery every 6 weeks or less (Freedberg, 2020). While this seems discouraging, it is 
important to note that the adoption of agile within government projects is still relatively new, and 
true agile transformation of a project or program can take years. 
As the DoD is transitioning to more agile practices, there are multiple programs and 
projects that are adopting agile practices and software successfully. For example, Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS), Air Force; Distributed Common Ground 
System–Navy (DCGS-N) Increment 2, Navy; Global Combat Support System–Joint (GCSS-J), 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); and Catapult/Attack the Network Tool Suite 
(ANTS), Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) programs have all adopted Jira 
project management software to support iterative and incremental development practices 
(Kramer & Wagner, 2019). While it is unknown what, if any, Jira plugins are being used to track 
the critical path, the adoption and native functions within the basic version of Jira support the 
overall goals and objectives of CPM by allowing task tracking in an integrated and networked 
fashion. 
Conclusion 
Agile methods allow projects to adapt to rapid and constant change. Traditional methods 
for project monitoring and control are based on theories and assumptions that change and 
variability are rare in projects, which results in project systems that can only monitor the past, 
not control the present or forecast the future. By applying agile methods—such as rolling-wave 
and capacity-based planning and iterative development cycles and incremental changes—and 
by focusing on controlling WIP, inventory, and resources, CPM can be improved to provide 
control, not just monitoring. 
In an agile construct, the intent of CPM—tracking the critical path of a project—can be 
done within native software project management tracking tools, such as Jira. Further adoption of 
Jira and Jira plugins, such as BigPicture and Structure, could allow government projects to 
capture the detailed level schedule and critical path in real time, eliminating or greatly reducing 
the barriers in place today with traditional CPM approaches and tools. After all, agile and CPM 
share a common goal of delivering a product or project with transparency of the time/cost 
throughout the life cycle. 
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Abstract 
Executable programs run on computers and digital devices. These programs are pre-installed by 
the device vendor or are downloaded or copied from a storage media. It is useful to study file 
similarity between executable files to verify valid updates, identify potential copyright 
infringement, identify malware, and detect other abuse of purchased software. 
An alternative to relying on simplistic methods of file comparison, such as comparing their hash 
codes to see if they are identical, is to identify the “texture” of files and then assess its similarity 
between files. To test this idea, we experimented with a sample of 23 Windows executable file 
families and 1,386 files. We identify points of similarity between files by comparing sections of 
data in their standard deviations, means, modes, mode counts, and entropies. When vectors are 
sufficiently similar, we calculate the offsets (shifts) between the sections to get them to align. 
Using analysis on these shifts, we can measure file similarity efficiently. By plotting similarity vs. 
time, we track the progression of similarity between files. 
Introduction 
Software of unknown pedigree abounds. This is partly due to software being distributed 
as executable code or a “binary,” and evaluating the contents of a binary is technically 
challenging. 
Numerous updates to a binary can occur over the useful life of the executable to address 
new software requirements, fix software defects, or port the software to a different computing 
platform. Each of these requires recompilation and results in a new binary. 
Executable code can be analyzed using reverse-engineering tools that recover 
information about the binary’s structure, function, and behavior. Some tools recognize data 
regions inside the code, while more advanced tools analyze the machine instructions to make 
inferences about the code’s function. Because of the differences in instruction set architectures 
(ISAs), tools use models of ISAs. However, reverse engineering of a binary can be resource-
intensive and can be stymied by deliberate anti-reversing techniques used to protect the binary 
file. 
Executable code is vulnerable to malware. By replacing machine instructions with 
malicious ones, executable code can be transformed into malware. Malware can divert 
execution of code to perform one or more malicious tasks. Detection of malware contained in 
adversarial malware binaries is technically challenging, even with the use of artificial-intelligence 
techniques such as deep learning (Kolosnjaji et al., 2018). 
We introduce here an approach based on texture vectors to allow executables to be 
compared against each other without requiring reverse engineering of the binaries. Our 
approach can be used as a first step to determine whether reverse engineering is needed. 
Background 
Contents of an Executable File 
A binary contains more than just executable code. It includes fixed data, reserved space, 
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and links to executable code that is external to the file (Josse et al., 2014). Similarities in fixed 
data and fixed links are easiest to find because they can be matched directly. Reserved space 
usually consists of bytes with zero values and is found in many places in a typical executable 
file. It can complicate similarity measurements since there can be many false matches with zero 
bytes. 
The portion of an executable file that contains the actual executable code consists of 
machine instructions and their associated operands. When executable code is modified, many 
machine instructions remain the same but usually their locations shift. Then the memory 
addresses encoded in their operands may change to compensate for this shift unless the code 
uses addressing relative to a register. However, register arguments encoded in operands may 
also shift. 
Identifying File Similarity 
Numerous approaches exist for identifying similarities between files. They can be used 
on text files, binary files, images, video, and audio. A few apply to files containing executable 
code. Some of these executable-analysis tools visualize software evolution in source code using 
version-control information or source-code file analysis (Arbuckle, 2008). A three-dimensional 
graph can show where code accesses the operating system or other information about code 
flow, and graph how these numbers change over the evolution of a software product. The Code 
Time Machine tool (Aghajani et al., 2017) does this to show the evolution of code metrics for a 
given file. It shows values along a time-line for the number of lines of code, number of methods, 
and cyclomatic complexity (i.e., the number of paths the code can take given the possible 
conditions written into the code). A three-dimensional graph of files and file relations between 
versions relates files. Circles represent releases, squares represent files, and edges represent 
associations (Koike & Chu, 1997). Other tools that graph code evolution are CVSScan (Voinea 
et al., 2005) and EPOSee (Burch et al., 2005). 
There are many types of files. Three important ones are: 
• Text: Text typically consists of words arranged in sentences. It may also be fragmented 
because of formatting, as in a formatted PDF file, or may be in short phrases in data 
tables or in the data section of executable code. We can measure text similarity by 
comparing words. 
• Arbitrary bytes: What may appear as arbitrary bytes may be numeric data, compressed 
data, or executable codes. Numeric data often has low entropy because many of the 
bytes tend to be zero. Compressed data has high entropy because unused byte patterns 
in the data are removed. 
• Audio and video: Audio and video data consists of bytes arranged in sequences. Bytes 
can be compared by aligning the sequences. 
There are many algorithms for identifying similarities in data. Some work better than others 
given the type of data being compared. Methods used in comparing files are: 
• Comparing byte sequences: Comparing content of text files to identify similarity is a 
common operation. One approach tries to find the longest common subsequences 
(Bergroth & Hakonen, 2000), where text that does not match is identified as new or 
deleted content. Algorithms for efficient string matching include Knuth-Morris-Pratt 
(Wikipedia, 2020), which allows searching without backtracking when a near match is 
found, and Boyer-Moore (Cole, 2018), which skips alignments when searching for 
specific text. Although intended for text, both algorithms may be used with executable 
code. Another popular algorithm for text files is implemented in the “diff” utility developed 
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for the Linux operating system (Shotts, 2019). 
• Comparing executable bytes: Comparing bytes in files is similar to comparing text in 
files. However, bytes of files containing executable code are unlikely to match on 
operands and thus only the operators should be compared. For Intel architectures, 
operands are usually spaced at 4-byte or 8-byte intervals. Because of this, Cabezas and 
Mooij (n.d.) says that “binary file analysis by both binary diffing and cryptographic hash 
signatures comparison is a very limited approach to identify source code being re-used” 
and suggests metadata analysis. Regardless, for Intel architectures, it is useful to 
compare at every fourth or eighth byte because this will often align runs of comparisons 
with operators. 
• Comparing histograms: We can identify common sequences of N bytes (N-grams) 
between files and contiguous sequences of bytes of a given length and compute a 
histogram of them. In Jang and Brumley (2009), 5-grams are used, and a Bloom filter is 
used as an efficient data structure for storing N-gram patterns that are found. Overall file 
similarity can be measured with the Jaccard index, the count of N-grams in common 
divided by number of distinct N-grams in both files. To take frequencies of the N-grams 
into account in measuring similarity, the cosine similarity or the Kullback-Leibler 
divergence can be used (Rowe, 2018). 
• Transforming values before comparison: It may work better to measure similarity on 
transforms of the data values. This is commonly done for audio and video data; 
perceptual hashing (Hadmi et al., 2012) provides a similar hash output if features are 
similar. For images, we can transform the image to frequency space, or apply 
convolutions to it to enhance features. For signals, we can apply the Fourier transform to 
obtain frequencies. 
• Comparing metadata: Initial comparisons of files can use their descriptive data to 
decide if they are sufficiently related to be worth further analysis. For example, if we 
know two executable files are built to run on a Microsoft Windows system using the 
same Intel instruction-set architecture, they are worth comparing. We can also compare 
metadata about sections and data structures within the files (Cabezas & Mooij, n.d.). 
Metadata includes: 
o File types and subtypes. 
o Data compression parameters. Cloning is indicated if the compressed size is 
significantly smaller than the combined size of its parts (Cabezas & Mooij, n.d.). 
o Mentions of precompiled libraries. 
o Hashcodes on the files. 
• Comparing decompiled data: Executable files can be decompiled into text, and we can 
compare this text. Disassemblers and decompilers can do this, though they are not 
perfect. Disassemblers turn the bytes of executable code into corresponding machine 
code mnemonics and symbolic names, addresses, and offsets. Decompilers go further 
by turning bytes into source code. 
Identifying similarity specifically between versions of source code can be 
accomplished in several ways: 
• Object-oriented analysis: Software objects in source-code versions can be visually 
compared using a difference graph (Seemann & von Gudenberg, 1998). A graph of each 
version can be created where nodes are classes and node attributes are class methods 
and variables. Edges connect nodes where attributes of one node reference attributes of 
another. Then a class relation diagram is constructed that highlights differences in class 
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relations in two software versions. 
• Software-diagram analysis: Software diagrams created during design may be 
compared if available (Rho & Wu, 1988). 
• Version control analysis: Many products used by the software industry manage source 
code versioning with a repository (Swierstra & Lh, 2014). Then there is often 
documentation of the differences between versions. 
Calculating File Similarity 
In this section we present our texture-vector approach. We perform three layers of 
calculations to make inferences about similarity and how and where files are similar. Our steps 
are: 
1. Calculate texture-vector datasets from the two files to be compared. 
2. Compare texture-vector datasets to identify similarity offsets and produce a similarity 
offset histogram. 
3. Calculate statistics from the heights of the similarity offset histogram to produce a single 
similarity measure for the comparison of the two files. 




Figure 1: Inference Process 
Calculating Texture-Vector Data 
Texture vectors are calculated from the byte values of contiguous sections of binary 
data. Although many transform algorithms are possible, we are specifically interested in 
transforms that can both represent some unique characteristic of the data and possess a value 
that can be meaningfully compared to other values to measure similarity. 
Sections measured as similar by many transforms have stronger similarities than others. 
We tested the following transforms for calculating texture vectors on the integer values of the 
bytes: 
• Standard Deviation: The standard deviation of the byte values in a section of binary 
data. Two sections with a similar amount of deviation may be similar. 
• Mean: The average byte value in the section. When executable code changes, 
operators may remain the same and help maintain the same mean. 
• Mode: The most frequent byte value in the section. Often this value was zero in our 
data. This value is nonmetric and can only be used in computing similarity distances in 
the sense that it is identical or not. 
• Mode Count: The count of occurrence of the most frequent byte value in the section. 
• Entropy: The Shannon entropy of the byte values in the section. Two sections may be 
similar if the amount of randomness in each section is similar. 
Calculating Texture-Vector Distance 
Two texture vectors are defined as similar when the first texture-vector is within a 
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threshold of closeness to the second texture vector by the weighted square of the L2 
(Euclidean) distance metric (Defant , 2011). The similarity can be thought of as 1/d2 where d is 
distance, calculated as: d = w1(dv1)2 + w2(dv2)2 + w3(dv3)2 + w4(dv4)2 + w5(dv5)2 where dv 
is the difference at a given vector element and w is the weight for a given vector element. For 
example if texture-vector 1 has values [100, 30, 220, 50, 80], texture-vector 2 has values [101, 
32,225, 51, 80], and weights [w1, w2, w3, w4, w5] are [0.25, 0.25, 0.0, 0.25, 0.25], then the L2 
distance d2 is 0.25 ∗ 12 + 0.25 ∗ 22 + 0.0 ∗ 52 + 0.25 ∗ 12 + 0.25 ∗ 02 = 0.25 + 1.0 + 0 + 0.25 + 
0 = 1.5. A threshold of similarity was used for our graphics; for instance, if the acceptance 
threshold is 1.0, these vectors are not similar because 1.5  $  1.0. We set weight values by 
experiment as explained in the Tuning Rejection Thresholds section. A good threshold identifies 
numerous correct similarities between the sections of data from which the texture vectors were 
calculated while excluding non-similarities. 
Calculating Similarity Off Between Sections 
We calculate similarity offsets by comparing all the texture vectors in one file against all 
the texture vectors in another file and counting the offsets between the files where the texture 
vector distance is within the threshold of closeness. When there are many offsets with the same 
value, this gives high confidence in those byte matches. 
We implemented a display to show consistently strong offsets between two files. The 
display draws lines connecting similar texture vectors. The pattern and quantity of similarity lines 
indicates the nature and degree of file similarity. Figure 2 shows an example of two very similar 
versions of executable code, where the texture vector pattern of each file is shown across the 
top and bottom, and the lines between them indicate points of similarity. The files are both 




Figure 2. Texture Patterns of Two Very Similar Executable Files and Lines Connecting 
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Them Indicating Points of Similarity 
 
Calculating Similar-Section Off Histograms 
We calculate a similarity offset histogram from the set of offsets identified when 
searching for sufficiently similar texture vectors. There can be many thousands of offset values 
where similar-section matches can occur. To quantify this distribution of offsets, we create a 
similarity offset histogram and distribute calculated offset values across approximately 400 
buckets, which sufficiently categorizes offsets in a viewable form. Consistent offset values are 
found as peaks on the histogram of offset values and represent likely meaningful similarities. 
We calculate the measure of similarity between two files from the heights in the similarity 
offset histogram to provide a numeric measure of similarity between files. A large spread in 
heights suggests similarity at specific offsets, indicating similarity, while minimal spread in 
heights suggests a random distribution of similarity offsets, likely a result of false positives. 
Calculating Similarity Measures Between Files 
We calculate the measure of similarity between two files from the magnitude of the 
standard deviation of the heights of the compensated histogram as described in the Calculating 
Similar-Section Off Histograms section. An example of calculated similarity measure, along with 
the texture vectors, similarity offsets, and similar-section offset histograms, is shown in Figure 3. 
The top part describes the files being compared, the weights used in calculating the texture-
vector distance, and statistics about the view, including the calculated similarity measure of 
334.3535. The middle part shows the two texture-vector patterns, which visually appear 
identical, along with the center region saturated black with similarity lines. The bottom part 
shows the similarity histograms, where the similar-section offset histograms have spikes and 
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Figure 3. Example of High Value of High Similarity in File Family iexplore exe 
 
Tracking Versions of Executable Code 
We can also graph a network of relationships between different versions of the same 
executable. By using the file modification time for the horizontal axis and the calculated 
similarity measure described in the Calculating Similarity Measures Between Files section as 
the vertical axis, we can show the relationships between versions. Files that have a larger 
similarity measure to the selected file are plotted higher on the vertical axis. Files whose 
similarity measure is below a user-selectable measure are not plotted. By adjusting the similarity 
threshold using the SD slider in the Texture-Vector Browser GUI tool, we can remove files with 
minimal similarity to reveal clusters of files that match with greater similarity. Using this graph, 
we can make inferences; for example, releases with a similar modification time may be a result 
of bug fixes or security updates; releases with a smaller similarity measure may have more 
functional differences or may have added malware. An example of this graph is shown in Figure 
9. 
Preparing the Dataset of Executable Files 
The dataset we studied consisted of executable files, texture-vector files, and similarity-
graph files. The initial set of files was a sample of executable .exe and .dll files extracted from 
the Real Data Corpus (Garfinkel et al., 2009). The Real Data Corpus consists of “images” 
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(copies) of used disk drives and other devices obtained from non-U.S. countries. The files were 
extracted using the icat extraction tool from The Sleuth Kit forensics tool, 
(https://forensicswiki.org/wiki/The_Sleuth_Kit). Prof. Rowe picked 23 representative families of 
executables defined by a file name for each. Since many of the files were faulty, he used a 
software wrapper that loaded files for each distinct file contents (as indicated by its hash code) 
until the wrapper found a non-faulty copy. Names were changed from the original ones to 
distinguish files with the same names and different contents. The initial set consisted of 1,386 
files. Of these, 162 were excluded because their size was greater than 1 MB and 55 were 
excluded because their size was less than 1 KB. Of the remaining 1,169 files, 35 were excluded 
because they were identical based on their MD5 cryptographic hash, leaving 1,134 files in our 
dataset. Figure 4 shows the distribution of file sizes. Note that since all files are from various 




Figure 4. Histogram of File Sizes for our Dataset 
 
The distribution of files by file modification time is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Histogram of File Modification Times for our Dataset 
 
Statistics on the 23 file families that we studied are shown in Table 1. This includes source-code 
family tabulate_drive_data_py, which allows us to compare some versioned source-code files 
too. 
Preparing the Texture-Vector Files 
We created the texture-vector .tv files with the sbatch_calc_tv.bash program, which is 
part of the Texture-Vector Generator toolset. Due to the computational burden, we calculated 
texture vectors on the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Hamming supercomputer using sbatch 
parallel processing. We then copied these .tv files to the Texture-Vector Similarity repository, 
renaming them to their MD5 cryptographic hash value, for access by the Texture-Vector 
Similarity GUI tool. 
Tuning Rejection Thresholds 
Similarity is indicated when the square of the L2 distance measure is less than an 
acceptance threshold, as described in the Calculating Texture-Vector Distance section 3.1.1. 
We performed our tuning with two arbitrarily selected larger files in the ccalert_dll file family. We 
began with a default weight of 0.5 for the standard deviation, mean, mode count, and entropy 
transforms and, after some experimentation, we selected a distance rejection threshold of 5.0 
because it resulted in reasonable similarity offsets without an oversaturation of matches. We 
selected a default weight of 0.0 for the mode because mode values do not quantifiably compare 
with each other, though an alternative could be to set distances between modes to 0 for 
identical values and 1 for nonidentical values.  
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Table 1. Files by File Family 
 
We examined our tuning of weight values by setting all weight values to 0.0 and then, 
one weight at a time, examined the saturation of matched offsets as we adjusted the weight for 
each texture contribution from 0.0 to 1.0. For each weight adjustment, we observed that the 
quantity of similarity offsets identified would vary as we changed the weight and also that there 
was a visually understandable quantity of similarity at weight 0.5. Given this, we accepted our 
weight and rejection threshold values as our default values. These defaults are shown in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2. Default Texture-Vector Threshold Settings 
 
Setting Type Value 
Standard Deviation Weight 0.5 
Mean Weight 0.5 
Mode Weight 0.0 
Mode Count Weight 0.5 
Entropy Weight 0.5 
Rejection threshold Threshold 5.0 
 
Preparing the Similarity-Graph Files 
We created the similarity-graph files by running the sbatch_ddiff_tv.bash program which 
is part of the Texture-Vector Similarity toolset. We calculated the similarity metrics on the NPS 
Hamming supercomputer using sbatch parallel processing with a job queue size of 700, 
resulting in a graph of 1,134 nodes and 463,486 edges from which we can create a similarity 
matrix across all file families. We compared files across file families in order to measure 
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similarity between known dissimilar files. There are 642,411 possible edges, but we dropped 
178,925 of them because they had less than two similarity matches. This processing took about 
15 hours. Runtime of each file pair varied because file sizes varied. 
Table 2. Default Texture-Vector Threshold Settings 
 
Node data consists of the node index, filename, file family, file size, file-modification 
time, and file MD5 hashcode. Edge data consists of the edge’s source and target file node 
indexes along with the standard deviation, mean, maximum, and sum similarity metrics 
described in the Calculating Similarity Measures Between Files section. 
Results 
To evaluate the ability of our tools to identify similarities between executable files, we 
examined the 642,411 texture-vector similarity measures calculated for each pair of files for the 
1,134 files. Of the 642,411 possible comparisons, 463,486 of them produced nonzero similarity 
values. Similarity measure values varied from zero to about 300. The distribution of these 
463,486 similarity values across all files in our dataset is shown in Figure 6. Due to the uneven 
distribution of these values, a similarity threshold cannot be calculated using a normal gaussian 
distribution. Most similarity measure values were less than 10, which is where the curve 
becomes level. This suggests that actual similarity between two files may be indicated when 
their similarity measure is greater than 10. 
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To establish a baseline of what the similarity measure values are for similar files, we 
calculated the mean similarity measures within and across file families. We tested whether the 
similarity measure between files of the same file family was higher than the similarity measure 
between files in different file families. The confusion matrix for file similarity across all file 
families in our dataset is in Table 3. Rows and columns represent file families using the 
numbers in the second column. The mean similarity measures between files within file families 
is typically greater than the mean similarity between files in other file families, showing that our 
approach for identifying file similarity is useful. 
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Although the greatest average similarity for a given file family is usually within that file 
family, there are exceptions as between file families a0003775_dll and xrxwiadr_dll. This 
inconsistency could be due to the differences in file size or to other attributes within the files in 
these two file groups. An example similarity analysis plot illustrating the problem is Figure 7. 
Ranges of homogeneous texture vectors contain similar low mode counts and moderately high 
entropy values, suggesting that our similarity measure is primarily attributed to regions of 
compressed data rather than similarity in code. The few similarity matches in other regions 
suggest that there is actually little similarity between these two files. 
 
Figure 7. False-Positive Similarity Between Two Files Caused by Homogeneous Compressed 
Data 
Examining Similarity Using the Texture-Vector Browser GUI Tool 
Our Texture-Vector Browser GUI tool can examine trends in file similarity based on file 
creation times and file-similarity measures. Figure 9 shows an example. The horizontal axis is 
the file modification time. This can be the time the file was created if it was never modified, or 
the time it was modified by update or by contamination with a virus. The vertical axis is the 
measure of similarity between the file the user selects and the other files in the view, which if the 
Stay in group mode is selected, will be files within its family. Files higher up on the vertical axis 
are more similar to the selected file than files lower down on the vertical axis, where the 
similarity measure, as described in the Calculating Similarity Measures Between Files section, is 
the value on the vertical axis. By clicking on a node, the focus of the view changes to show the 
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similarities between the file associated with the clicked node and other files. By clicking on an 
edge, the view shows the similarity graph involving the two files associated with the edge. 
Using the node listing capability in the Texture-Vector Browser GUI and by sorting the 
list by file group and modification time, we find and select the file in the ccalert_dll file group with 
the latest timestamp, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Sorted Node Listing with Node 326 Selected 
In our dataset, this file is named AE10-1158_Program_Files_Norton_AntiVirus_Engi 
ne_18.5.0.125_ccalert.dll.tmp, indicating that it is on drive AE10-1158 from United Arab 
Emirates. It is indexed in our similarity graph dataset as node 326 (in green). The file naming 
convention is explained in the Peparing the Dataset of Executable Files section. This graph 
shows node 326 and its similar neighbors and similar edges, where the similarity measure, 
described in the Calculating Similarity Measures Between Files section, is 1.0 or more. The 
horizontal axis is the file modification time and the vertical axis is the relative similarity between 
file (node) 326 and the other files. In this graph, we see two clusters of similarity. 
 
Figure 9. Files (Nodes) and Similarity Measures (Edges) Associated With File Node 326 Showing 
Modification Times and Similarity to Node 326 
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Figure 10 shows the analysis of the edge that connects nodes 326 and 312, 
corresponding to Program Files/Norton AntiVirus Engine 18.5.0.125_ccalert.dll on drive AE10-
1158 and Program Files Norton AntiVirus Engine 17.0.136_ccAlert.dll on drive AE10-1160. This 
display was obtained using the GUI by clicking on the edge shown in Figure 9 that connects 
these two files. The texture vector patterns appear very similar and the similarity histogram 
spikes with a similarity count of nearly 370 near file offset 0, a large number, indicating that 
these two files are similar. We can click on any of the yellow dots in the GUI to select the file 
corresponding to it to compare other files against it. 
 
Figure 10. A Detailed Comparison of Files 312 and 326 Showing a High Degree of Similarity 
Composition Analysis 
By looking at the five bands in the texture-vector diagram, we can make inferences 
about the regions of executable code files being compared, in particular the locations of header, 
code, and data sections. For Figure 10, for the first two textures, covering the first 1,000 bytes, 
the standard deviation, mean, mode, and entropy values are lower than the values in other 
regions, while the mode count is higher. We infer that this represents a header, and the 
transition in the texture represents a transition to another type of content. The region from 
approximately byte 1,000 to byte 160,000, contains relatively medium values of the standard 
deviation, mean, and entropy, mode values that are either very high or very low, and 
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consistently low mode counts. We infer that this is the code section. The third region, from 
approximately byte 160,000 through to the end at byte 219,512, usually has a low mode value 
while values in the other four statistics vary but consistently with the two files. We infer that this 
is a region of data mostly unchanged between version. We also infer that the additional 10 KB 
added in the newer version was new code. 
Progressive Time Similarity 
Software files tend to be most similar to the previous version. Figure 11 shows an 
example for the nvrshu_dlll file family. Here, the file with the latest timestamp, WINDOWS 
system32 nvrshu.dll from the MY01-023 drive from Malaysia, is selected. We see sporadic 
measures of similarity between 10 and 30 for files before year 2005, but for files after 2005, we 
see a gradual increase in similarity over time from about 40 to 61. 
 
Figure 11: Similarity Increases as Versions Approach the Latest Version 
Version Analysis 
With these diagrams, we can study on the origin and evolution of versions of files. 
Although an original file should have the earliest file creation time, file creation times can be 
modified inadvertently or maliciously. Another clue is that the original file often has the least 
amount of code. Node 326 in Figure 9, file Program Files/Common Files/Sym antex/Shared 
ccAlert.dll.tmp from drive PA002-049 from Panama is likely the original file in its group because 
its file modification time is earliest and its similarity to latest files decreases over time. 
A newer version of code that introduces new features is likely to contain more code than 
the version before it. A newer version that is only a bug fix will be similar in size to the version 
before it and will have similar texture-vector patterns as in Figure 10. 
Files released at approximately the same time may be targeted for different operating 
system platforms or different feature sets. For example 13 files in the webclnt_dll file family were 
released over 2 days, 2006-01-03 and 2006-01-04. This is too clustered to be in response to 
new functionality or bug fixes. These files could be a response to a virus because some of their 
file sizes are the same and their texture-vector patterns appear identical. However, bear in mind 
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our sample is incomplete and important versions of software may be missing. 
Examining Similarity using Gephi 
Although the Texture-Vector Browser GUI tool was specifically designed for examining 
network graphs created from the dataset of similarity-graph files, graph analytics can also be 
done with popular open-source tools such as the Gephi graph-visualization tool. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Conclusions 
This thesis proposed applying a vector of transforms to executable code to create 
texture-vector data, and then using analytics to identify similarities between executable files. We 
tested a sample of executable code files with our methods. Our experiments showed files within 
file families had greater average similarity than files across file families. We found that the visual 
patterns in the texture vectors were effective in identifying similar regions in two files as well as 
sections that may be compressed. 
Future Work 
This work used texture vectors calculated from a section size of 500 bytes. A large 
section size might reveal similarity across a larger section of data, equivalent to applying a low-
pass filter to texture-vector values. A section size that is a power of two or is aligned to the size 
of fixed-size data might naturally align better with the section boundaries from which texture-
vectors are calculated. 
Texture vectors may be useful for classifying file types or detecting types of data 
embedded within a file. Further work in this direction might consist of defining data patterns that 
map to particular data types. 
The open-source tool Gephi offers many capabilities such as filtering and neighbor 
analytics that can be used to augment the similarity analytics provided by our tool. 
Future work might use it to obtain additional insight about file similarity. 
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Abstract 
As autonomous systems become more capable, end users must make decisions about how and 
when to deploy such technology. The use and adoption of a technology to replace a human actor 
depends on its ability to perform a desired task and on the user’s experience-based trust that it will 
do so. The development of experience-based trust in autonomous systems is expensive and high 
risk. This work focuses on identifying a methodology for technology discovery that reduces the 
need for experience-based trust and contributes to increased adoption of autonomous systems. 
Initial research reveals two problems associated with the adoption of high-risk technologies; 1) end 
user’s refusal to accept new systems without high levels of initial trust and 2) lost or uncollected 
experience-based trust data. The main research hypothesis is that a trust score, or trust metric, 
can influence the initial formation of trust by functioning as a surrogate for experience-based trust, 
and that trust in technology can be measured through a probability-based prediction of risk.  
Introduction 
We had better be quite sure that the purpose put into the machine  
is the purpose which we desire. 
       - Norbert Wiener,  Some moral and  
     technical consequences of automation 
 
The use of technology by the Department of Defense (DoD) depends on its ability to perform a 
desired task. There are many issues associated with trust in technology that are increasing in 
importance as the U.S. military begins to acquire and deploy autonomous systems. In order to 
ensure the effective adoption of new innovations in technology, there is a need to establish a 
system of metrics that justify a level of technology trust. This proposed research has the explicit 
goal of investigating and recommending trust metrics by applying advanced analytical 
methodologies to increase the speed and effectiveness of the adoption of new technologies. This 
investigation proceeds by participating in an evaluation of technologies for use in evolving high-
risk military applications. The trust metrics are measured in terms of the technology acceptance 
versus system control. 
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Technology Trust 
Devitt (2018) implies that in order to meet the DoD requirements for increased speed of 
adoption for new technologies, there is a need to replace the model of developing trust over longer 
periods of time with a justifiable metric of trust. This research studies the effectiveness of 
establishing and introducing trust metrics on the evaluation and selection of technologies. The 
work participates in an ongoing assessment of autonomous systems for use in high-risk military 
applications throughout fiscal year 2019. A model is developed that optimizes the cognitive 
impacts of these trust metrics as they relate to the technology selection and adoption process. 
The approach will be extensible and can be adopted into private industry. 
Research Problem 
The recent increase in the use and deployment of commercial technologies by other 
countries is a disruptive threat to the United States’ technological superiority. The rapidly changing 
technology landscape requires DoD laboratories to increase the speed at which they adopt new 
technologies (David & Nielsen, 2016). With declining budgets in research, it is imperative that the 
DoD establish new methods for rapidly adopting and effectively deploying new and emerging 
technologies whenever possible. 
Research Purpose 
As autonomous systems begin to surpass the capabilities of humans, there is a need to 
establish a level of confidence in a technology’s ability to perform as expected. The complexity of 
modern systems makes it difficult to establish a comprehensive metric of trust. Past research in 
technology trust focused on automation and methods to measure interpersonal person-to-firm 
relations, such as trust in a Web vendor or a virtual team member (McKnight et al., 2011). This 
research has the goal of establishing and measuring a comprehensive trust metric for individual 
pieces of technologies, such as autonomous systems, used in high-risk military applications. The 
development of a trust metric serves two purposes: first, as a surrogate for experience-based 
trust by contributing to the formation of initial trust and, second, as a collection tool for capturing 
experience-based trust data. 
Research into a "trust-discovery" methodology contributes to improved understanding of 
human-machine trust formation and the development of a technology-literate workforce capable 
of accurately assessing new technology for a given operational scenario. This work first 
establishes a baseline definition of what it means to “trust” technology. It concludes with the 
development of a methodology leading to trusting relations between humans and technology. This 
work contributes to the literature in areas of trust in autonomous systems, technology adoption, 
and technologies intended for use in high-risk applications where failure or improper application 
can lead to severe consequences. 
Research Questions 
This study attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. How do varying levels of system control affect the development of trust in technologies 
used in high-risk military applications? The constructs researched include: 
a. Perceived ease of use 
b. Perceived usefulness 
c. Intent to use 
2. How do anthropomorphic metrics affect the development of trust in technologies used in 
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Research Approach 
The following research approach is used: 
1. Study the evaluation process of autonomous systems for use in high-risk military 
applications. 
2. Develop a conceptual framework for trust metrics that optimizes the technology evaluation 
process. 
3. Observe and record the results of both laboratory and field experimentation.  
 
The basic tenets of the experimental design are realized through a 2 x 3 factorial design (Table 
1-1). 
Table 1-1. 2 x 3 Factorial Design 
   SYSTEM CONTROL 
   LOW MID HIGH 
TRUST 
METRIC 
 NOT USED … …  …  
 USED …  …  …  
 
Contribution 
The concept of a technology trust metric has applicability beyond the DoD. Private industry 
can greatly benefit from the concepts and methodologies developed in this research by applying 
trust metrics to the research and development of existing or new consumer technologies such as 
machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI) systems, smart algorithms, and embedded 
technologies. These intelligent systems are transformative areas that will eventually integrate into 
all industries (e.g., self-driving cars, delivery drones, big data analytics, and the Internet of Things, 
where algorithms, machines, and computer systems are continually learning and evolving). 
This research also contributes to trust theory and provides an increased understanding of 
military technology acceptance. The recommendations provide a conceptual framework for how 
a military community develops trust in technologies for high-risk missions and how varying factors 
influence the development of such a relationship. Currently, there is an effort to perform such trust 
analytics within the DoD in which this current research will participate. 
Organization 
Section 2: Literature Review  
This review investigates existing literature that includes terms such as technology trust 
and risk, decision making, and technology-adoption models. A review of current and past theory 
on technology trust and decision making is developed, which is then used to develop a 
comprehensive metric for assessing technology trust within the DoD. A proposed framework for 
a comprehensive trust metric is identified and introduced to the technology evaluation process. 
Section 3: Experimental Design  
Both lab and field experiments are conducted to identify trust metrics. This research 
intends to leverage an ongoing DoD experiment reviewing and selecting a series of new 
autonomous systems. The existing data is collected from DoD active-duty technology end users, 
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as well as civilian scientist support staff. The study investigates how varying levels of trust 
influence cognitive decision making as well as technology adoption. The primary product of this 
investigation is the experimental data obtained.  
Literature Review 
The purpose of this section is to understand the formation of trust, as well as analyze the 
constructs of a trust relationship. The idea of trust metrics is broken down into quantifiable 
segments based on leading theories. We conclude by presenting a conceptual framework for a 
technology trust metric based on what was learned from the literature, as well as what is missing 
from the literature. 
This research was initiated through informal interviews that attempted to identify the 
factors that contribute to the use of technology in high-risk environments. The participants were 
a small group of active-duty military and veterans that deploy, or have deployed, with technology 
that posed great risk of physical harm should it fail. A number in this group experienced significant 
injury due to the failure of technology, and the potential for bias was noted. The open-ended 
questions were based on what the users did or did not like about using technology in high-risk 
scenarios. The initial coding of interviews revealed the following themes: 
1. Hands-on experience with technology is critical for establishing trust, and team-based 
reputation for a technology is as important as personal experience. 
2. Users favor simple technology containing only the features needed to accomplish a 
mission, and users reject new technology in favor of older and more trusted systems. 
3. Personal investment in a mission is key to learning how to use new technology.   
  
These themes all have implications for the adoption of autonomous systems within the 
DoD. Advanced robotic systems have the ability to improve performance in a number of military 
roles while reducing risk to humans, and it is important to understand how to improve the adoption 
of such systems within the DoD. This initial research focused on technology in dangerous 
environments and reveals that adoption is highly dependent on the ability of the user to obtain the 
knowledge necessary to develop trust. This theme led to our initial literature review on 
understanding trust, and how it applies to technology adoption. 
The literature review was developed through searches on both Web of Science and 
Google Scholar using combinations of search terms such as trust, knowledge-trust, technology 
trust, human-computer, human-robot, technology acceptance, trust attribute, trust risk, and risk 
score. The literature results were narrowed to 93 relevant articles. 
Knowledge 
The process of obtaining knowledge is fundamental to the establishment of trust. We 
therefore briefly review the epistemologies, or the processes for how a person gets to know 
something, as concepts important to this work. Early philosophers presented the two opposing 
views of the source of knowledge: rationalism or empiricism. 
The French Philosopher Rene Descartes was an early rationalist who believed that we 
can only know something through reason, and that the only thing we can truly know is that we 
have consciousness. Descartes presented a methodology for knowing what is real that rejects a 
construct needed for the establishment of technology trust. He established a dualism that reduces 
our understanding to distinct areas of consciousness and matter but does not account for the 
senses. Our sense perception, he believed, is easily prone to error due to subjective 
interpretation. He believed that the senses are meant to simply get us around in the world rather 
than lead us to truth. In order to test our hypothesis of trust in technology we must identify 
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constructs that permit measurement of human interaction with technology, and technology 
interaction with its surroundings. 
John Locke later introduced empiricism that, contrary to rationalism, stated that all 
knowledge must be obtained through experience. The empiricists claimed that the senses were 
the only way to true knowledge, and that experience is much more accurate than anything the 
mind could ever reproduce through memory or reason. The theories presented by rationalism and 
empiricism both stand to contribute to the formation of trust through the application of reason-
based knowledge and experience-based knowledge. (However, there is a limitation in that we 
lack a method for integrating these two forms of obtaining knowledge.) 
Further review reveals that modern philosophers reject the idea that knowledge is 
obtained exclusively through either rationalism or empiricism. The philosopher Immanuel Kant 
provided a synthesis between the two opposing theories. First, he noted that reason lacks the 
ability to create sensory experience; it is only through reason that we are able to accurately 
analyze the stimuli received through the senses. This theory represents a foundation for 
understanding the development of trust. The Figure 2-1 represents a causal model based on our 




Figure 2-1. A Model of Inquiry Leading to Knowledge 
Trust 
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) review over 72 definitions of what it means to know 
something well enough to have trust, and their work reveals a great deal of confusion and 
ambiguity surrounding the use of the term. The concept of trust appears to be subjective in nature, 
and the literature does not provide a commonly accepted definition across research disciplines. 
Agreement in the literature was found for the definition of trust in two small areas: 1) the basic 
premise of trust involves two actors, and 2) trust is a relationship in which one entity relies on 
someone, or something, based on a given criterion. Research into the meaning of a “given 
criterion” reveals an interchangeable use of the terms trust and confidence. The only noticeable 
difference in the use of these terms is that trust is based on decisions involving risk, whereas 
confidence involves decisions devoid of consequence.  
This literature review furthers its investigation into trust through researching interpersonal 
relationships. Leading theories on interpersonal trust present vulnerability and risk as the 
contributing factors unique to the development of such a relationship. Cho et al. (2015) surveyed 
the meaning of trust across academic disciplines and identified that it follows a basic premise 
involving risk. For example, they found that academic researchers of trust in psychology assess 
the probability that individual behaviors are repeatable in situations that entail risk, and in 
sociology researchers of trust assess the probability that one party will perform an action that will 
not hurt the interests of a dependent party or expose them to risk due to ignorance or uncertainty. 
Rousseau et al. (1998) define interpersonal trust as a psychological state of a trustor 
accepting vulnerability in a situation involving risk, based on positive expectations of the intentions 
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or behavior of the trustee. Boon et al. (1991) simplify the definition of trust as a state involving 
confident predictions about another’s motives in situations entailing risk. The majority of early 
research on trust involves person-person relationships and provides a starting point for our 
understanding of the process of developing trust. Figure 2-2 presents an operational model of 
interpersonal trust formation based on the reviewed literature. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. A Model of Interpersonal Trust Formation 
 
Adams and Webb (2002) describe two broad processes of developing trust between two 
individuals. The first is defined as “person-based trust”, which develops through repeated 
engagements, and the second is called “category-based trust”, which develops in the absence of 
direct experience. These definitions parallel the theories identified in our previous research into 
the epistemologies. Consequently, we modify interpersonal trust terminology to match our 
research by replacing “category-based” with “reason-based”, and “person-based” with 
“experience-based”. 
Kramer and Tyler (1996) assess reason-based trust and presents it as useful for 
understanding how one develops a trusting relationship when personal or social interaction is not 
possible. This type of trust often develops through someone's membership in a familiar group or 
category. The factors contributing to reason-based trust can be social roles, training, or 
experience. In reason-based trust, the relationship is most commonly developed through a 
reputation that serves as a proxy for personalized knowledge and direct experience. These 
concepts lead to our first research hypothesis regarding the experience-based trust relationships. 
H1: An experience-based proxy will influence the tendency to trust or distrust. 
Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) assess that experience-based trust relationships 
develop over a long period of time through personal interaction. In their early research on trust 
they describe three factors that influence the development of trust as competence, benevolence, 
and integrity. They also discuss the significance of the mental motivation behind the desires to 
establish a relationship and found it was strongly correlated to the factors that influence trust. 
Their work confirms a theme identified in our early interviews with users of technology in risk-
application that emphasized the importance of personal investment. It also leads to our second 
hypothesis relating motivation to technology acceptance. 
H2: Increased personal motivation will increase technology acceptance. 
There appears general agreement in the literature reviewed that interpersonal trust 
consists of two categories: first, that trust is both reason-based and experience-based and, 
second, the strength of the trust bonds may differ. The concept of initial trust involves the 
development of a relationship based purely on reason and represents a weaker connection that 
can be explained by first impressions. The second category of experience-based trust involves 
direct knowledge and regular interaction. This type of trust represents a stronger connection and 
is explained by relationships that develop over a longer period of time through an experience-
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Figure 2-3. Interpersonal Trust Life Cycle 
Technology 
The past research on interpersonal trust applies in many ways to trust in technology. This 
study sought out literature that contributes to the development of a methodology of technology 
discovery leading to person-technology trust. The potential for integrating interpersonal trust 
research into technology trust was discussed by McKnight (et al., 2011). This research found that 
interpersonal trust is based on a trustee’s expectations and reliance on a trustor to perform as 
expected through benevolence, even though the trustor possesses the volition to choose to do 
what is right or what is wrong. Since technology does not possess volition (ability to choose), 
some researchers went as far as to dismiss the idea of trust in technology as irrelevant. However, 
recent advances in artificial intelligence refute the claims that technology lacks volition. This is 
confirmed in the vast amount of current research into how autonomous systems make decisions 
that can either harm or protect human life.  
Technology trust research is further represented in multiple disciplines of engineering and 
science. The major fields of technology trust research include, but are not limited to, artificial 
intelligence, command and control, human-computer interaction (HCI), data fusion, human-
machine fusion, cyber security, and automation. Multiple models for researching trust are 
presented in the literature that combine both humanlike and systemlike terminology. Technology 
trust is a multifaceted area of research that integrates both humanlike measures and systemlike 
measures. Three of the most frequently used humanlike terms used to model technology are 
competence, benevolence, and integrity. The work by McKnight et al. (2011) and Lankton et al. 
(2015) consider the systemlike alternate terms for technology trust as reliability, functionality, and 
helpfulness. A number of systemlike measures of technology trust were identified that are outside 
the scope of this work but still important to ongoing trust research. These potential systemlike 
measures include supply chain management, past vendor performance, hardware/software-
oriented security, and network security. 
The majority of the language used to describe interpersonal trust can apply to technology 
trust. For example, the word benevolence is a very humanlike attribute that is likely to appear in 
future literature on the decision-making capabilities of self-driving cars. A total of 86 factors and 
attributes related to interpersonal and technology trust were collected from the literature to form 
a random nomological network of trust terms. A factor is described as situational consideration of 
technology use that has the potential to influence trust, such as risk and time to operate. An 
attribute is a characteristic inherent to the technology such as its speed, power, and processing 
capability. The combined and unsorted list is presented in Table 2-1. Future experimentation 
involves understanding the influence of these terms in the following areas: 
1. Factors that measure reason-based and experience-based technology trust 
2. Attributes that characterize technology trust as a proxy for experience  
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Table 2-1. Nomological Network of Trust Factors and Attributes (Sources: Cho et al., 2015; DeVitt, 2018; 
Hoff and Bashir, 2015; McKnight et al., 2011; Schaefer, 2016) 
Ability Character Disappointment Importance Process Skills 
Adaptive Communication Disposition Incompetent Protect Stability 
Adoption Competence Dynamic Integrity Purpose Supportive 
Adversarial Completeness Easy Intelligibility Rationality Teammate 
Altruism Confidence Expectation Intent Recency Trainable 
Attractive Contract Experience Knowledge Reciprocation Transparency 
Autonomous Control Faith Learning Regret Uncertain 
Availability Cooperation Faults Likeable Relational Understandability 
Awareness Credibility Fear Monitored Relevance Unstructured 
Belief Credit Feeling Motives Reliability Utility 
Benevolence Decisive Frequency Perception Relief Validity 
Capability Delegation Frustration Performance Responsive  
Capital Dependability Helpfulness Popular Risk  
Centrality Difficult Honesty Power Robust  
Certainty Directability Hope Predictability Similarity  
Figure 2-4 represents the integration of technology trust with the interpersonal trust factors and 
attributes included in our nomological network of terms. 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Technology Trust Life Cycle 
A theory relevant to measuring and characterizing trust is found in the technology 
acceptance model (TAM) developed by Fred Davis nearly 30 years ago. This model plays a 
significant role in the majority of research investigating the factors and attributes that influence 
the acceptance of a technology. In the work by Venkatesh and Bala (2008), they present the 
TAM’s ability to predict individual adoption and use of technology. The TAM assesses the 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 254 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
behavioral intention to use a technology through two constructs: perceived usefulness (PU), which 
is defined as the extent to which a person believes that using a technology will enhance his or her 
job performance, and perceived ease of use (PEOU), which is defined as the degree to which a 
person believes that using a technology will be free of effort. These two variables are used to 
establish a relationship between external influences and potential system usage (Gefen et al., 
2003). In the work by McKnight et al. (2002), it was experimentally determined that the TAM 
variables do not predict continued use of a technology outside of initial acceptance, and that trust 
in a vendor’s past technology does not translate to acceptance of subsequent technologies.  
Tétard and Collan (2009) address the challenges of adopting new technology in their work 
on the lazy-user theory. This theory states that a user will select the technology that demands the 
least amount of effort to do the job. This theory also addresses one of the themes identified in our 
early grounded theory study interviewing operators of technology in high-risk scenarios. The 
application of this theory places technology users at a disadvantage, particularly in high-risk 
military applications where trustors are known to avoid more capable technology for systems that 
are easier to understand. If an experience-based proxy can improve the accuracy of developing 
trust through increased technology literacy, it may lead to increased acceptance of more complex 
and capable technologies thereby reducing the influence of the lazy-user theory. This leads to our 
third research hypothesis. 
H3: An experience-based proxy will decrease the influence of the lazy-user theory on technology 
acceptance. 
Conclusions 
One intent of this section is to identify gaps in research on trust in autonomous systems. 
It appears that a methodology of technology discovery that leads to trust is not available. This 
review reveals a clear distinction between reason-based trust and experience-based trust. It also 
suggests that users are willing to trust technology in high-risk environments, and that an 
experience-based proxy may increase the quality of such a relationship and the pace at which it 
is established. Based on the finding in literature, Figure 2-5 illustrates a conceptual framework for 
a causal methodology of technology adoption by introducing an experience-based proxy that is 
hypothesized to improve technology adoption. The impact of a proxy introducing inaccurate 
information is noted as significant but is outside the scope of this work. 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Conceptual Framework for Methodology Leading to Technology Trust 
 
Experiment Methodology 
This experiment investigates the formation of trust in technology and how it influences the 
adoption of autonomous systems for use in high-risk military applications. The formation of trust 
in technology is governed by two constructs: reason-based trust and experience-based trust. 
Existing literature presents the case for increased accuracy in technology selection through the 
development of experience-based trust. However, the development of experience-based trust is 
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financially burdensome and takes much longer to form. In most military scenarios, developing 
experience-based trust presents high levels of risk for physical injury and harm. 
Introduction 
This experiment is designed to identify trust metrics and how they influence the formation 
of reason-based trust in autonomous systems used in high-risk military applications. The desired 
outcome of this work is the identification of attributes that can replace some of the burden required 
to develop experience-based trust. This research does not intend to demonstrate the validity of 
the theories behind technology acceptance. Rather, this work investigates potential causal 
relationships between the manipulation of information and its effect on trust in technologies. 
The experiment is conducted in two-phases. Phase one is a group-administered 
experimental survey that employs manipulations of multiple theories of technology acceptance in 
order to collect data on reason-based trust in autonomous systems. Phase Two consists of 
administering the same survey following extensive field testing and experimentation of the phase 
one systems to provide external validity.  
Metrics 
The goal of this work is to study the influence of trust metrics on the acceptance of 
autonomous systems in high-risk applications. However, the complexity of modern technology 
makes it difficult to establish generalizable metrics that can function as a proxy for experience-
based trust. One area of research relevant to establishing such metrics involves the use of 
anthropomorphism, the attribution of human traits to nonhuman entities, to increase a trustor’s 
ability to accept and utilize technology. Waytz et al. (2014) discuss the need for humanlike mental 
models to consider technology as a trustworthy teammate. There are reported cases (Pak et al., 
2012) where the tendency to anthropomorphize technology leads to situations in which humans 
give a higher degree of trust to a technology than is warranted. The inverse of this situation also 
exists in the development of a lack of trust in a human teammate caused by the introduction of 
technology with more capability and reliability. The work conducted by Waytz et al. (2014) 
includes a study that found test subjects were quicker to forgive a trustee’s mistakes and stay 
calm in high-stress situations when the trustee was a technology with humanlike attributes. This 
work provides a foundation for the establishment of our technology trust metrics. 
HAL Score 
In this work we hypothesize that statistically significant differences will result in technology 
trust by anthropomorphizing an experience-based proxy. This hypothesis is based on leading 
theory used to increase cognition in students enrolled in a college-level computer architecture 
course. Over a period of ten years, the author of this paper provided instruction to university year-
three engineering students on the topics of digital design and computer architecture. The 
predominant challenge reported by students in end-of-year course evaluations was difficulty 
synthesizing the highly complex components of a computer into a usable system. Based on 
student feedback, a method for reducing complexity was developed by anthropomorphizing the 
components of a computer. This theory provided students with the context needed to understand 
how the pieces of a computer function together to create a whole system. The work resulted in 
increased student comprehension and an ability to describe a computer from the elemental 
circuits up to the most advanced concepts of computer engineering such as compilers and 
operating systems. 
To develop the measurement system needed for an experience-based technology trust 
proxy, we introduce the anthropomorphic technology categories of hardware, algorithms, and 
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Figure 3-1. Anthropomorphic Technology Trust Metrics 
 
In order to increase the familiarity for military end-users, the metrics are established 
through the HAL scoring system. The values of each HAL subsystem initially range from 0 to 100 
and lead to an equally weighted maximum score of 300. This scoring system is identical to the 
Physical Fitness Test (PFT) employed by the United States Marine Corps. The PFT scores three 
physical fitness tests each scored from 0 to 100. The individual tests are pull-ups, crunches, and 
a 3-mile run that result in a maximum combined score of 300. Future research intends to identify 
weights for the HAL score that accurately reflect the overall impact on trust. For the purposes of 




Figure 3-1. HAL Score Experimental Model 
Data Analysis Plan 
This study will employ Repeated Measures ANOVA. The variables in this study create a 
mixed design scenario. The first manipulated variable, metric, is a between-subjects factor and 
applies a treatment between two groups. The second manipulated variable, System Control, is a 
within-subjects factor, and each subject receives all three treatments of low (autonomous), 
medium (remote-control), and high (tethered control). 
There are validity concerns due to fixed-effects seen in a repeated measure study. The 
participants may weight the system control variable based solely on whether or not they like the 
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accompanying technology. To correct for such effects, techniques such as multilevel modelling 
may be employed in place of repeated measures analysis. 
Success in this research is realized through statistically significant results leading to a new 




Mar–April 2019 Data Collection 
April–May 2019 Data Analysis 
May 2019 Initial Findings 
July–Aug 2019 Field Testing 
Sep 2019 External Validity Data Analysis 
October 2019 Final Report 
Conclusion 
The topic of trust in technology is increasingly important to the DoD as outlined in the 
Defense Science Board Study on Autonomy (David &Nielsen, 2016) that states, “There is a need 
to build trust in autonomous systems while also improving the trustworthiness of autonomous 
capabilities. These are enablers that align RDT&E processes to more rapidly deliver autonomous 
capabilities to DoD missions.” 
This work involves the introduction of novel ideas to existing theories that relate to the 
formation of trust. This research focuses on the impact of trust toward the adoption of autonomous 
systems. We have established that trust involves a user assuming some level of risk. The only 
literature available on technology trust involves situations that expose users to insignificant levels 
of risk. We posit that our research conducted on technology used in high-risk military application 
will reveal causality not identified in previous trust research. 
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Abstract 
This research explores where Agile practices used for software development within the 
information technology domain, can be successfully applied in other domains. Private industry is 
already applying Agile principles in manufacturing, construction, health, research and 
development, and finance. These approaches are captured in this research in terms of best 
practices and lessons learned. This research explores where accepted Agile principles and 
practices can accommodate organizational agility and program management environments.  
This research identifies suggested guidance where Agile can be applied more broadly, especially 
when adopting the four Agile values. 
1. Determine if Agile is a good fit. 
2. Determine the scope of the Agile effort. 
3. Consult with experts. 
4. Tailor Agile values and principles to the situation. 
5. Develop an approach. 
6. Leverage lessons learned. 
Introduction 
This paper presents research on whether Agile development can be successfully applied 
to domains beyond information technology (IT) and software. This research will explore where 
accepted Agile values, principles, and practices have been applied in other technical domains 
and offers guidance for organizations to adopt Agile within their organization.  
Background 
Agile software development is an overarching term that encompasses numerous modern 
methods for software development that adhere to a common set of values and principles. When 
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those values and principles are applied, Agile projects, programs, or organizations display 
shared characteristics such as collaboration; small, self-organizing, and cross-functional teams 
that include customers and users; adaptive planning; early and continuous delivery; and rapid 
and flexible response to change.  
Agile Values and Principles 
When discussing the history of Agile, everyone acknowledges the significance of the 
2001 meeting of 17 software developers in Snowbird, UT, that led to publishing the Manifesto 
for Agile Software Development that specified four values, and the Principles Behind the Agile 
Manifesto that defined 12 principles, which are cornerstones for all Agile methods.  
Agile Values (Beck et al., 2001a) 
1. Individuals and interactions over processes and tools  
2. Working software over comprehensive documentation  
3. Customer collaboration over contract negotiation  
4. Responding to change over following a plan.  
Agile Principles (Beck et al., 2001b) 
1. Customer satisfaction by early and continuous delivery of valuable software. 
2. Welcome changing requirements, even in late development. 
3. Deliver working software frequently (weeks rather than months). 
4. Close, daily cooperation between businesspeople and developers. 
5. Projects are built around motivated individuals, who should be trusted. 
6. Face-to-face conversation is the best form of communication (co-location). 
7. Working software is the primary measure of progress. 
8. Sustainable development, able to maintain a constant pace. 
9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design. 
10. Simplicity—the art of maximizing the amount of work not done—is essential. 
11. Best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self-organizing teams. 
12. Regularly, the team reflects on how to become more effective, and adjusts accordingly. 
Software development methods that are now part of the Agile umbrella pre-date the 
2001 publications. Some of these methods include: Rapid Application Development (RAD) from 
1991, Unified Process (UP) from 1994, Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) from 
1994, Scrum from 1995, Extreme Programming (XP) from 1996, and Feature Driven 
Development (FDD) from 1997. Today there are many methods of software development that 
are considered Agile. Some of the most popular methods include adaptive software 
development, Agile modeling, UP, disciplined agile delivery, DSDM, XP, FDD, Lean software 
development, Lean startup, Kanban, RAD, Scrum, Scrumban, and Scaled Agile Framework 
(SAFe; “Agile Software Development,” 2019). 
Agile methodologies did not derive from software development or IT in the first place. 
Many trace agile concepts back to 1930s when Walter Shewhart of Bell Labs began applying 
the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle for product and process improvement. He taught PDSA to 
his mentee, Edwards Deming, who later applied it extensively in post-WWII (1950s) Japan to 
develop the famous Toyota Production System, which became the primary source for today’s 
“lean” thinking. In an ironic twist, after Agile was defined, some purists refused to recognize 
software development based on lean as Agile until they improved their focus on customer 
collaboration. Ultimately, Agile methods based on lean such as Lean software development, 
Kanban, and their hybrids (Scrumban and Lean scrum) gained acceptance (Rigby et al., 2016).  
Understanding the scrum process and terminology will be particularly useful, as it is the 
most widely implemented Agile framework and our research found that it served as the starting 
point for adaptation in most domains beyond IT and software. 
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Given the history that Agile does not originate from software and that it produced a wide 
variety of methodologies in practice today, it naturally leads to the research question—can Agile 
be, or has it been, adopted to acquisition domains beyond IT to improve speed of delivery and 
increase user satisfaction just as it has done for software? 
Agile Environments 
Numerous references discuss the modern business atmosphere that has evolved over 
the past several decades and led to conditions where Agile is optimized to excel. The 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) describes an Uncertain, Unpredictable, 
Risky, Variable, Evolutionary (UURVE) environment that drives the need for an Agile approach 
(Dove & Schindel, 2016). This is nearly identical to the concept of a Volatile, Uncertain, 
Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) environment, a term popularized by the U.S. Army in the 
1990s that also supports the need for Agile (Kirkpatrick et al., 2019). The Scrum Fieldbook 
makes the case that things change so rapidly, the old ways of working are breaking down and 
that complexity is not the exception but has become the norm (Sutherland, 2019). Henrik 
Kniberg, in “Agile Everywhere!” his keynote to Agile Tour Montreal, provides a simple graphic on 
when Agile is most needed that summarizes these concepts by comparing the spectrums of 
understanding on what to deliver and how to deliver it (Kniberg, 2016). There is a great deal 
information about when and where Agile is applicable—as in a “good fit.”   
The Harvard Business Review article “Embracing Agile” (Rigby et al., 2016) provides a thorough 
summary of the right conditions for Agile, outlining favorable and unfavorable conditions, as 
shown below. 
Table 1. When Is Agile Right? 
Conditions Favorable Unfavorable 
Market 
Environment 
Customer preferences and solution options 
change frequently. Market conditions are stable and predictable. 
Customer 
Involvement 
Close collaboration and rapid feedback are 
feasible. Customers know better what they 
want as the process progresses.  
Requirements are clear at the outset and will 
remain stable. Customers are unavailable for 
constant collaboration.  
Innovation 
Type 
Problems are complex, solutions are 
unknown, scope is not clearly defined. 
Product specifications may change. Creative 
breakthroughs, time to market is important. 
Cross-functional collaboration is vital.  
Similar work has been done before, and innovators 
believe the solutions are clear. Detailed 
specifications and work plans can be forecast with 
confidence and should be adhered to. Problems can 
be solved sequentially in functional silos. 
Modularity of 
Work 
Incremental developments have value, and 
customers can use them. Work can be broken 
into parts and conducted in rapid, iterative 
cycles. Late changes are manageable.  
Customers cannot start testing parts of the product 
until everything is complete. Late changes are 
expensive or impossible.  
Interim 
Mistakes Interim mistakes provide valuable learning. Interim mistakes may be catastrophic. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 12-681, Software Development: 
Effective Practices and Federal Challenges in Applying Agile Methods (GAO, 2012) identified 32 
practices and approaches as effective for applying Agile software development methods to IT 
projects. Ten of the practices were found to be common across all five agencies reviewed: 
• Start with Agile guidance and an Agile adoption strategy. 
• Enhance migration to Agile concepts using Agile terms, such as user stories (used to 
convey requirements), and Agile examples, demonstrating how to write a user story. 
• Continuously improve Agile adoption at both the project level and the organization level. 
• Seek to identify and address impediments at the organization and project levels. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 262 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
• Obtain stakeholder/customer feedback frequently. 
• Empower small, cross-functional teams. 
• Include requirements related to security and progress monitoring in your queue of 
unfinished work (the backlog). 
• Gain trust by demonstrating value at the end of each iteration. 
• Track progress using tools and metrics. 
• Track progress daily and visibly.  
These two references from HBR and GAO point to the need for conditions to be right for Agile 
principles to be adopted and integrated into the business atmosphere to be successful.  
Agile Applied to Management and Organizations  
Agile Management 
The report “Unleashing the Power of Small, Independent Teams” from the McKinsey 
Quarterly, July 2018, proposes that the key to Agile management is found in the enactment of 
small independent multi-functional teams that are given a specific task/goal/product that matters 
greatly to the customer, empowered to self-organize and make decisions, and provided with the 
tools to move fast. Further, the teams must be supported by organizational management that 
takes on roles and responsibilities quite different from the traditional model. Management must 
learn to direct teams to the best opportunities, define outcomes and let teams chart their own 
course, staff teams with the best personnel, oversee with a light touch, focus on removing 
roadblocks and providing support, ensure proper governance, provide teams a clear view of the 
customer, allocate resources up front and hold teams accountable, and commit to 
retraining/coaching managers for their redefined roles (Bossert et al., 2018). 
Organizational Agility 
Organizational Agility is a term used to refer to the idea of Agile management. The 
MITRE Corporation, Enterprise Strategy and Transformation Technical Center, developed a 
model for Organizational Agility (Kirkpatrick et al., 2019a). The model defines Organizational 
Agility as, “the capacity to adapt quickly and effectively in response to or in expectation of 
changes in the organization’s environment” (Kirkpatrick et al, 2019a, p. 4). This work found that 
attributes of traditional organizations include: a hierarchical structure, leaders that sense/scan 
the environment every 2 or 3 years, decisions are made by those at the top, a less educated 
workforce is required, less customer input, and strategy is set at the top while power trickles 
down. These traditional characteristics no longer work well in the VUCA environment most 
businesses faced in the late 20th century. The Organizational Agility model found that three 
routines best characterize Agile organizations in the VUCA environment: sensing, interpreting, 
and responding. The Organizational Agility Model applies the sensing, interpreting, and 
responding routines across seven organizational dimensions, and compares the varying 
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based on function 
Flat organizational structure with 
permanent teams 
Temporary teams form, re-form, 




The environment is 
scanned annually by 
leaders 
Routine processes are in place to 
scan the environment, widely 
share and store information 
Employees reflect on information 
to make sense of it and determine 
the impact to the mission 
Decision making 
Leaders make 
decisions and solve 
problems 
Decisions are communicated 
upward to leaders, who provide 
resources and oversight 
Decisions are made at the lowest 





and inhibit learning 
Leaders are informed about 
decisions made at lower levels 
Leaders encourage employees to 
share what they learn 
Process 
management 
Processes are either 
overly rigid or ill-
defined 
Some processes are well-defined 
and continually improved 
Some processes are flexible; 
experiments are conducted to 
facilitate learning and innovation 
Roles Roles are ill-defined or not flexible 
Some roles are stable and clearly 
defined 
Some roles are intentionally 
flexible to quickly meet changing 
conditions and customer needs 
Norms and 
expectations 
Norms are to retain 
information, not 
collaborate, and view 
learning as a cost 
Leaders create climate of psychological safety. Employees are 
expected to view “mistakes” as learning, share information, and 
collaborate. Learning and training are viewed as an investment; 
employees are trained proactively in anticipation of future skill needs. 
Overall Respond to change slowly, ineffectively 
Anticipate as well as respond to changing environmental conditions to 
carry out their missions quickly and effectively 
There are two important strengths in this model. First, it acknowledges that some 
aspects of most organizations are best suited for a stable approach that is closer to traditional 
than Agile. The model allows for those areas to be tailored for each organization on a case-by-
case basis. By not requiring an “all or nothing” commitment to Agile, the framework mitigates 
some of the key barriers for those contemplating the use of Agile (e.g., inertia, risk of breaking 
already efficient processes, and time to train and develop necessary skills). Secondly, in an 
Agile organization, personnel in authority support these routines by providing access to 
resources and by removing obstacles, but most important, leaders at all levels must provide 
psychological safety.  
Psychological safety is like trust, and both terms are used in describing attributes of 
Agile. When psychological safety is not present, team members are more reluctant to take risks, 
ask questions, or offer new ideas for fear of embarrassment or reprisals (Kirkpatrick et al., 
2019b). The concept of psychological safety leading to the absence of fear is further supported 
and elaborated on in The Scrum Fieldbook. Sutherland feels so strongly about the need for 
psychological safety (and trust) that he addresses the importance in three of his five scrum 
values: openness, respect, and courage. He also emphasizes its importance in empowering 
personnel to highlight problems. Sutherland supports a principle of the Toyota Production 
System that not having any problems is the worst problem because they always exist and not 
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knowing what they are makes it impossible to fix them (Sutherland, 2019, pp. 110–112 and 
131–136). 
Agile Applied to Other Domains 
Manufacturing 
Aircraft—Saab Fighter Jets 
Saab made the commitment to build the Gripen E fighter jet using Agile practices that 
are “implemented at every level and in every discipline: software, hardware and fuselage 
design. The Saab Agile framework contains practices from Lean, Scrum, Kanban, XP and 
others” (Furuhjelm et al., 2015). This is one of few examples of applying Agile to the design and 
manufacturing domain writ large and not just in the software development component of a 
production item. The following describes a summary of the characteristics of the Saab Agile 
framework as derived from two sources: Team Autonomy, Common Iterative Project Master 
Plan, Continuous Improvement, Clarity, Commitment, Transparency, Continuous Delivery, 
Prioritization, Living Strategic Plan (Furuhjelm et al., 2016; Sutherland & Justice, 2020). 
Saab’s Agile framework includes several catalysts (additional characteristics) atypical to 
scrum but critical toward implementing Agile in the aircraft manufacturing domain: Modular 
Architecture, Modeling and Simulation, and Co-located Pilots. 
Result: The use of Agile on all aspects of the Gripen E program resulted in a fighter jet 
with 50 times lower development costs compared with the F-35, 10 times lower unit costs 
compared with the F-35, and the lowest cost per flight hour of any modern fighter jet (Kniberg, 
2016). 
Motor Vehicles—WIKISPEED and Tesla 
The WIKISPEED SGT01 car was an entrant in the Progressive Insurance Automotive X 
Prize contest. The contest goal was to produce a full-sized, road-legal car, getting 100+ mi/gal 
(2.25L/100 km). WIKISPEED used an Agile design approach that demanded that modules were 
loosely coupled and could be tested apart from the whole. The WIKISPEED car developed 
major sub-assemblies, such as suspension, motor, and body, that can be replaced in the time it 
takes to change a flat tire. The modularity supported many of the design and process principles. 
It allowed for rapid iterations and experimentations during development and testing. The loosely 
coupled components, with simple and well-defined interfaces, minimized system 
interdependencies that enabled more rapid and reliable software and hardware development. 
While most of WIKISPEED’s Agile implementation adapted standard principles, one atypical 
aspect is that WIKISPEED was able to complete the work using a distributed team (Socha et al., 
2020). 
WIKISPEED Result: WIKISPEED successfully built one prototype to prove concepts 
using Agile principles. The Agile methods resulted in a product cycle times measured in weeks, 
not years (as compared to traditional motor vehicles). The company is working on other 
prototypes for a mail delivery vehicle, next generation taxicab, ultra-light racing vehicle, and five-
seat sedan for ARPA-E’s (Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy) LiteCar Challenge.  
Tesla’s Agile approach is disrupting the automobile industry by shifting the core of its 
products from mechanics to software, and the company is using that advantage to skip beta 
testing on its latest vehicle, Model 3, and going straight into production. Antonio Patti, a digital 
strategist at the Transport Company of Milan, wrote in a 2017 blog post: 
“Skipping the beta testing for a traditional car-maker is a sort of suicide, but if you 
are Tesla it is the first application of its agile car development framework approach. 
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Tesla’s cars are different from the other cars. Its engines, chassis, interiors and all 
the other components are way simpler [than] other cars so, once tested and 
standardized, they don’t need to be tested again for all the models.” (Patti, 2017) 
The data collected from the same hardware used previously on the Model S and Model 
X is sufficient to justify going directly to production and skip beta testing.  
Tesla no longer views the Model 3 as a new concept car that requires beta testing but 
instead as the next company model, an iteration of the product where the important hardware 
parts have already been tested and the easily replaceable components and less critical 
functions are still in development (Patti, 2017). 
Tesla Result: Tesla shifted its products from mechanics to software to skip beta testing 
and go straight into production. This approach allows enacting product updates and mechanical 
improvements through updated software directly to the customer, avoiding extensive recalls and 
utilizing large amounts of data drawn from customers to continually improve products. 
Automotive Parts, Power Tools, and Agriculture Sensors—Bosch 
The example of Bosch’s transition to an Agile company is included in this research not 
because it contains any unique methods but due to the sheer size and diversity of the company. 
Bosch is an enormous company with 390,000 employees located across 60 countries that has 
been in existence since 1886 and is well known as an innovator. In May 2017, when 
commenting on why Bosch was turning to Agile across all parts of its business, CEO Volkmar 
Denner said, “For Bosch [A]gility is crucial, it allows us to adjust to the increasing speed of 
change around us. Agility allows us to remain in a position as an innovation leader” (Howard, 
2017). Denner realized that the world environment had radically changed and his company 
needed to react faster, provide more customized solutions, and be more connected (everything 
is part of the Internet of Things). He is clearly underscoring the UURVE and VUCA 
environments introduced earlier as driving factors for why every program/project or organization 
should be considering Agile. Bosch homed in on the approach of implementing Agile as a 
leadership-driven transformation.  
Result: Bosch cut its automotive parts development time in half; for home and garden 
power tools their innovation increased and employee engagement improved; and for agricultural 
sensors, 10 new innovations were developed in 1 month when it traditionally took 6 to 8 months 
for each innovation (Howard, 2017). Perhaps, more important, Bosch provided some valuable 
lessons learned through its two false starts and demonstrated that with persistence and 
commitment, Agile could be applied even in the largest, most widely dispersed companies. 
Shipbuilding and Submarines—GDEB and HII/NNS 
General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News 
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) both have achieved success in manufacturing surface ships and 
submarines by applying Agile principles. A Naval Engineers Journal article and several GAO 
reports provide excellent detail on recent efforts to adapt Agile principles into shipbuilding and 
submarine manufacturing processes. For completeness, the following list of comprehensive 
reports providing extensive industry reviews is provided:  
• “Benefits and Challenges of Implementing Agile Development in Modular Shipbuilding,” 
Naval Engineers Journal, June 2019 (Castell et al., 2019)  
• “Research on Systematization and Advancement of Shipbuilding Production 
Management for Flexible and Agile Response for High Value Offshore Platform,” Journal 
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• “Can a Shipyard Work Towards Lean Shipbuilding or Agile Manufacturing?” Sustainable 
Maritime Transportation and Exploitation of Sea Resources (Alves de Moura & Botter, 
2012) 
Result: Numerous reports cite excellent details on recent efforts in shipbuilding and 
submarine manufacturing to adapt Agile principles in their processes. 
Construction  
Uranium Enrichment Plant—Centrus Energy Corp 
Construction projects are generally considered poor candidates for Agile because they 
are thought to require sequential phases (i.e., initiation/planning, design, construction, testing, 
turnover, and closeout) and any changes in the plan get progressively more expensive later in 
the life cycle. Centrus Energy Corp. elected to apply Agile concepts to a construction project to 
build the next generation U.S. uranium enrichment technology. The project required building, 
installing, operating, and testing a large cascade of machines and centrifuges. Centrus chose to 
use Agile because there was a mandated aggressive schedule and funding was being provided 
in tranches, both of which rendered the traditional construction approach unworkable. To 
implement Agile, Centrus effected numerous changes not part of conventional construction.  
Result: Centrus met an aggressive schedule, was under budget, had no safety issues or 
deficiencies from any oversight and regulatory agencies, and had a significantly higher than 
average productivity for a nuclear project or even for a less complex construction project 
(Straçusser, 2015). 
Prefabrication—PCL Constructor 
PCL Constructor, Canada’s largest general contractor company, in 2012, formed PCL 
Agile to implement Agile principles including prefabrication as a form of incremental 
development. PCL Agile now regularly provides offsite modular construction in large 
warehouses to assemble smaller components and larger built-up assemblies, to overcome site 
logistical challenges where lay-down (working real estate) areas are scarce (Caulfield, 2018). 
Many vertical construction projects are located within dense downtown areas that lack ample 
space necessary for construction staging and equipment maneuvering. More architects are 
using prefabricated solutions to ensure projects are completed on time while mitigating 
unforeseen change conditions. For PCL Agile, this approach led to better site access in the 
field, improved quality control within a climate-controlled environment, reduced congestion and 
trade stacking at the site, increased worker safety, decreased waste due to reusable parts, and 
reduced transportation costs, which strengthened contractor and customer relationships. 
Result: PCL Agile now regularly provides offsite modular construction in large 
warehouses to assemble smaller components and larger built-up assemblies, to overcome site 
logistical challenges where lay-down (working real estate) areas are scarce. 
Construction Project Management—Construction Blog 
In a NTaskmanager.com blog post, Fred Wilson notes that despite not seeming to be a good fit 
for construction, Agile is proving its effectiveness and efficiency in this industry. Wilson sees 
Agile principles already being incorporated and feels the existing roles in construction can easily 
map to Agile roles—for example, the superintendent acting as a scrum master coordinating 
work and ensuring task completion, the project manager acting as the product owner prioritizing 
tasks and interfacing with the customer, and workers completing the physical tasks acting as the 
development team. Project management software is now commonly used in construction, 
allowing real-time collaboration (between architects, engineers, subcontractors, owners/clients), 
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Rachel Burger observed that Agile construction is best suited for the pre-design and 
design phases where customer involvement can be increased and the complex project can be 
broken into easier-to-manage subprojects, enables collaboration, sharing of information, re-
prioritization of tasks due to unforeseen circumstances, coordination for major installs between 
all trades affected, and feedback for continuous improvement on productivity and profitability 
(Burger, 2019). 
Result: Agile construction also applies to project management where the roles and 
responsibilities must be redefined. It has already made its way into project management 
software tools, allowing for real-time collaboration, and affords the potential to improve speed, 
reduce costs, and increase customer satisfaction. 
Health 
Big Data—3M HIS 
Daniel Keys Moran is a computer scientist, novelist, and big data expert who popularized 
the saying, “You can have data without information, but you can’t have information without data” 
(Sutherland, 2019). 3M Health Information System (HIS) is a research and development (R&D) 
program that is trying to address the big data problem of how to turn huge amounts of data into 
actionable information for hospitals, insurance companies, and health plans. 3M HIS integrates 
inputs such as doctors’ notes, lab reports, and demographic data to support proactive versus 
reactive actions. In May 2015, 3M was faced with the daunting task of updating its system from 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems Version 9 (ICD-
9) with ~14,000 codes to ICD-10 with ~141,000 codes within 6 months (by October 2015) and 
the efforts were not going well. 3M HIS had ~5,000 customers that used its system daily to 
determine the correct codes and properly reimburse hospitals and clinics from insurance 
companies, so the program decided to adopt Agile and hire Scrum Inc. to consult. 3M met the 
deadline and continued to improve its adoption of Agile over the years.  
Result: 3M recognized that it needed to change to meet an aggressive schedule and 
that it did not possess the necessary expertise to make the needed change. 3M used an expert 
consultant to help prioritized the work, instituted stabilized teams, worked off the backlog, 
reduced interruptions, and changed the scrum process to improve velocity, and successfully 
meeting deadlines. 
Mental Health—Monash Health 
Monash Health is the largest public health service provider in Melbourne Australia. Dr. 
Melissa Casey, Director of Psychology at Monash Health, led the change to Agile after realizing 
their system was broken from observing her teams struggle to meet key performance indicators 
for emergency care and measuring a significant increase in patients presenting in crisis to 
emergency rooms. In 2013, after several weeks of design, clinician workshops, and 
collaborating with Agile consultants the first prototype Agile Psychological Medicine Clinic 
(APMC) opened. The methods APMC found most useful were adopting an Agile ethos, using 
Agile consultants, developing flexible treatment programs, and instituting rapid delivery of care 
(Faucher, 2019). 
Result: APMC was so successful that Dr. Casey and her team won a State-level award 
for delivering innovative mental health care the first year after opening. In addition, four more 
clinics modeled on the prototype opened near other hospitals. Over a 12-month period patient 
data showed a 23%–46% improvement on several standardized measures following treatment, 
a significant decrease in the number of clinicians and case managers involved in each case 
(handoffs), and an increase in clinician job satisfaction.  
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Research and Development 
Laboratories/Academic Research—Broad Institute of MIT/Harvard  
The Broad Institute of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard is one 
of the world’s leading genomic research centers, with over 1,300 employees across 30 
academic laboratories, each with a different research focus but all working to enhance health 
and human medicine. Within each laboratory are numerous teams that share a common 
research theme but conduct individualized experiments. At Broad, Kendra West co-founded 
AgileAcademia a group of more than 80 members across 22 teams that look to improve team 
function through Agile practices.  
West and her AgileAcademia group identified several methods that helped their teams 
embrace Agile. The methods they highlighted were introducing Agile in a comprehensible 
manner because academics have a hard time getting started and try to understand the whole 
process and avoiding using intimidating Agile terminology (e.g., project reflecting instead of 
retrospective and check-in vs standup). With some effort, the same intentions behind Agile were 
applied for great success in the R&D environment (West, 2018). 
Result: Broad Institute identified typical challenges R&D laboratories adopting Agile 
would face. They found methods to address roadblocks and successfully incorporated Agile 
values.  
Innovation—3M HIS 
Another R&D example echoes many of the same tips recommended by the Broad 
Institute. This example comes from the 3M HIS work previously described under the health 
domain. 3M HIS is made up of dozens of Agile teams and some of those teams also work in the 
R&D environment where they must design, create, prototype, and refine new and innovative 
approaches. These teams are faced with the dilemma of how to best adapt Agile to research 
projects. They discovered implementation was not insurmountable, given that the research 
process is already naturally iterative with many false starts and incomplete finishes.  
The 3M HIS R&D teams decided to customize the SCrum fOr REsearch (SCORE) 
method proposed by Hicks and Foster (2010). The techniques that worked for them included 
reducing the daily scrum to two meetings per week and eventually to one per week and making 
all other meetings “on demand” between team members and scrum master to troubleshoot or 
review results (Butterfield & LaBrec, 2019; LaBrec & Butterfield, 2016).  
Result: The 3M HIS R&D teams adopted a more efficient use of time for faculty, 
improved both morale and productivity for student researchers due to the transparency and 
accountability, and generated a group identity for a research community for shared knowledge 
to the benefit of all. 
Product Research—HPE  
Ruly Weisbach was the R&D director at Hewlett-Packard Enterprises (HPE) in 2015 and 
led six R&D groups through the transition to Agile. His experience in the R&D environment was 
that early on the teams used the terminology, held the meetings, and followed processes but 
were still not Agile. In the R&D domain, his teams tended to start on too many features at once, 
so the work in progress (WIP) was always overloaded, making it impossible for a product owner 
to get feedback and react to it, and the list of features would take years to deliver.  
For HPE R&D, Weisbach tackled this by (a) reviewing the backlog with the team and 
ruthlessly removing items that didn’t fit the definition for a minimum viable product (MVP), which 
they defined as the top 5 themes and 50 features; (b) structuring the organization by features 
not domains (functional expertise); (c) tracking features in addition to user stories so that teams 
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were consistently delivering new functionality to the customer; and (d) planning short term for 
MVP, not long term on features that were not the priority, which kept the backlog manageable 
and prevented feature creep (Weisbach, n.d.). 
Result: The HPE solution for Agile R&D was to force all teams to focus on prioritizing 
the backlog and delivering the most important feature first, which is identical to the swarm 
attribute discussed in The Scrum Fieldbook about the 3M HIS work.  
Finance—ING  
ING started a pilot Agile transformation in 2010 that was limited to three IT teams. Those 
teams showed enough success to convince the company to adopt it across the entire software 
development department in 2011. By 2014, executives recognized the success in software and 
IT but noted it had not translated to business gains (Siroky, 2020). That realization was the 
motivation for ING’s full implementation of Agile. Starting in 2014, ING spent 8 to 9 months 
examining what worked at companies such as Zappos, Google, and Spotify and planning how 
to adapt those concepts for ING. The full transition started in June 2015 when ING started 
focusing on the customer journey (i.e., an individual may go to a branch for financial advice but 
wants to go online to make the investment) or ING risked becoming irrelevant.  
A McKinsey & Company article (Schlatman & Jacobs, 2017) based on interviews with 
the chief information officer (CIO) and chief operating officer (COO) provides the best insights 
into their reasons to move to Agile, the ideas they adapted from other companies, how they 
implemented them, and the challenges and risks they faced. Some of the main points of the 
article are summarized below, but the full source is highly recommended for anyone 
contemplating an organizational shift to Agile.  
ING adapted a squad/tribe/chapter construct from Spotify. To apply Agile at scale across 
the company, ING organized its ~2,500 employees into 350 squads no larger than 9 people, all 
co-located, formed to work toward a specific client-related objective with end-to-end 
responsibility, and ready to dissolve once its mission was complete. The squad/tribe/chapter 
approach is how ING adapted Agile for its own use, but even more important are some of the 
adaptations and observations the company made in applying Agile company-wide beyond IT 
and software (Perkin, 2017; Schlatman & Jacobs, 2017). 
Result: ING has been quicker to market, has increased employee engagement, 
releases software every 2 to 3 weeks versus 5 to 6 times per year previously, and has 
increased customer satisfaction and employee engagement scores. 
Lessons Learned from Adopting Agile 
Table 3 presents a synopsis of the successful results of the domain research on 
companies that adopted Agile into their processes and methods from the Agile Applied to Other 
Domains section of this paper. Most companies improved quality, decreased production time, 
and/or reduced costs. They also improved collaboration across the organization, breaking down 
barriers to communication, which resulted in increased employee satisfaction. They generally 
improved their viability and relevance within the market under changing market or technology 
conditions, enabling company longevity.  
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Table 3. Agile Application Lessons Learned  
Company Agile Results 
Saab 
The use of Agile on the Gripen E program resulted in a fighter jet with 50 times lower development 
costs compared with the F-35, 10 times lower unit costs compared with the F-35, and the lowest cost 
per flight hour of any modern fighter jet. 
WIKI 
SPEED 
Successfully built one prototype to prove concepts using Agile principles. The company is now 
working on other prototypes: mail delivery vehicle, next generation taxicab, ultra-light racing 
vehicle, and five-seat sedan for ARPA-E’s LiteCar Challenge. 
Tesla 
Shifted products from mechanics to software to skip beta testing and go straight into production. 
Enacting product updates and mechanical improvements through delivery of updated software 
directly to the customer, avoiding extensive recalls to continually improve products. 
Bosch 
Cut development time in half; divided into cross-functional teams leading to increase innovation and 
improve employee engagement; developed 10 new innovations in 1 month when it traditionally took 
6 to 8 months for each innovation.  
Shipbuilders Numerous reports cite excellent quality improvements in shipbuilding and submarine manufacturing by adapting Agile principles. 
Centrus 
Met an aggressive schedule, under budget, with no safety issues or deficiencies from oversight and 
regulatory agencies. They had a significantly higher than average productivity for a nuclear 
construction project or a typical less complex construction project. 
PCL PCL Agile now regularly provides offsite modular construction in large warehouses to assemble smaller components and larger built-up assemblies, to overcome site logistical issues. 
Construction 
Projects 
Agile has already made its way into the construction domain through software tools and real-time 
collaboration to improve speed, reduce costs, and increase customer satisfaction. 
3M HIS 3M prioritized its work, instituted stabilized teams, reduced backlog, reduced interruption, and changed its scrum process to improve velocity. 
Monash 
Health 
So successful four more clinics modeled on the prototype opened near other hospitals. Over a 12-
month period patient data showed a 23%–46% improvement on several standardized measures 
following treatment, a significant decrease in the number of clinicians and case managers involved in 




Incorporated tailored Agile values into its laboratory environment; utilized flexible sprints and 
adopted the right tools and techniques to fit each research lab space. 
3M HIS 
R&D 
3M HIS R&D teams adopted a more efficient use of time for faculty, improved both morale and 
productivity for student researchers with transparency and accountability, and generated a group 
identity for a research community and shared knowledge to the benefit of all. 
HPE The HPE solution for Agile R&D allowed all teams to prioritize the backlog and delivering the most important feature first. This approach used the swarm attribute referenced in The Scrum Fieldbook. 
ING Quicker to market, increased employee engagement, and released software every 2 to 3 weeks versus 5 to 6 times per year. Customer satisfaction and employee engagement scores are all up. 
Apply at scale: The benefits of adopting Agile will not extend throughout a company and 
business units unless Agile is applied at scale. If Agile can be applied on a small scale to an 
individual project/program or organizational unit, the benefits will be limited to that scope. If a 
company decides to adopt Agile at scale, the change needs to be leadership driven, applying 
the Agile management information presented in this research.  
Organizational adoption: Organizations should use Agile principles to transform their 
company and decide how to apply Agile. They need to outline core principles and transform 
roles to define outcomes. A company that draws a detailed plan, schedule, and milestones for 
Agile migration, falls into the trap of waterfall project management while attempting to become 
Agile.  
Teams: Organizations need to release the power of small cross-functional teams with 
clear purposes, close connections to the end user, and process iteration with short feedback 
cycles (sprints). Scrum is the most widely used form of Agile, consistently at the top of the State 
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of AgileTM survey, with ~72% of respondents saying they practice Scrum or a hybrid Scrum 
(VersionOne, 2019).  
Experts: Organizations should consider using an Agile outside consultant, rather than 
trying to adopt Agile alone. Companies can learn from their expertise and experience.  
Common Characteristics of Adopting Agile  
The research showed several common characteristics of companies that successfully 
applied Agile in their domains. These characteristics reflect on the Agile values or principles. 
When possible, companies adopting Agile should cultivate these common characteristics such 
as: a) iterative, b) adaptive and flexible, c) collaborative, small teams, d) user/customer focus, e) 
visual progress, f) short feedback loop, g) continuous improvement, h) trust/psychological 
safety, i) simplify, j) change in leadership roles, and k) build in quality. 
Conclusion  
Our research concludes that Agile can be applied successfully across many domains. 
Several studies and surveys have confirmed that notion. The Scrum Fieldbook references 
surveys. CHAOS Report from Standish Group since 1985 covered many companies and 
showed that Agile projects are successful/are challenged/fail at 42%/50%/8%, compared with 
26%/53%/21% for traditional projects, or a 60% greater success rate and 260% lower failure 
rate (Sutherland, 2019, p. 40). 
The benefits of adopting Agile development practices are clear. Between 2016 and 
2019, thousands of Agile practitioners from companies and countries were surveyed, and 50%–
85% of those surveyed identified the following benefits (in approximate descending priority): a) 
user/stakeholder engagement, b) allows for change, c) transparency/visibility, d) faster time to 
market, e) increased team productivity, f) project predictability (deliveries, cost, and schedule), 
g) improved team morale, h) business and IT alignment, i) improved quality, and j) reduced risk 
(fail early; VersionOne, 2015, 2019). 
The research concludes that an organization or program can adopt Agile in a domain 
beyond IT and software. There are no definitive answers for the optimum approach. The 
following general guidance for implementing Agile is provided:  
• Determine if Agile is a good fit: There is no point starting down the path to Agile if an 
organization cannot meet or otherwise substitute for core values and principles such as 
access to users and the ability to iteratively deliver a useable product (see the 
Background section). 
• Determine the scope of the Agile effort: Agile can be applied to all or portions of an 
organization or program. If applying at scale, Agile management is a necessary 
component (see the Agile Applied to Management and Organizations section). 
• Consult with experts: Organizations are unlikely to have Agile experts on hand ready to 
assist with this journey. Organizations should make sure they have access to experts 
(The Scrum Fieldbook and Agile experts to consult with such as those identified in the 
Agile Applied to Other Domains section). 
• Tailor Agile values and principles to the situation: This sounds simple but is where 
organizations or programs need to put the most thought (see the Background section). 
• Develop an approach: Remember not to fall into the trap of developing a detailed plan 
and milestones; instead, use Agile to iterate and refine the approach (see the Agile 
Applied to Other Domains section). 
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• Leverage lessons learned: Use research, the references provided, and other 
organizations that already transitioned to Agile (see the Lessons Learned from Adopting 
Agile section). 
Federal agencies face different challenges than private industry when adopting agile. 
Many constraints, such as budget authorizations, program approvals, leadership change, and 
different agendas can impact full adoption of Agile, and certainly influence scale. Some of these 
challenges as well as best practices are included in the GAO Report 12-681. We suggest that 
Federal Agencies review these items as they adopt Agile practices within their organizations.   
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Abstract 
This study examines five advanced decision support methodologies—Lean Six Sigma (LSS), 
Balanced Score Card (BSC), Integrated Risk Management (IRM), Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA), and Earned Value Management (EVM)—in terms of how each can support the information 
technology (IT) acquisition process. In addition, the study provides guidance on when each 
methodology should be applied during the acquisition life cycle of IT projects. This research 
includes an in-depth review of each methodology in the context of the acquisition life cycle. All 
acquisition projects within the Department of Defense must go through the acquisition life cycle. 
While each acquisition project is unique, all must pass a series of common hurdles to succeed. 
Understanding how and when the methodologies can be applied to an IT acquisition is 
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fundamental to its success. The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the use of 
each methodology in the acquisition life cycle of IT projects. 
Problem Statement 
A recurring problem at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is that acquisitions of 
information technology (IT) have been fraught with schedule and cost overruns. High-profile 
programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Coast Guard Deepwater program, Army Comanche, 
and the Navy A-12 demonstrate the need for improvement within the acquisition process. The 
current suite of management tools does not seem to adequately provide sufficient early warning 
and high enough fidelity into the root causes of fiscal overruns in order to provide the program 
manager (PM) time to adequately respond to program issues. This is a problem because the 
capabilities promised to the warfighter are not provided in a timely manner and the over-
budgeted resources used to provide the capabilities could be more efficiently allocated to other 
programs. In essence, the learning time that traditionally is found in production does not exist in 
DoD acquisitions. Thus, the “Job Shop” size for many of these major acquisition procurements 
becomes a lot size of “one” due to the fact that each version of the new production is a unique 
procurement with customized outputs and places a higher premium on each reoccurring item. A 
further problem is that the current methodologies do not include a defensible way to measure 
the value of the proposed acquisition of an IT system. Without a ratio level measure of value, 
using portfolio management to optimize IT investments is problematic. Several of the 
methodologies (i.e., Knowledge Value Added [KVA] and Integrated Risk Management [IRM]) do 
provide ratio scales for the value metrics they use.  
The problem is that current analysis and management tools based on continuous 
production are not adequate to address the evolving requirements of complex IT systems. This 
is a problem because acquisitions of increasingly complex IT systems require a broader set of 
management and analysis tools to ensure successful acquisitions in a Job Shop production 
context. The purpose of this study was to suggest a set of criteria for selecting management and 
analysis tools that could help acquisition professionals successfully navigate the acquisition life 
cycle of Job Shop products. This research is important because acquisition managers need a 
wider variety of tools to help them optimally analyze and manage their increasingly complex 
acquisition of IT-based portfolios. 
There are several analytical and decision-support methods that can be used to improve 
the acquisition life cycle of IT investments. This study provides an approach that will aid 
practitioners in selecting the best decision support method for a given phase of the acquisition 
life cycle for IT systems. The methodologies that were reviewed for this study included Lean Six 
Sigma (LSS), Balanced Score Card (BSC), Integrated Risk Management (IRM: Risk 
Simulation), Knowledge Value Added (KVA), and Earned Value Management (EVM).  
Research Questions and Objectives 
The research questions are as follows:  
1. When should the methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to ensure 
successful IT acquisitions?  
2. How should the methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to ensure 
successful IT acquisitions? 
3. What are the risks and limitations of using each of the methodologies for IT 
acquisitions?  
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The objective of the research is to provide a set of pragmatic recommendations, based 
on comparison of the proposed methodologies, that focuses on when and how each method 
can be applied to improve the acquisition life cycle of IT investments. 
The Five Methodologies 
There are other management tools (aside from the five methodologies) that might be 
applied to the IT acquisition life cycle (e.g., activity-based costing and Total Quality 
Management [TQM], to name two). However, a review of the literature supported the focus on 
the five main analytical methodologies identified for this study. Expanding the potential scope of 
this research to include other methodologies was deemed to add minimal value given that these 
five approaches are in current use in acquisitions management and research. It was also 
assumed that starting with these five methodologies would provide a platform for inclusion of 
other approaches in future research. 
Reviews of each of the methodologies follow, beginning with LSS followed in order by 
BSC, IRM, KVA, and ERM. The focus on this paper is providing a brief introduction of the 
methodologies. For a more thorough discussion, see the full report of this research that provides 
a detailed explanation as well as examples of and prior research on each methodology (see 
Housel et al., 2019).  
Lean Six Sigma 
Currently employed to help justify the future use of an IT system to incrementally 
improve process productivity within the DoD, Lean Six Sigma (LSS) is a combination of two 
complementary concepts, Lean and Six Sigma, designed to eliminate waste and variation to 
attain customer satisfaction in the areas of quality, delivery, and cost (Salah et al., 2010). Six 
Sigma evolved from the TQM program and is focused on reducing variability and removing 
defects within a process (Apte & Kang, 2006). The Lean concept centers on reducing waste and 
increasing the speed of a process (Apte & Kang, 2006). In the past, practitioners often chose 
one concept or the other, believing the two approaches to be contradictory in nature (Apte & 
Kang, 2006). However, many managers now view the concepts as synergistic (Apte & Kang, 
2006). Together they lead to the goal of a continuous process flow via a cycle of iterative 
improvement. 
LSS is an effective technique to improve the processes within a system. A detailed 
understanding of a procedure is required prior to implementing any changes to a process. This 
acumen could give decision-makers insight into the as-is system, that is, the current process or 
system the acquisition program is seeking to improve. Having a firm grasp on the as-is system 
may assist the PM when deciding the best course of action to fulfill stated requirements. LSS 
offers the most benefit when applied to processes that are already stablished. Incrementally 
improving procedures during the operations and support phase may provide significant cost 
savings and improved performance over the life of an acquisition.  
Balanced Score Card 
A strategic planning and management methodology developed by Kaplan and Norton 
(1996), BSC includes financial metrics as well as nonfinancial performance measures, such as 
leadership, customer satisfaction, and employee satisfaction, to achieve a balanced view of an 
organization’s performance (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; see also Niven, 2008). The BSC helps to 
strategically align an organization’s actions to its vision and strategy, improve internal and 
external communications, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals.  
BSC could provide valuable perspective to the DoD when determining how to fill a 
specified need. Linking the various categories to acquisition categories could help determine the 
best solution for an Information System (IS) or IT need. Rather than looking at each acquisition 
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as an individual system, a BSC approach could help decision-makers assess the needs of the 
organization rather than just state requirements for a single program. However, the DoD 
Decision Support System does incorporate some of these considerations already, specifically in 
the interaction between JCIDS and the Defense Acquisition System, which may diminish some 
advantages typically gained from using BSC. 
Integrated Risk Management 
IRM is a comprehensive methodology that is a forward-looking risk-based decision 
support system incorporating various methods such as Monte Carlo Risk Simulation, Parametric 
Forecast Models, Portfolio Optimization, Strategic Flexibility, and Economic Business Case 
Modeling. Economic business cases using standard financial cash flows and cost estimates, as 
well as non-economic variables such as expected military value, strategic value, and other 
domain-specific Subject Matter Experts (SME) metrics (e.g., Innovation Index, Conversion 
Capability, Ability to Meet Future Threats, Force Structure, Modernization and Technical 
Sophistication, Combat Readiness, Sustainability, Future Readiness to Meet Threats) can be 
incorporated. These metrics can be forecasted as well as risk simulated to account for their 
uncertainties and modeled to determine their returns to acquisition cost (e.g., return on 
investment for innovation, or return on sustainability). Capital investment and acquisition 
decisions within IT portfolios can then be tentatively made, subject to any budgetary, manpower, 
and schedule constraints.  
The IRM methodology is a systematic technique to determine the best possible projects 
to pursue based on the statistical likelihood of their success. Using historical knowledge of 
defense acquisition programs and IT systems in both the government and commercial realms 
could improve the budgeting and scheduling processes. Determining the likely range of 
outcomes through dynamic statistical modeling may improve the program’s performance. By 
better understanding the risk associated with various components, a more appropriate schedule 
and budget could be developed. IRM may also help determine which real options should be 
included in acquisition contracts. A high-risk program may need more options, such as the 
options to abandon, delay, or expand, based on its actual performance. Finally, IRM could prove 
useful in portfolio management, helping decision-makers determine which programs to initiate 
when viewing the portfolio of other programs in progress and used operationally. 
Knowledge Value Added 
As the U.S. military is not in the business of making money, referring to revenues 
throughout this paper may appear to be a misnomer. For nonprofit organizations, especially in 
the military, we require the KVA methodology to provide the required “benefits” or “revenue” 
proxy estimates to run a true ROI analysis. ROI is a basic productivity ratio with revenue in the 
numerator and cost to generate the revenue in the denominator (i.e., ROI is revenue-cost/cost). 
KVA generates ROI estimates by developing a market comparable price per common unit of 
output multiplied by the number of outputs to achieve a total revenue estimate. The presumption 
is that the output of a process, at a given point in time, is the thing of value because it was 
desired by the process owner regardless of how the process owner may decide to change the 
process at some future point in time.  
In this way, KVA follows the general historical accounting model as a measure of cost 
(i.e., historical cost accounting model) per common unit of output. Standard accounting is based 
on historical measures of cost based on the cost to use resources (i.e., human, machine, raw, 
and infrastructural) to produce outputs. Generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) does 
not provide any way to allocate revenue backward/historically within the enterprise. KVA goes a 
step further by adding a historical common unit measure of value (i.e., ratio level metric for 
common units of value via the KVA methodology). In a for-profit enterprise, this addition to 
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GAAP allows for the allocation of revenue throughout the enterprise based on the outputs that 
core processes or functional areas produce at a given point in time providing an estimate for 
ROI. And, using KVA, it has been shown that internal ROIs are a defensible metric to use as a 
surrogate for capital asset price in estimating volatility over time (Housel et al., 2007). Armed 
with this new information, it is possible to use standard financial investment metrics that require 
measures of volatility (i.e., risk in financial terminology) over time.  
In application to measuring the general productivity of organizational resources, KVA is a 
methodology whose primary purpose is to describe all organizational process outputs in 
common units. This provides a means to compare the current and potential future outputs of all 
assets (human, machine, information technology) regardless of the aggregated outputs 
produced. For example, the purpose of a military process may be to gather signal intelligence or 
plan for a ship alternation. KVA would describe the outputs of both processes in common units, 
thus making the ROI performance of any of the processes comparable.  
KVA differs from other nonprofit ROI models because it allows for revenue estimates, 
enabling the use of traditional accounting, financial performance, and profitability measures at 
the suborganizational level. KVA can rank processes by the degree to which they add value to 
the organization or its outputs. This assists decision-makers in identifying how much processes 
add value. Value is quantified in two key metrics: Return on Knowledge (ROK: revenue/cost) 
and ROI (revenue-investment cost/investment cost). As previously noted, the KVA method has 
been applied to numerous military core processes across the services. It was originally 
developed to estimate the ROI on IT acquisitions in the telecommunications industry at the 
subcorporate level and has been used for the past 17 years in the DoD, with emphasis on the 
Navy, to assess the potential value added by IT acquisitions to core DoD processes. 
With the KVA methodology, the value concept has a different meaning than it does for 
EVM or LSS. Using the KVA methodology, the value concept is based on complexity theory. 
This methodology values organizational processes in terms of their ability to change inputs into 
outputs using a given process. Thus, these changes are the units of value (Housel & Kanevsky, 
1995). Elementary changes can be represented by common units of computational complexity; 
see Kolmogorov complexity theory explanation in Housel and Kanevsky’s (1995) original 
treatise. These common units of complexity can be described in terms of the knowledge 
required to execute these units in a process. And, the amount of knowledge (i.e., computational 
complexity) can be described in terms of the learning time for a common reference point learner 
(i.e., common units of learning time is proportionate to the amount of knowledge contained in a 
process by the process change-making resources: people and machines).  
KVA is potentially an extremely valuable tool for inclusion in the Defense Acquisition 
System. Since the DoD is not a for-profit company, it does not have revenue to judge the 
effectiveness of its programs. Instead, it relies on various metrics and evaluations that are not 
comparable for system to system. If the DoD implements the KVA methodology, PMs may have 
an objective measure to compare various technological solutions to fulfill requirements. 
Understanding the value that a system or process provides in direct comparison with the value 
of other systems, whether they are similar or unrelated processes, could provide beneficial 
information in the decision-making, budgeting, and planning processes. 
Earned Value Management 
EVM is used by the DoD and industry for the planning and management of projects and 
programs. It provides cost and schedule metrics to track performance in accordance with an 
acquisition project plan during the developmental phase of the acquisition life cycle after the 
engineering development contract is awarded. It uses a work breakdown structure (WBS) to try 
to measure the performance of a program based on the amount of planned work that is done at 
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any point in the program management baseline (PMB). EVM uses cost and schedule metrics 
that aid in performance trend analysis with a focus on identifying any budget and schedule 
deviations from the plan to allow the project team to take action as early as possible. It has been 
used for process improvements, but its strength is in providing a disciplined, structured, 
objective, and quantitative method to integrate performance, cost, and schedule objectives for 
tracking contract performance (DoD, 2015). It is important to note the term value in EVM does 
not have the same meaning as in other methodologies, such as Knowledge Value Added. 
Within the context of EVM, value is defined as the work accomplished towards completion of the 
project. There is no reference to the quality of the completed work or additional (or missing) 
benefits the work might provide to a system. The value is assumed because the specifications 
were defined in the project requirements. 
EVM has proven to be a reliable system to manage cost and schedule performance for 
manufacturing in both defense and commercial industries. However, as systems become more 
complicated and IT and IS gain a more prominent place within even traditional manufacturing 
projects, EVM may need additional information from additional methodologies to improve its 
capabilities. Better incorporating the strategic guidance associated with a program, the value 
gained from subcomponents and subprocesses, the risk associated with developing 
subcomponents of a system, and incrementally improving a process may help improve the 
Defense Acquisition System as a whole. 
Research Methodology 
A review of each of the methodologies was conducted as well as a high-level review of 
the current phases of the acquisition life cycle (i.e., DoDI 5000 series). The methodologies were 
evaluated in terms of each major phase of the acquisition life cycle to suggest how they might 
be used to enhance the likelihood of successful completion of the phase. Analysis included a 
review of how the general overall acquisition life cycle approach might be modified to 
incorporate the benefits from the methodologies, including the original motivations for the IT 
acquisition per the problems/challenges identified prior to the beginning of the acquisition 
process. It was presumed that it was possible that the acquisition life cycle should include a 
formal review of the need for the IT in the first place. It also was presumed that it was possible 
that the acquisition life cycle should not end when the IT is acquired. What follows are a review 
of the generic IT acquisition life cycle and the mapping of this generic life cycle to the existing 
DoD acquisitions framework; a review of the benefits and challenges of using each of the five 
methodologies with final recommendations about how to use each within the generic acquisition 
life cycle; a statement of the limitations of this study; and remarks on future research. 
Acquisition Life Cycle 
This study developed a basic framework for placing the five methodologies within the 
generic IT acquisition life cycle as shown in Table 1, which can be mapped to the standard DoD 
acquisition framework. Doing so allows a comparison of where the two general frameworks 
match up and provides some preliminary guidance for how the five methodologies might be 
used in the standard 5000 series acquisition framework.  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 280 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 1. Five Approaches: When to Apply in the Methodologies in Tech Investment Life Cycle 
 
As shown in Table 2, the Defense acquisition life-cycle framework mirrors the generic 
technology investment acquisition life cycle in that there exists a planning phase that includes 
activities consistent with pre-investment and strategic alignment, an execution or 
implementation phase, and an operations and support phase, generally considered the post-
implementation phase of a program. The DoD defines these phases as the Materiel Solution 
Analysis phase, Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase, Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase, Production and Deployment, and the Operations and 
Support phase. Figure 1 is a visual representation of these phases as they are defined in DoDI 
5000.02. 
Table 2. Aligning the Generic and 5000 Series Life Cycles 
 
Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
The Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase assesses potential solutions for a needed 
capability in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), which was developed during the defense 
requirements generation process known as the Joint Requirements Capability Determination 
System (JCIDS). The MSA phase is critical to program success and achieving materiel 
readiness because it is the first opportunity to influence systems supportability and affordability 
by balancing technology opportunities with operational and sustainment requirements. During 
this phase, various alternatives are analyzed to select the materiel solution and develop the 
Technology Development Strategy (TDS) that will be further assessed in the TMRR phase and 
eventually executed during Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD).  
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Figure 1. The 5000 Series Acquisition Life Cycle (DoD, 2017) 
The MSA phase also includes identifying and evaluating affordable product support 
alternatives with their associated requirements to meet the operational requirements and 
associated risks. Consequently, in describing the desired performance to meet mission 
requirements, sustainment metrics are defined that will impact the overall system design 
strategy. One of the principal tasks that must be completed during this phase is the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA), suggesting that tools that offer robust trade-off analysis might be better 
suited for this phase. 
Significant events within the MSA and other phases of the acquisition life cycle are listed 
in Table 3. While this is not an all-inclusive list of events during each phase, important steps 
within a program’s development are incorporated. 
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Phase 
The Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase is designed to reduce 
technology risk, engineering integration risk, life-cycle cost risk and to determine the appropriate 
set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. The objective of the TMRR phase is to 
develop a sufficient understanding of a solution to make sound business decisions on initiating a 
formal acquisition program in the EMD phase. This phase lends itself well to management tools 
that provide all the program manager (PM) needs to conduct technical and business process 
trade-off analysis studies relative to cost and schedule. 
Table 3. Key Events Within the Phases of the 5000 Series 
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Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase is where a system is 
developed and designed before going into production. The EMD phases is considered the 
formal start of any program and the point at which a development contract is awarded based on 
a specific statement of work (SOW). The goal of this phase is to complete the development of a 
system or increment of capability and evaluate the system for technical maturity before 
proceeding into the Production and Deployment (PD) phase. This is the phase in which cost and 
schedule variance models that help the PM to better understand technical issues are best 
employed since requirements are fundamentally solidified and represented in the SOW. If 
requirements are shown to be less than optimal or there are other mitigating issues during this 
phase that impact cost and schedule, then decision support tools to facilitate trade-offs may be 
used to help the PM maintain the program baseline and deliver user-defined capability. 
Production and Deployment and Operations and Support Phases 
These two phases (PD and Operations and Support [OS]) are necessary for the PM to 
ensure that the product being manufactured meets the operational effectiveness and suitability 
requirements for the user or customer. While the design is pretty well set at this point in the 
program, there may still be some trade-offs that take place prior to the full rate production 
decision and fielding of the system. The PM is less concerned with managing cost and schedule 
variance at this point since the contract types typically revert to a fixed price strategy. The 
biggest concern for the PM at this point is correcting any final deficiencies in the system and 
establishing a stable manufacturing and sustainment process. 
The four generic phases listed in Table 1 align with the current DoD structure, as shown 
in Table 2. As the scope of this research is limited to the 5000 series, the pre-materiel solutions 
analysis column is for informational purposes only. The JCIDS process accomplishes strategic 
goal alignment, determining the necessary additions to the DoD’s capabilities portfolio prior to 
the 5000 series. The ICD generated in the JCIDS process describe the high-level needs that the 
user requires, and these needs are assessed in the AoA process during the MSA phase. Within 
the scope of this paper, the DoD acquisition life cycle and generic IT acquisition life cycle begin 
with pre-investment during MSA.  
Risk Management Framework 
If one discounts basic scheduling and cost management practices, the primary tools to 
monitor progress of an acquisition program during the MSA and EMD phases are EVM and the 
Risk Management Framework (RMF). Figure 2 shows the seven steps that comprise the RMF, 
repeating in a cyclical pattern—prepare, categorize, select, implement, assess, authorize, and 
monitor.  
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Figure 2. Seven Steps in the Risk Management Framework (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 
2018) 
Preparation initiates the process, ensuring organizations are ready to execute RMF and 
giving context and priorities for managing risk (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2018). 
Categorization consists of organizing the system and the information used by the system based 
on an impact analysis (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2018). The risk manager then 
selects the appropriate security controls, tailoring them as necessary (Joint Task Force 
Transformation Initiative, 2018). The controls must then be implemented into the system and its 
operating environment before assessing the controls’ effectiveness and authorizing the use of 
the information system (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2018). Finally, the manager 
must monitor the security controls on a continual basis, repeating the cycle as necessary when 
deficiencies are discovered (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2018). EMD is the first 
point at which PMs use EVM in an official capacity. The appropriate decision-makers approved 
a schedule and budget for the program creating the Acquisition Program Baseline. Future 
progress is now measured against this benchmark. Even using these proven tools, cost and 
schedule overruns occur regularly, illustrating the need for a different approach.  
The RMF is a broad analysis that covers multiple types of risk and is used throughout 
the entire life cycle of a new development system. Implementing other tools into the process 
could help PMs better understand the risk involved at various points throughout the program. 
Within an acquisition there is an interdependence of risk. As the program progresses (and using 
the EVM methodology) and the ACWP increases, there are increasing levels of aggregation and 
abstraction of risk. For instance, to award an EMD contract, the technology involved must be at 
a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6, indicating the technology performed adequately in a 
relevant test environment (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
[ASD(R&E)], 2011). However, the technology is not yet completed and requires significant 
improvement before production. The current risk assessment program does not account for the 
possibility that this categorization is incorrect and may not lead to a fully operational system. As 
a result, PMs proceed with the assumption the technology will continue development as 
planned. Any lack of progress will not become apparent until the ACWP begins to vary from the 
BCWP. It is often too late to make the appropriate corrections to the program in order to remain 
on budget by the time the discrepancy is discovered using EVM metrics. 
Early risk management that focuses on the validity of the decision-making process using 
the RMF framework might introduce a higher level of understanding of the subordinate 
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processes. For example, if at a particular milestone, the technology is not at the level of 
readiness it is being portrayed, then the consequences are x, y, and z. The results of each 
statement can be expressed in terms of time and money, or, keeping with the already 
established EVM terminology, potential CV. A PM can then assign a probability of success 
estimate to the state of the program that might drive a deeper understanding of the various 
interdependent program management processes.  
Generic Framework and 5000 Series Integration 
Table 4 shows when each methodology might be used in the 5000 series phases. This 
table reflects the reality that there are multiple tools for the various phases that should be used 
in concert and that certain tools are more appropriate for a particular phase than others. It is 
incumbent on the PM to use the tools appropriately in that they provide more information for a 
complex environment. The tools themselves do not provide the solutions to potential problems; 
they are simply indicators of underlying performance issues and, as such, are tools that can 
provide better insight into the life cycle of a program. 
Table 4. Methodologies Within the 5000 Series 
 
Understanding the extent to which a particular tool might provide greater insight into 
program performance across the life cycle, one should consider the level of analysis required 
and the viability of a particular tool to provide sufficient insight at that level of analysis. Three 
levels of analysis were considered for this initial survey: organizational, business process, and 
task analysis (see Table 5). 
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Table 5. Management Tool Selection Criteria Based on Level of Analysis, Focus of Analysis, and 
Acquisition Phase 
 
It is clear from Table 4 that a variety of tools are required across the life cycle for the PM 
to gain a more robust view of the program performance. As shown in Table 5, the selection of 
the tool will depend on the particular focus and time horizon with which the tool is able to 
provide relevant information about the program. Table 6 illustrates different benefits and 
challenges of each methodology. Simply relying on one tool will not allow the PM to adequately 
manage the program. Planning for the type and depth of the management tool is started early in 
the life cycle and should be part of the overall acquisition strategy. Additionally, selecting 
contractors that are able to implement and manage these tools is critical in the decision-making 
process. 
BSC is an excellent tool when viewing a system holistically. It provides a way for 
managers to examine a project from a systems-thinking approach. It may be most useful when 
strategizing about the potential use of an IT acquisition and how it might fit into the DoD’s 
higher-level strategic goals prior to developing a requirements document. The statements 
derived from the BSC for general dissemination among all levels of the organizational structure 
must be translated into a simpler form presented in set of objectives and targets that are clear 
for all levels within the organization. It is also important to understand that leadership is central 
to ensuring any IT acquisition will support the organization’s overall strategy enumerated in the 
BSC. This is true in the DoD as well as in any organization’s implementation of a BSC (Llach et 
al., 2017). Without leadership support and guidance, the BSC is unlikely to succeed, and the 
organization will not be able to generate acceptable returns on its IT investments. 
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Table 6. Benefits and Challenges of the Five Methodologies 
 
The use of BSC can result in a cursory review of KPIs during the traditional acquisition 
life-cycle management process. BSC also avoids overreliance on financial KPIs by viewing the 
effects of each KPI on the other parts of the scorecard. While financial KPIs are reviewed with 
BSC, the other segments are separated from a purely financial analysis, allowing managers to 
use their judgement in determining how the proposed solution will affect the scorecard as a 
whole. The problem is that without a quantifiable common-units performance metric that allows 
the practitioner to determine the relative value between the different scorecards, it is difficult to 
determine which course of action would be optimal. There is no performance ratio that tells the 
manager that by performing a given action, the financial KPIs will improve by a given amount, 
the stakeholder engagement will decrease by this amount, and the internal process will change 
by this amount. Instead, it is more of a conceptual thought exercise to ensure managers 
consider the effects of their decisions on the entire range of KPIs. Because of this, BSC works 
best during the strategic goal alignment phase of the generic IT acquisition life cycle and the 
pre-MSA portion of the DoD acquisition life cycle. The MSA phase also includes aligning the 
stated requirements with the possible solutions to the capability gap during the AoA. An all-
inclusive view of the effects of the various IT solutions that are being considered will assist in 
the selection of the most appropriate option to continue towards acquisition. BSC is 
recommended for implementation during the MSA phase.  
EVM provides users with an easily understandable report of a project’s advancement 
towards completion. Comparing the BCWP and the ACWP gives a clear view of how a system 
is progressing within the anticipated budget. The metrics used for cost and time are also clearly 
delineated. This delineation allows managers to compare the performance at different points 
throughout the project, which can assist in determining where a project has changed 
trajectories. There are numerous challenges when using EVM as well. While cost is measured 
and tracked regularly, the value of the project is not monitored as closely. Despite the name, the 
amount of work performed does not tell a manager the actual quantifiable value (in a common-
units measurement) the project has accrued at a given point. There is no quantifiable measure 
of value within the methodology. The only quantitative measures of performance are measures 
of cost and time.  
The ACWP assumes the outputs from all work were perfect on completion. If there are 
issues with the results from earlier efforts, they must be reworked, changing the ACWP 
calculation. If the technology does not improve as expected because the TRL was not 
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accurately portrayed, a PM will believe the project is on schedule despite the “earned value” 
lagging behind what the numbers are projecting. Additionally, and in some instances because of 
this assumption, EVM outputs are not timely. Conducting an accurate analysis of a program is 
time consuming and does not provide useful predictive information. By the time EVM alerts a 
PM to a variance, the variance has already occurred. All corrections are reactive to bring the 
ACWP back to the baseline, which has proven to be a nearly impossible task in practice. EVM 
will only be effective when the baseline plan is well researched and accurate. Otherwise, the 
ACWP is compared against flawed data. EVM does provide valuable information to project 
managers during the EMD phase but should be supplemented with some of the other 
methodologies (LSS, KVA, IRM) throughout the project management cycle.  
Successfully implementing LSS into a process will lower the cost of the project by 
reducing the variation in a product run and the waste associated with its production. When 
additional steps or unnecessary waste is reduced, additional resources become available for 
use in other processes. In identifying a bottleneck, LSS can address multiple problems 
simultaneously depending on how the project is defined. By creating improvement in one area 
and freeing resources, other areas may benefit from an improved process workflow. However, 
LSS can be costly to implement. The analysis requires a great deal of time and information to 
develop meaningful understanding of any problems. LSS’s definition of value is at the nominal 
scale level: an item either adds value to a project or it does not. Reality is not often as black or 
white. There are required steps that must be conducted that do not necessarily add value to a 
product from the user’s standpoint. For instance, accounting departments do not attempt to 
directly add value to a final product, but any organization recognizes the need for accounting, 
suggesting the accounting department does add value. LSS is time-consuming when applied on 
a large scale, as would be the case in a DoD acquisition. Defining the problem and determining 
appropriate measurements in a step-by-step manner is a major undertaking. However, 
acquisition professionals can use it to ensure the project is defined and measured appropriately.  
The greatest benefit from KVA is a quantifiable (common units) value metric that can be 
compared across various aspects of a project (Housel & Bell, 2001). If the value of an 
intermediate step is quantified, managers can compare the outputs of a component instead of 
simply the effort measured by time and cost that were inputs. KVA provides a value 
measurement for both tangible and intangible assets, making it especially well-suited for use 
with IT. A KVA analysis can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time in comparison 
with the other methodologies. A quick, rough-cut KVA analysis can provide rapid guidance for 
the project before sinking valuable time and resources into a more comprehensive examination. 
KVA is primarily a measurement tool that provides performance information to decision-makers. 
It is not a system that will drive an acquisition project towards the goal on its own. As in the 
other methodologies mentioned thus far, KVA has limited value in making predictions for future 
value, focusing instead on the current value of systems in development. There must be another 
methodology employed with KVA to ensure a project’s success.  
IRM provides a foundation to incorporate the risk associated with a decision into a 
quantitative decision process. IRM’s core premise maintains there is a probability for success 
and failure with every decision option during a project’s life cycle. Using statistical simulations, 
real options, and optimization will improve the quality of information a PM has to determine the 
course of a project. Real options analysis can be used to frame strategies to mitigate risk, to 
value and find the optimal strategic pathway to pursue, and to generate options to enhance the 
value of the project while managing risks. IRM’s drawback is that the analytical methods can 
sometimes be difficult to master. But with the requisite knowledge and training, coupled with the 
correct tools, the IRM methodology can provide a plethora of value-added information for 
making strategic and tactical decisions under uncertainty.  
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Comparison of Key Attributes 
Choosing a methodology should depend on the nature of the project under 
consideration, specifically, the commitment needed from the organization, the organization’s 
desire to align strategic goals with the project, the predictive capability of the methodology, the 
flexibility required, and the time available. Table 7 compares these categories across the five 
methodologies. While others in the organization need to understand the concepts to 
comprehend status reports, EVM only needs the management team to track the cost and 
schedule of the project compared to the baseline as there is no goal alignment with the 
organization. While the CPI and SPI can help estimate the final cost and schedule, there is no 
true predictive ability associated with EVM since the assumption is that the schedule will 
proceed according to the baseline, regardless of previous performance. Adherence to the 
baseline is essential in EVM, and changing requirements can drastically alter a baseline, 
reducing the effectiveness of the methodology. Setting up, monitoring, and reporting the 
performance of each work package within the WBS can be a time-consuming and expensive 
task.  
Based on the strategic goal alignment and the department-specific metrics, the entire 
organization is committed to any BSC efforts. The underlying assumption within BSC is that 
measuring something will improve its performance. As such, leaders are predicting 
improvement in the areas being measured, although BSC does not give a numerical estimate of 
the improvement. BSC is flexible in that the same key areas can lead to different metrics 
depending on the specific department’s tasks. These tasks and metrics can also change as the 
organization shifts its vision or strategy. However, doing so can take a significant amount of time 
as every level must adjust its metrics and can do so only after the immediate superior has 
updated the metrics for that level.  
Table 7. Comparison of Key Attributes 
 
KVA needs only the analyst and the process owner as the subject matter expert to 
determine the value of a process’s output, eliminating the need to align the project with an 
organization’s goals. Using this analysis, they can establish the current as-is process and 
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compare it with the to-be process in development, predicting the improvement between 
systems. Since KVA can be used with any language of description to define the process, 
analysts can choose whichever method is most beneficial for the particular system in question, 
providing flexibility. This analysis can be completed quickly, potentially providing a rough-cut 
assessment within a few days.  
IRM requires the organizational leadership, portfolio and project managers, and the 
analyst to determine how a project fits within an organization’s portfolio, the Present Value of 
the project, and potential real options. By analyzing and simulating various scenarios, IRM 
provides a prediction of a project’s likely performance, which allows managers to build in 
flexibility via real options at the appropriate locations. Assuming the data necessary for the 
analysis is available, the process can be completed in a relatively quick manner. 
Leadership, project and process managers, a project champion, and LSS team 
members must all be involved for an LSS initiative to have success. Leadership is needed to 
provide funding for black and green belt training to ensure improvements made to processes 
remain in place and additional areas with potential enhancements are identified. While the 
overarching goals of the company will not change because of LSS, some business practices will 
be adjusted to make iterative improvements. There is limited predictive capability within the 
methodology other than that the areas from which waste and variation are removed will produce 
a more efficient product. LSS makes numerous incremental changes that can be time 
consuming before a process is optimized. 
Methodologies in IS Acquisition 
As previously discussed, the five methodologies all have strengths and weaknesses, 
making them more suitable in certain applications than others. Table 8 depicts some of these 
considerations when conducting an acquisition of a software-intensive system, hardware-
intensive system, upgrade to a legacy system, or a complete organic build. The biggest 
challenge in using EVM when acquiring IS is the iterative nature of software development. EVM 
needs clearly stated, detailed requirements for intermediate steps to be most effective. While 
the outputs of software programs are defined well, the steps required to build the software are 
not, leading to issues when developing cost and schedule estimates. If the software is not 
complex or consists of known processes, EVM can sufficiently monitor the progress. Integrating 
software and hardware is also complicated with EVM since there are numerous pieces of the 
program that must be combined to meet the goals, resulting in additional debugging and 
recoding. EVM is more efficient when used to manage the physical creation of systems or 
infrastructure. It can monitor the progress of software work packages but is not as useful at 
estimating the earned value of those programs until the requirements have been delivered. 
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Table 8. Methodology Performance in Different IS Acquisition Cases 
 
BSC can assist mangers in aligning the goals of the organization with those of their 
individual program, whether they are dominated by hardware or software. This is especially true 
during an organic build, ensuring the entire IS under development is created with the strategy 
and vision of the acquisition community in mind. However, it can be difficult to change the vision 
when implementing updates to existing hardware and software systems already in use if the 
original strategy differs greatly from the strategy already in place. For example, if the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) needs updates in the future through acquisition programs and the future 
vision of the DoN focuses on redundancy for combat operations versus the current vision of IS 
replacing manpower, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to redesign the ship with the necessary 
modifications.  
KVA can provide an objective, ratio scale measure of value and cost for each 
subprocess within any of the IS systems. Using the two measurements, managers can then 
analyze productivity ratios, such as ROI, to determine the effectiveness of a process compared 
to the resources used to achieve the output. This can help the manager decide how to use 
resources to update systems or estimate the future value of a system being acquired. 
Combining the KVA results with IRM allows managers to iterate the value of real options 
analysis through simulation and other techniques. IRM can also quantify risks and assign 
probabilities of success for programs and components of programs using historical data. It is a 
tool to assist with the investment strategy, making it useful when acquiring all types of 
information systems. However, it is not designed to help manage the actual acquisition of a 
program or determine how to meet its detailed requirements. 
LSS is best used after a process has reached its steady-state operational capability. 
Then it can be used to analyze any of the systems to reduce waste and variation within the 
processes. The corrections made to the sustainment process are done incrementally, gradually 
improving the efficiency of the program over time. While elements of LSS, such as mistake 
proofing, may be beneficial during the acquisition process, LSS as a whole works better after 
the program is operational and can improve the system holistically. 
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Research Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion 
The central question of this research was, “How should the methodologies be used in 
the acquisition life cycle to help ensure successful acquisition of IS technologies?” It should be 
noted that EVM is required for all programs with a contract value greater than $20 million. 
Regardless of this requirement, EVM offers a structured approach to the acquisition of IT via 
program management processes that track schedule and cost. While there are some significant 
limitations when using EVM for IS acquisitions, this was the only program management 
methodology required by the government and military program managers and can be useful in 
ensuring that an acquisition stay on schedule and within cost estimates. 
The major weakness of EVM for IT acquisition is that it was not designed for managing 
IT acquisitions that follow a very iterative pathway. Organic IT acquisitions require a given level 
of flexibility to deal with the unknowns that arise during the development process. In addition, 
EVM does not provide a common unit of value metric to enable standard productivity metrics, 
such as ROI. When value is inferred by how consistent a program is with original baseline cost 
and schedule estimates, the performance of the program may sacrifice on the quality of the 
outputs when planned program activities become iterative, as in the development of many IT 
programs. For example, if an IT program is trending toward cost and schedule overruns, but the 
resulting value added of the modifications to the original requirements provides disproportionate 
increases in value, EVM is not designed to recognize this increase in value.  
To remedy these shortcomings of EVM in IT acquisitions, the methodology should be 
combined with BSC, KVA, and IRM. BSC and KVA can be useful during the requirements phase 
of EVM by ensuring that a given IT acquisition is aligned with organizational strategy and that a 
baseline process model has been developed for establishing current performance before 
acquisition of the supporting IT. A future process model that estimates the value added of the 
incorporation of the IT can also set expectations that can be measured against the baseline 
model after the IT has been acquired. IRM can be used to value the real options that an 
acquired IT may provide so that leadership can select the option that best fits their desired goals 
for the IT inclusion. This kind of information can help guide the requirements analysis based on 
expected value added by the IT over time.  
BSC is not recommended for use within the defense acquisition system as a means to 
ensure an IT acquisition aligns with the overall defense strategy for any given area or military 
service. The primary purpose of BSC is to ensure all levels of the organization are aligned to the 
organizational strategy and vision. The requirements process already produces outputs aligned 
with the strategic goals. Program managers must oversee their programs in accordance with the 
given requirements, which should force them to automatically align with the vision of the DoD. 
The “what you measure is what you get” theory is accounted for in the defense acquisition 
system. The specifications, cost, and schedule are the desired measurements that must be 
followed. While BSC might provide some benefit in aligning goals throughout the DoD or the 
entire acquisition process (i.e., using BSC to align requirements, budgeting, and acquisition 
together), using BSC exclusively within the defense acquisition system is not recommended. 
KVA should be used in the acquisition of IT. Having an objective, quantifiable measure 
of value in common units will allow decision-makers to better understand and compare different 
options based on their value and the cost. Obtaining a return on investment of IT systems can 
only be done when using KVA to determine the value embedded in the system. This information 
provides insight to PMs and gives them a more complete perspective regarding the 
performance of both the current and the to-be systems. 
Likewise, using IRM is recommended when acquiring IS through the defense acquisition 
system. Applying static and dynamic modeling techniques to predict likely outcomes can 
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improve the risk estimates associated with the components and sub-components of a program. 
Analyzing various real options within the context of the models’ outputs will help PMs make the 
most advantageous choices when determining a program’s future. 
LSS should also be used when acquiring IT. The incremental advancements LSS 
principles can discover may result in significant improvements in efficiencies and cost saving 
measures over the life of a program. Using the DMAIC process to eliminate waste and reduce 
variation will enhance program performance. The techniques can be applied to all types of 
processes, including both hardware and software-based systems. Improvements may be made 
to aspects of programs ranging from the software repair process to the depot level repair of the 
hardware in an IS. The military already has extensive experience with LSS, including education 
teams and a belt training system. This familiarity will make the introduction of the formal LSS 
methodology into the defense acquisition system easier than other options. 
• How should the methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to ensure successful 
acquisition of IS technologies? 
Program managers should use EVM only in the EMD phase, as is currently done. EVM 
will work best in hardware manufacturing solutions with technology that is fully mature prior to 
the program beginning. Since many IS acquisition programs consist of advancing the current 
technology and developing new software solutions to meet requirements, EVM is not perfectly 
suited for IS development. Nevertheless, PMs can use various agile EVM techniques to 
complete projects on baseline provided the appropriate steps are taken when establishing the 
baseline. Requirements must be broken into small, easily definable tasks with suitable risk and 
uncertainty factors accounted for within the schedule. Other methodologies should be used with 
EVM to ensure these factors are based on defendable metrics rather than simply guessing how 
much additional time and money may be necessary to complete complex tasks. 
During the MSA phase, KVA will help determine the value of the different options 
considered in the AoA. KVA can objectively measure the value of the current, as-is system and 
the potential to-be systems under consideration. Using other factors such as cost, complexity, 
timeline, etc., the PM can then select an appropriate alternative. As the chosen solutions mature 
during the TMRR phase, an updated KVA analysis will reassess initial estimates and provide a 
projected return on investment for the IT solution prior to entering the EMD phase. In the OS 
phase, KVA will help decision-makers establish how a program is performing and use that 
information to make any adjustments or corrections that may be needed. KVA has limited 
prediction capabilities, so it should be used in conjunction with other methodologies, particularly 
IRM, to obtain the most benefit. 
IRM techniques should be implemented during most of the acquisition phases. Ideally, 
portfolio management decisions were made during the requirements development process, 
although they should also be considered during MSA. Financial and value analysis derived from 
KVA, as well as simulation of possible outcomes, should occur during the MSA, TMRR, and 
EMD phases. The results of these simulations should be fed into the EVM baselines to account 
for risk across the program. Real options should be developed during the TMRR phase prior to 
awarding contracts, and the real options should be executed during the EMD and PD phases as 
appropriate. 
LSS will best serve IS acquisitions after the product is implemented in the operational 
forces during the OS phase, which overlaps with PD. While individual manufacturers may use 
LSS in their manufacturing processes, PMs will not see the full benefits of this methodology until 
the program is in its steady state operation and the incremental improvements can have the 
greatest effect on process improvement and cost savings. LSS will help PMs evaluate the 
system through in-depth analysis of updates, upgrades, repairs, and other services that occur 
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during OS. Elements of LSS may be useful in other phases of the Defense Acquisition System 
as most processes can be improved in some manner. However, formal LSS procedures should 
not be established until the system is in use, regardless of whether it is a hardware- or software-
based system.  
In conclusion, PMs should use the approach that fits with the selection criteria and point 
in the acquisition life cycle (constrained by time and cost). Thus, they should use continuous 
production economics for mature, simple products. Furthermore, in the case of the job shop and 
lot size of one, economics for complex products that can be “intelligensized.”1 In the era of 
Great Power Competition and the race with rising powers, there is a need for a new common 
unit of value to track upside of value of intelligensizing military products to stay ahead, because 
no current methodology in use provides adequate program value to risk-based forecasting. 
Therefore, this study seeks to address that gap in methodology.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This research examined only the 5000 series acquisition life cycle.2 It is probable both 
the JCIDS and PPBE processes could benefit from the calculated implementation of some, or 
all, of the methodologies discussed. Improving one component of the Defense Acquisition 
Decision Support System will likely improve the outputs of the other two systems. Additional 
research into creating a quantifiable measure of risk will provide beneficial information that 
allows decision-makers to understand the probability of success for subcomponents within a 
project. 
Future research in how the five methodologies might be useful for other areas of 
investment in IT and DoD acquisitions of IT might be beneficial in extending the current 
research study. The proposed five methodologies may be useful for researchers who are also 
interested in focusing on the following topics of acquisition research interest:  
• Innovative Contracting Strategies––contracting at the speed of relevance (BSC, IRM)  
• Breaking down silos, enterprise management (LSS, KVA)  
• Rapid Acquisition and Decision Support (IRM, KVA)  
• Effects of Risk-Tolerant and Risk-Averse Behavior on Cost, Schedule, and 
Performance (IRM, EVM)  
• The Role of Innovation in Improving Defense Acquisition Outcomes (BSC, IRM, 
EVM)  
• Applying Model-Based Systems Engineering to Defense Acquisition (IRM, KVA)  
• Augmenting the Acquisition Decision Processes with Data Analytics (IRM)  
  
 
1 This is an operational term that the authors use to describe the processes laid out in this work. 
2Given that the case studies of IT acquisitions exist in various existing data sources and written case studies, there is 
very little risk associated compared to the normal generation of new data sets that were required in the prior studies 
performed by the authors for the ARP. Access to acquisition subject matter experts (SME) at NPS reduced the risk 
associated in seeking other SMEs to discuss IT acquisitions and the use of the methodologies within the IT 
acquisition life cycle.  
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Abstract 
Both the commercial world and Department of Defense (DoD) are challenged with system safety 
issues when dealing with Machine Learned (ML)/Artificial Intelligence (AI) deployed products. 
DoD has a more severe issue when deploying weapons that could unintentionally harm groups of 
people and property. Commercial manufacturers are motivated by profit, while DoD is motivated 
by defense readiness. Both are in a race and can suffer the consequences from focusing too 
much on the finish line. Establishing formal oversight ensures safe algorithm performance. This 
paper presents a measurement approach that scrutinizes the quality and quantity of training data 
used when developing ML/AI algorithms. Measuring quality and quantity of training data 
increases confidence in how the algorithm will perform in a “realistic” operational environment. 
Combining modality with measurements determines: (1) how to curate data to support a realistic 
deployed environment; (2) what attributes take priority during training to ensure robust 
composition of the data; and (3) how attribute prioritization is reflected in size of the training set. 
The measurements provide a greater understanding of the operational environment, taking into 
account issues that result when missing and/or sparse data occur, as well as how data sources 
supply input to the algorithm during deployment. 
Introduction 
As opposed to traditional software development techniques, Machine Learned 
(ML)/Artificial Intelligence (AI) created functions have models that are configured using training 
data sets. Traditional code is used to manage the training process. Training sets are comprised 
of a combination of attributes, sometimes called features. When we refer to a feature within an 
image, we are describing a piece of information contained in the content of the image. In this 
case, the feature describes a certain region of the image, which has certain properties as 
opposed to another popular definition of a feature as a single pixel in an image. The aggregation 
of attributes can be contained in one source, e.g., a camera taking a facial picture, or from many 
sources, e.g., various sensor inputs, such as radar and communication links. In this paper, we 
will distinguish whether attributes are generated from one or multiple sources based on their 
modality. As will be described, understanding the type of modality and creating training data 
sets with the proper quality and quantity of instances/samples to replicate the variation, 
anomalies and noise experienced during deployment is key to algorithm behavioral confidence.  
No Warning Labels 
The first woman killed by an autonomous driven car (Schmelzer 2019) provided a reality 
check for the reliability of AI performance in a deployed environment. Interestingly, 1896 is when 
the first person was killed by a human driver. Who’ was at fault? It was determined to be the 
driver. When an autonomous system makes a mistake, is it the car or the driver (Gurney 2013) 
that is at fault? There are many factory recalls of faulty mechanisms in cars, like brakes. Is it any 
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different with AI software systems? The objective for many car developers is how safe can they 
make a car using autonomy as compared to other manufacturers (Griffith E 2016). That is their 
key to their advertising to create acceptance and sales from the consumer.  
Elon Musk states a major concern in that AI systems might be developed in secret 
(Etherington 2012), thereby limiting oversight. For example, Microsoft has exclusive rights to 
OpenAI’s text generation software (Hamilton 2020). This goes against the initial policy by Elon 
Musk as one of the founders of OpenAI with the goal of developing open source technology. 
Over the last decade and beyond, the primary motivator for car companies has been money. 
Over a 20-month period, a company producing technology for driverless cars was involved with 
18 accidents (Wiggers 2020). This company declined to support a conglomerate of major 
automotive developers focused on “safety first” guiding principles (Wiggers 2019) in 
autonomous vehicles. Instead, the company publicly stated that they support laws and 
regulations. From a legal standpoint, it is quite uncertain that existing laws will apply (Moses LB 
2007). Because of that, car manufacturers may not have the proper incentives to develop safe 
systems (Cooter 2000). Even with this company’s public being against a proactive safety focus, 
even with 18-accidents in 20 months, they were still able to raise over 3 billion dollars. Some 
legal thoughts support limited regulation, but with the caveat of incentivizing commercial 
manufacturers to only develop beneficial/useful AI (McGinnis JO 2010). For better or worse, 
discussions about economics, law, and philosophy (Russell 2015) are attempting to shape the 
answer to what is beneficial/useful. How to intrinsically motivate (Baum 2017) developers to 
create beneficial AI? The challenge is that people justify actions based on needs (Kunda 1990). 
Commercial manufactures must support their bottom-line, whereas DoD has a different set of 
goals. 
The DoD Unique AI Challenge – It’s Secret! 
DoD has a different set of standards with regard to what is beneficial as compared to 
commercial needs. Yet, there are many things we can learn from industry. Certainly, DoD 
cannot afford an international incident regarding an autonomous system, especially a series of 
incidents that occur over a 20 month period. The significant challenge is that DoD must develop 
solutions in a sheltered and isolated environment, even from other classified projects. Even 
open source based oversight is limited. That is the reason system safety organizations are so 
vital in DoD and must have standards, measurements, policies and procedures to support their 
effort. Whether in the commercial world or DoD, AI functionality is considered to be 
unpredictable, unexplainable and goal uncertain (Yampolskiy, 2020). When we talk about AI 
safety issues for naval weapon systems, this has not typically included adversarial attacks that 
might affect functional performance. Given this perspective, AI adversarial network attacks 
using techniques like DeepFakes, putting an image/video into another image/video for mis-
categorization (Chauhan 2018), was not included this research, but may be considered for 
future investigation. Unpredictable, unexplainable and goal uncertain is still an significant issue 
with AI deployed technology, even when developers are motivated and doing their best (Deci 
1971, Krantz 2008). Even the best is still resulting in 18 incidents in 20 months. 
A major challenge that both DoD and commercial manufactures face is a race to the 
finish line (Armstrong 2016) approach to development. Is there something to be learned from 
the nuclear arms race? The obvious lesson is that we need oversight in the early stages of 
development (Borrie 2014). AI may have the same dramatic effect, as did the nuclear arms 
race. Consider the issues of putting military drones and weaponry under the full control of AI 
systems (Bohannon 2015). Now consider Murphy’s Law, “Anything that can go wrong, will.” 
When it comes to what we expect computers to do and what they will actually do, especially 
when development gets more complex, unwanted incidents are more likely to occur (Joy 
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2000). Note that the majority of research that was been initiated over a decade ago involving 
robotic “decisions” and actions was being funded by the military (Lin 2011). 
What DoD must ask is, “Can we deploy AI in safety critical functions, i.e., AI-enabled 
weapons acting autonomously?” The challenge to answering this question is in determining if an 
AI system can ever be “fixed”, become more reliable, to support safety needs, like brakes in a 
car. 
For both commercial and government AI development, the need for safety standards is 
becoming more prominent (Ozlati 2017). The federal government has taken the initiative. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is focused on creating standards that 
provide oversight for AI development. In their 52 page report (NIST 2019), one of the nine areas 
of focus is on metrics. This paper is offered for consideration to be included in the NIST 
standards for AI development with regard to measuring the quantity/size and 
quality/composition of training data.  
Navy System Safety for Weapons Deployment 
In order to overcome the unique challenges of ensuring there is adequate safety and 
security in naval ordnance, the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) formed. 
NOSSA, the funding organization for this research, recognized the AI system safety might 
require a special set of policies, guidelines and metrics. Their concern was that ML/AI 
algorithms could not be analyzed using traditional hazard analyses approaches (MIL-STD 
882E), nor would Federal Aviation Administration rigor guidelines (DO-178C) be adequate. 
NOSSA wanted to investigate requirements for unique analysis specific to AI development in 
military systems (Joint SSSEH v1.0). NOSSA also wanted to investigate if any new 
methodologies were needed to conduct adequate hazard analysis for AI deployed weapon 
systems (JS-SSA-IF Rev. A). 
This research was motivated based on the six critical reasons why the Navy needs to 
establish measurable confidence in Machine Learned algorithms being deployed in weapons 
systems: 
1. We cannot and should not expect the warfighter to accept and use AI as a social norm 
(Lapinski 2005), even when the best explainable AI techniques are available, without first having 
our Acquisition Community measurably establish confidence in Machine Learned algorithms 
being deployed in realistic operational environments. 
2. Acquisition communities cannot identify and certify operational constraints of an ML algorithm 
for deployment without having confidence in the training data quality, including any negative 
side effects (Everitt 2018), that might result from the training process.  
3. DoD Acquisition communities are limited when following commercial system safety guidelines 
because the commercial world does not have the same rigor requirements for ensuring AI 
functional behavior. Commercial manufacturers are driven by profit and may suffer from 
objective reasoning (Lewandowsky 2015) associated with the conflicting motivation to 
emphasize safety issues might result in lowering sales. 
4. AI upgrades to Navy programs of record that were initially developed following a Capability 
Maturity Model for traditional software development (Shneiderman 2020) currently exclude 
ML/AI development differences. Acquisition communities need support and oversight to fill this 
gap. 
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5. It is imperative that “Speed to the fleet” deployment of AI systems must overcome their 
motivational limitations and consider safety impacts of AI using planning, oversight and 
continuous monitoring by knowledgeable review boards that includes retrospective analysis of 
disasters (Shneiderman 2016).  
6. Navy Weapon System Explosive Safety Review Board (WSESRB) and other approval 
oversight authorities are limited in their assessment without adequate guidance and tools 
(Porter 2020, Jones 2019). Guidance and tools need to be a priority in DoD budgets. 
AI has a potential of creating a technology leap (Eden 2013). That potential leap, 
especially when dealing with weapon systems, needs scrutiny. This scrutiny focuses on the 
specificity of the composition and size of the training data. This research will describe the 
needed scrutiny by oversight groups can use to increase safety and confidence in the 
deployment of AI functions.  
The AI Acquisition Paradigm 
An ML/AI function is selected because it can handle “noisy” inputs and still make a 
decision as to category or value of the output, the former being categorization and the latter 
being regression. The success rate of an ML/AI function is the primary measurement, but 
success is limited to the quality and quantity data input used to train the algorithm. Because of 
this dependency, “garbage in, garbage out” becomes a determining factor in the capability of the 
algorithm. For ML/AI functions, the degree of “garbage in” can affect how unpredictable, 
unexplainable and goal uncertain the algorithm performs (Amodei 2016). 
Machine learning is a process where input data is used to train the algorithm to 
determine a correct answer. In general, training data sets have two parts: (1) the attributes that 
the function is learning to recognize, most times called instances, and (2) a truth label that 
describes the categorization of those attributes to train on correct answers. A trained ML 
function receives attributes and determines whether those attributes belong to a category such 
as a dog or cat. This research investigated measuring various aspects of attributes used for 
categorization. In the research, we divided attributes within the training set into three levels of 
significance: (1) primary, (2) secondary and (3) tertiary. In our sandbox analysis, we considered 
and determined that tertiary was unnecessary with regard to its modality. Our concern focused 
on the effects missing or sparse data occurrences had on the most significant attributes, i.e., a 
noisy operational environment where the unexpected happens. Unexpected examples might be 
communication link failures, sensor malfunctions or human data input error. 
Training set size and composition (Foody 1995) is the principal ingredient that 
establishes the quality and quantity of a Machine Learned algorithm. No matter how exceptional 
is your Data Scientist development team, without the adequate quality and quantity of training 
data, the algorithm will never meet operational needs. The problem is that training data is a new 
paradigm for acquisition managers to consider. There are methods to test the output (Pei 2017) 
to determine incorrect corner case behaviors. Some of this tests are provide “whitebox” 
analysis. Yet, even these tests don’t provide insights into the composition and size of the input, 
again raising the concern about “garbage in, garbage out.” Key areas needing to be addressed 
regarding “negative training” (Rodríguez-Pérez 2017), i.e., things to not categorize, or how well 
noisy data occurs within a “realistic” operational environment cannot be addressed without 
looking at input. How well does input represent missing and sparse data issues and how much 
of the data set training consist of these examples. Testing the output or reviewing the array of 
weights inside the box might provide insights, but direct measurements of inputs will provide 
facts. 
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Instead of the output performance, our approach focused on measuring training data 
input as an approach to increase algorithm success rate reliability (Kim 2014). Preparing the 
training data for measurement is a form of curation within the Data Science field. This type of 
curation rigor of the input will aid the developer in thinking about how “noise” might affect the 
algorithm when deployed in its operational environment. Obviously, it is always important to 
measure output, but this research demonstrates the value of detailed measurements of the 
input. 
Training ML algorithm based on operational environment “realism” was the primary 
motivation behind the development of these measurements. Since “realism” was the goal, it was 
necessary to create a program that represented products that would eventually be deployed in 
the operation environment. For the purpose, a “Sandbox” was created. 
Our “Sandbox” – Because “Seeing is Believing” 
Results of this research are based on using a “Sandbox” implementation approach that 
represents completion of three phases of a four-phase research approach. A “Sandbox” 
implementation approach means that a project was created, stakeholder requirements 
generated, architecture defined, design constructed, code developed and tests conducted within 
a confined, controllable environment for training, experimentation and analysis. Our Sandbox is 
designed to support seven different AI-enabled algorithms. To support realism, a mocked up 
acquisition program was created that consisted of five different AI-enabled algorithms 
supporting a mission planner and three different AI-enabled algorithms supporting two deployed 
autonomous vehicles. Both mission planner and autonomous vehicles had a full set of DoDAF 
system diagrams and UML Sequence Diagrams defining interfaces associated with software 
message transfer, SQL commands and application programming interfaces (APIs). These 
artifacts were designed in detail and reviewed before proceeding with ML algorithm investigation 
and development. Using this process allowed for an understanding of needed measurements 
regarding training sets. We also developed and reviewed a graphic user interface (GUI) and 
how human interaction plays a role in safe AI. 
The Sandbox provided an opportunity for experimentation of an integrated hybrid 
system, combining various AI technologies to represent advanced capabilities (Baum 2011). 
This hybrid system allowed for “what-if” variations and intentional mistakes to investigate and 
test various measurements and approaches that could affect accurate forecasts and thereby 
resolve ML behavioral issues in advance. The following ML algorithms were either coded or 
design reviewed for implementation in the Sandbox: (1) for the Mission Planner -- Naïve Bayes, 
Logistic Regression, Random Forest, k Nearest Neighbor and XG-Boost, and (2) for the 
autonomous vehicles – Deep Neural Network, Deep Reinforced Learning and Convolutional 
Neural Networks. Algorithm design review included hyper-parameters variations specific to the 
algorithm under investigation. 
The eventual goal of the “Sandbox” is to develop code and analytical measurements for 
all five different AI-enabled algorithms supporting the mission planner and all the three different 
AI-enables algorithms used within the autonomous vehicles. Within the sandbox environment, 
identified AI-enabled systems were analyzed and the measurements described below were 
identified to address the issue of how quality and quantity of training data might affect the 
confidence in the behavior of the algorithm in a deployed environment.  
This phase of the research has resulted in postulating 14 tips that include best practices 
and measurements spanning requirements, architecture, design, development and test. All 14 
tips focus on how to improve confidence in ML algorithm behavior. This paper presents results 
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associated with two key tips regarding measurements to determine if there is adequate quality 
and quantity of data within a training set for the ML algorithm to meet operational needs. The 
measurement approaches described in this paper are to demonstrate the reliability of the 
training set in establishing confidence in the behavior of the machine learned algorithm.  
The paper will highlight insights into both the quality and quantity of the attributes within 
the training set instances. An instance is a single sample of data used for training the algorithm. 
The motivation of this research is to include the proposed measurements as part of Objective 
Quality Evidence (OQE) gathering when submitting recommendations by system safety 
practitioners for Weapons Systems Explosive Review Board (WSESRB) review in support of 
justifying ML behavior confidence. In addition to OQE, the research findings will also provide 
valuable insight to the acquisition community, to include program managers, and test and 
evaluation engineers. 
Training Data Modality  
When creating training data, it is important to understand the operational environment 
being represented in order to ensure adequate development of the ML algorithms. The training 
data is either found from live events or synthetically created to match the operational scenario 
that will be provided as input to the ML algorithm. Therefore, the ML algorithm must learn how to 
perform under these conditions. Three types of modality represent various operational 
environments that can be encountered during deployment, where the type of modality defines 
how the ML algorithm needs to be trained. 
ML Training Data Modality 1: This modality supports training data sets that are based on 
an operational environment from multiple data sources, where each source contains one or 
more attributes as described in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the various sources of separate data 
attributes is either found from live events or synthetically simulations created to match the 
deployed operational scenario. Therefore, the input for ML algorithm for training needs to 
replicate the input that will be received during deployment. 
 
Figure 1. ML Training Data Modality 1 
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ML Training Data Modality 2: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a single data source, where the single data source contains multiple data 
attributes as described in Figure 2. In Figure 2, the one stream set of aggregated attributes is 
either found from live events or synthetically simulations created to match the deployed 
operational scenario. Therefore, the input for ML algorithm for training needs to replicate the 
input during deployment. 
Figure 2 represents several versions of Modality 2, labeled (a), (b), (c) and (d). Version 
(a) describes the simple case where a sensor is capturing an image (in some frequency 
spectrum) that contains all the attributes needed to train the ML algorithm. As in all versions, 
Version (a) contains all the attributes needed to train the ML algorithm based on how the 
algorithm will be operationally deployed. Version (b) describes how one sensor might create a 
string of images causing channels for the ML algorithm to learn. Each channel might require one 
algorithm or a unique set of algorithms for processing. Version (c) describes a series of images, 
similar to Version (b), but in this case, as in an attempt to capture a 3-D image, where the 
combination of each slice of the image may constitute a single attribute that is part of the 
training. Finally, Version (d) describes how multiple attributes sources might be fused/combined 
into one source that will be used for training the ML algorithm. Again, the selection of Modality 2 
Versions is based on the operational need/requirements associated with its deployment. 
 
Figure 2. ML Training Data Modality 2 
ML Training Data Modality 3: Training data sets that are based on an operational 
environment from a combination of multiple data sources where each source contains one or 
more attributes form various sources and from a single source containing multiple aggregated 
data attributes. 
Modality 3 is the most challenging data set to replicate or find that can adequately 
represent “realistic” operational environments. In all three modalities, the primary challenge with 
using adequate data sets for ML training is to ensure the training set accurately represents 
“realistic” operational environments. The more complex in the composition of data sources that 
the ML algorithm needs for training in order to adequately perform its function, the more 
challenging it is to replicate a “realistic” training set that includes issues, such as communication 
failures over data links, unintentional human input error or sensor malfunctions. Additional 
challenges stem from adequately replicating noise that blur, surround or somehow challenges 
the data source feeding the ML algorithm. For example, synthetic replication of a single attribute 
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over various slices of an image may be difficult to create with the adequate noise background, 
e.g., the blur needs to be consistent. The difficulty increases when that attribute needs to train 
the ML algorithm using hundreds of slight variations. Complications increase when dozens of 
attributes need to be included within the slices of images that will constitute a training set will 
realistically represent the required operational environment. 
 
Figure 3. ML Training Data Modality 3 
Given these potential challenges, a need to measure the quality and quantity of the data 
set to meet the operational needs of a “realistic,” noisy environment become essential to ensure 
confidence in the behavior of the ML algorithm during deployment. 
Missing and Sparse Data Effects on Modality  
For Modality 1, missing data can be represented as a sensor, communication link or 
human input issue. The sandbox software filtered the faulty data as being out of performance 
bounds and therefore provided no values. Sparse data occurred when the sensor, 
communication link or human input was properly working but data was unavailable for the ML 
algorithm to use. In this case, the sandbox implementation design provided zero values for 
those data sources. The sandbox software handled the zero values as no input to the ML 
algorithm. The challenge for Modality 1 is that missing and sparse issues can occur at the same 
time from different data sources. Either the data source fails, causing missing data or the data 
source does not register any input. In either case, the sandbox software filtered the sparse or 
missing data and therefore provided no values in those situations. Therefore, when developing 
AI functions, the training data needs to represent these occurrences and the developer needs 
an approach to handle the occurrences of sparse or missing attribute data. In the case of the 
sandbox, the training set consisted of secondary attributes when the primary attributes were not 
present. Primary attributes represent nominal input expectations, whereas secondary attributes 
are a back up to the unexpected. 
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For Modality 2, we still used our previous definition of missing or sparse data, when 
either occurs from a single sensor. Because a single source was replicated, only one could 
occur but not both. From our sources, this was an accurate representation of a realistic 
operational environment. For Modality 3, the combination of missing and sparse data could 
occur causing significant replication issues with regard to the training data set supporting a 
“realistic” operational environment. It is important to note that in Modality 2 and 3, missing and 
sparse data issues become even more challenging because filter techniques, like used in our 
sandbox, are harder to apply. For example, if missing data occurs, then the sensor may be 
malfunctioning causing blurs in the image, which would require the developer to train on 
secondary attributes that compensate for this type of blur in the picture. Once the first algorithm 
failed to categorize above threshold, this compensation approach may require a second 
algorithm trained on primary and secondary combination of attributes within the image. If the 
image contains no attributes, potentially from a sparse data issue, then categorization is 
impossible, there would be no secondary attributes to use. Again, complexity of how the training 
data is composed becomes more challenging, but needs to be addressed as part of oversight. 
Training Set Composition Measurements 
In developing our measurement approach to better ensure a training set represented a 
“realistic” operational environment, it was important to measure how well the training data 
represented both in quality and quantity missing and sparse issues with the data sources. Table 
1, rows (a), (b), (c) and (d), represents questions that need to be addressed based on Modality, 
first by adequately defining the operation environment the training set represents based on 
modularity and then by ensuring the quality and quantity of data is adequate for the ML 
algorithm training. 
 
Table 1. ML Training Data Investigation Topics by Modality Types 
In Table 1, each row represents a series of questions associated with the modality of the 
ML Training set. Row (a) introduces the need to group attributes in terms of 
precedence/significance with regard to an expected operational norm and potential source 
failures (causing Missing and Sparse data issues) that the ML algorithm needs to learn in terms 
of data inputs. What attributes are primary to consider for training the ML algorithm? What 
attributes are secondary? Depending on the operational environment, there may be “n” number 
of groupings. Row (b) focuses on missing and sparse data modeling of attributes for training. As 
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described in the previous section, missing and sparse data issues can direct attribute 
precedence. For example, when one primary attribute is not available, can another attribute in 
the secondary group be used to increase behavior confidence? Is the ML Algorithm being 
trained to use primary and secondary combinations of attributes? Row (c) defines an approach 
to analyze quality based on a precedence list. Within each group, what is of highest precedence 
for the ML algorithm so it can be adequately trained? The answer to this question ensures that 
the developer understands the relationship between attributes and the operational environment 
those attributes will support. Finally, Row (d) focuses on the need to understand if the quantity 
of training data is sufficient. Although quantity may be analyzed using overfitting and underfitting 
techniques specific to the algorithm being trained, this quantity analysis is based on how much 
more emphasis is placed on training data with higher precedence vs lower precedence. For 
example, if higher precedence/significant attributes are based on nominal operational 
conditions, then by definition of precedence/significance, slight variations of higher precedence 
attributes should have a greater or at least equal number of instances as compared to lower 
precedence attributes. If this is not the case, then why is one attribute group more significant 
over the other? Row (d) topic of investigation asks the questions, “Is there sufficient training 
data based on precedence grouping?” Measurements described in this paper provide answers 
to the topic investigation questions shown in Table 1. 
Training Data Measurements 
Using the sandbox, we created and examined two types of measurements that support 
answers to the questions posed in Table 1. The focus of both measurements is on 
attributes/features within each sample/instance. 
If synthetic data is created, then a Design of Experiments (DOE) review needs to be 
performed during the requirements and architecture stages, e.g., somewhere during preliminary 
design review (PDR) and critical design review (CDR) timeframes. This become obvious while 
working within our sandbox development environment. In our sandbox, we used a modeling and 
simulation (M&S) approach to create training data. We developed a DOE that ensured primary 
and secondary data sources were created to support five ML classes using various 
combinations of seventeen attributes. Figure 4 represents the sandbox data sources, real-time 
and synthetic, and includes the operational environmental variables that are translated into 17 
attributes supporting five classes/categories. 
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Figure 4. Operational Environment being Represented using M&S Synthetic Data 
Training Set Alignment Test (TSAT) 
Training Set Alignment Test (TSAT) is an approach we recommend using during 
requirements definition, architecture review and finally during algorithm code analysis. When 
creating synthetic training set data via modeling and simulations, attributes from highest to 
lowest significance should be identified in the Design of Experiments (DOE) to ensure proper 
emphasis is placed on primary, secondary to n-levels of precedence.  
In our sandbox analysis using synthetic training set creation from simulations, we were 
able to develop the TSAT measurement process. Figure 5 diagrams the steps discussed below 
when taking a TSAT measurement: 
• At Requirements stage and checked during Architecture review 
• First Step: Determine what attributes are most significant as compared to others in 
terms of the function the ML algorithm must perform. Note: this is based on the part the 
algorithm plays in the mission. What functions must it perform so the other subsystems 
can achieve their goals? For example, a common ML algorithm function is computer 
vision. What are the most significant attributes it should use to perform its image 
recognition function? 
• Second Step: Group the most significant attributes and consider them as primary 
attributes to the algorithm’s learning process 
• Third Step: Group the other algorithms in terms of secondary and tertiary significance in 
terms of what the algorithm needs to learn 
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• When training set is produced, conduct analysis (Note: we’ve included the next three steps 
as part of Algorithm Code review because training data creates the weights and structures 
that constitute the deployed code). 
• Fourth Step: When the training data set is generated/gathered, use the statistics of how 
often an attribute occurred to determine the ranking. 
• Fifth Step: Perform a weighted calculation (similar to a discrete match filter in signal 
processing.) 
• Sixth Step: Determine if this grade, meaning the determination of how well the DOE 
goal matches the generated/created data. In this approach, the grades range up to 
100%, where 100%i s a perfect alignment between operational needs and training data, 
where below 25% is extremely poor. Even with the most tolerant requirements, it is 
recommended that anything below fifty percent should not be accepted. 
 
Figure 5. TSAT Diagram of Steps 
TSAT ensures that the developer verifies that the attribute priority and ML training set 
modality is congruent between the deployed architecture and the training data set generation 
process based on the precedence/rating of attributes defined in TSAT. This will also document 
compliance to requirements for review. 
Procedure for calculation: 
1. Determine a scale for grading from 1 to “m,” where “m” means greatest attribute 
priority/significance based on operational deployed needs. 
2. Identify attributes a1 to an to grade, such that “n” is the number of attributes being graded 
out of r total attributes available. Therefore n ≤ r and n ≤ m, where grading ai with grade 
“m” indicates ai (m) is the most important attribute based on operational needs. 
Additionally, attribute grading range is (m-n+1) to m, consecutively, where lowest grade 
indicates least operationally important (possibly DOE analysis and/or SME 
determination). 
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3. Identify the n attributes that occur the most times in the training data. Using the same 
scale “m,” grade attributes b1 to bn based which attribute occurred the most often within 
the training set (this can be a statistical number, e.g., 70% of the time bi attribute was 
used in simulations or 70% of the samples/instances were collected, e.g., images, that 
contained attribute bi). Again, grade “m” indicates bi occurred the most and (m-n+1) 
indicates bj occurred the least within the training set. 
4. Perform 𝑘𝑘 =) and 𝛽𝛽 =∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔)  ≤ 𝑚𝑚  
5. Perform ∗ 100 =  𝛼𝛼% ≥ 50% as a constraint 
Source to Attribute Ratios – nth Order Grouping (StAR-n) 
Source to Attribute Ratios – nth Order Grouping (StAR-n) is an approach that can be 
used during requirements definition, architecture reviews and finally during code analysis. The 
basic premise is that attributes (e.g., primary, secondary or tertiary groupings) with the highest 
significance (precedence/rating) identified in the DOE (defined in TSAT) should be occur in 
greater numbers of instances within the Training Set than lower significance attributes. The 
comparison of numbers can be analyzed as ratios.  
The reason why developers should verify that primary instances have greater numbers 
than secondary, and so on, is because: (1) With live data collection, there is a difficulty with 
finding or creating realistic training data that includes noisy environments representing missing 
and sparse data issues; and (2) With synthetic data creation, there is a physical limitation with 
how much simulation can be performed within the timeframe allotted? (Remember that most 
likely there is an infinite number of possibilities in terms of training data variations.) What should 
be the priority in your DOE?  
In our sandbox analysis, we were able to develop the StAR-n measurement process. 
Figure 6 diagrams the steps discussed below when taking a StAR-n measurement: 
• At Requirements stage and checked during Architecture review: 
• First Step: Create a ten by ten matrix, labeling each axis from zero to 1.  
• Second Step: Label the horizontal axis “% Number of Primary Attributes vs Total 
Attributes for Class” and the vertical axis “% Number of Primary Attribute Instances vs 
All Instances for Class”  
• Third Step: Determine a three-color zone scheme (see Figure 6 as an example), where 
green indicates that the ratio fell within acceptable limits, yellow indicates ratio is boarder 
line acceptable, and red color zone indicated ration is outside expected limits. Color of 
the zone should how well training data reflects operational environment. Based on color 
zone, determine evidence justification. Examples (used for guidance only) are described 
below:  
• Zone Green: Evidence of data by showing appropriate n-th order groups of training 
sets collected or generated by the simulations, including success rates as well as 
the TSAT results. 
• Zone Yellow: Zone Green evidence plus justification on why n-th group precedence 
can still handle the unexpected and provide acceptable success rates. 
• Zone Red: Zone Green and Yellow evidence as to how this algorithm is going to be 
supervised or monitored when operationally unexpected events occur. 
 
• When training set is produced during Algorithm code review: 
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• Fourth Step: Calculate the σ and δ (see Figure 6 as an example) ratios. Each ratio 
should be less than 1. The example below is for primary attributes, but can be done for 
any n-th order attributes: 
• σ (by Class) = (Number of Primary Attributes / Number of All Attributes) ≤ 1. 
• δ (by Class) = (Number of all Primary Instances / Number of All Instances) ≤ 1. 
• Fifth Step: Plot (x, y) using (σ, δ) pair of numbers and assess where the pair fall within 
the color zones to determine support action. An example is provided in Figure 6. 
• Zone Green: Evidence of data by showing appropriate n-th order groups of 
training sets collected or generated by the simulations, including success rates 
as well as the TSAT results. 
• Zone Yellow: Zone Green evidence plus justification on why n-th group 
precedence can still handle the unexpected and provide acceptable success 
rates. 
• Zone Red: Zone Green and Yellow evidence as to how this algorithm is going to 
be supervised or monitored when operationally unexpected events occur. 
 
 
Figure 6. StAR-n Diagram of Steps 
Notice that in Figure 6, the five classes have been plotted based on our sandbox results, 
provided as an example. Given the plot, there are two classes in the green, two in the yellow 
and one in the red. The color scheme relates to the type of justification needed in support of 
using the training data for those classes to adequately develop the algorithm to support the 
required operational environment. Since there is a significant mismatch when a (σ, δ) pair a 
plotted in the red zone, as in our example in Figure 6, we need to make sure that this algorithm 
has supervision when the expected occurs. Justification and the relationship to which boxes are 
colored needs to be described during requirements and checked during the architecture review. 
Again, the periods can be around PDR and CDR. 
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Matrices can be created for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary attributes, not just Primary. 
The StAR-n Grouping Matrix for this sandbox was only 2nd order. A StAR-3 looks at ratios of 
primary, secondary and tertiary attributes, as they are defined through requirements. As stated, 
training data is key to the development and the question becomes how much of the training data 
consist of primary vs secondary vs tertiary attributes as dependent on data sources that will be 
available in the field. Again, the issue becomes missing and sparse data during deployed 
operations.  
StAR-n provides confidence to the system safety practitioner or test and evaluation 
engineer when the training data is generated synthetically and an attribute random generator is 
used. StAR-n ensures that justification is provided as Level of Rigor evidence based on primary, 
secondary, … n-th order attribute ratios to training data content ratios as part of the assessment 
of operational needs compared to what the training data contains. 
In the Sandbox, an attribute random generator was used to create 15,000 simulations 
supporting 5 classes and 17 attributes. The analysis focused on determining the “Simulation to 
Attribute Ratios” for 1, 2 or 3 (nth) Order and graphed in a matrix to determine what type of rigor 
is needed to justify the ratio involved with each class being modeled via selected attributes. 
Consideration included how the attribute random generator creating the training data simulated 
an operational environment of sparse and missing data for the targeted algorithm to learn. The 
matrix using StAR-n identifies the need for the three types of justification, Zone Green, Yellow 
and Red, as described above. 
StAR-n measures data source requirements, architecture and data set generation 
process specific to the categorized ratios of attributes defined. This measurement helps ensure 
that the developer is reflecting reality during algorithm development. 
Combining TSAT and StAR-n ensures congruency between the operational environment 
and the training data set generation process. Figure 7 graphically describes the congruency 
using our sandbox classes between the blue operational deployment of the algorithms and the 
brown development of training data incorporating the attributes that will be available to the 
algorithm during operations. 
It should be noted that labeling attributes/features, especially when live data is being 
collected, can be challenging. Labeling each instance within a Modularity 2 training set means 
looking at each sample and ranking, grouping and counting various n-order attributes. The 
challenge increases when evaluating effective sample size and the correlation between the 
attributes. Effective sample size affects the total number of instances used for training and 
therefore the classifier’s performance/confidence interval (Figueroa 2012). Feature correlation 
affects total number of attributes used for training. Correlation can be measured and observed. 
For example, a smile affects two sides of the mouth. It would be inappropriate to consider both 
ends of the mouth as two different attributes. They are not independent events. Statistical 
independence of attribute within an instance affects algorithm training. A smile, a single 
attribute, can have many variations that affect both sizes of the mouth. Effective sample size is 
related to the randomness of each created or observed instance. Again, the samples should 
support statistical independence. 
Instances and features within the instances need scrutiny to know if an algorithm is 
taught properly. Without this focus, the training would be uncontrolled. It would be like 
instructing children math and not knowing if they are being taught the “right” mix of problems or 
just the same problem with different letters for the variables. In training algorithms, it is important 
to ensure the training content is specific to the feature level of the education. This rigor is 
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practiced in life sciences (Toloşi 2011) where wrong conclusions might lead to fatality. This 
same level of rigor should apply to any function performing operations that could cause lives to 
be at risk. Therefore, as applied to DoD, effective sample size and attribute/feature correlation 
of each instance needs to both be assessed as statistically independent (or at an acceptable 
low correlation) when applying TSAT and StAR-n measurements to training sets of algorithms 
performing operations that could cause lives to be at risk. 
 
Figure 7. TSAT and StAR-n ensure congruency between what will be operationally deployed and what 
will be synthetically developed or collected from live data sources. 
Numerical and Graphical Interpretation of Measurements 
Using sandbox generated training sets, both TSAT and StAR-n were applied. Figure 8 and 
Table 2 represent the TSAT analysis for 17 attributes used by five classes from our sandbox. 
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Figure 8. Sandbox Results from Applying TSAT Measurements for the LT class. 
In Figure 8 (one of the five classes), you can notice that the blue and red bars are fairly 
equal in height causing a high score of 80%. Visually, if blue and red bars have significantly 
different heights, then a lower score will occur. 
 
Table 2. Attribute Alignment Scores for Each of the Five Classes 
When looking a StAR-n ratios, Figure 9 describes a visual inspection of the two axis in 
the matrix. The “Instances Ratio” represents the vertical axis, “% Number of Primary Attribute 
Sims vs All Sims for Class.” The “Attribute Ratio” represents the horizontal axis, “% Number of 
Primary Attributes vs Total Attributes for Class.” In Figure 9, there are an equal number of 
primary and secondary attributes, as seen in the “Attribute Ratio” graph. In the “Instances Ratio” 
graph, although equal in number, there are more primary attributes in the training set.  
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Figure 9. Visual Review of Instances Ratio to Attribute Ratio in StAR-n Matrix 
To better understand the significance of the ratios, consider the combinations of training 
instances based on use of the sandbox. In Figure 10, just focusing on whether an attribute, i.e., 
data source, will be present or not in the operational environment. Class combinations range 
from 821 to 2026, totaling 9580 different combinations. If we decided to train our ML algorithm 
to recognize a class based on attribute presences and numerical integer value, the 
combinations become extremely large. If we decide to have values in the real number domain, 
the combinations become infinite. 
How much training data can you generate or collect to support 9580 combinations, in the 
simple case, or an infinite number of values in the extreme case? Therefore, it is necessary to 
prioritize attributes in terms of the number and type of instances within the training set. That is 
why TSAT and StAR-n are vital measurements. 
 
Figure 10. Attribute Occurrence Combinatorial Variations of Primary and Secondary Attribute Types per 
Class within Sandbox 
From this research, three guidelines when using StAR-n to analyze ratios consistently surfaced.  
Guideline 1: Order of precedence/significance should also describe ratio structure. 
Primary should have more instances than Secondary, Secondary should have more instances 
than Tertiary, etc. Describing the obvious, you would not want the ratios to be inverted, meaning 
the secondary would have more secondary attributes than the primary. 
Guideline 2: Depending on the n-th order grouping of significance, there should be 
instances, therefore ratio values, for all n-th order combinations. Figure 11 describes when a 
tertiary attribute group, equal in number to the primary and secondary attributes, was omitted 
from the modeling and simulation. This means that the training data will not support the 









Total 1st and 2nd 
Order
Keep 2 1st Order Keep 3 1st Order Keep 4 1st Order Keep 5 1st Order Keep 6 1st Order
Total 
Configurations
LT 5 5 10 560 210 30 1 0 821
MT 6 5 11 1890 1120 315 36 1 3384
UT 5 6 11 840 280 35 1 0 1178
MR 6 4 10 1050 700 225 30 1 2026
DP 6 4 10 1050 700 225 30 1 2026
9580
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Guideline 3: If one of the n-th order grouping attributes is less than 5% (conservatively) 
in the attribute ratio graph, consider including it in other attribute groupings. Remember that a 
lower order attribute is likely to have less simulated or live data instances collected. This means 
that the instances will be lower than 5%, and likely be between 1 and 2% if Rule 1 and 2 are 
followed. Therefore, it may make more sense to include this n-th order attribute into another 
attribute group. 
 
Figure 11. TSAT and StAR-n Identified Issues. 
By following the three guidelines, valuable discussions can occur with the developer. As 
a reminder, the order significance sources relates to primary, secondary and tertiary data 
sources providing the related attributes in the algorithm. In Figure 11, tertiary data source 
creating attributes is not included, like our sandbox example, which means tertiary attributes i 
“not significant” from DOE viewpoint. It could be that there is less than 5%, which is causing the 
tertiary attributes to not be considered for ML algorithm training. In our sandbox, there were no 
tertiary attributes. 
The Figure 11 example provides discussion points as follows: 
• In Attributes Ratio, notice that 1st and 2nd attribute grouping have about the same 
number of attributes. Yet, if primary and secondary attributes are equally produced in the 
simulation, why is one group considered more significant than the other? This may not 
be wrong but definitely a discussion point for the developer. In this example, maybe 2nd 
order plays important role acting as a noisy environment or non-ideal environment. If of 
equal importance, then maybe there are only primary attributes. If so, is a noisy 
environment still being modeled? No right or wrong answers, just discussions that 
should be had on the operational environment and how the ML algorithm is being 
trained. 
• In this example, there is a potential issue: If 1st and 2nd order are about the same number 
of simulations and this needs to be understood. What also needs to be discussed is why 
the fraction of attribute occurrence in the training set is so disproportionate to the fraction 
of total attributes? (Again, 2nd order acts as noisy or none ideal environment) 
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• Should the 2nd order and 1st order be a different ratio given the attribute numbers are 
about equal? 
• Consider a better ratio, possibly 33 % to 66%, meaning I’ve run twice as many 
simulations on the 1st order vs the 2nd order. 
Findings 
From a sandbox approach, Table 3 became evident in terms of how much AI and traditional 
software code differ with respect to the acquisition process: 
 
Table 3. Traditional Logic vs Likelihood Software– Why treat ML/AI Algorithms differently in Acquisition. 
A key question asked in this paper was, “Can the safety question with regard to weapon 
deployment regarding autonomy/AI ever be answered?” This paper answers this question in 
terms of rigor with regard to the training data. The measurements focused on improving 
confidence to an acceptable standard defined in requirements, checked during architecture and 
validated when reviewing the algorithm coding practices. To improve confidence of ML/AI 
behavior within the sandbox, TSAT and StAR-n measurements focus on n-th order grouping of 
attributes based on nominal operations for primary grouping, and non-nominal operations for 
lower level grouping. The cause of non-nominal operations is noise or faults in the deployed 
system. As described in previous sections, noise or faults result in missing and sparse data. 
How missing and sparse data affect the training data is based on the type of modality, as was 
discussed. TSAT and StAR-n measurements allows for ML algorithm training that ensures a 
match between the training data set and reality in the operational environment.  
In the Sandbox, an attribute random generator was used to create 15,000 simulations 
supporting 5 classes and 17 attributes. The analysis focused on determining the “Simulation to 
Attribute Ratios” for 2nd Order analysis and graphed in a matrix to determine what type of OQE 
rigor was needed to justify the ratio involved with each class being modeled via selected 
attributes. Consideration included how the attribute random generator creating the training data 
simulated an operational environment of sparse and missing data for the targeted algorithm to 
learn. The matrix, using StAR-n, identifies the need for various types of rigor described 
previously based on where it is located in the matrix. 
TSAT and StAR-n demonstrated that these measurement can support quality and 
quantity factual analysis that can be used by the acquisition community, including system safety 
and test and evaluation groups, to improve the confidence of the behavior of the algorithm to 
support a realistic deployment operations. From these measurement processes, issues 
associated with training, i.e., “garbage in,” can be identified and resolved in advance and 
thereby increase ML functional confidence.  
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In our analysis, we were able to successfully use TSAT to ensure synthetic data for each 
of the five classes and 17 attributes had adequate quality and quantity of training data. 
The basic premise is that attributes (primary, secondary and tertiary) with the highest 
significance identified in the Design of Experiments (DOE) should be simulated more 
than attributes with lower significance. TSAT can effectively analyze Primary, Secondary to 
an n-th order data sources to determine if the training data is adequately aligned the 
Operational Needs defined in the DOE (note that the DOE must match operational use cases 
associated with mission parameter and environment). 
1) We were also able to successfully use StAR-n. The Star-n can effectively use ratios involving 
primary, secondary to an n-th order, as they are defined by requirements and described in the 
architecture. As stated, training data is key to the development and the question becomes 
how much of the training data consist of primary vs secondary vs tertiary attributes, etc., 
as dependent on data sources that will be available in the field. StAR-n provides 
confidence to the system safety practitioner or test and evaluation engineer whether the 
training data is generated synthetically or collected from live events. StAR-n ensures that 
a Level of Rigor is provided based on primary, secondary and tertiary attribute ratios being 
with expected values. 
By using both StAR-n and TSAT, the sandbox proved that quality and quantity of training 
data can be assessed. For TSAT, quality assessment meant the correct ranking of attributes 
(including primary, secondary, etc. mixes) that represented real world deployment issues 
associated with data source availability, which included noise factors. For StAR-n, quantity 
assessment meant the appropriate amount of samples/instances used for training based on 
operational priorities, which considered the mix of n-th order attribute ratios. Combining both 
measurements provides the Acquisition community, from project managers to test and 
evaluation engineers, the ability to maintain positive control over knowing that an AI/ML 
algorithm have been rigorously developed to support the expected behavior during deployment, 
even worst case environments. Why? Because using these measurements ensured that those 
environments were captured using the adequate quality and quantity of samples/instances 
needed to train the ML algorithm to deal with those issues. 
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Abstract 
Today’s warfighters are bombarded with information and faced with challenging decision spaces 
as technology exponentially expands and threat environments become more complex. Artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are advancements that can lessen the burden on the 
warfighter. AI systems offer far-reaching benefits—improving situational awareness and detection 
and understanding of threats and adversary capabilities and intents; identifying and evaluating 
possible tactical courses of action; and offering methods to predict outcomes and effects of 
course of action decisions. AI systems are the key to understanding and addressing highly 
complex tactical situations.  
AI systems offer advantages to the warfighter, but only if these systems are engineered and 
implemented correctly and in a manner that lessens the warfighter’s cognitive load. Implementing 
AI systems for defense applications presents unique challenges. This paper identifies four unique 
challenges and describes how they affect the tactical warfighter, the engineering design 
community, and national defense. This paper offers solution ideas for addressing these unique 
challenges through defense acquisition and systems engineering initiatives. 
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, machine learning, complexity, tactical decision aids, systems 
engineering, trust, human–machine teaming 
Introduction 
AI is a field that includes many different approaches with the objective of creating 
machines with intelligence (Mitchell, 2019). Figure 1 shows a simple Venn diagram with 
machine learning (ML) as a subset of AI, and with AI as a subset of the broader category of 
automation. Automated systems function with minimal human input and often perform repetitive 
tasks based on commands and rules. AI systems perform functions that mimic human 
intelligence. They incorporate learning from past experiences with new information received to 
make decisions and reach conclusions. 
Figure 1. Venn Diagram of Automation, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning 
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There are two primary types of AI systems, as described in Figure 2. The first type, which 
are explicitly programmed, are also known as Handcrafted Knowledge Systems. Allen (2020) 
described Handcrafted Knowledge Systems as “AI that use traditional, rules-based software to 
codify subject matter knowledge of human experts into a long series of programmed ‘if given x 
input, then provide y output’ rules” (p. 3). These systems use traditional, or normal, programming 
languages. The second type are ML systems that are trained from large sets of data. The ML 
systems “learn” from the trained data sets, and the “trained” system is then used operationally to 
produce predicted outcomes given new operational data. 
Figure 2. Two Types of Artificial Intelligence: Explicitly Programmed and Learning Systems 
 
Automation, AI, and ML systems—both handcrafted knowledge systems and learning 
systems—offer great potential for the Department of Defense (DoD) with diverse applications in 
most mission domains. These intelligent systems can extend the DoD’s abilities to make sense 
of complex and uncertain situations, to develop and weigh options, to predict the success of 
actions, and to assess the consequences. They offer the potential to support the DoD in 
strategic, planning, and tactical domains. AI systems can lessen the burden on the warfighter, 
but only if these systems are engineered and implemented correctly and in a manner that 
lessens the warfighter’s cognitive load. Implementing AI systems for defense applications 
presents unique challenges. This paper identifies four unique challenges and describes how 
they affect the tactical warfighter, the engineering design community, and national defense. 
The first unique challenge in implementing AI systems for defense applications is that 
tactical warfare presents highly complex situations. Tactical complexity can involve information 
overload, multiple concurrent missions that need to be addressed, time-critical decisions with 
dire consequences, unknowns/inaccuracies/incompleteness in situational awareness, and 
engineering challenges arising from the interoperability required among a diverse set of 
distributed warfare capabilities. Adding AI systems into this already-complex environment is a 
necessary but highly challenging endeavor.  
The second unique challenge is that AI systems require large amounts of data for the 
systems to be trained. The quality of the resulting AI systems that are developed depends 
largely on the quality and quantity of the training data sets. Data in the military domain can be 
especially hard to come by. Military data may involve classification issues, cyber vulnerabilities, 
data validation challenges, and may simply be very costly and time-consuming to gather based 
on the need for fleet exercises and war games.  
The third unique challenge is that the engineering of AI systems presents a new frontier 
for systems engineering. In traditional systems, behavior is set and is therefore predictable: 
given an input and conditions, the system will produce a predictable output. Some AI solutions 
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may involve systems that are complex in their own right—adapting and learning—and therefore 
producing unforeseen outputs and behaviors. In fact, the intent of some AI systems is to do just 
that—team with a human decision-maker by taking on some of the cognitive load and producing 
intelligent recommendations. Systems engineering methods are needed to engineer intelligent 
systems and ensure that they are explainable, trustable, and safe to human operators.  
The fourth unique challenge is that for defense applications there is always a potential 
adversary that needs to be considered. In terms of AI systems, the acquisition community must 
be mindful that peer competitor nations are making their own strides in AI advancements. U.S. 
defense systems must also advance in this AI race. Cyberattacks are always a possibility in 
defense systems. As defense capabilities increase reliance on automation and AI systems, this 
may be creating more cyber vulnerabilities. Finally, technology is rapidly evolving, and the 
adversarial threat space is changing. The defense acquisition and systems engineering 
communities must ensure that AI systems evolve and adapt to address changes in the threat 
environment and do this in a trustable and safe manner. 
Challenge: Complex Decision Spaces 
The first unique challenge is that many defense domains present a complex decision 
space. Therefore, engineering and implementing appropriate AI systems to address this 
complexity will be highly challenging. Figure 3 highlights some of the many factors that 
contribute to decision complexity in the tactical domain. Naval strike force operations, as an 
example, can quickly change from a peaceful state to one of great peril-- requiring alertness to 
the threat and appropriate response actions—all within a highly compressed decision time line. 
Tactical threats may arise from underwater, on the surface, in the air, from the land, from space, 
or even virtually, resulting in the need to address multiple time-critical missions. With naval and 
defense assets on ships, submarines, aircraft, land, and in space; the tactical decision space 
must address the optimal collaborative use of these dispersed and diverse resources. 
Developing effective tactical courses of action must also occur in highly dynamic operational 
environments with only partial and uncertain situational knowledge. The decision space must 
also consider constraints imposed by command authority, rules of engagement, and tactical 
doctrine. The role of humans as tactical decision-makers adds to the complexity of the decision 
space—with the challenges of information overload, operator error, AI trust, and AI ambiguity 
and explainability issues. Finally, the stakes can be very high for tactical decisions and their 
possible consequences. 
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Figure 3. Factors that Lead to Tactical Decision Space Complexity 
 
Addressing highly complex decision spaces is a challenge for the DoD. AI offers a 
potential solution to addressing this complexity—by handing large amounts of data, dealing with 
uncertainty, making sense of complex situations, developing and evaluating decision 
alternatives, and understanding risk levels and decision consequences. AI solutions can apply 
at the DoD strategic, planning, and tactical levels. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has 
developed an engineering framework and theory for addressing highly complex problem spaces 
that require the use of intelligent and distributed AI systems for gaining situational awareness 
and making collaborative course of action decisions that adapt to a dynamic situation (Johnson, 
2019). A complex tactical scenario was modeled to demonstrate the use of AI to validate the 
approach (Johnson, 2020a). NPS has developed a conceptual design for a predictive analytics 
capability to be implemented as an automated real-time war-gaming system that explores 
different possible tactical courses of action and their predicted effects and red force responses 
(Johnson, 2020b). NPS studies have identified the need to characterize the level of complexity 
during tactical operations and to implement an adaptive human–machine teaming arrangement 
to make tactical decisions where the level of automation adapts according to the level of 
situational complexity. Ongoing NPS research is studying the application of these conceptual 
engineered approaches in a variety of defense use case applications, including air and missile 
defense, over-the-horizon strike, ship self-defense, UAV operations, and laser weapon systems. 
Complex decision spaces create challenging problems for AI systems to try and solve. 
Table 1 compares different AI application domains based on the complexity of their decision 
space. The table contains 10 factors that characterize the complexity of a decision space: 
epistemic uncertainty (the amount of uncertainty in the knowledge of the situation), situational 
dynamics, the decision time line (amount of time to make the decision), the complexity of the 
human interaction in the decision process, the resource complexity (the number, types, distance 
between them, and how dynamic they are), whether there are multiple missions involved, the 
existence of adversaries (competitors, hackers, or outright enemies that intend to destroy or 
overtake), the margin of allowable error (how much decision error is acceptable), and the 
severity of decision consequences.  
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The decision spaces involved in AI applications for advertising (determining which ads to 
stream to specific users based on their buying habits or Internet searches), loan approvals 
(determining loan eligibility based on loan amounts and credit scores), and medical treatments 
(determining diagnoses based on patient symptoms) are relatively straightforward. Large 
amounts of training data exist, calculations and human interaction in the decision process are 
straightforward, and the situations are relatively stable. The consequences of poor advertising 
are minimal. A bad loan approval decision can be audited. Poor medical diagnoses can have 
more serious consequences, but there is often enough time to seek more evaluation and 
opinions before treatment. Determining optimum shipping routes and engineering AI systems for 
self-driving cars are more complicated endeavors. These applications are dynamically changing 
and require shorter amounts of time to make decisions. Shipping routes will have complexity in 
the numbers of possible routes—which can result in many possible options. However, there is 
room for shipping errors, and the consequences are usually not too severe. The margin for 
decision error is very small for self-driving cars. Poor decisions in this application can cause 
serious accidents.  
However, the military tactical domain presents extreme complexity in all areas of the 
decision space: uncertainty and limited knowledge/awareness, highly dynamic situations, very 
limited time lines, complicated human interaction, large numbers and types of resources, 
multiple missions, costly and hard-to-obtain training data sets, extremely small margins of 
allowable errors, and life-or-death consequences of actions (or inaction).  
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Challenge: Data Can Be Hard to Acquire 
The second unique challenge is that AI/ML systems require large amounts of relevant 
and high-quality data for training and development, and these data can be hard to come by in 
the military domain. Handcrafted knowledge systems that are explicitly programmed need data 
during the development process for evaluation and validation. ML systems have an even 
greater dependence on data during development. As shown in Figure 4, ML systems “learn” 
from data sets that represent what the operational conditions and events will be. The process of 
ML system learning is also called being trained, and the data used during the development 
phase are called training data sets. There are several types of ML learning or training—these 
are supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement. All three types of ML learning require training 
data sets. The ML systems continue to need data during the post-deployment or operational 
phase. Figure 4 shows that during operations, the ML system, or “model,” receives operational 
real-time data and determines predictions or decision outcomes by processing the operational 
data with its “trained” algorithms. Thus, throughout the systems engineering and acquisition life 
cycles, the ML system is intimately connected to data. The ML system “emerges” from the 
process of learning from the training data sets. ML systems are a product of the quality, 
sufficiency, and representativeness of the data. They are wholly dependent on their training 
data sets.  
Figure 4. Developing and Implementing Machine Learning Systems 
 
The DoD is beginning to recognize the need for these data sets as more AI developers 
in many domains (warfare, supply chain, security, logistics, etc.) are understanding the potential 
benefit of AI solutions and are embarking on AI system development. In some cases, the data 
exists and is ready to support AI system development. In other cases, the data exists but is not 
saved and stored. Finally, in other cases, the data does not exist and either needs to be 
simulated or gathered in fleet exercises or war games. Figure 5 illustrates a process of 
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considerations that need to be made to gather, obtain, and in some cases develop data for use 
in developing and training AI and ML systems.  
 
Figure 5. Development of Data Sets for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning System Training 
 
The military domain presents some unique challenges for developing training data 
sets—the data may be classified, the data may present a cyber vulnerability (it could be hacked 
and purposely corrupted by an adversary), and if the data doesn’t exist, it may need to be 
obtained from military/fleet exercises or war games. Data validation is a challenging endeavor 
as well. 
NPS is performing a needs analysis and conceptual design for a data management 
system for the Navy that will collect and provide data to many disparate organizations within the 
Navy that are developing AI/ML systems (French et al., 2021). Figure 6 is a context diagram of 
the Navy Central Artificial Intelligence Library (CAIL) that is envisioned as a data management 
system and process for identifying data sets and providing indexing, validation, auditing, and 
secure access to data that can be used by AI/ML developers working on naval applications. The 
CAIL would not be a data repository or database, but instead, a central organization that 
enables AI/ML developers to access validated and secure naval data—to help identify the 
existence of data sets, enable the authorized access, and help support developers when data 
that is needed does not yet exist and needs to be obtained—possibly through fleet exercises or 
war games. 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 328 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 6. The Conceptual Central Artificial Intelligence Library (CAIL; French et al., 2021) 
 
Challenge: AI Presents a New Frontier for Systems Engineering 
The third unique challenge is that developing AI systems is presenting a new frontier for 
systems engineering. Systems engineering methods have been developed for engineering 
traditional systems that can be highly complicated but also deterministic (Calvano & John, 
2004). Traditional systems have predictable behavior: for a given input and conditions they will 
produce a predictable output. Figure 7 illustrates the need for changes to traditional SE 
methods, like the SE Vee process, in order to engineer AI systems that are complex and 
nondeterministic. In particular, new methods will be needed to define requirements for a 
learning system that adapts over time, and the process of system validation may need to evolve 
and continue during operations to ensure safe and desired behavior. For military systems with 
high stakes consequences, there is very little room for error, so implementing a systems 
engineering process that can ensure safe and desired operations for AI systems is a 
requirement. 
 
Figure 7. Artificial Intelligence: A New Frontier for Systems Engineering 
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A recent initiative by the International Council of Systems Engineers (INCOSE) has 
begun to explore what changes need to be made to systems engineering methods to effectively 
develop AI systems. Figure 8 was created as part of this initiative to highlight five aspects of AI 
systems that need to be considered during the SE process. In addition to nondeterministic and 
evolving behavior, AI systems may present new types of failure modes that are unanticipated, 
may occur suddenly, and whose root causes may be difficult to discern. Robust design—or 
ensuring that AI systems can handle and adapt to future scenarios—is another systems 
engineering design consideration. Finally, for AI systems with more involved human–machine 
interactions, careful attention must be paid to designing systems so they are trustworthy, 
explainable, and ultimately useful to the human decision-makers. 
 
 
Figure 8. Challenges in the Engineering of Artificial Intelligence Systems (Robinson, 2021) 
 
NPS is studying systems engineering methods that can support the design and 
development of complex, adaptive, and intelligent AI systems. A systems engineering 
framework and methodology has been developed to engineer complex adaptive systems of 
systems solutions (Johnson, 2019). The methodology supports the development of systems of 
systems that, through the use of AI, can collaborate to produce desired emergent behavior. A 
current research project is studying safety measures that can be engineered into AI systems 
during the design process to ensure safety during operations (Cruz et al., 2021). NPS is 
studying a design solution called metacognition as an approach for an AI system to identify 
internal errors (Johnson, 2021). Another current NPS thesis project is studying how to engineer 
“trust” into AI systems to ensure effective human–machine teaming arrangements (Hui, 2021). 
Several NPS research projects have studied the use of an SE design approach called coactive 
design to determine interdependences between human operators and AI systems (Blickley et 
al., 2021; Sanchez, 2021). 
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Challenge: Adversaries 
The fourth unique challenge is the presence and role of the adversary in defense 
applications. The DoD must keep up in the race with adversaries to advance AI capabilities, AI 
systems must be protected from cyberattacks, and AI systems must adapt to the ever-changing 
evolution of the threat environment. Figure 9 highlights this unique set of challenges that the 
existence of adversaries presents for AI systems being developed for the DoD. 
Figure 9. Adversarial Challenges 
 
The race among peer competitor nations to develop AI capabilities is ultimately about 
getting inside the adversary’s decision cycle to decide and act faster than the adversary can 
(Rosenberg, 2010). AI systems offer the potential to improve the quality and speed of decisions 
and are therefore critical to gaining decision superiority. As the DoD explores AI solutions, peer 
competitor nations are doing the same. Ultimately, realizing the goal of using AI for the DoD 
depends on more than AI research. It requires proper data gathering and management, 
effective systems engineering and acquisition methods, and careful consideration of the human 
interaction with AI systems. The DoD must ensure that it meets all the challenges involved with 
implementing AI systems in order to win the race. An NPS research initiative is studying how to 
apply AI and game theory to get inside an adversary’s tactical decision cycle (Johnson, 2020b). 
This project is developing a concept for creating models of the tactical situation, the adversaries’ 
location and capabilities, and a prediction of what the adversaries know about the situation. The 
conceptual system would then play a real-time “war game” to analyze tactical decision options 
based on predicted adversarial responses and second- and third-order effects. This is an 
example of studying what future tactical warfare might be like with enhanced knowledge and 
decision aids for both blue and red forces. Other NPS initiatives to prepare the DoD for the AI 
race include studying new SE methods and acquisition practices for developing AI capabilities, 
studying the data management needs of the Navy and the DoD (French et al., 2021), and 
studying AI system safety risks to develop engineering practices that ensure safe AI capabilities 
(Cruz et al., 2021; Johnson, 2021). 
Cyber warfare is another race that the DoD must successfully compete in to stay ahead 
of the constant onslaught of hacking attempts. As the DoD implements more automation, it 
naturally results in more cyber vulnerabilities. The use of AI systems that are intrinsically 
dependent on both trained and operational data, opens up opportunities for hackers to poison 
the systems with corrupt data during the development phase and also during the operational 
phase. If an adversary gains control of an operational AI system, the possible harm they can 
inflict will depend on the application domain. For automation that supports weapon control 
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decisions, the consequences can be deadly. In a recent study on automotive cybersecurity, a 
car company posted a fake vehicle electronic control unit online, and in under 3 days, 25,000 
breach attempts were made (Taub, 2021). The DoD must be mindful of the particular cyber 
vulnerabilities presented as AI systems are developed. Careful cyber risk analysis and cyber 
defense strategies must be implemented for each new AI system. NPS is studying data security 
requirements for ensuring that ML training data sets are safe from hacking and will require 
secure authorization to access (French et al., 2021). NPS is studying the use of metacognition 
as a method for AI systems to perform self-evaluation as a means to identify cyber intrusions, 
tampering, or any unusual behavior (Johnson, 2020b). NPS is also studying the use of ML to 
identify malicious spoofing and tampering with the Global Positioning System (GPS; Kennedy, 
2020). 
The evolution of the threat environment is the third adversarial race for the DoD as it 
develops AI systems. As the adversarial threat space is constantly changing over time with 
faster and more lethal weapons, more autonomy, greater surveillance assets, more advanced 
countermeasures, and more stealth, this poses a challenge for the DoD to be able to anticipate 
and identify new threats and cope with unknowns in the battlespace. NPS research is focused 
on engineering systems that continue to adapt and learn during operations to detect and identify 
unknown unknowns in the battlespace and quickly respond to new threats through innovative 
courses of action (Grooms, 2019; Jones et al., 2020; Wood, 2019). NPS is studying ML 
methods for identifying anomalies in patterns of life by studying data over time for a given region 
to identify unusual changes (Zhao et al., 2016). An example is the study of commercial aircraft 
flight patterns and identifying suspicious aircraft based on unusual flight patterns. Ground-based 
operations can be surveilled over time to identify new and unusual construction projects that 
could signify military operations. 
Conclusions 
AI systems offer the DoD significant advances in achieving and maintaining knowledge 
and decision superiority. However, implementing AI systems for defense applications presents 
unique challenges. The military tactical domain presents extreme complexity in all areas of the 
decision space: uncertainty and limited knowledge, highly dynamic situations, very limited time 
lines, complicated human interaction, large numbers and types of resources, multiple missions, 
costly and hard-to-obtain training data sets, extremely small margins of allowable errors, and 
life-or-death consequences of actions (or inaction). AI systems, and ML systems in particular, 
require representative, sufficient, secure, and validated data sets for their development. 
Gathering suitable data for defense application has the additional challenges of handling 
classified data sets and ensuring that data is secure and protected from cyberattacks; it will also 
be a major endeavor to gather real-world data that represents tactical operations. New systems 
engineering methods will be required to effectively specify, design, and evaluate AI systems that 
present new levels of complexity through their non-determinism, new types of human–machine 
teaming challenges, and new safety failure modes that are hard to anticipate and prevent. 
Finally, the existence of adversaries in the military domain presents an AI race in three forms: a 
race to develop AI systems as quickly as adversaries, a race to stay ahead of possible 
cyberattacks, and a race to train AI/ML systems that can cope with the ever-advancing 
adversarial threat space. 
NPS is addressing the four unique challenge areas through a series of ongoing research 
initiatives. NPS researchers are studying the implementation of AI systems in the naval tactical 
warfighting domain, conducting needs analysis and requirements development for military data 
sets, studying systems engineering methods for developing complex AI systems, and 
developing methods to engineer AI systems that are safe, trustable, and mindful of the role of 
potential adversaries. NPS is providing AI research and educational opportunities for military 
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officers and civilian students. NPS welcomes collaboration with the DoD and naval 
organizations to continue studying AI systems for defense applications and to continue 
exploring solution strategies and methods for overcoming the challenges of developing and 
implementing AI capabilities. 
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Abstract 
The acquisition of artificial intelligence (AI) systems is a relatively new challenge for the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD). Given the potential for high-risk failures of AI system acquisitions, 
it is critical for the acquisition community to examine new analytical and decision-making 
approaches to managing the acquisition of these systems in addition to the existing approaches 
(i.e., Earned Value Management). In addition, many of these systems reside in small start-up or 
relatively immature system development companies, further clouding the acquisition process due 
to their unique business processes when compared to the large defense contractors. This can lead 
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to limited access to data, information, and processes that are required in the standard DoD 
acquisition approach. The well-known recurring problems in acquiring information technology 
automation within the DoD will likely be exacerbated in acquiring complex and risky AI systems. 
Therefore, more robust, agile, and analytically driven acquisition methodologies will be required to 
help avoid costly disasters in acquiring AI systems. This research provides a set of analytical tools 
for acquiring organically developed AI systems through a comparison and contrast of the proposed 
methodologies that will demonstrate when and how each method can be applied to improve the 
acquisitions life cycle for AI systems. 
Introduction 
This report seeks to address the emerging field that falls under the umbrella term 
“Artificial Intelligence” or AI, and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that is not designed to 
develop and procure such state-of-the-art, rapidly evolving AI technologies. Thus, the research 
examines the challenges of acquiring an AI-based system within the typical acquisitions 
framework in business and in the Department of Defense (DoD) by conducting an analysis on a 
set of recommended quantitative tools for use in analyzing the processes in the acquisition of 
organically developed DoD AI systems. Thus, this research introduces tried and true 
quantitative methods (EVM, KVA, IRM) for their application to the DoD Acquisition of AI 
systems. Therefore, this research proposes the re-examination of acquisition methods, 
strategies, and methodologies based on the category of AI being acquired. 
Acquisitions of AI systems is a relatively new challenge for the DoD. Given the high risk 
of failure for such system acquisitions, it is critical that the acquisition community examines 
potential new approaches to help manage the AI acquisition life cycle. The well-documented 
recurring problems in acquiring information technology within the DoD will likely be exacerbated 
in acquiring these leading edge, complex, and risky systems. The identification, review, and 
recommendation for the optimal use of new acquisition methodologies, to supplement or replace 
existing methodologies, should help avoid costly disasters in AI system acquisitions. In addition, 
the use of these methodologies should also create a more flexible acquisition scheme that 
allows for incorporation of unanticipated, value added components of future AI systems. Please 
note that this conference paper is an abridged version of the research conducted by Housel et 
al. (2020). For a more thorough discussion, see the full report of this research that provides a 
robust literature review, more detailed explanations, as well as the step-by-step process for 
each of the three methodologies please see the full report.2 
AI has been in use in various commercial and governmental domains to address a 
variety of decision support problems. However, existing DoD acquisition frameworks may not be 
adequate to address the unique nature of AI systems life-cycle investments. AI systems are 
qualitatively different than standard automation systems that focus on routine, repeatable tasks. 
To develop acquisition frameworks for AI systems, it is first necessary to examine how AI 
systems will be used to support, or supplant, decision-makers. The purpose of this research 
project is to provide a set of quantitative and analytically robust decision-making methodologies 
for acquiring AI systems that address the inadequacies of the current standard investment 
acquisition life-cycle framework. 
To better understand the potential contributions of this research, it is important to 
recognize the recent drive towards using innovation in improving Defense Acquisition outcomes. 
During the Cold War, the United States and particularly the Department of Defense enjoyed a 
position of prominence in the realm of military technological development. Therefore, the use of 
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the common Defense Acquisition System allowed the DoD to develop, test, and field large-scale 
weapons systems through a slow, labor intensive development process. However, the rapid 
growth of technological developments has diminished the DoD’s technological advantage over 
many of the United States’ near peer global competitors. As a result of the current challenges, 
the DoD launched several key initiatives such as “Better Buying Power 3.0,” which is “aimed at 
accelerating acquisition reform and incentivizing innovation within government,” as well as the 
Defense Innovation Initiative, and the “Third Offset Strategy” (Voelz, 2016, p. 180).    
The underlying premise behind these recent efforts is that the traditional methods of 
acquisition are less than optimal in achieving the desired outcomes in DoD weapons and 
business systems. Therefore, the goal of implementing innovation in the DoD acquisition 
process has been designed to provide the means of achieving these better acquisition 
outcomes. Some of the key attributes in the recent initiatives include adopting best practices in 
DoD labs (Sullivan, 2018) and increasing the use of rapid development cycles through 
prototyping (DiNapoli, 2019). In addition, the DoD also seeks to take advantage of the 
commercial sector’s rapid development of innovative technologies by partnering with the 
commercial development of dual use technology—technology that has application for both the 
private and defense sectors (Kendall, 2017; Voelz, 2016). It is this urgent context that provides 
a push for innovation in the DoD acquisition processes and provided the impetus for the current 
research study. 
The underlying challenge is best understood through a discussion of programmatic risk 
management requires a foundational understanding of the effect of risk on human behavior. 
Primarily, this is the effect of risk on the PM and other program leaders. The goal is to gauge 
how these principal acquisition professionals respond to risk and their aversion to risk with 
regard to acquisitions decision-making in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. Bhatt et al. 
(2005) note that a fundamental understanding of risk management addresses the question, 
“How much risk is acceptable?” (p. 64). As noted by Housel et al. (2019), “A recurring issue at 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is that acquisitions of information technology (IT) have 
been fraught with schedule and cost overruns. The problem is the risk and project management 
tools the DoD currently use inadequately address the fiscal and temporal overruns (p. 3).” This 
premise is supported by numerous studies on DoD acquisitions, particularly those that involve 
complex IT systems. A prime example that illustrates this issue is the multitude of reports on the 
development of space and satellite systems (Chaplain, 2017, 2019; Ludwigson, 2019). The 
issue of concern is that PMs and other managers of DoD acquisitions, particularly in the case of 
advancing cutting-edge technological systems, are increasingly becoming either overly risk 
tolerant or increasingly risk adverse.   
Thus, the motivation to be risk averse promotes a cautious culture among the DoD 
Acquisition community. As the DoD continues to develop systems that are increasingly complex, 
the risk tolerance of PMs and other Acquisition leaders is diminished in direct proportion to their 
inability to meet the program requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. It follows that 
the result of this is an organizational culture in the DoD Acquisition community that is unwilling 
to assume risk. In addition, there is tremendous pressure to push unrealistic schedule and cost 
goals and results in unforced errors in the acquisition program’s baseline. As a result of these 
unintended consequences, programs are most often more expensive, late, and/or not able to 
perform to the standards specified.   
Research and Problem Statement 
The current problem at the DoD is that the complexity and speed of decision-making is 
increasing exponentially with the advent of intelligent systems that support or that actually make 
decisions in time-critical, high-impact problem spaces. The current process management and 
control tools that a program manager (PM) might use to support acquisitions do not provide 
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adequate warning of, or provide sufficient information about the root causes of, fiscal budgetary 
overruns and time schedule delays. This is a problem because PMs are, as a result, unable to 
respond to issues in a timely manner, delaying the delivery of promised capabilities to the 
services. Additionally, the money and resources spent in excess of the original budget could be 
used in other acquisition programs. To better understand the possible causes and solutions to 
the AI acquisition problem, this study will examine the strengths and weaknesses of three 
performance and project management methodologies.  
These methodologies, Earned Value Management (EVM), Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM), are used to strategically and tactically plan, 
monitor in real time, measure, and preemptively forecast the value and progress of AI 
acquisitions. A review of these recommended project analysis and control methodologies will 
offer insights into the strengths and weaknesses each approach could offer acquisition 
professionals within the general phases of the Defense Acquisition System. This research offers 
potential solutions to improve early warnings of cost and schedule overruns, and value 
opportunities foregone in the acquisition process. As such, this research focuses on the review 
of these methodologies and their applications to the acquisition process of AI systems. 
Research Objective 
The current research examines the challenges of acquiring an AI-based system within 
the common acquisitions framework in business and in the DoD. The primary objective of the 
current research is to evaluate three quantitative analysis tools for improving the acquisition of 
organically developed DoD AI systems. A comparison and contrast of the proposed 
methodologies will identify when and how each method can be applied to improve the 
acquisitions life cycle for AI systems. 
Research Questions 
The questions examined in this research are as follows: 
1. How should each proposed methodology be used throughout the AI systems 
acquisition life cycle? 
2. Will the combination of methodologies reduce the risks associated with acquiring an 
organically developed AI system? 
3. When should the methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to ensure 
successful acquisition of AI systems? 
4. What are the risks inherent in following a 5000 series acquisition framework when 
acquiring an organically developed AI system? 
Technical Approaches and Outcomes of the Research 
This research provides an in-depth review of each of the three methodologies (IRM, 
KVA, and EVM). While each acquisition project is unique, all must pass a series of common 
hurdles to succeed. A successful AI acquisition approach requires the support of methodologies 
that are designed to identify and value system options and forecast the future value of systems 
while assessing and mitigating investment risks. The dominant methodology for managing DoD 
acquisitions that exceed $20 million is EVM. The current structure of EVM may be enhanced 
with the addition of the IRM and KVA methodologies due to the unique needs of an AI system 
acquisition. This research examines how these three methodologies might be incorporated 
within an acquisition life-cycle framework assessing the benefits and risks of this potential 
extension of the standard framework. These methodologies have been used extensively in the 
past in acquisition research performed for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). This current study will build on the key learnings from this prior 
research to enhance the acquisition life-cycle framework with a focus on the unique 
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characteristics of AI system acquisitions. The anticipated outcome of this research will be a set 
of guidelines for how and when to use the three methodologies to improve the potential success 
of acquisition of AI within the acquisition’s life cycle. The history of organic complex information 
technology (IT) has been characterized by cost and schedule overruns creating havoc for 
acquisition professionals as well as system designers and future users who expect to receive 
valuable new capabilities (Housel et al., 2019; Oakley, 2020). The DoD’s standard 5000 series 
acquisition life cycle will provide the context for reviewing the ways the methodologies can be 
used to enhance the acquisition life-cycle approach in managing the acquisition of AI systems. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)  
This next section will briefly discuss Artificial intelligence (AI) in context of its current 
impact in the Defense Acquisition System through a discussion on how the three Acquisition 
methodologies (EVM, KVA, and IRM) can be utilized to assess an AI program based on its 
stage in the Acquisition life cycle. AI does not refer to a specific system. It is a broad 
nomenclature for a collection of related inorganic computer science methods used to simulate 
human intelligence. The term AI typically conjures up the general concept of machine learning, 
which is a type of AI where a computer system is programmed to identify and categorize 
external real-world stimuli via a “learning” process. The DoD’s AI strategy defines AI as “the 
ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—for example, 
recognizing patters, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or 
taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems” 
(DoD, 2019). This capability of enhanced automation is of great interest to the DoD as potential 
future near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China, are investing heavily in this field for 
military purposes (DoD, 2019).  
The Growth of AI Literature from Inception to Industry 4.0 
Utilizing the Web of Science comprehensive academic search engine, the researchers 
found 316,009 scholarly publications, including 188,275 academic journal articles on the topic of 
AI. The period of these AI publications covers the entire timeline from the inception of term 
“artificial intelligence” in the early 1960s until present day. Using Van Eck and Waltman’s (2020) 
VOSviewer tool for visualizing scientific landscapes, the researchers created a network map that 
showed the illustrates how AI (“intelligence” in the diagram) relates to other key topics. A 
visualization of the major key terms in AI research is depicted below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Key Topics in AI from 1960 to Present Day 
Figure 1 depicts how AI relates to numerous terms that have more than 50 publications 
related to AI since it branched out of cybernetics in the 1960s. As Figure 1 depicts, AI topics 
have branched out of the general computer science and automation fields into other fields such 
as healthcare, as noted in medical terms in Figure 1. As the timeline illustrated in Figure 1, 
much of the expansion in AI topics has occurred in the past two decades. A major cause of the 
recent interest in AI in the past decade is the phenomenon known as “The Fourth Industrial 
Revolution” or “Industry 4.0” (Lee, 2013; Schwab, 2015). In noting how steam power impacted 
the agrarian society in the First Industrial Revolution, the assembly line in the Second Industrial 
Revolution, the computers in the Third Industrial Revolution, Schwab (2015) argues that society 
is on the cusp of a “technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the way we live, work, 
and relate to one another.” Schwab (2017) and his colleagues at the 2011 Hanover Conference 
on Technology made the case that impact of this new revolution is quite extensive,  
We have yet to grasp fully the speed and breadth of this new revolution. Consider 
the unlimited possibilities of having billions of people connected by mobile devices, 
giving rise to unprecedented processing power, storage capabilities, and 
knowledge access. Or think about the staggering confluence of emerging 
technology breakthroughs … such as artificial intelligence. (p. 9)  
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While much of this research focuses on the DoD Acquisition of AI, the tools this research 
proposes for the project management in developing and procure AI (KVA and IRM) have a 
broader application. 
AI in National Security and Defense Applications 
As the capabilities of AI has expanded in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, there has 
been a growing concern that the international arena, particularly the three Great Powers of the 
United States, China, and Russia, may already be in the throes of an “AI Arms Race” (Geist, 
2016). One of prevalent fears among scholars in the age of expanding AI, is the risk of 
developing “autonomous weapons” that can no longer be controlled (Geist, 2016). In essence, 
by developing AI weapon systems, humanity may be sowing the seeds of its own destruction. 
As former Secretary of State Kissinger noted on the rise of AI:  
The scientific world is impelled to explore the technical possibilities of its 
achievements, and the technological world is preoccupied with commercial vistas 
of fabulous scale. The incentive of both these worlds is to push the limits of 
discoveries rather than to comprehend them. And governance, insofar as it deals 
with the subject, is more likely to investigate AI’s applications for security and 
intelligence than to explore the transformation of the human condition that it has 
begun to produce. (Kissinger, 2019) 
Kissinger’s (2019) words strike at the heart of the growing mistrust of this new technology that 
has exploded with the recent rise of Big Data and more powerful computing. This fear may also 
grow as AI can potentially dominate international relations with a new race to develop and 
weaponize AI (Geist, 2016). 
AI and The DoD’s Third Offset Strategy 
The discussion will now shift towards the DoD’s recent drive towards AI. As the potential 
capabilities of AI became more evident, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (2014) 
launched the “Third Offset Strategy.” The DoD’s Third Offset Strategy hearkens back to the 
“First Offset” launched by President Eisenhower where the United States developed its strategic 
arms to reduce the need for standing conventional forces during the early Cold War and the 
“Second Offset” where after the Vietnam War, the DoD, through programs such as DARPA, 
increased the capabilities of its conventional forces to counter the Warsaw Pact (Hillner, 2019). 
Then Deputy Secretary Work noted that it is the challenges of the current geopolitical 
environment, artificial intelligence can help reinstate the U.S. previous technological overmatch, 
“Learning machines are an example of technology that can help turn AI and autonomy into an 
offset advantage” (Pellerin, 2015). It was the Third Offset Strategy that pushed for subsets 
initiatives such as the Defense Innovation Initiative and Frank Kendall’s (2017), then Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Better Buying Power 3.0” 
which were focused on bringing back the competitive edge that the U.S. military once had over 
its geopolitical competitors.    
The theme that arises from the Third Offset, Defense Innovation Initiative, and Better 
Buying Power 3.0 is that the Defense Acquisition System is unable to meet the requirements of 
fielding software intensive systems such as AI systems. Kendall (2017) discussed this problem 
by illustrating the challenging that PMs with software intensive systems such as AI face due to 
the extensive cycle of developing, testing, fielding “several builds of software in various stages 
of maturity” simultaneously while dealing with the organizational bureaucracy that slows the PM 
down (p. 50).    
DoD Acquisition of New Software-Intensive Technology 
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The fielding of new and advanced technologies such as AI is a challenge for the DoD 
and all federal government. The current methodologies have proven unsuccessful in meeting 
the task of providing the requirements to the warfighter to face the challenges of the modern 
battlefield (Kendall, 2017). However, with the release of recent strategic changes such as 
implementing innovation practices and advanced prototyping, the DoD may prove up to the task 
of fielding the materiel and equipment to support the Department and the Services (Kendall, 
2017; Voelz, 2016). Some of the practices that have proven success is the adopting best 
practices in DoD labs and increasing the use of rapid development cycles through prototyping 
(DiNapoli, 2019; Sullivan, 2018). 
A recent case study on the two-decade process of developing biometrics for the use in 
the Services provides the lessons learned on comes to acquisition of new and advanced 
technology. According to Voelz (2016), “The case study of biometrics demonstrates that 
effective military innovation can only occur through an integrated approach that takes into 
account the interdependent elements of technology development, acquisition planning, doctrinal 
design, and warfighting strategy” (p. 180). While not exactly the same, the lessons learned of 
adapting biometrics in the Services is an example of how the DoD can adopt AI throughout the 
department. This is because a key attribute that biometric systems and AI systems share are 
that they are both heavily software intensive development process.   
Earned Value Management 
EVM provides cost and schedule metrics to track performance in accordance with an 
acquisition project plan. EVM is required for large DoD acquisition programs that use incentive 
contracts valued at or greater than $20 million (DoD, 2015a). EVM methodology uses a WBS to 
try to ensure that an acquisition project is on schedule and within the estimated cost for each 
work package. It is used to measure work progress and any deficiencies using cost and 
schedule metrics that also can be used to measure program performance trend analysis with a 
focus on identifying any budget and schedule deviations from plan. However, the analysis is 
done after each process or stage in the WBS. In other words, the actual cost and time spent to 
execute a particular phase is compared against the initially projected budgeted plan.  
Given the propensity of IT and AI acquisitions to be over budget and behind schedule, 
EVM metrics help PMs identify and attempt to avoid overruns and schedule deviations. 
Recognized plan deficiencies can help program managers identify waste and chokepoints that 
require immediate correction. When deficiencies in cost or schedule occur, EVM analysis can 
be used to reforecast the budget and schedule with the focus of providing PMs with up-to-date 
accurate performance information. EVM analysis uses schedule and cost estimates to find the 
Planned Value (PV) of a given acquisition project. Cumulative PV provides the total value that 
should be achieved by a specified date. The specific label for PV within the DoD acquisitions 
community is Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled (BCWS). Actual Cost (AC) is the accumulated 
accrued costs of labor and materials at any point in time during a project. The label for AC within 
the DoD acquisitions community is Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). Earned Value (EV) 
measures the progress for a given plan. The DoD acquisitions label for EV is Budgeted Cost of 
Work Performed (BCWP).  
In sum, EVM exists to provide an assessment of the actual physical work a project has 
completed compared to a baseline plan (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). EVM integrates the 
actual cost spent on the project to date with the work that has been performed on the project, 
allowing managers to compare the progress of the project with their planned budget and 
schedule (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). It provides managers the ability to compare cost 
performance with work completion rather than simply cost performance and planned cost, as is 
done in traditional cost management (Fleming & Koppelman, 2010). When properly employed, 
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EVM provides a reliable prediction of the total cost and schedule requirements for a project 
through three distinct dimensions: the planned value, earned value, and actual cost (Fleming & 
Koppelman, 2010). It is important to note the term value in EVM does not have the same 
meaning as in other methodologies, such as KVA. Within the context of EVM, value is defined 
as the work accomplished towards completion of the project. There is no reference to the quality 
of the completed work or additional (or missing) benefits the work might provide to a system. 
The value is assumed because the specifications were defined in the project requirements. 
EVM has proven to be a reliable system to manage cost and schedule performance for 
manufacturing in both defense and commercial industries. However, as systems become more 
complicated and information technology (IT) and AI gain a more prominent place within even 
traditional manufacturing projects, EVM may need additional information from additional 
methodologies to improve its capabilities. Better incorporating the strategic guidance associated 
with a program, the value gained from subcomponents and subprocesses, the risk associated 
with developing subcomponents of a system, and incrementally improving a process may help 
improve the Defense Acquisition System as a whole. 
Knowledge Value Added 
KVA is an empirical model that focuses on the practical application and implementation 
of knowledge management (Tsai, 2014). Originally developed to assist in business process 
reengineering, KVA creates an objective, quantifiable method to measure the value of a process 
or service (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). Typical financial approaches to business process 
reengineering use the dollar amount of a final product to determine the value of an object, failing 
to account for the knowledge required in the various subprocesses involved in making the 
product (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). In its essence, KVA performs a single function: describing 
all process outputs in common units. KVA accounts for the value of all components, processes, 
and support systems necessary to complete a task or create a product or service by describing 
all outputs in common units. It allows managers to compare the efficiency of the various steps 
across all processes within a common value reference point. 
Value has a different meaning in KVA than it does in other methodologies, such as EVM 
or IRM. KVA bases its definition of value on complexity theory and views organizational 
processes by their ability to change their input (raw material, information, energy, etc.) into 
common units of output, as shown in Figure 2 (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). Per Figure 2, 
process P changes the input in some manner, creating a different product or service at the 
output, adding value to the system based on the number of common unit changes from input to 
output (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). If process P did not change input X, then output Y is the 
same as input X, indicating no value was added by the system (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995). 
While the change from X to Y may be minute or large depending on the process, KVA converts 
all changes into common units, and these changes indicate the amount of value added by 
process P to produce the final product. The value generated through the process is proportional 
to the change in the state from X to Y, denoting the amount of knowledge required to make the 
changes (Yu et al., 2009). Thus, the contribution to a process is equivalent to the sum of all 
knowledge necessary to produce a product and/or interpret meaning from an input (Housel & 
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P(X) = Y 
Fundamental assumptions: 
1. If X = Y no value has been added. 
2. “value” ∝ “change” 
3. “change” can be measured by the amount of knowledge required to make the 
change. 
 
So “value”∝ “change” ∝“amount of knowledge required to make the change” 
Figure 2. Value Added Process (Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 94) 
The KVA methodology is best completed by following the seven-step process shown in 
Figure 3. Practitioners can use several methods to describe the units of change, such as tasks, 
Haye knowledge points, Shannon bits, units of knowledge, and so on (Housel & Bell, 2001). For 
ease of measurement, three measures are typically used within KVA to estimate the embedded 
knowledge within a process (Housel & Bell, 2001). Learning time, column two in Figure 3, 
measures the length of time it takes an average user to learn a process and correctly complete 
it (Housel & Bell, 2001). Process description, column three, is the number of process 
instructions used to transform the given input into the desired output (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
Each instruction must require an approximately equal amount of knowledge to complete a task 
(Housel & Bell, 2001). The binary query method uses the number of binary questions (i.e., bits) 
necessary to accomplish the process, roughly equivalent to the lines of code within a computer 
program (Housel & Bell, 2001). However, any measure that satisfies the basic concepts of KVA 
can be used to create a common-units measure (Housel & Bell, 2001). 
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Figure 3. The KVA Approach (Housel & Bell, 2001) 
KVA identifies the actual cost and value of an organization’s assets (human and 
technological), standard functional areas, or core processes. KVA identifies every process 
required to produce an output, and the historical costs of those processes, the unit costs, and 
unit values of products, processes, functions, or services can be measured. By describing all 
process and subprocesses (down to the detailed level of WBS) outputs in common units, the 
methodology also permits market-comparable data to be generated; this ability is particularly 
important for nonprofits like the military and government organizations. When market 
comparables from industry are used, value is quantified in two key productivity metrics: Return 
on Knowledge (ROK) and Return on Investment (ROI). Following these steps yields a 
defensible estimate of the productivity (i.e., ROK, ROI) of a given process or set of 
subprocesses. These estimates can then be used to track progress in an EVM framework in 
terms of cost, schedule, and importantly, the value produced. The KVA estimates can also be 
used to track the volatility of a set of processes and this metric can be used in the IRM 
processes that forecast future value from, for example, an AI system.  
KVA is potentially useful tool for inclusion in the Defense Acquisition System. Since the 
DoD is not a for-profit company, it does not have revenue to judge the effectiveness of its 
programs in a monetized form. Instead, it relies on various metrics and evaluations that are not 
comparable from system to system. If the DoD implements the KVA methodology more widely, 
PMs may have a more objective measure to compare various technological solutions to fulfill 
evolving requirements. Understanding the value that a system or process provides in direct 
comparison with the value of other systems, whether they are similar or unrelated processes, 
could provide beneficial information in the decision-making, budgeting, and planning processes. 
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Integrated Risk Management 
IRM is a system developed by Dr. Johnathan Mun designed to provide management the 
ability to analyze risk associated with the development of a new project or initiative. IRM 
combines several commonly accepted analytical procedures, such as predictive modeling, 
Monte Carlo simulation, real options analysis, and portfolio optimization, into a single, 
comprehensive methodology. The methodology uses existing techniques and metrics such as 
discounted cash flow, return on investment (ROI), and other metrics within the analytical 
processes to improve the traditional manner of evaluating potential projects within a company or 
the DoD. In contrast to the other methodologies, IRM focuses on the risk involved with a 
decision. It seeks to mitigate negative effects from risk while maximizing rewards from potential 
outcomes. At its core, IRM is a technique to provide managers the best analytic information 
available to use during the real options process. Figure 4 illustrates the comprehensive IRM 
process.  
 
Figure 4. Integrated Risk Management Process (Mun & Housel, 2010) 
As depicted in Figure 4, there are eight steps within the IRM methodology: 
1. Qualitative management screening 
2. Forecast predictive modeling 
3. Base case static modeling 
4. Monte Carlo risk simulation 
5. Real options problem framing 
6. Real options valuation and modeling 
7. Portfolio and resource optimization 
8. Reporting, presenting, and updating analysis 
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While each of the individual steps provides value to a project manager, incorporating all 
of them in a contiguous approach will allow decision-makers the most effective use of the IRM 
process. 
IRM is a comprehensive methodology that is a forward-looking risk-based decision 
support system incorporating various methods such as Monte Carlo Risk Simulation, Stochastic 
Forecasting, Portfolio Optimization, Strategic Flexibility Options, and Economic Business Case 
Modeling. Economic business cases using standard financial cash flows and cost estimates, as 
well as non-economic variables such as expected military value, strategic value, and other 
domain-specific subject matter expert (SME) metrics (e.g., Innovation Index, Conversion 
Capability, Ability to Meet Future Threats, Force Structure, Modernization and Technical 
Sophistication, Combat Readiness, Sustainability, Future Readiness to Meet Threats) can be 
incorporated (Mun, 2016). These metrics can provide robust forecasts as well as mitigating risk 
via simulations that account for program uncertainties. The tools set also uses modeling to 
determine potential program benefits compared to program costs (e.g., return on investment for 
innovation or return on sustainability). Capital investment and acquisition decisions within AI 
program investment portfolios can then be made based on the resulting rigorous quantitative 
analysis (considering budgetary, manpower, and schedule constraints). Projects can be broken 
down into their detailed work breakout structure (WBS) and tasks, where these tasks can be 
combined in complex systems dynamic structures or implementation paths. The cost and 
schedule elements for each task can be modeled and risk-simulated within the system to 
estimate the resulting total cost and schedule risk of a given AI acquisition program. Portfolio 
management is often integrated with IRM methods to provide a more holistic view in terms of 
acquisitions of IT and AI acquisition programs. 
The IRM methodology is a systematic technique to determine the best possible projects 
to pursue based on the statistical likelihood of their success. Using historical knowledge of 
defense acquisition programs and AI systems in both the government and commercial realms 
could improve the budgeting and scheduling processes. Determining the likely range of 
outcomes through dynamic statistical modeling may improve the program’s performance. By 
better understanding the risk associated with various components, a more appropriate schedule 
and budget could be developed. IRM may also help determine which real options should be 
included in acquisition contracts. A high-risk program may need more options, such as the 
options to abandon, delay, or expand, based on its actual performance. Finally, IRM could prove 
useful in portfolio management, helping decision-makers determine which programs to initiate 
when viewing the portfolio of other programs in progress and used operationally. 
Acquisition Life Cycle & AI 
 Housel et al. (2019) noted that the DoD 5000 series Acquisition Life Cycle (see Figure 5) 
can be aligned to the generic technology investment life cycle. As depicted in Figure 6, while 
terminology differs between the DoD 5000 and generic technology life cycle phases, the 
sequence of activities in these respective life cycles are congruent.   
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Figure 5. The 5000 Series Acquisition Life Cycle (DoD, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 6. Aligning the Generic and 5000 Series Life Cycles (Housel et al., 2019) 
 
Housel et al. (2019) noted that the acquisition methodologies, to include EVM, KVA, 
IRM, and others may be used “concert,” however, “certain tools are more appropriate for a 
particular phase than others” (p. 48). Thus, the PM and should “use the tools appropriately in 
that they provide more information for a complex environment” (Housel et al., 2019, p. 48). 
Therefore, during the beginning of the life cycle such as the Pre-Materiel Solution Analysis, the 
Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), or the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) 
phases, methodologies that such as IRM and KVA may be of more use to the PM as they 
provide quantitative value metrics such as a common unit assessment of the technology and 
risk, as opposed to EVM that only measures cost. Meanwhile, during the main implementation 
phases of Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and Production and 
Development (PD), all three metrics—EVM, KVA, and IRM—can provide useful data to assess 
the program. However, during the post-implementation or Operations and Support (OS) phase, 
KVA is more likely to provide useful data over EVM.   
Comparison of Acquisition Methodologies in AI Development 
In a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) on AI it was noted that “standing 
DoD processes—including those related to standards of safety and performance, acquisitions, 
and intellectual property and data rights—present another challenge to the integration of military 
AI” (Sayler, 2020, p. 16). As discussed earlier in the report, the difficulty of traditional Acquisition 
methods in relation to emerging technology such as AI is the speed the development and 
deployment of these technologies often outpaces the Defense Acquisition System. When 
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compared to the commercial sector, the DoD process for developing and fielding its AI systems 
has a mismatch between when compared to the timelines for its requirements. This is likely 
because there is a stark contrast with “the pace of commercial innovation and the DoD’s 
acquisition process” (Ilachinski, 2017, p. 1). This is because it takes an average of 91 months, 
or 7 and a half years, to go from the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to the Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC; Ilachinski, 2017). The Defense Science Board (2018) found the DoD’s timeline 
for fielding systems is multiple times longer than the commercial sector which uses an iterative 
process to field AI systems in approximately 6 months. As noted in the RAND Report that 
assessed the DoD’s posture for AI: 
Our starting point at the onset of our study was the DoD model of technology 
development, procurement, fielding, and sustainment, giving rise to two dimensions of 
posture assessment related to technologies: advancement and adoption. However, as 
we carried out our study, it became clear that this model is not valid for AI, owing to the 
spiral nature of AI technology development. (Tarraf et al., 2019, p. 51)   
Because of the challenges of procuring and fielding AI systems, the CRS Report reached the 
conclusion that the “DoD may need to continue to adjust its acquisitions process to account for 
rapidly evolving technologies such as AI (Sayler, 2020, p. 17). Similarly, the RAND Report also 
noted that the DoD should utilize and adapt acquisition approaches that are “appropriate for the 
technology” (Tarraf et al., 2019).   
One method that the DoD can adjust or adapt its acquisition process and/or approach is 
to adapt and utilize the Acquisition methodologies based on the complexity of the development. 
As noted by Ilachinski (2017) and the Defense Science Board (2018), AI systems development 
processes tend to be iterative in their approach. Thus, the need for rapid development and 
prototyping is likely to be utilized more than in traditional Acquisition Life Cycles (Tarraf et al., 
2019). However, despite being iterative in nature, the techniques recommend by Housel et al. 
(2019) of using EVM, KVA, IRM, or a combination of using various methodologies in concert 
can also be applied to the Acquisition of AI systems as shown in Table 1. 
 










Mature Technologies X   X 
 
Iterative Development     X  X   
Complex AI Systems   X 
 
            X                              X 
Non-Complex AI Systems  X            X 
 
Note. Iterative Development is for AI systems that are either prototypes or have rapid generational 
development cycles (i.e., versions). 
For the mature technologies and/or non-complex AI systems, because there is typically 
less risk in these life cycles, the PM can follow the normal of the EVM methodologies to monitor 
the progress of the development. However, the PM can also choose to utilize KVA to assess the 
AI systems with its common unit of value.   
Comparison of Key Attributes 
Choosing a methodology should depend on the nature of the project under 
consideration, specifically, the commitment needed from the organization, the organization’s 
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desire to align strategic goals with the project, the predictive capability of the methodology, the 
flexibility required, and the time available. While others in the organization need to understand 
the concepts to comprehend status reports, EVM only needs the management team to track the 
cost and schedule of the project compared to the baseline as there is no determined goal 
alignment with the organization. While the CPI and SPI can help estimate the final cost and 
schedule, there is no true predictive ability associated with EVM since the assumption is that the 
schedule will proceed according to the baseline, regardless of previous performance volatility. 
Adherence to the baseline is essential in EVM, and changing requirements can drastically alter 
a baseline, reducing the effectiveness of the methodology. Setting up, monitoring, and reporting 
the cost/schedule performance of each work package within the WBS can be a time-consuming 
and expensive task for an AI project with its many unknowable components and capabilities a 
priori.  
KVA needs only the KVA analyst and the process owner, as the SME, to determine the 
value of a process or component output, supporting the need to align the project with an 
organization’s productivity goals. Using this analysis, they can model the current baseline as-is 
process ROK and compare it with the proposed to-be process model ROK, thus offering a 
simple prediction of the improvement between the models. Since KVA can be used with any 
language of description that defines the process outputs in common units, analysts can choose 
whichever method is most beneficial for the particular system in question, providing flexibility. 
This analysis can be completed quickly, potentially providing a rough-cut assessment within a 
few days.  
IRM requires the organizational leadership, portfolio and project managers, and the 
analyst to determine how a project fits within an organization’s portfolio, the present value (PV) 
of the project, and potential real options. By analyzing and simulating various scenarios, IRM 
provides a prediction of a project’s likely performance, which allows managers to build in 
flexibility via real options at the appropriate locations within the project. Assuming the data 
necessary for the analysis is available, the process can be completed in a relatively quick 
manner.  
Methodologies in AI Acquisition 
As previously discussed, the methodologies all have strengths and weaknesses, making 
them more suitable in certain applications than others. The biggest challenge in using EVM 
when acquiring AI is the iterative nature of software development. EVM needs clearly stated, 
detailed requirements for intermediate steps to be most effective. While the outputs of software 
programs are defined well, the steps required to build the software are not, leading to problems 
when developing cost and schedule estimates. If the software is not complex or consists of 
known processes, EVM can sufficiently monitor the progress. Integrating software and hardware 
is also complicated with EVM since there are numerous pieces of the program that must be 
combined to meet the goals, resulting in additional debugging and recoding. EVM is more 
efficient when used to manage the physical creation of systems or infrastructure. It can monitor 
the cost/schedule progress of software work packages but is not as useful at estimating the 
value of those programs.  
KVA can provide an objective, ratio-scale measure of value and cost for each core 
process and its subprocesses or components within any IS system. Using the two parameters, 
managers can then analyze productivity ratios information, such as ROK and ROI, to determine 
the efficiency of a process compared to the resources used to achieve the output. This can help 
the manager decide how to use resources to update systems or estimate the future value of a 
system being acquired. Combining the KVA results with IRM allows managers to iterate the 
value of system real options analysis through simulation and other techniques. IRM can also 
quantify risks and forecast performance probabilities for measures of the potential success for 
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programs and components of programs using historical data. It is a tool to assist with the 
investment strategy, making it useful when acquiring all types of AI. However, it is not designed 
to help manage the actual acquisition of an AI program or determine how to meet its detailed 
requirements. 
Examining the benefits and challenges of the proposed methodologies demonstrates the 
scope, capabilities, and limitations of various AI systems. It also helps inform in which areas and 
phases of the Defense Acquisition System life cycle it may be appropriate to include the 
methodologies or components of the methodologies within the system. The main research 
question of this study was, simply, how can certain advanced analytical decision-making 
methodologies be used in the acquisition life cycle to complement existing methods to ensure a 
successful acquisition of AI technologies? 
As discussed, EVM remains the only program management methodology required by the 
U.S. government for all DoD acquisition programs with a contract value exceeding $20 million. 
Regardless of this requirement, EVM is a methodology that provides a structured approach to the 
acquisition of IT via program management processes that can help ensure an acquisition program 
stays on schedule and within budgeted cost estimates. However, there are significant limitations 
when using EVM for AI acquisitions, the major weakness being that it was not designed for 
managing AI acquisitions that follow a very iterative and highly volatile pathway. Organic AI 
acquisitions require a high level of flexibility to deal with the unknowns that arise during the 
development process as well as value adding possibilities not in the original plan. In addition, 
EVM does not provide a common unit of value metric to enable standard productivity metrics, 
such as ROI. When value is inferred by how consistent a program is with original baseline cost 
and schedule estimates, the performance of the program may be sacrificed in terms of the quality 
of the outputs when planned program activities become iterative, as in the development of many 
AI programs. If an AI acquisition program is trending toward cost and schedule overruns, but the 
resulting value added of the modifications to the original requirements provides disproportionate 
increases in value, EVM is not designed to recognize this increase in value.  
To remedy these shortcomings of EVM in AI acquisitions, the methodology should be 
combined with KVA and IRM, which can be useful during the requirements and monitoring phases 
of EVM by ensuring that a given AI acquisition is aligned with organizational strategy and that a 
baseline process model has been developed for establishing current performance before 
acquisition of an AI system. A future process model that estimates the value added of the 
incorporation of the AI can also set expectations that can be measured against the baseline model 
after the AI has been acquired. IRM can be used to forecast the value of strategic real options 
flexibility that an acquired AI may provide so that leadership can select the options that best fit 
their desired goals for the AI in defense core processes.  
Because it provides an objective, quantifiable measure of value in common units, KVA 
should also be used in AI acquisitions to allow decision-makers to better understand and compare 
different strategic options based on their value and the cost. Obtaining a return on investment of 
AI systems can only be done when using KVA to determine the value embedded in the system. 
This information provides insight to PMs as well as a more complete perspective regarding the 
performance of both the current and the to-be systems. 
Likewise, using IRM is recommended when acquiring AI through the Defense Acquisition 
System. Applying dynamic and stochastic uncertainty and risk-based modeling techniques to 
predict likely and probabilistic outcomes can improve the risk estimates associated with the 
components and subcomponents of a program, in terms of their potential cost overruns, value 
variabilities, and schedule delays. Analyzing various real options within the context of the models’ 
outputs will help PMs make the most advantageous choices when determining a program’s future. 
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PMs should use EVM only in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase, as is currently done. That said, EVM will work best in hardware manufacturing solutions 
with technology that is fully mature prior to the program starting. Since many AI acquisition 
programs consist of advancing the current technology and developing new software solutions to 
meet requirements, EVM is not perfectly suited for AI development. Nevertheless, PMs can use 
various agile EVM techniques to complete projects on cost/schedule baselines provided the 
appropriate steps are taken when establishing the baseline. Requirements must be broken into 
small, easily definable tasks with suitable risk and uncertainty factors accounted for within the 
schedule. Other methodologies, such as KVA and IRM, should be used with EVM to ensure these 
factors are based on defendable metrics rather than simply guessing how much additional time, 
money, and value may be necessary to complete complex tasks. 
During the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, KVA and IRM will help determine the 
value of the different options considered in the analysis of alternative (AoA) process. KVA can 
objectively measure the value of the current, as-is system and the potential to-be systems under 
consideration. Then IRM can use additional factors to value the alternatives in terms of their 
relative parameter values such as cost, value, complexity, timeline. As the chosen solutions 
mature during the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, an updated KVA 
analysis will reassess initial estimates and provide a projected ROI that can be incorporated in an 
IRM risk and real options analysis for the AI solution prior to entering the EMD phase as 
appropriate. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This research examined whether the various methodologies—EVM, KVA, and IRM—
could be used within the Defense Acquisition System to improve the acquisition of AI. Future 
research should examine how these methodologies may interact with or improve other 
components of the acquisition system. This includes the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
components as individual processes and the interaction of JCIDS, PPBE, and the Defense 
Acquisition System as a whole. Certain methodologies, specifically IRM, may be more beneficial 
when used throughout the entire acquisition process instead of within a portion of the system. 
Additionally, future research could examine how these different methods may be used in the 
acquisition of products outside the AI or IT realm. 
The research conducted looked at AI as a whole and not specific types of AI. Future 
studies should examine if acquisition methods, strategies, and methodologies should change 
based on the category of AI being acquired. This is of specific interest when considering artificial 
intelligence and its subsets. Machine learning, intelligence with a specific focus or field of 
expertise, and general or universal intelligence would likely have different methods used in the 
acquisition process based on their complexity, complicated nature, undeveloped technology, and 
level of risk. 
The applicability of these methodologies within commercial acquisition of AI is another 
area of potential research. This research focused exclusively on the application of the respective 
techniques within the DoD acquisition process. However, commercial entities also struggle when 
acquiring complex or complicated AI and IT systems, particularly when the systems operate at 
the enterprise level. Further research may indicate if these same methodologies could provide 
value to decision-makers in the private sector during the creation, adoption, or customization of 
commercial AI. As noted earlier, the hype cycle for AI and automation is on the rise and the 
demand to procure such technologies is as relevant for the commercial sector as it is for the DoD. 
Furthermore, the recent pandemic caused by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has 
forced a permanent shift in society towards an increased trend towards a permanent remote 
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workforce. As these trends are likely to continue in the foreseeable future, an increased in 
automation tools will be required to support this workforce. These trends could be explored for 
their implications as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and Industry 4.0. 
Finally, this research only examined the most promising methodologies out of numerous 
different possibilities. Future research could examine other program management tools, 
management philosophies, analytic tools, or other methodologies and their benefit when acquiring 
AI. While the examined methodologies were chosen because they would likely benefit the process 
and support improvements in EVM, other systems may be more appropriate in certain phases or 
may offer additional benefits not seen in this research. 
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Abstract 
Navy ships are complex enterprises comprised of multiple organizations that must interact 
smoothly and interface externally without threats to efficiency and combat-readiness. As logistical 
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challenges increase and technology pushes response times, it is critical to introduce state of the 
art computational methods for analyzing the interlocked systems and training for different events. 
To address these challenges in this context, we introduce a framework called LAILOW: learn, 
optimize, and wargame. LAILOW exploits data arising from multiple sources in a complex 
enterprise by offering data mining, machine learning, and predictive algorithms that can be used 
for analysis and discovery of patterns, rules, and anomalies. LAILOW’s output can then be used 
to optimize business processes and course of actions. 
We show three use cases of using the of LAILOW framework. We show the whole LAILOW 
framework to search for vulnerability of a major Marine equipment’s maintenance and supply 
system for difficult tests and evolve resilience and novel solutions accordingly. We show using of 
lexical link analysis (LLA) as part of LAILOW to improve the prediction accuracy of probability of 
failure of critical Navy Ship parts, related to C4I systems, for NAVWARSYSCOM’s Predictive Risk 
Sparing Matrix (PRiSM) product. We also show the comparison of LLA prioritizing items in the 
Financially Restricted Work Que (FRWQ) with the baseline calculation.  
Introduction 
Leveraging deep analysis such as LAILOW for the U.S. Navy Ships is motivated by 
current challenges and needs. The Navy Ships conduct their activities based on the concepts of 
operations (CONOPS). For example, Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO) is a CONOP for the 
Navy; Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation (EABO) is a CONOPS for the U.S. Marine 
Corps (USMC). These CONOPS require capabilities, manpower, maintenance, and supply 
among other resources to be carefully analyzed, planned, and executed to complete missions 
successfully. Meanwhile, military sensors have been constantly collecting big data in many 
readiness components to facilitate decision-making and improve courses of actions. All the 
activities require data analytics. Deep analytics for big data and business intelligence including 
machine learning (ML), and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms such as deep learning 
algorithms (LeCun et al., 2015), and game theory (Brown & Sandholm, 2017; Silver et al., 2017) 
have performed benchmark tasks and demonstrated the superb performance to human. It is 
imperative to adopt these analytics and tools to understand the entire spectrum of the Navy 
Ships related to complex enterprises including capabilities, manpower, maintenance, supply, 
transportation, health services, general engineering, and finance. The paper addresses the 
needs on the Navy and Marine logistics value chain, where there is a need to consider 
uncertainty, disruption, and perturbation that can impact the logistics plans as a whole. For 
example, uncertainty factors related to the environment in wide geographic areas, such as 
weather change, mission change from a peace time to a conflict time, or a sudden event can 
cause a perturbation and disruption for previous logistics and supply plans. Previously high-
impact but low-failure parts may suddenly become in high demand.  
The LAILOW framework focuses on three pillars of deep analytics, that is, machine 
learning, optimization, and wargame as shown in Figure 1. When there are data from various 
sources, data mining, machine learning, and predictive algorithms are often used to analyze 
data and discover patterns, rules, and anomalies that can later be used to optimize business 
processes and course of actions. New requirements have emerged in recent years that 
emphasize greater complexity in uncertainty, unknowns, and unexpected situations for Navy 
Ships. More importantly is the risk of adversarial novelty: adversaries might work on the 
scenarios and situations that Navy Ships might never encounter before or there are no data are 
available for decision-making. These requirements and concerns motivate wargame simulations 
that could generate synthetic data, perform what-if analyses, and explore analyses of 
alternatives (AoAs). The ultimate goal is to enhance total force readiness and project combat 
power across the whole range of military operations and spectrum of conflict at any time.  
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LAILOW Framework 
 
Figure 1. The LAILOW Framework Applied to U.S. Ships 
The technical concept of this paper is to leverage artificial Intelligence (AI) to learn, 
optimize, and wargame (LAILOW) for a complex enterprise, customized to Navy Ships, 
especially to the logistics value chain and readiness of Navy and Marine enterprises as shown 
in Figure 1. The components of LAILOW are as follows: 
• Component 1—Learn: When there is certain amount of data available, LAILOW 
performs data mining, machine learning, and learns predictive, associative, and 
sequential patterns from historical data.  
The motivation for Component 1 is the great value of prediction. Once specific way 
prediction helps is to guide anticipatory preparations. For example, predictive maintenance 
reduces downtime and indicates which spare parts should be proactively prepared. Predictions 
of maintenance-related parameters (e.g., MTBF—mean time between failures, probability of 
failure, probability of demand) enable forecasts of parts’ lifetimes under potential circumstances 
and scenarios. Predications of customer waiting time—the days between a trouble ticket 
opened and closed—reveal potential bottlenecks or ensure accurate customer expectations. 
This general ML capability indirectly helps extend asset product life and reduces total ownership 
costs.  
In our use cases, we apply open source ML and data mining toolkit (i.e., Orange 
software by University of Ljubljana, 1996–2021) to data sets. Orange features a visual 
programming front-end for explorative rapid qualitative data analysis and interactive data 
visualization. It contains supervised ML algorithms of logistic regression, decision trees, naïve 
Bayes, random forest, k-nearest neighbors, and neural networks; and unsupervised ML 
algorithms such as principal component analysis (PCA) and k-means algorithms among others. 
Orange algorithms are wrapped from the python machine learning library scikit-learn 
(Pedregosa et al., 2011).  
We also apply Soar (Laird, 2012; Laird et al., 2012), a cognitive architecture that 
scalably integrates a rule-based AI system and reinforcement learning (RL; Sutton & Barto, 
1998, 2014). Soar-RL has advantages for defense applications over other ML/AI algorithms 
because it is rule-based and explainable, providing reasons for prediction, classification, and 
anomaly detection results. Rules can include existing tactical knowledge and rules of 
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engagement. New rules can also be discovered from big data via online, on-policy, and 
continual learning. Soar has been used in modeling large-scale complex cognitive functions for 
warfighting processes in kill chain applications such as Combat Identification (Zhao et al., 2018) 
and Battle Readiness Engagement Management (BREM) wargame (Zhao et al., 2020)  
The machine learning component also includes unsupervised ML algorithms. We often 
perform clustering, unsupervised neural network, or lexical link analysis (LLA) from the LAILOW 
framework to improve prediction, detect anomalies, and sort/rank important information. LLA is 
an unsupervised ML method and describes the characteristics of a complex system using a list 
of attributes or features, or specific vocabularies or lexical terms. Because the potentially vast 
number of lexical terms from big data, the model can be viewed as a deep model for big data. 
For example, we can describe a system using word pairs or bi-grams as lexical terms extracted 
from text data. LLA automatically discovers word pairs, and displays them as word pair 
networks. This innovative configuration of LLA allows us to use it to discover and rank high-
value information such as attributes and factors that correlate to the measures of performance 
of a complex enterprise from both unstructured and structured data. Bi-grams allow LLA to be 
extended to numerical or categorical data. For example, using structured data, such as 
attributes from maintenance and supply chain databases, we discretize numeric attributes and 
categorize their values to word-like features. The word pair model can further be extended to a 
context-concept-cluster model (Zhao & Zhou, 2014). A context can represent a location, a time 
point, or an object shared across data sources. Figure 2 shows an output of word networks from 
LLA for an unstructured data of a ship corrosion patent. Each node represents a word and each 
link represents how likely (the strength of the link) two words are next to each other as a bi-gram 
phrase. For example, “polystyrene dish” has a strength 242.5. An example of LLA for 
unstructured data is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Examples of LLA from Unstructured Data 
In this paper, we use LLA for the structured data. With the bi-gram representation and 
context-concept-cluster models, LLA can be used as a “market basket analysis,” where items 
appear together in the same context are considered associated or linked. Such association and 
link patterns can be used to improve prediction (Use Case 1 and 2) and rank items (Use Case 
3). 
Causal learning is also important for process improvement and quality control of a 
complex enterprise such as Navy Ships. The common consensus is that data-driven analysis or 
data mining can discover initial statistical correlations and associations from big data. Decision-
makers and engineers often need to validate causes behind any observable effects. This calls a 
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systematic approach of causal machine learning. The key factors for causal learning include the 
three layers of a causal hierarchy—association, intervention, and counterfactuals (Mackenzie & 
Pearl, 2018). A typical causal machine learning needs to select a cause (C) that maximizes the 
counterfactual difference Probability (E|C) – Probability(E|Not C), where the effect E is 
observable data and cause C is actionable and controllable variable. If deep analytics can 
reason and detect the cause for good or bad events (effects), engineers and decision-makers 
can fix the cause, avoid bad events/effects, and achieve desired effects. LLA potentially allows 
such a causality analysis. Causality analysis is related to the counterfactual regret minimization 
(CFR) that becomes important for many ML/AI applications.  
• Component 2—Optimize: Based on the patterns, LAILOW optimizes the measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) or the measures of performances (MOPs), defined by business 
decision-makers, by searching through all possible courses of actions to improve 
performance. The MOPs can be probability of failure (POF), probability of demand 
(POD), cost, time, and total readiness (e.g., a system uptime). 
After machine learning algorithms in LAILOW discover associations, patterns, and rules, 
optimization algorithms can use them to search for decisions, course of actions, configurations, 
and combinations to optimize predicted MOEs and MOPs. LAILOW draws upon evolutionary 
algorithms for optimization. Evolutionary algorithms are genetic algorithms, which integrate the 
metaphor of genetic reproduction of selection, mutation, and crossover where the objective 
function's derivatives are not easy to compute. 
• Component 3—Wargame: The LAILOW framework can be set up as a wargame with 
two players in order to test the quality or performance capabilities of a complex 
enterprise. One player, “self,” represents the complex enterprise. The “opponent” of 
“self” evaluates the complex enterprise for robustness and resilience under stress, for 
example, when environmental factors, such as mission requirements, weather, 
emergency events, natural disasters, or adversaries, (who may deliberately generate 
disruption and exploit the vulnerability of the self-player), come into consideration or 
suddenly emerge.  
The wargame serves the purpose of improving a real-time and dynamic operational 
environment through adaptative modeling. The opponent generates new operation conditions 
and events that might challenge the whole value chain and readiness measures in an intent to 
either improve the complex enterprise or disrupt the complex enterprise. The self-player adapts 
to optimize the actions and solutions to counter the opponent’s actions/decisions. The whole 
process iterates and escalates due to each player adapting to the other.   
To create a wargame environment, LAILOW uses coevolutionary algorithms (O’Reilly & 
Hemberg, 2018; Popovici et al., 2012). These are related to evolutionary algorithms and genetic 
algorithms (Back, 1996; Goldberg, 1989) and provide search, adaptation, and optimization 
mechanisms for two populations that engage to test and solve problems respectively. 
Coevolutionary algorithms explore domains in which the quality of a candidate solution (e.g., an 
action combination) is determined by its ability to successfully pass some set of tests 
(attackers), for example, solutions (defenders) in a logistics chain need to pass the known 
difficult or adversarial tests (attacks). Competitive coevolutionary algorithms are used to solve 
minmax problems, similar to those encountered by generative adversarial networks (GANs; 
Arora et al., 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2014), where adversarial engagements of opponents can 
be computationally modeled. Competitive coevolutionary algorithms take a population-based 
(parallel) approach to iterative adversarial engagement. In this competitive setting, the test 
(attacker) and solution (defender) strategies can lead to an arms race between the players, both 
adapting or evolving while pursuing conflicting objectives. 
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In summary, Navy Ships including USMC need to constantly perform a type of what-if 
and AoA wargame simulations in order to get ready for the unknown situations and perform in a 
contested environment. There are many challenges for Navy Ships and global materiel 
distribution that often require such wargame simulations. Forward deployed Navy Ships, 
particularly in the high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) areas such as the Seventh and Fifth 
Fleets, have challenges that arise in receiving logistical support when parts failures occur. 
These failures manifest as either a demand on the supply system, a casualty report (CASREP), 
or a request for technical assistance, which can cause a “redline,” or a failure that stops the unit 
from being able to complete the whole mission until the problem can be resolved. Limited 
manpower, funding, storage space, and resources for repair are all in high demand (Stevens & 
Zhao, 2021). A good system needs to be in place to determine the most efficient and effective 
method of stocking, forward staging, or contracting for the materials that have the highest 
likelihood of demand and balance with the potential impact of failure. LAILOW can support 
these system requirements because it exploits algorithms for learning, optimization and 
wargaming.  
Use Case 1: Marine Maintenance and Supply System 
As part of Navy Ships, the USMC maintenance and supply chain is a complex enterprise 
and exemplifies socio-technological infrastructures that require continuous learning, optimizing, 
and wargaming. To show the feasibility of the whole LAILOW framework, we first fuse and 
synthesize seven years of maintenance and supply time series data for a Marine equipment, 
namely, Land Armored Vehicles (LAV), including maintenance, supply, and equipment usage 
from the database Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). We then 
aggregate the data for each maintenance and supply ticket as shown in Figure 3(a). There are 
about 500 aggregated variables representing states and actions for both the self-player and 
opponent when applying LAILOW. The sample data set contains ~11% tickets that have the 
days between deadlined (i.e., the Marine term for “redlined”) and closed date more than 32 days 
(32 days is the mean of the days between the deadlined and closed dates for the data set).  
As shown in Figure 3(b), we first apply Orange’s predictive algorithms to predict the 
target variable “days between deadlined and closed” for each ticket. We add LLA to improve 
predictive models. We also add Soar-RL as another predictive algorithm outside Orange to 
predict the same target variable which result in comparable predictive accuracy. Finally, we 
divide all the variables into two groups: Attackers and Defenders, shown in Figure 3(d), and 
apply the coevolutionary algorithm using the predictive rules generated using Soar-RL. The 
predictive rules are generated for both Attacker variables and Defender variables to predict the 
target variable or fitness function in opposite directions. During the wargame phase, the 
Attacker variables change their values to increase the Attackers’ fitness, or increase the days 
between deadlined and closed; while the Defender variables change their values to increase the 
Defenders’ fitness or decrease the days between deadlined and closed.  
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Figure 3. The LAILOW Framework Applied to the Marine Use Case 
The Soar-RL and coevolutionary algorithms thus systematically simulate and discover 
possible new tests or “vulnerabilities” for a complex system and evolve solutions accordingly. 
For example, the evolved Attacker  “d284e4” in Figure 4(c), which is a specific combination of 
Attacker variables, has an improved fitness -0.204 from where it starts from the database, i.e., -
0.34 for “10fe75,” in Figure 4(a), against the best Defender “b642cf.” Such an attacker can 
potentially present a challenge or vulnerability to the current logistics solution system, because it 
is difficult for the defender to come up with a better solution than “b642cf.” Of course, the 
feasibility of such an Attacker configuration needs to be considered as well. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Evolution Process for Attackers and Defenders. 
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The evolved Attacker “d284e4” in Figure 4(c), which is a specific combination of Attacker 
variables, has an improved fitness -0.204 from where it starts from the database, i.e., -0.34 for 
“10fe75,” in Figure 4(a), against the best Defender “b642cf.” Such an attacker can potentially 
present a challenge or vulnerability to the current logistics solution system, because it is difficult 
for the defender to come up with a better solution than “b642cf.” 
 
 
Figure 5. The Evolution Process for Attackers and Defenders 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the Attackers’ and Defenders’ mean and best fitness values 
changing for three generations in the coevolutionary algorithms, respectively. The trends 
validate the results and analyses that the self-player or Defender, representing the logistics 
solutions, gets worse on average while the opponent or Attacker, representing logistics tests, 
gets better on average in the coevolution simulation.   
In summary, we show a use case of LAILOW which is capable of evolving, searching, 
simulating, and performing what-if analyses that reveal the new tests and solutions, possible 
vulnerability of the logistics system. The simulation can also suggest novel and more powerful 
solution (defender) configurations to handle new tests (attacker) that are never seen before.  
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Use Case 2: Predictive Risk Sparing Matrix (PRiSM) 
 
Figure 6. Predictive Risk Sparing Matrix (PRiSM) 
NAVWARSYSCOM’s Predictive Risk Sparing Matrix (PRiSM) as shown in Figure 6 is a 
product to accurately predict which critical Navy ship parts, related to Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems, are likely to fail during an 
operational deployment. If the ship parts’ failure can be correctly predicted, the parts can be 
proactively staged aboard Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 
platforms. Advanced analytics is needed for decision-making to replace parts with low remaining 
service life or pre-position parts afloat or ashore or accept risk with no parts support. The 
decisions are then to use for course of actions, for example, to build and fill AT-5 TYCOM 
Allowances onboard CSG/ARG ships, transfer parts to areas of responsibility (AOR) DD site, 
and monitor results during the deployments. This provides support from their advanced training 
phase (COMTUEX) to end of deployment in increasing mission readiness by reducing Mean 
Logistics Delay Time (MLDT) and relative Mean Down Time (MDT). Using various key data 
points, PRiSM utilizes ML analytics with Python, NumPy, Scikit-Learn, Pandas, Tableau, data 
structures, algorithm design for data science, and advanced programming and techniques to 
build a baseline of prediction performance. It has been previously funded by Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet and developed by NAVSEA, NSWC Corona. In 2020, we tested the LLA algorithm 
with the PRiSM product. LLA uses the parts association patterns (e.g., what parts are likely to 
fail with what other parts) to improve the probability of failure. For the test using real-time USS 
Boxer (BOXER ARG) and USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (TR CSG) deployment 
data, the predictive accuracy improved from ~60% to ~80% by adding LLA. PRiSM and LLA are 
complementary and use different information to pick up different types of failure, which made 
the improvement possible.  
Data Set 
The following detail of LLA to PRiSM is showing using the data from the TR CSG. Like 
many ML algorithms, LLA first sifts through a so-called train data set to extract patterns (i.e., 
failure association patterns for patterns), network models, and visualizations, and then apply the 
patterns to a test/validation data set as shown in Figure 7. Both data sets were extracted from 
the current PRiSM application, reflecting the real-time event of the TR CSG deployment. 
• Train data: Failure data 2 years prior to the TR CSG deployment 
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• Test/validation data: Failure data during the TR CSG deployment 
 
Figure 7. LLA Process Overview 
LLA Application 
We first use LLA to compute associations to see if two items or parts (used 
interchangeably below) are linked in the sense if one item fails, the other item also fails. The 
steps are shown below: 
1. In order to compute statistically significant association patterns, we first group the failed 
parts into “baskets.” Each basket is identified as a combination of the location of a failed 
part in the system (e.g., “object index,” “unit id”) and timestamp of the failure event (e.g., 
“year and month of event start date time”) as shown in Figure 8. We choose the failure 
event time “month” for the basket combination for associated failed items which fail in a 
period of month sequentially. Figure 8 also shows an example of basket and item pairs.  
 
Figure 8. Basket and Item Mapping for the TR CSG Sata 
2. LLA applies causal learning and compute counterfactual proportion difference, i.e., 
cf= [P(B|A) – P(B|Not A)]*(pooled sample size)                   (1) 
to compute the strength of the association of two parts as cf, where P(B|A) is the 
probability of part B fails within the same basket (i.e., fails at the same location and time 
frame) if part A fails. The pooled sample size is a pooled number of historical failure of 
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item A and B based on their pooled historical failure probabilities. cf is a z-score (PSU, 
2021) and we use cf >1.96 for p-value < 0.05 as the statistical significance for the 
associations. In Figure 9, item A could be more important than item B for causality, 
because A’s failure might cause B’s failure although A has fewer failure than B in total. 
The step generates an item network for all historical failed parts for the train data set. 
 
Figure 9. Causal Learning in LLA 
3. Once a network of items is generated using the measure defined in Equation (1) , a 
community finding algorithm (Girvan & Newman, 2002) is performed to cluster items into 
groups or communities, and  then compute centralities such as degree in, degree out, 
and betweenness scores.   
4. Outputs and centralities from LLA 
a. The probability of failure (POF): the percentage of baskets containing an item 
(e.g., item B in Figure 8)  
b. Degree in: the number of items with smaller POF (e.g., item A in Figure 9) fail 
together (i.e., in the same basket) with item B 
c. Degree in weight: degree in/average (cf), total estimated causal impact from 
other items 
d. Degree out: the number of items with bigger POF (e.g., item C in Figure 9) fail 
together (i.e., in the same basket) with item B 
e. Degree out weight: degree out/average (cf), total estimated causal impact to 
other items if item B fails 
f. Betweenness: the number of items to which item B links are in the different 
groups from the one of item B based on the community finding algorithm output.  
Results 
The outputs and centralities from LLA are used to improve the prediction for PRiSM. 
Fifty-one high impact C4I parts that were predicted failed and had actually, matched with either 
the LLA predictions or PRiSM predictions, improved from 36 matched from the PRiSM 
predictions alone. The total failed number of items failed is 64. PRiSM and LLA are 
complementary in terms of predicting failed items in this use case. 
Use Case 3: Readiness Impacts of Underfunding Spares Backlogs 
Navy Ships’ aviation and maritime units order spares from their general funds to fill 
modeled allowances. If there is not enough funding to buy all modeled allowances, spares 
requirements accumulate in a Financially Restricted Work Que (FRWQ) awaiting resourcing. In 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 364 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
the meantime, the systems with these parts support are still fielded, and the Fleet still generates 
requirements to replace these parts. 
The goal of this use case is to conduct a comparison of Fleet Demands against 
requirements in a FRWQ and assess these requirements with high priority demands linked to 
maritime units’ CASREP and aviation unit’s casualties, i.e., Non-Mission Capable Supply 
(NMCS). The result will help improve and determine the efficient and effective method of 
prioritizing materials that have the highest likelihood of demand balanced with their impact to 
readiness as a whole. 
Baseline 
The current tool and methodology of scoring and prioritizing the items are based on the 
DoD Manual 4140.01-V2 (DoD, 2018) in a FRWQ, with respect to their impact to the weapon 
system and aviation readiness data from CASREP and NMCS. The DoD Manual 4140.01-V2 
describes that two categories of measures, i.e., the weapons system criticality and fleet 
demand, are needed to prioritize items as shown in Figure 10. The weapons system criticality is 
measured by the Item Mission Essentiality Code (IMEC) or Weapon System Group (WSG) 
code. We use IMEC in this paper as follows: 
• IMEC Points: IMEC=5, 100 points awarded; IMEC=4, 80 points awarded; IMEC=3, 60 
points awarded; IMEC=2, 40 points awarded; and IMEC=1, 20 points awarded. Figure 
11 shows the detail of IMEC points calculation. 
The fleet demand is based on the two criteria of intermittency and correlation variance (CV) for 
scoring and prioritizing items  
• CV Points: calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of the demand to the 
average demand and normally expressed as a percentage. A “low variance” is less than 
75%; “median variance” is between 75% and 125%; and “high variance” is greater than 
125%.   
• Intermittency Points: calculated as the percentage of total historical demand periods 
(e.g., months in a year) that have non-zero demand. A “continuous” intermittency for an 
item means it is needed greater than 85% of 12 months (i.e., at least 11 of 12 months), 
while “limited” is less than 10%; “uneven” is between 10% and 60%; “erratic” is between 
60% and 85%. Figure 12 show the details of CV and Intermittency calculations. 
• Platform/Type Points: In addition to the IMEC, CV, and Intermittence points, platform 
and hull type are also used in the baseline calculation for total points. The overarching 
idea is that afloat units are given higher priority than shore units. Within afloat, we can 
prioritize further by leaning on U.S. Fleet Forces Command, which releases a fleet 
priority list on a semi-annual basis. Figure 13(a) shows the detail of the points 
calculation. This is a very insightful list, as it shows which units are highest priority 
(deploying soon) vs. low priority units (those in extended shipyard avails). But even the 
lowest priority afloat unit would still receive slightly higher points than a shore unit. The 
platform/type ranking shown in Figure 13(b) is just for CVNs. Other platforms and types 
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Figure 10. Current Methods of Prioritizing Items for a FRWQ 
 
 
Figure 11. IMEC Points Calculation (DoD, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 13. Platform/Type Points Calculation 
In the base line calculation, total points are the sum of CV points, Intermittency points, 
IMEC points, and Platform/Type Points. The maximum possible score is 400 points, and the 
minimum possible score is 115 points.  
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Data Sets 
There are two data sets used in the use case: 
• Data set 1: Historical raw demand for items related to aviation readiness and NMCS 
• Data set 2: Historical raw demand for items related to maritime parts and CASREPs 
The baseline points calculation examples: 
 
1. An aviation example for NIIN 015761575 associated with R2010393330312 (LHA 6 
Document)  
• CV Points: low variance (100 points awarded) 
• Intermittency Points: continuous (100 points awarded) 
• IMEC Points: 4 (critical system; 80 points awarded) 
• Platform/Type Points: LDECK (afloat type, highest LDECK Priority for USFF; 100 
points awarded) 
• Grand Total: 380 points (highest priority for FRWQ Investment) 
2. A maritime example: NIIN 005181789 associated with N2194510161535 (DDG 71 
Document) 
• CV Points: low variance (100 points awarded) 
• Intermittency Category: continuous (100 points awarded) 
• IMEC Category: 5 (critical system; 100 points awarded) 
• Platform/Type Points: DDG (afloat type, 4th highest CG/DDG priority for USFF; 98.5 
points awarded) 
• Grand Total: 398.5 Points (highest priority for FRWQ Investment) 
LLA Application 
LLA can be applied to the maritime data set 2 more meaningfully since it contains a data 
attribute JCN that is used to group the items into a same requisition time or “basket.” The items 
are the National Item Identification Numbers (NIIN) and hull type. There are 611,335 
unique baskets and 280,762 unique items in this data set; 2,093,633 statistically significant 
associations are found. The hypothesis is that items that appear together in the same baskets in 
the raw data, historical data might they be associated with a same cause so they are demanded 
together.   
In general, LLA and network theory are potentially to provide a network and centrality 
view of the items/parts generated from raw demand data, which is related to the network 
analysis applications, for example, ranking people in a social network or ranking an object such 
as a biological gene in an environment where such a baseline ranking is not available. 
However, application of LLA in this use case do not conclude better and more 
meaningful rankings than the existing methods. The correlations of LLA scores and baseline 
points are shown in Table 1. LLA suggests using “Degree out weight” scores as the total 
estimated impact to other items as the scores for the item’s importance, which has the least 
correlation of the total points. One of association patterns discovered is meaningful as shown in 
Figure 14. POD has a correlation 0.34 with the total points. This indicates LLA’s centrality 
measure “Degree out weight” does not use demand as signals for deciding the importance of an 
item. This may indicate the argument of causality learning that one item’s demand might cause 
another item’s demand may not fit to this problem, and the low-demand and high-impact items 
may not exist in the FRWQ data.  
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Figure 14. Example of LLA Associations Between Two Items 
This calls for further research of LLA, possibly applications of other LAILOW methods 
such as supervised ML methods. For example, feedback data needs to be collected for 
consequences to understand how item prioritizing decisions and resource allocation decisions’ 
impact future readiness. Future work also includes a review of business processes at a holistic 
level and consideration to plan for a whole class of ships or a whole fleet for a period of time 
(e.g., the CVN-74, USS John C. Stennis group for last a few years). 
Table 1. Correlations of LLA and Baseline Points 
 Total Points CV Intermittency IMEC Platform/Type 
POD 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.09 -0.09 
Degree in weight 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.16 -0.11 
Degree out weight 0.08 0.06 0.19 -0.019 -0.06 
Degree 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.012 -0.04 
Betweenness 0.17 0.07 0.19 0.18 -0.13 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we show the LAILOW framework provides a holistic predictive and 
simulation platform to improve the readiness of Navy Ships. The Soar-RL, comparable to other 
predictive machine learning algorithms, rule-based, and explainable, can be integrated with the 
coevolutionary algorithm to conduct a wargame for a Navy complex enterprise. The wargame 
simulates and discovers possible new tests or “vulnerabilities” of a value chain for U.S. Ships 
and related complex enterprises, and evolve solutions or “resiliency” accordingly for uncertain 
and new conditions.  
Recommendations and Future Work for Navy Ships  
In some use cases, LAILOW methods may require to collect more right data for deep 
analytics such as feedback data to be collected for consequences to understand how item 
prioritizing decisions and resource allocation decisions’ impact future readiness. Navy Ships 
need to adopt more deep analytics, machine learning and AI algorithms for big data or no data 
and focus on the entire spectrum or end-to-end (E2E) logistic planning.  
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Abstract  
Major defense acquisition programs take about 8 years to proceed from program initiation to an 
initial operational capability. Recent changes created Middle Tier Acquisition programs intended 
to deliver capabilities and products in less than 5 years. 
This research defines schedule risk as the likelihood of exceeding a duration. We developed 
quantitative models to identify significant factors and relationships. This report summarizes our 
approach and presents modeled results associated with Middle Tier Acquisitions. 
Program offices must concurrently adapt to both emergent guidance and programmatic realities. 
This research contributes to the understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with 
recent Middle Tier Acquisitions. The research results will be useful to program offices and 
acquisition leadership in executing current and future rapid acquisition programs. 
Introduction 
This research explored schedule-related risks and opportunities associated with implementing 
new rapid prototyping and fielding program authorities, modular open system architectures, and Agile 
development. We assessed schedule risks and opportunities associated with these innovations and 
identified programmatic modifications and measures to manage schedule growth. 
Research Scope  
Our research focused on quantifying the programmatic and system engineering–related 
schedule risks attributable to using rapid prototyping and fielding pathways, modular open 
systems architectures, and Agile acquisition practices. We developed quantitative models to 
identify significant factors and relationships. This report summarizes our approach and presents 
results associated with Middle Tier Acquisitions (MTAs). 
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The research applies to rapid prototyping and rapid weapon system MTA programs and 
specifically excludes programs intended to acquire services or defense business systems. It 
includes acquisition policy and management changes enacted in the 2016, 2017, and 2018 
National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) and the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
service guidance, governance, and execution strategies implementing these changes. The 
research findings may not be valid for programs beyond these innovations. 
Research Questions and Objectives 
1. What types of programs have delivered prototypes or fielded systems within 5 years? 
2. What characterized innovative technologies and systems fielded within 5 years? 
3. How do acquisition process innovations such as Agile development and modular open 
systems affect program schedule performance? 
Research Objectives 
1. To develop a program database from publicly available sources suitable for research. 
2. To identify and quantify significant factors for rapid acquisition strategies and significant 
predictors of and risk factors associated with achieving schedule objectives. 
This paper continues with a review of recent literature in the Literature Review. A 
methodology overview in Methodology describes datasets developed from publicly available 
sources and the quantitative methods used. Results and Analysis presents the results of 
quantitative analysis, and Conclusions and Future Work summarizes research results and 
suggests future opportunities.  
Literature Review 
Schedule is an outcome. Successful past approaches include incremental or 
evolutionary acquisition strategies, exemplified by Mortlock’s (2019) case study, adopting or 
reusing existing technologies, and updating or modifying existing systems (Tate, 2016). We 
briefly review policy and highlight recent innovations and research, including open systems 
architectures, modularity, Agile development, and Middle Tier Acquisitions. 
Rapid Acquisition Policies 
Fox (2011) produced a comprehensive summary of defense acquisition reform efforts 
between 1960 and 2009 and chronicles the interplay between Congress, the DoD, and the 
defense industry. Significant changes included 
• McNamara centralized acquisition authorities and introduced budgeting, programming, 
and requirements processes within the DoD.  
• Laird and Packard instituted policies related to management by objective, decentralized 
execution, cost reforms, prototyping, identifying, and managing technical risks, and 
formalizing acquisition training. 
• Increased accountability for results with congressional legislative initiatives such as the 
Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and Clinger-Cohen 
Act. 
Fox (2011) argued that DoD personnel did not have the expertise to implement and 
execute these reforms but emphasized the importance of congressional, DoD and industry 
leadership in creating these process and policy changes. Recent reforms starting with the 2016 
National Defense Authorization Act increasingly emphasized speed of development and 
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Middle Tier Acquisitions 
Congress enacted Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) processes in 2016 (NDAA, 2015, § 
804). In 2019, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(OUSD[A&S]) issued a new policy directive, Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) 
(Lord, 2019). This policy introduced two new acquisition paths, rapid prototyping and rapid 
fielding, which are structured for rapid start, including setting requirements or starting production 
within 6 months, and delivery of a prototype residual capability or completed fielding within 5 
years of start (Lord, 2019). The services released their own middle acquisition references 
concurrent with DoD issuance.  
The DoD introduced the Agile Acquisition Framework, bringing traditional acquisition, 
urgent acquisition, Middle Tier Acquisitions, software, business and services acquisitions into a 
common framework (Lord, 2020b). The DoD issued extensive acquisition policy revisions in 
2020, including The Defense Acquisition System (Lord, 2020b), and Operation of the Adaptive 
Acquisition Framework (Lord, 2020b). The MITRE Corporation created a comprehensive 
website collecting the DoD and service acquisition executive policy and guidance (MITRE, 
2019).  
Contracting Innovations 
Contracting strategies are critical to rapid acquisitions. The time from program start to 
contract award is in series with development and production. Most government acquisitions use 
contracts conforming to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Several innovations exist to 
reduce procurement acquisition lead time, including 
o Modular contracting, introduced by the Clinger–Cohen Act (Clinger–Cohen Act, 
1996). The intent was reducing investment risk, product delivery times, and 
barriers to introducing new information technology (Office of Management and 
Budget [OMB], 2012). Modular contracting has expanded beyond information 
technology acquisitions to include software and hardware development and 
procurements (OUSD[A&S], 2019).  
o Agile contracting adapts contract management to support agile acquisition 
processes. Pennington (2018) notes that inherently Agile attributes such as 
incomplete requirements, incremental deliverables, and acceptance criteria make 
for challenging procurements. Contracting officers predominantly use fixed-price 
type contracts to manage Agile procurements; key issues include setting quality 
standards, definitions of done, and appropriate risk sharing (Ellis et al., 2019).  
Statutory alternatives to FAR contracts also reduce lead times, including Procurements 
for Experimentation (Procurement for Experimental Purposes, 1993), and Commercial Solutions 
Opening (NDAA, 2016, sec. 879). These simplify commercial item procurements for research 
and development. Other Transaction Agreements (Research Projects: Transactions other than 
Contracts and Grants, 1993) are legally binding agreements where generally contract- and 
grant-related Federal laws and regulations do not apply. There are three common types of other 
transactions – other transactions for prototypes, other transactions for research, and other 
transactions for production (Research Projects: Transactions other than Contracts and Grants, 
1993). 
Business Innovations 
Several advisory panels provided specific recommendations for business process 
innovations. A recent example was the Section 809 Panel, which provided extensive 
recommendations intended to accelerate acquisition processes by leveraging commercial 
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marketplaces and processes, simplifying acquisition regulations, changing resource allocation 
processes, and improving the acquisition workforce (Drabkin et al., 2016). The DoD 
implemented less than half of their recommendations as of January 2021. 
The DoD and Congress created several funding processes designed to accelerate 
technology transitions from non-traditional performers (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering [OUSD(R&E)], 2020). For example, the DoD Rapid Innovation 
Fund was created by Congress in 2011 and expanded in 2018 to accelerate small business 
technology transition to the DoD (NDAA, 2011). It is structured to move small business 
technology into operational use or to an acquisition program within 24 months (OUSD[R&E], 
2020). Congress did not appropriate funding for this activity in 2020. 
The Defense Innovation Unit is a different effort, embedded in Silicon Valley and 
reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]). It is 
focused on transitioning commercial advanced technologies to the DoD and uses an extension 
of other transaction agreement authorities (NDAA, 2015, § 815) to fund development and 
transition. It recently expanded to other locations and provides market access and non-dilutive 
capital for non-traditional defense contractors (Defense Innovation Unit [DIU], 2020). 
Rapid System Acquisitions  
Arellano et al. (2015) analyzed two successful rapid acquisition programs and noted the 
importance of direct senior leadership involvement to successful rapid acquisitions. This support 
mandates schedule adherence, requires programs to accept more risk, and creates agility to 
bypass financial and bureaucratic obstacles.  
Wong (2016) identified three long-term (replacement, expedited, or traditional) and three 
opportunistic (missed, new, or alternative) acquisition categories. In his analysis, rapid 
acquisition processes depend upon budget reprogramming for initial action, but quantities 
depend upon capability adoption and use proliferation (Wong, 2016). The recently introduced 
acquisition pathways or strategies emphasize accelerated demonstration of a prototype or 
fielding of a new capability and are consistent with Wong’s (2016) opportunistic categories. Of 
note, Congress provided statutory relief allowing transfer of procurement funds to rapid fielding 
accounts (NDAA, 2016), further supporting Wong’s (2016) analysis.  
Following Wong (2016), rapid acquisitions are a response to an emergent need—an 
immediate investment. Van Atta et al. (2016) defined “accelerated acquisitions” as those with 
requirements urgency, requirements specificity, and technology availability. They noted that 
relatively few (18 of about 330 Major Defense Acquisition Programs [MDAPs] reviewed) 
programs met these criteria and resulted from emergent urgent needs. Nine of these 18 
programs delivered a prototype or claimed initial operational capability (IOC) within 5 years of 
program start (Van Atta et al., 2016). Dougherty (2018) examined programmatic and objective 
differences between six current rapid acquisition offices, noting attributes reflecting flexibility in 
contracting, transition, and programmatic objectives. 
 Open Architectures  
Initiatives such as open system architectures intend to minimize change costs1 by 
encapsulating functions in modules, using interfaces conforming to consensus standards, and 
 
1 Congress directed DoD use of open systems, called Modular Open Systems Architectures (MOSA; 10 
U.S.C. § 2446a, 2016). MOSA development strategies emphasize module-level competition, 
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establishing processes to ensure architectural compliance (Firesmith, 2015). Watson et al. 
(2016) related design margin (what they called “excess capacity”) to the ability to evolve a 
military ground vehicle design over time. They found, given future requirements uncertainty, the 
optimal design in terms of cost and benefits of excess capacity was related to the expected 
design service life; also, excess capacity was not cost-effective when expected service lifetimes 
were below a certain value (Watson et al., 2016).  
The implications are that system designs face a choice: produce systems designed for 
changeability over a long service life or in favor of sustained production of incrementally 
evolving systems with shorter system design lifetimes. We see examples of both choices today, 
such as the aircraft carrier (changing over a long life) and commercial computers.  
Modularity 
Modularity, like open systems architectures, is a design choice to reduce complexity or 
change system function or performance without creating a new system. It partitions product 
knowledge into distinct but related processes and products. Modularity allows companies to 
develop products faster and either protects or exposes company intellectual property (Baldwin & 
Henkel, 2015, p. 1641).  
van Gent and Kassapoglou (2014) examined modularizing composite airframes and 
showed the effects on direct operating costs and fuselage weight with increasing modularity. 
They derived cost and weight values for specific flight load conditions and optimized structural 
designs. While cost and weight savings were achievable, they were reduced or lost at high 
modularity levels as modules became heavier (and more expensive; van Gent & Kassapoglou, 
2014). Chadha et al. (2018) examined redesign of a representative missile using additive 
manufacturing processes to simplify system interfaces and expand the design space. Applying 
their redesign process to selected modules and components, they presented design changes 
improving reliability and manufacturability by reducing module part count, eliminating internal 
module interfaces, and optimizing module design. While improved, the redesigned missile still 
required flight certification (Chadha et al., 2018). 
Agility and Agile Development 
Agility has multiple meanings within the DoD; it may refer to software development, 
acquisition processes, or any changeable process or product. In 2017, the DoD had few 
programs using Agile software development methods.  
Rosa et al. (2017) developed cost models for traditional (“waterfall”) and Agile software 
processes within the DoD. Notwithstanding a small Agile process dataset, they found that 
product size (source lines of code) is a valid measure of required effort and Agile methods were 
more productive than traditional (non-Agile) software development methods (Rosa et al., 2017, 
p. 36). 
Nidiffer et al. (2014) described Agile programs as “implementation-driven,” meaning 
requirements are dependent on interactions and direct communications to establish short-term 
requirements, while traditional approaches focus on documented requirements. While Agile 
helps requirements validation, there still are specific issues such as contract modifications and 
managing non-functional requirements (Inayat et al., 2015). Adams (2017) identified DoD and 
non-DoD related factors affecting DoD Agile software development adoption, including 
contracting, requirements management, training and team organization. Schoeni (2015) found 
similar cultural barriers and identified regulatory constraints.  
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Rework is a significant shortcoming of Agile processes for physical systems, as it uses 
incremental function2 delivery (OUSD[A&S], 2019). Cooper and Sommer (2016) proposed a 
hybrid development process, called Agile Stage-Gate, where Agile methods are applied within 
selected stages, such as studies and technology development, and gated with clear exit or 
“done sprint” criteria. 
Haberfellner and Weck (2005) provide an excellent overview of Agile systems 
engineering in a series of illustrative case studies highlighting the systems engineering 
challenges of designing agility (speed of change) into real systems. They show that agility is 
valuable for long-lived systems when “significant switching costs exist coupled with substantial 
uncertainty3 in the environment” (Haberfellner & Weck, 2005, p. 1463).  
Islam and Storer (2020) developed a case study examining how safety-critical systems 
development conflicts with Agile development. While qualitative and from a single case, they 
identified three broad grounds of challenges: the influence of “waterfall-like” systems 
engineering processes on Agile teams, complex customer interactions, and conflicts between 
Agile process and regulatory standards, such as upfront design requirements for hazard 
analysis conflicting with incremental Agile design (Islam & Storer, 2020).  
Production 
DoD production (inventory) quantities for traditional acquisition programs are defined by 
requirements (Wicecarver, 2017), reducing incentives to produce more than contract 
requirements. Desai et al. (2007) considered the problem for commercial durable goods 
production and found inventory holding costs and durability incentivize lower inventory. Davis 
and Tate (2020) provide several examples of how acquisition quantities change over time and 
that systems change over time such that later production versions may be quite different than 
initial deliveries.  
Physical system production at large scale requires extensive facilities. For example, in 
December 2019, Boeing and Airbus delivered 29 and 138 large commercial aircraft, respectively 
(Oestergaard, 2020). Boeing’s Everett production facility covers nearly 100 acres (Boeing, 
2020), and Airbus has five final assembly lines world-wide (Airbus, 2020). Changing production 
demand may exceed a contractor’s capacity. In such cases, leader–follower production 
strategies may be useful.  
 Reconfigurable manufacturing systems reduce short-run production overhead and 
retooling costs by modularizing production processes for an intended parts family. Commercial 
modular production firms use mechanisms such as cost-sharing agreements, hedged delivery 
dates,4 and premiums for early deliveries5 to incentivize rapid acquisitions (Zhai et al., 2016), 
and spot and future markets can be created for premium demand purchases (Cai et al., 2020). 
Asghar et al. (2018) developed a multi-objective algorithm to optimize module (machine) 
sequencing and usage (scheduling) as production demands change (p. 4397). The research 
was specific for a part production line using programmable multi-axis milling machines. Efficient 
production sequencing minimized production downtime.  
 
2 Function, also called story or story points. 
3 Examples include requirements or demand uncertainty. 
4 In this case, hedging consists of setting module delivery dates earlier than need dates, thus covering the 
module production process time uncertainty. 
5 Zhai et al. (2016) call these premiums “crashing money.” 
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The U.S. Air Force recently announced flight testing of a Next Generation Air Dominance 
prototype, developed using a “digital engineering6” based development process, asserting this 
to be a faster path to prototype demonstration than prior methods (Reim, 2020). The 
development time is not stated, but the program office was activated in October 2019, 
suggesting a short development cycle (Waldron, 2019). 
Schedule Estimating–Related Research 
Schedule risk has different definitions in the literature, ranging from the likelihood to 
achieve a predicted duration (Dubos et al., 2007) to an estimate of likelihood and consequence 
(Tao et al., 2017). Browning (1998) used causal loop representations to identify likely sources 
and consequences of schedule delays and showed how uncertainty drives risk. Thomas et al. 
(2014) extended earned value methods to estimate schedule risk within a detailed cost and 
schedule Monte Carlo simulation. Similarly, Wauters and Vanhoucke (2017) used machine 
learning techniques to simulate project schedule duration within an earned value methodology. 
Such simulations require detailed work project schedules and duration uncertainty distributions 
as inputs.  
Jaifer et al. (2020) examined effort and time drivers for aerospace new product 
development and grouped them into complexity7 and proficiency8 categories, later adding 
uncertainty as a separate category following a subject matter expert survey. Jahr (2014) tried to 
quantify the effect of Agile project management on schedule relative to traditional program 
management processes. He developed a hybrid management process for software 
development using constrained activity-on-node graphs and ran an experiment comparing 
performance to scrum processes for modification and new product development. The teams 
using the modified process were able to outperform scrum teams in terms of schedule and cost 
growth for both new and modified software development (Jahr, 2014). This suggests that 
applying planning constraints and management can benefit Agile processes such as scrum-type 
software development. 
Ingold (2014) noted that schedule durations for small software development efforts are 
approximately the cube-root of the planned effort in person-months, and the square root of 
planned effort for large efforts. He argued that Agile efforts tend to follow square root 
relationships and that while reducing schedule leads to cost growth, Agile processes are able to 
achieve schedules shorter than predicted by standard software cost estimating models (Ingold, 
2014). He developed and calibrated an Agile schedule systems dynamic model with 12 
qualitative schedule acceleration sub-factors that predicted schedule durations within a few 
percent (Ingold, 2014). His schedule-accelerating subfactors map to previously identified 
schedule factors (Riposo et al., 2014), and his people-related factors map to Jahr’s (2014) 
proficiency group.  
Discussion and Summary 
The literature provides an overview of program better practices and decisions associated 
with shorter schedules. These include  
• Reducing requirements to meet capability and deliver something sooner 
• Having a competent team and bounding the system by what is known and in use, 
including interfaces and standards 
 
6 Also called a digital thread (Bone et al., 2019). 
7 Such as size, technical difficulty, and uncertainty. 
8 Examples include experience, communications, and process management competency. 
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• Starting with an existing or proven system to reduce development delays  
• Adjusting work to retire schedule risk 
• Having sponsorship from the top and using the resulting flexibility to overcome 
inevitable obstacles 
• Segmenting integration risk 
There is extensive literature on specific manifestations of rapid acquisitions, notably 
modularity and Agile software development; however, these are focused cases and provide 
lessons learned for program management offices. The literature shows extensive development 
in policies and process supporting rapid acquisitions.  
Congress and the DoD instituted several process and statutory changes in recent years, 
such as Modularity, Agility, and Middle Tier Acquisitions. The DoD adopted these innovations to 
reduce program cycle times. There are few quantitative articles on the effects of modularity and 
Agility on schedule performance, and Middle Tier Acquisition programs as relatively new, 9 
representing a significant research gap. We focused this paper on Middle Tier Acquisitions 
schedule risk and the following research hypothesis: 
• Middle Tier Acquisition programs have lower schedule risk than traditional MDAPs. 
Methodology 
We defined the likelihood of exceeding a specified schedule duration as the schedule 
risk. We did not assess risk context, severity, or treatment, as these are program-dependent. In 
Figure 1, the vertical red dashed line indicates a schedule risk of about 0.9 (89.2%) that the 
schedule of a program in this dataset will exceed 60 months. 
 
 
Figure 1. Estimation of schedule risk 
 
 
9 Some quantitative information is in recent budget documentation. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget data 
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The key assumption is that similar program types have similar schedule durations and 
risks—in this case, MDAPs. If true, then there is a 50% chance of a similar program’s schedule 
exceeding 120 months, and about an 11% chance of exceeding 180 months.  
Research Design Overview 
We relied on several publicly available data sources for this research: the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) annual weapon system assessments, the Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DOT&E) Annual Reports, FPDS.gov, and usaspending.gov. We included the 
Fiscal Year 2019 through 2021 budget documentation to identify rapid acquisition programs. We 
compiled data into comma-separated variable files that are available upon request. Contract 
data was substantial; programmatic data was sparse. We manually validated the smaller 
datasets. 
Budget data text searches were critical to labeling programs as modular, open systems, 
Agile development, Middle Tier, or Section 804 acquisitions, and claiming rapid fielding or rapid 
prototyping activities. 
We used Microsoft and Adobe text search engines, R, Minitab, and SPSS to identify 
relevant programs and significant factors. We developed simplified schedule models in Minitab 
and ran Monte Carlo simulations to estimate schedule risk for the previously-labeled strategies. 
We performed additional modeling on Air and Missile system commodity types to identify and 
characterize influential variables and test model predictive performance. 
Research Terms and Definitions 
GAO and DOT&E 2020 reports and DoD budget documentation provided most of the 
research data. We searched for programs with the following text strings: 
• “Agile development.” This is commonly a software-dominated development and delivery 
process with incremental requirements elaboration, schedule-driven product delivery and 
acceptance. Searches included “Agile,” “Agility,” and “Agile software.” Searching using 
“Agile development” provided good specificity to specific budget documents. An example 
of “Agile development” is the previously mentioned Air Force Air Operations Center 
Weapon System 10.2 (AOC-WS 10.2) replacement program. 
• “Modular system.” A modular system is often the product of a program with multiple 
components in development or production, with system function determined by the types 
of modules used to compose systems. Searches included “modular” and “modularity.” 
An example of a modular system is the Army Field Medical Equipment. 
• “Middle Tier.” This is a program or project using Section 804 (Middle Tier Acquisition) 
pathways. Searches were also conducted using “Section 804,” “MTA,” “rapid fielding,” 
and “rapid prototyping.” Prior to the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, the DoD 
used “Agile,” “rapid fielding,” and “rapid prototyping” within budget documentation 
descriptions of program plans and strategies. Examples include the Air Force Air-
Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and AOC-WS 10.2  
• “Open System.” Also known as Open System Architecture & Modular Open Systems 
Architecture Explicit Interfaces, standards, composition rules (structure) Often includes 
configuration management. Examples include the Air Force F-16 Modification of In-
Service Aircraft and AOC-WS 10.2. 
Results and Analysis 
Text searches of budget documents between Fiscal Years 2010 and 2021 inclusive 
showed that Agile development and Modular system are more common in procurement 
documents, and Middle Tier and Open System are more common in research and development 
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documents. Also, the Air Force has more activity related to Agile development and Middle Tier 
Acquisitions that the other services. Figure 2 shows these trends. 
 
 
Figure 2. Term usage count summary by fiscal year 
 Figure 2 shows increasing overall usage trends for both procurement (Figure 2[a]) and 
research and development (Figure 2[b]). Agile development and open system activities are 
growing in all services. Open systems are a sustained emphasis in research and development, 
and Middle Tier Acquisition programs are a recent development. 
Modeling Middle Tier Acquisition Program Schedule Duration 
 We used data from the GAO 2020 annual weapon systems assessment and added 
Fiscal Year 2020 and 2021 budget documents to create a dataset with program cycle times or 
schedules with programmatic factors and classification using the previous labels.  
We found that modifications of existing systems were commonly occurring with modular 
systems and considered “modification” as a proxy for modular and open systems in the dataset.  
Agile development programs did not always have a clear end date or planned initial 
operational capability date. The challenge is part of determining the “definition of done” 
(OUSD[A&S], 2020), essentially when the accumulated product value meets the customer 
requirement. This is normally a software development issue and may be in-service use, date of 
authority to operate, or another defined state. This definition problem exists in Agile 
development and Middle Tier Acquisition programs. We chose either the latest specified product 
delivery date or the last date in the budget submission. 
 We subsetted the data to consider Air (AIR) and Missile (MSL) commodity type 
programs. Figure 3 summarizes the cycle times by Agile (AGILE), MDAP, modification (MOD) 
and Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA.RP).10  
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Figure 3. Cycle Times for AIR and MSL Programs (GAO, 2020) 
Figure 3 highlights that Middle Tier Acquisition programs are so new that none have 
reported schedule growth resulting in durations greater than 5 years (60 months). It also shows 
that modifications of existing systems have a smaller range and lower median cycle time than 
an MDAP does. Random forest modeling identified the most important predictor variables: time 
since program start, change in the research and development budget, the natural log transforms 
of the research and development budget, and estimated unit cost.11 We developed a 
multivariate regression, leaving out time since program start.12 Table 1 summarizes the 
multivariate regression model that excluded time since program start. 
 
Table 1. Cycle Time (Schedule) Regression Model Summary 
Factor Coefficient Contribution p-value VIF 
Intercept 1.6     
LN(R&D budget) 12.66 25.87% 0.000 1.13 
PCT change (R&D) 37.74 20.32% 0.000 1.17 
LN(Unit cost estimate) 4.97 6.75% 0.013 1.03 
MTA = TRUE -39.28 11.94% 0.000 1.03 
S R-sq R-sq(adj) R-sq(pred)  
34.74 64.88% 61.90% 51.23%  
 
We used a reduced version of this model as one estimator of Middle Tier Acquisition 
program schedule risk.  
Predicting Schedule Risk for Middle Tier Acquisition Programs 
We fitted polynomials to GAO cycle time (schedule) cumulative distributions for the four 
different program types.13 These provide a simple estimate of schedule risk following the Figure 
 
11 If not specified, then unit cost was total budget divided by planned buy. 
12 This was evaluated as reflecting the schedule growth of older programs in the dataset. 
13 The cumulative distributions could be modeled by a 3 parameter Weibull distribution. We developed 
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1 approach. Most polynomials were quadratic or cubic, with R-squared values above 95%. The 
Middle Tier Acquisition distribution was best fit by a logarithmic equation: 
 
𝑃𝑃(> 𝐷𝐷) = 1 − {0.4284 ∗ ln(𝐷𝐷)− 0.8496}, 
 
where D is the schedule duration in months. 
We ran three Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the likelihood of Middle Tier 
Acquisition programs exceeding 60 months. The first simulation (normal data fit) assumed 
normally distributed schedule durations with estimated upper (53 months) and lower (10 
months) bounds and an estimated standard deviation. The second simulation (regression 
model) started with a regression model predicting schedule distributions from program 
budgets.14 The third simulation (Weibull data fit) assumed schedules followed a Weibull 
distribution, with scale (49.7), shape (2.705), and a 0 threshold. Table 2 shows Middle Tier 
Acquisition program duration simulation schedule risk results at 5, 6, 7, and 8 years (60–96 
months). 
Table 2. Middle Tier Acquisition Schedule Risk Simulation Results 
Simulation/Model P(>60 months) P(>72 months) P(>84 months) P(>96 months) 
Normal data fit 2.7% 0.4% 0.19% 0% 
Regression model 46.6% 25.4% 11.5% 4.3% 
Weibull data fit 19.8% 7.2% 1.6% 0.2% 
poly fit 9.6% 1.7% 0% 0% 
 
 The last row (poly fit) is the estimate for the GAO cumulative schedule distribution for 
comparison with the simulations. The normal data fit simulation estimated a duration less than 
zero 2.3% of the time; 2.7% is the schedule risk of duration exceeding 60 months. The other 
models predict some risk of exceeding 60 months. Regression model results suggest that larger 
budget (greater than $1 billion) programs will be more likely to exceed 60 months. No Middle 
Tier model or simulation predicted significant schedule risk beyond 96 months.  
We modeled MDAP schedule risk as above. Table 3 summarizes MDAP schedule risk 
for the GAO data and a polynomial model. 
Table 3. MDAP Schedule Risk Simulation Results 
Simulation/Model P(>60 months) P(>120 months) 
Monte Carlo simulation 88.7% 46.7% 
Polynomial model 88% 46% 
This shows that Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) programs have less schedule risk than 
MDAPs at the same absolute schedule duration. However, the schedule risk of an MTA and an 
MDAP at the same relative percent schedule completion are comparable. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 The literature review provided an overview of program better practices and decisions 
associated with shorter schedules, including  
• Reducing requirements to meet capability and deliver something sooner 
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• Starting with proven technologies, interfaces, and standards  
• Having a competent team and capable suppliers 
• Adjusting work to retire schedule risk and segmenting integration risk 
• Having a plan to get to contract award and production sooner 
Middle Tier Acquisition programs can benefit from these practices and add policy limits 
on schedule durations, oversight, and stakeholder involvement to incentivize schedule 
adherence and lower schedule risk.  
This research provides insight into the schedule risk of MTA programs. Simulations 
showed the likelihood that an MTA program will exceed its planned schedule is less than 20%. 
Simulations also predict that the schedule risk for MTA programs grows with larger total 
research and development budgets (MTAs with budgets greater than $1 billion are more likely 
to exceed 60 months). 
Middle Tier Acquisition programs have less schedule risk than traditional MDAPs at the 
same absolute duration. For example, at 60 months after program start, the schedule risk for an 
MTA program should be less than 20% and over 80% for an MDAP, as the MDAP has years of 
schedule left, while the MTA is (should be) nearly completed.  
The schedule risk estimation process is extensible to other rapid acquisition innovations. 
Future work should include replicating this effort using restricted datasets and program-level 
data, validating schedule risk predictions and predictor significance with observed program 
performance, and developing context and severity estimators.  
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Abstract 
This study aims to measure the technology transition performance of 252 small firms that won the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase II awards 
from 2001 to 2010 and filed more than 15 patents (“elite DoD SBIR awardees”) and to explore 
how social, industrial, and geospatial contexts influence the performance. For the purpose, we 
first employ two-stage, dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that incorporates network 
building sub-process as well as R&D and commercialization sub-processes and then utilize Tobit 
regression analysis. We find two implications. One of them is that more than a quarter of the elite 
DoD SBIR awardees are efficient and their efficiency scores of about a half are higher than 60%. 
The other is that their strong networks with big-sized funders and their high-tech concentration 
are positively associated with the technology transition performance whereas locational factors 
are not significantly related with the performance.  
Introduction 
As a complex system, regional, industrial, or national innovation system involves many 
players who are interdependent with each other (Dougherty, 2017; Katz, 2016). Generally, the 
public sector (e.g., federal agencies with a substantial amount of extramural R&D budget) and 
non-profit organizations (e.g., private foundations) provide R&D funding to knowledge producers 
or technology developers. Universities and national and corporate research laboratories 
produce knowledge or develop technology depending on the funding. The private sector (e.g., 
small businesses) capitalizes on the produced and transferred knowledge and makes revenues 
and profits that are sources of investment and incentives to the players. While the segmentation 
of role responsibilities worked well in the era of the public sector-dominant R&D (particularly, in 
the wartime), the boundaries that were drawn for each player have been blurred (Kaufmann & 
Tödtling, 2001; Lundberg, 2013). For instance, the Department of Defense (DoD) develops 
technologies in house through Air Force, Army, and Naval research laboratories, outsources 
high-risk, high-return R&D projects to universities or corporations through the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and acquires state-of-the-art technologies from 
the private sector through the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. It stresses not 
only technology transfer (e.g., a knowledge flow from the DoD to small businesses) but also 
technology transition (e.g., a knowledge flow from small businesses to the DoD). It is especially 
true at the current times when the private sector is leading in many high-tech areas such as 
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information and communications technology and biotechnology (Ryu, 2017). Nonetheless, most 
literature has paid attention to the former (particularly, technology transfer from universities or 
national laboratories to the private sector) whereas a paucity of literature has studied the latter 
(particularly, technology transition from small businesses to the public sector). 
Innovation itself is also complex in that it entails various processes and sub-processes at 
multiple levels (Dias et al., 2014; Pelz, 1985). At the product level, for instance, it should pass 
along a series of product development processes from ideation to prototyping to testing in order 
to create a new product. To sell the new product, it should get through a chain of value-added 
processes from inbound logistics to operations to outbound logistics to marketing and sales to 
service. Innovation is affected by other upper-level characteristics (Autio et al., 2014; Tidd, 
2001). For instance, organizational culture and institutions (e.g., incentive system) at the firm 
level, state government’s business environment (e.g., tax credits and support for the public 
universities) at the regional level, and federal government’s policy programs (e.g., R&D 
spending and procurement) at the national level can influence innovation. Given that innovation 
is affected by various contexts, policy-makers are responsible to reconstruct the contexts to 
attract more innovators to their jurisdictions and to grow their economies. Innovators 
(particularly, technology-based small businesses), on the other hand, tend to search better 
locations to operate their businesses considering not only government’s support but also other 
factors (e.g., access to market and benefits resulted from agglomeration). In this vein, decision-
makers who seek technological innovation in their organizations or jurisdictions may need to 
evaluate their current performance and find some entities to benchmark in order to improve their 
performance (Guan et al., 2006; Sun, 2011). That is why Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has 
been widely used to measure the innovation performance and identify leading entities at the 
firm-, regional-, and national levels. 
With this background, this study seeks to (a) assess technology transition performance 
(as a special case of innovation) of technology-based small businesses that received the DoD 
SBIR awards, and (b) examine how social, industrial, and geospatial contexts influence the 
performance. For the purpose, we first employ two-stage, dynamic DEA to deal with the sub-
processes of innovation in measuring technology transition performance and then Tobit 
regression analysis to determine what factors drive the performance. 
The remaining sections of this research are organized as follows. The Literature Review 
section discusses a literature study. The Methodology section describes the methodology used 
in this study. The Empirical Study section summarizes empirical results. The last section 
concludes this research along with summary and future research. 
Literature Review 
DEA Applications to Measuring Innovation Efficiency 
DEA, to date, has been utilized to measure innovation efficiency at multiple levels such 
as organization (e.g., firm and university), region, and country. At the microscopic level, for 
instance, Sueyoshi & Goto (2013) examined the firm-level efficiency by associating R&D 
expenditure with Tobin’s q as an indicator for the corporate value. Kuah & Wong (2011) 
measured the university-level R&D efficiency by using multiple inputs (e.g., research grants and 
the numbers of research staff and students) and outputs (e.g., the numbers of publications, 
awards, and intellectual property rights). At the mesoscopic level, Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2007) 
looked at the performance of regional innovation systems based on the European Innovation 
Scoreboard (EIS) data. At the macroscopic level, Sharma & Thomas (2008) explored the cross-
national R&D efficiency of 22 countries. While they offer useful information about which entities 
lead in terms of the innovation performance and which entities can serve as benchmarks, they 
have some limitations: (a) they tend to regard the innovation process as a single big black box 
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(and thus it is hard to understand the specifics of the innovation and to incorporate the time-
consuming nature of the innovation), (b) although they seek to shed light on the specifics, they 
tend to focus on one specific segment of the whole value chain of innovation (and thus it is 
difficult to understand the interdependence between the innovation sub-processes), (c) they 
tend to stress only traditional production factors such as labor and capital materialized by 
financial resources (R&D personnel and expenditure in our case) ignoring the aspects of social 
capital, and (d) they tend to be general (particularly in the regional and country-level studies) 
and thus their frameworks need to be tailored to solving specific program-related performance 
measurement issues. 
To address the aforementioned limitations (a) and (b), multi-stage and/or dynamic 
network DEA approaches have been recently developed and applied to measure the innovation 
efficiency. At the firm-level, for instance, Chun et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2016) used two-
stage DEA models by decomposing the innovation process into R&D and 
marketing/commercialization sub-processes and analyzed the innovation efficiency of Korean 
and Chinese companies. At the regional level, Chen and Guan (2012) and Chen et al. (2018) 
looked at the innovation efficiency of Chinese regions based on two-stage network DEA models. 
At the national level, Carayannis et al. (2016) and Kou et al. (2016) measured the innovation 
efficiency of European or OECD countries. All of these studies incorporate the systematic and 
dynamic aspects of the complex and non-linear innovation process. Along with the emerging 
concepts of Regional Innovation System (RIS) as well as the National Innovation System (NIS), 
those studies can better inform regional- and national-level policy-makers who desire to 
invigorate the economies of their jurisdictions through technological innovation. While achieving 
the desired result in the limitations (a) and (b), they are not still sufficient to address the 
remaining limitations (c) and (d).  
As the position of this study is to fill this gap in the existing literature, we seek to 
incorporate the social capital dimensions into a two-stage, dynamic DEA model. Moreover, we 
seek to customize a general DEA model into addressing the technology transition issue, a 
special case of the innovation process but one of the objectives that the DoD SBIR program 
desires to achieve. Through the proposed DEA model, thus, we can better inform technology 
transition-related policy-makers and DoD SBIR program managers.  
Role of Social Capital in Small Businesses’ Innovation Context 
There is a great body of studies on the corporate size of businesses. Most of them 
argued over the advantages and disadvantages of business size (e.g., MacMillan, 1975; Moen, 
1999). For instance, large businesses can be price-competitive by reducing average cost 
through the economies of scale and also be technology- and market-competitive by investing 
more in R&D and marketing whereas they can suffer from bureaucracy, ineffective 
communication, and concerns about cannibalization or creative destruction. On the other hand, 
small businesses can take advantage of their flexibility, agility, and risk-taking innovation while 
they have to face many challenges such as lack of well-educated workers and well-secured 
financial resources and limited access to valuable information. One of the solutions to those 
challenges may be developing social networks (e.g., Miller et al., 2007; Lee, 2015). To hire 
qualified employees or to obtain useful information, for instance, small firms or their founders 
may be able to utilize their social networks (from strong and informal ties such as family and 
friends to weak and formal ties such as professional communities). They can also build social 
networks with potential funders to secure external financial sources. Particularly for startups and 
early-stage small businesses, securing funds through public venture programs such as federal-
level Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants/contracts and state-level SBIR 
matching grants and private equity such as investments from corporate venture capitals and 
angels are critical for their survival and growth. 
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Particularly, the SBIR program has contributed to facilitating the innovation of small 
businesses. Since the 1980s, the program has successfully attained its four objectives: 1) 
stimulating technological innovation, 2) using small businesses to meet federal R&D needs, 3) 
fostering and encouraging participation by minority and disadvantaged people in technological 
innovation, and 4) increasing private-sector commercialization (Small Business Administration 
[SBA], 2014). Of them, the second objective is especially important to the DoD that accounts for 
almost half of the total SBIR budget. Unlike the past where the public sector (e.g., national 
laboratories) dominated technological innovation, the private sector is currently leading in the 
high-tech innovation (e.g., information and communications technology and biotechnology). It is 
essential for the DoD to acquire cutting-edge technologies from the private sector in order to 
maintain its military and technological leadership. In this regard, we define technology transition 
as a knowledge/technology flow from the private sector to the public sector (when compared to 
technology transfer indicating a knowledge/technology flow from the public sector to the private 
sector) following Dobbins’s (2004) definition about technology transition: “the process by which 
technology deemed to be of significant use to the operational military community is transitioned 
from the science and technology environment to a military operational field unit for evaluation 
and then incorporated into an existing acquisition program or identified as the subject matter for 
a new acquisition program” (p. 14). 
Considering both the importance of social networks among small business communities 
and the technology acquisition purpose of the DoD SBIR program, we include the technological 
distance from the DoD as one of the input variables and the number of small firms’ connections 
to funders (captured by their eigenvector centrality in the SBIR funding network) as one of the 
intermediate variables. The rationale is that the DoD may seek novel technologies that are 
different from ones in its technology portfolio through the SBIR program. The technological 
distance measures the degree of dissimilarity between small firms’ and the DoD’s technological 
portfolios based on their patent distributions across the patent classification codes (e.g., Bar & 
Leiponen, 2012; Benner & Waldfogel, 2008). Our underlying concept is that the higher 
technological distance may lead to the more (or stronger) connections to the SBIR funders. To 
better reflect the reality of the SBIR budget allocation (where three services such as Air Force, 
Army, and Navy take a lion’s share of the DoD SBIR budget), we use the eigenvector centrality 
(which counts the number of connections differently by placing more weights on the connections 
to big-sized funders and less weights on the connections to small-sized funders) instead of 
degree centrality (which counts the number of connections equally by placing the same weights 
on all connections). See Bonacich (2007) and Faulk et al. (2017). 
Methodology  
Primary 
Nomenclatures used in this study are summarized as follows:  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the observed i th input of the j th DMU (i = 1, …, m &  j = 1, ..., n) at the t th stage, 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the observed r th output of the j th DMU (r = 1, ..., s &  j = 1, ..., n) at the t+1 th stage, 𝑦𝑦ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
observed h th intermediate output of the j th DMU (h = 1, …, z &  j = 1, ..., n) at the t th stage, 
 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 is the observed h th intermediate input of the j th DMU (r = 1, ..., s &  j = 1, ..., n) at the 
t+1  th stage, ξ  is an inefficiency measure, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥  is an unknown slack variable of the i th input at 
the t th stage, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔  is an unknown slack variable of the r th output at the t th stage, yhtd  is an 
unknown slack variable of the h th intermediate output/input at the t and t+1 th stages, jtλ  is an 
unknown intensity (or structural) variable of the j th DMU at the t th stage, 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠 is a prescribed very 
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small number and  tJ is a set of all DMUs at the t th stage. This study considers the first and 
second stage, so t = 1 and 2. 
Before applying the proposed formulations, we need to specify the following data ranges 
on X (inputs) and G (outputs): 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 is a data range on the i th input which is specified as  
                        𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥 = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠)−1 �max𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖│𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗 & 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡� − min𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖│𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗 & 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡��
−1
          (1) 
𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 is a data range on the r th desirable output which is specified as  
                           𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟
𝑔𝑔 = (𝑚𝑚 + 𝑠𝑠)−1 �max
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
�𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗 & 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡� − min𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗 & 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡��
−1
.           (2) 
The data ranges are applied to the all DMUs (j = 1, .., n) in all periods (t = 1, .., z) in the 
proposed DEA models. The purpose of these data ranges is that DEA results can avoid an 
occurrence of zero in dual variables (i.e., multipliers). Such an occurrence implies that 
corresponding production factors (X and G) are not fully utilized in our DEA applications. Such 
an occurrence is problematic. To avoid the difficulty, this study incorporates the data ranges, (1) 
and (2), into the proposed formulations so that we can fully utilize available information on the 
two production factors. 
Operational Efficiency Measurement 
This research considers the operational performance of various entities. Each entity is 
considered as a DMU. In every DMU, the production technology transforms an input vector with 
m components (𝑋𝑋 ∈  𝑅𝑅+𝑚𝑚) into a desirable output vector with s components (𝐺𝐺 ∈  𝑅𝑅+𝑠𝑠 ).  
The axiomatic form of Production Technology (PT) on a production possibility set (P) is 
expressed at the specific t th period as follows: 
                                            { }( ) :  can produce P P X X Gt mt t t= ∈ +R  
                     (3) 
within the framework of (3), the production possibility set at the t th period can be expressed as 
follows:  
                         ( ) ( ), , =1 & 0 1,...,
1 1 1
n n n
vP X G G X X j nt t t jt jt t jt jt jt jt
j j j
λ λ λ λ
 
 = ≤ ≥ ≥ = 
 = = = 
∑ ∑ ∑  
 
(4) 
The expressions on P incorporate the assumption on variable Returns to Scale (RTS). Equation 
4 incorporates the variable (v) RTS because Equation 4 has the side constraint  (i.e., 
1 1
n
jtj λ= =∑ ). See Sueyoshi & Goto (2018) for a detailed mathematical description on RTS.  
Figure 1 depicts the contract assessment used in this study. The contract consists of two 
staged processes. There is an intermediate stage that connects between them by considering a 
“time lag.” The first stage uses (a) the amount of SBIR awards, (b) the number of employees, 
and (c) the level of technology distance. There are two outputs: (a) the number of patents and 
the number of connections at the intermediate stage. After 5 years, the two outputs from the first 
stage serve as inputs at the second stage. The final output is the amount of federal procurement 
contract. Since the Empirical Study section provides a detailed description on inputs and 
outputs, this section focuses upon a description on the methodology. 
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Figure 1. Two-Stage Analytic Framework 
Note: (a) we collected data from various sources: (i) SBIR awards data from the Small Business 
Administration’s (SBA) SBIR database, (ii) employment data from the System for Award 
Management (SAM), (iii) patent data from the Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information 
Service (KIPRIS, original data imported from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), and (ix) 
federal procurement contracts data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next 
Generation (FPDS-NG). (b) There are three inputs at the first stage: the amount of SBIR awards 
(ASA), the number of employees (EMP), and technological distance from the DoD (TDD). Both 
ASA and EMP are measured at US$ million and full-time equivalent (FTE), respectively, while 
TDD is valued between 0 and 1. There are two variables at the intermediate stage (which act as 
stage-1 outputs and stage-2 inputs simultaneously): the number of patents (PAT) and the 
number of connections (SEC). The former is measured as the number of patent applications 
and the latter is valued between 0 and 1 and measured as the eigenvector centrality.1 There is 
also one output at the second stage: the amount of federal procurement contracts (FPC). FPC 
is measured at US$ million. (c) It is also worth noting that there is a 5-year time lag between 
inputs and outputs. Given that technology transition takes a substantial amount of time. 
To analyze the procurement process specified in Figure 1, this study uses a DEA-based 
radial approach to determine the level of Operational Efficiency (OE) on the specific k th DMU at 
the t th period. Given Xkt and Gkt+1, we evaluate the performance of the k th DMU to be 
examined. The subscription (jt) is used to express each DMU (j = 1, .., n) in the total set (Jt).  
Based upon the framework of Figure 1, this study proposes the following formulation to 
measure the level of Operational Efficiency ( vktOE ) on the k th DMU at the t th period: 
 
1 There are several ways to calculate the number of connections in a network. For instance, degree centrality focuses 
on the absolute number of links while closeness centrality pays attention to the distance between nodes (that is why 
closeness centrality is often used for the analysis of information spread) and betweenness centrality stresses the path 
of pairs of nodes (that is why betweenness centrality is used for identifying brokers or intermediaries who can 
connect two different groups). In this study, we use eigenvector centrality because we believe the connections of 
small firms to big-sized funders are different from those to small-sized funders. We put more weight on the former 
connections. From a firm’s perspective, for instance, connections to the Air Force, Army, or Navy may be more 
valuable than those to the Defense Logistics Agency or Missile Defense Agency. 
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The superscript (v) of vktOE  indicates variable (v) RTS.  
The degree of vktOE  is measured by 
               
m s g g*v * x x*
kt s i it rt rt
i 1 r 1
OE 1 [ ( R d R d )],ξ ε
= =
= − + +∑ ∑  
(6) 
where the inefficiency score and all slack variables are determined on the optimality (*) of Model 
5. Thus, the equation within the parenthesis is obtained from the optimality of the objective 
value of Model 5. The vktOE  is obtained by subtracting the level of inefficiency from unity. If the 
degree of vktOE  is unity, then it indicates the status of “full efficiency.” On the other hand, the 
degree is less than unity, it includes some level of “inefficiency.” If the degree is zero, it indicates 
“full inefficiency.” 
Here, it is important to note four concerns related to Model 5. First, as formulated in 
Equation 6, the degree of vktOE  is measured by the first groups of constraints (i.e.,
xn
ijt jt it ikt iktj 1 x d  + x = xλ ξ= +∑ ) on inputs at the t th period and the fourth groups of constraints (i.e., 
gn
rjt 1 jt+1 rkt+1 rkt+1j 1 rt 1g d  g   gλ ξ+= +− − =∑ ) on outputs at the t+1 th period. Both are used to 
determine a degree of the inefficiency measure in the whole process for the two (t and t+1) 
periods. Next, the second group of constraints (i.e., yn hjt jt hktj 1 hty  d = yλ= −∑ ) indicates that 
intermediate factors functions as outputs at the t th period so that the frontier (i.e., n hjt jtj 1 y λ=∑ ) 
locates above or on their observed values ( hkty ) because of 
y
hkt hty  d+ . The slacks (
y
htd ) is 
minimized in Model 5. Meanwhile, the third group of constraints (i.e., 
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yn
hjt 1 jt 1 hkt 1j 1 ht 1y + d = yλ+ + += +∑ ) indicates that intermediate factors functions as inputs at the 
t+1 th period so that the frontier (i.e., n hjt 1 jt 1j 1 y λ+ +=∑ ) locates below or on their observed 
values ( hkt 1y + ) because of yhkt 1 ht 1y  d+ +− . The slacks (
y
ht 1d + ) is minimized in Model 5. Third, the 
fifth and sixth constraints ( n jtj 1 1λ= =∑  and n jt 1j 1 1λ += =∑ ) indicate that the sum of these 
intensities (weights) is unit at the t th and t+1 th periods, respectively. Such constraints imply 
that the degree of vktOE  is measured under variable RTS. Finally, it is necessary to describe 
that we are interested in the performance between initial inputs (Xt) and final outputs (Gt+1). So, 
Equation 6 measures g g*v * x x*m skt s i it rt rti 1 r 1OE 1 [ ( R d R d )],ξ ε = == − + +∑ ∑  The intermediate factors (Yt 
and Yt+1 ) make a linkage between the two stages. Figure 1 visually describes such relationship 
among the three groups of factors. 
Empirical Study  
Data 
This study uses a data set on 252 small firms that meet two criteria: (a) filed more than 
15 patents, and (b) awarded the SBIR Phase II funding from the DoD over the decade (from 
2001 to 2010). The criteria evidence their R&D and network building capacities because of the 
three rationales. First, Hicks & Hegde (2005) have defined firms with more than 15 patents as 
“serial innovators.” Second, the SBIR Phase II is followed by the successful completion of 
Phase I that focuses on the assessment of technical feasibility. The SBIR funding usually entails 
close relationships between funders and awardees. Finally, the DoD SBIR program selects and 
announces very specific SBIR topics that require technical fit with awardees. While 2,889 firms 
meet the second criterion, only 252 firms meet both criteria. Hereafter, we call the 252 firms 
“elite DoD SBIR awardees.”  
For the analysis in the frame of multiple inputs and outputs across two stages, we 
collected data from various sources: (a) SBIR awards data from the Small Business 
Administration’s (SBA) SBIR database, (b) employment data from the System for Award 
Management (SAM), (c) patent data from the Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information 
Service (KIPRIS, original data imported from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), and (d) 
federal procurement contracts data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next 
Generation (FPDS-NG).  
There are three inputs at the first stage: the amount of SBIR awards (ASA), the number 
of employees (EMP), and technological distance from the DoD (TDD). Both ASA and EMP are 
measured at US$ million and full-time equivalent (FTE), respectively, while TDD is valued 
between 0 and 1. There are two variables at the intermediate stage (which act as stage-1 
outputs and stage-2 inputs simultaneously): the number of patents (PAT) and the number of 
connections (SEC). See Figure 1. The former is measured as the number of patent applications 
and the latter is valued between 0 and 1 and measured as the eigenvector centrality.2 There is 
 
2 There are several ways to calculate the number of connections in a network. For instance, degree centrality focuses 
on the absolute number of links while closeness centrality pays attention to the distance between nodes (that is why 
closeness centrality is often used for the analysis of information spread) and betweenness centrality stresses the path 
of pairs of nodes (that is why betweenness centrality is used for identifying brokers or intermediaries who can 
connect two different groups). In this study, we use eigenvector centrality because we believe the connections of 
small firms to big-sized funders are different from those to small-sized funders. We put more weight on the former 
connections. From a firm’s perspective, for instance, connections to the Air Force, Army, or Navy may be more 
valuable than those to the Defense Logistics Agency or Missile Defense Agency. 
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also one output at the second stage: the amount of federal procurement contracts (FPC). FPC 
is measured at US$ million.  
It is also worth noting that there is a 5-year time lag between inputs and outputs. Given 
that technology transition takes a substantial amount of time, we collected input-related data as 
of 2010 and output-related data as of 2015. This approach has two advantages: (a) reflect more 
realistic conditions, and (b) avoid the endogeneity issue in the analysis. There are some studies 
supporting this. NASEM (2009, p. 230), for instance, showed a table describing the time 
elapsed between SBIR awards (R&D) and actual sales (commercialization), which tends to be 
5–7 years. Xue & Klein (2010) also used a 5-year time lag between independent and dependent 
variables related to entrepreneurial activities. Seegopaul (2016) explored the time required for 
development/commercialization by industry (e.g., 0–2 years for software and 5–15 years for 
advanced materials).  
Table 1 presents a summary of data descriptive statistics for DEA. The table shows 
detailed data and descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs at the first, intermediate, and 
second stages. Companies are listed in the alphabetical order of their names. On average, elite 
DoD SBIR awardees made approximately US$ 100 million worth of federal procurement 
contracts and filed approximately 50 patents while they have received approximately US$ 6 
million of SBIR awards and employed 90 people.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Data for DEA 
Category Variable                             Descriptive Statistics 
Obs Mean Max Min SD 
Stage-1 inputs ASA 252 5.78 103.27 0.29 11.21 
EMP 252 86.17 480.00 2.00 109.11 
TDD 252 0.38 0.88 0.00 0.21 
Stage-1 outputs &  
Stage-2 inputs 
PAT 252 49.61 1,251.00 15.00 94.77 
SEC 252 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Stage-2 output FPC 252 98.14 2,433.14 0.19 292.76 
Note: ASA: amount of SBIR awards; EMP: number of employees; TDD: technological distance from DoD; 
PAT: number of patents; SEC: eigenvector centrality in the SBIR funding network; FPC: federal 
procurement contract 
For the Tobit regression as a subsequent analysis, we also collected firms’ demographic 
data, such as age (AGE), location (HUB: Historically Under-utilized Business Zones; RUR: rural 
area with less than 50,000 people; LOC: leading states such as California and Massachusetts; 
and STE: states), technological concentration (HTC: high-tech focus; and IPC: technical areas 
expressed by the international patent classification codes), and ownership (MOW: minority-
owned firms; and WOW: women-owned firms), and calculated technological distance from 
prime contractors (TDP) and closeness centrality in the SBIR funding network (SCC). While 
AGE, TDP, and SCC are continuous variables, HTC, RUR, LOC, HUB, MOW, and WOW are 
binary (or dummy) variables. STE and IPC are categorical variables (but transformed into binary 
variables for the analysis). The former includes 33 states in which 252 elite DoD SBIR awardees 
are located while the latter includes 8 sections of technical fields (A: human necessities; B: 
performing operations and transporting; C: chemistry and metallurgy; D: textiles and paper; E: 
fixed constructions; F: mechanical engineering, lighting, heating, weapons, and blasting; G: 
physics; and H: electricity) in which the awardees are situated.   
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Table 2 presents a summary of Tobit regression data descriptive statistics. On average, 
elite DoD SBIR awardees are approximately 22 years old. A majority of them are nested in high-
tech industries and situated in urban areas of leading states. Few of them are owned by 
minorities or women.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Data for Tobit Regression 
Category Variable                                    Descriptive Statistics 
Obs Mean Max Min SD 
Continuous AGE 252 22.17 122.00 2.00 14.93  
TDP 252 0.46 0.97 0.00 0.26  
SCC 252 0.88 1.00 0.51 0.12 
Binary HTC 252 0.86 1.00 0.00 0.35  
RUR 252 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.49  
LOC 252 0.72 1.00 0.00 0.45  
HUB 252 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.11  
MOW 252 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.20  
WOW 252 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.20 
Note: AGE: age of firms; TDP: technological distance from prime contractors; SCC: closeness centrality in 
the SBIR funding network; HTC: high-tech concentration; RUR: location in the rural area; LOC: location in 
the leading states; HUB: location in Historically Under-utilized Business Zones (HUBZones); MOW: firms 
owned by minority; WOW: firms owned by woman 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes the OE measure of some companies measured by Model 3. Instead 
of listing all 252 companies’ OE scores, we present those of 24 companies as an example. The 
first company (1st Detect Corp) of the table shows the status of full efficiency (OE = 1.00) while 
the second company (Aculight) exhibits the status of inefficiency (OE = 0.78). All firms are 
characterized by their OE measures. To visually summarize all the measures, Figure 2 exhibits 
the distribution of OE measures of all firms.   
Table 3. Operational Efficiency of Some Companies 
                             Company  OE                       Company  OE 
1st Detect Corp 1.00 Calspan Corporation 0.54 
Aculight Corp. 0.78 Cambridge Scientific, Inc. 1.00 
Ada Technologies, Inc. 0.83 Cape Cod Research, Inc. 1.00 
Adaptive Materials, Inc. 0.20 Cascade Designs 0.28 
Adesto Technologies 0.73 Ceradyne, Inc. 1.00 
Advanced Ceramics Research, Inc. 0.36 Ceramatec, Inc. 0.43 
ADVANCED CIRCULATORY SYSTEMS, INC. 0.50 CFD Research Corp. 1.00 
Advanced Energy Systems, Inc. 0.27 CHEMIMAGE CORP. 1.00 
Advanced Fuel Research, Inc. 1.00 CIPHERGEN BIOSYSTEMS, INC. 0.54 
Advanced Mechanical Technology, Inc. 0.45 Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc. 0.29 
Advanced Scientific Concepts, Inc. 0.65 Coherent Logix, Inc. 0.19 
AEC-ABLE ENGINEERING CO., INC. 0.52 Coherent Technologies, Inc. 0.22 
Note: OE = Operational Efficiency 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 396 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Companies by Operational Efficiency 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Assuming that the operational performance of elite DoD SBIR awardees may be affected 
by not only input and output variables used in the DEA investigation but also their 
demographics, relationships to prime contractors, and agility in seeking external funding, this 
study constructs the following hypotheses. Since firm-level characteristics related to the 
transition from R&D to commercialization have been studied by other literature, we focus on 
firm-level traits related to the transition from network building to commercialization and 
contextual factors such as firms’ technological concentration (industrial context) and location 
(geospatial context). 
Hypothesis 1: Small companies’ network building capacity (captured by TDD, SEC, and 
SCC) is positively related to their operational performance. 
Sub-hypothesis 1a (H1a): Small firms with higher TDD outperform those with lower 
TDD. One of the primary objectives of the DoD SBIR program is acquiring R&D outcomes 
developed by the private sector (technology-based small businesses in this case) but not yet 
held by the public sector (DoD in this case). To fill the technological gap, the DoD may look for 
small firms with complementary technical assets so that small firms with different patent 
portfolios from the DoD’s may be more advantageous in developing networks with the DoD than 
those with similar patent portfolios to what the DoD’s are.  
Sub-hypothesis 1b (H1b): Small firms with higher SEC outperform those with lower 
SEC. The amount of the SBIR budget (determined by the percentage of extramural R&D budget 
of SBIR-participating agencies) and procurement contracts depends highly upon the size of 
agencies. Given that three services (Air Force, Army, and Navy) are the largest DoD 
components and other components are relatively small, connections to big-sized components 
may be more valuable to small firms than those to small-sized components. 
Sub-hypothesis 1c (H1c): Small firms with higher SCC outperform those with lower 
SCC. Social closeness often means better access to information that is critical for securing 
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external funding. Thus, social adjacency to funders and small firms’ agility in seeking funding 
sources may lead to better performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Small companies’ high-tech concentration (captured by HTC and IPC) is 
positively associated with their operational performance. 
Sub-hypothesis 2a (H2a): Small firms operating in the high-tech industries outperform 
those in the non-high-tech industries. The R&D- and capital-intensive nature of high-tech 
industries tends to lead to higher value-added. Nowadays it is especially true since technology 
plays a pivotal role in firms’ sustainable competitiveness. Thus, small firms with high-tech focus 
may achieve better performance than those with non-high-tech focus. 
Sub-hypothesis 2b (H2b): Small firms operating in the industries indexed by specific 
IPC codes outperform those in the industries indexed by other IPC codes. According to the 
Eurostat indicators on high-tech industry and knowledge,3 this study includes (a) computer and 
automated business equipment (indexed by G06C, G06D, etc.), (b) aviation (indexed by B64B, 
B64C, etc.), (c) micro-organism and genetic engineering (indexed by C40B, C12P, etc.), (d) 
lasers (indexed by H01S), (e) semiconductors (indexed by H01L), (f) communication technology 
(indexed by H04B, H04H, etc.), and (g) biotechnology (indexed by A61K, G01N, etc.) in the 
fields of high technology. In congruence with sub-hypothesis 2a, small firms with high-tech 
concentration (indexed by the aforementioned IPC codes) may perform better than those with 
non-high-tech concentration.  
Hypothesis 3: Small companies’ location in better places (captured by HUB, RUR, 
LOC, and STE) is positively associated with their operational performance.  
Sub-hypothesis 3a (H3a): Small firms located in the HUBZones or rural areas 
underperform counterparts. Despite various incentive programs (e.g., tax credits) offered by 
governments for small firms located in the HUBZones or rural areas, small firms in those areas 
tend to have many disadvantages in conducting R&D, building networks, and commercializing 
R&D outcomes because of (a) limited access to a well-trained workforce, financial resources, 
and valuable information, (b) lack of knowledge spillover and infrastructure (e.g., broadband), 
and (c) distance to the market or customers. Thus, small firms situated in the HUBZones or rural 
areas may perform worse than counterparts do. 
Sub-hypothesis 3b (H3b): Small firms located in the economically or technologically 
leading states or states with business-friendly environment outperform counterparts. Leading 
states such as California, New York, and Massachusetts tend to offer a better business 
environment to small firms than lagging states such as Mississippi, Montana, and Wyoming. 
Particularly financial resources such as venture capitalists and angels, which are critical for 
high-risk technology-based small businesses, tend to concentrate in the leading states. 
Moreover, leading states tend to have more prestigious research universities and large 
companies that play a role as anchor institutions in the regional innovation system or 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Thus, small firms situated in the leading states may perform better 
than counterparts do. 
To empirically test these hypotheses, we employ Tobit regression models that are 
appropriate for censored data considering the boundary of firms’ efficiency scores (between 0 
and 1; Bi et al., 2016). We test three different Tobit models (M 1–3) using efficiency scores as a 
dependent variable. The first model (M 1) includes only DEA input and output variables, the 
second (M 2) adds one more network building capacity-related variable (i.e., SCC), and the third 
 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 398 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
adds contextual variables (i.e., HTC, IPC, LOC, and STE). Because of a long list of variables, 
we utilized the stepwise function that removes insignificant variables from a full model. We also 
dropped some variables due to the multicollinearity issue. Table 4 summarizes the Tobit 
analysis results. 
Table 4. Results of Tobit Regressions 
             Variables             M 1              M 2              M 3 
Controls ASA 0.0027 (1.48) -0.0016 (-0.99) -0.0017 (-1.06) 
EMP -0.0011*** (-6.18) -0.0010*** (-6.19) -0.0010*** (-6.24) 
PAT 0.0009*** (3.66) 0.0009*** (3.86) 0.0009*** (3.97) 




TDD -0.3604*** (-4.48) -0.3754*** (-5.39) -0.3952*** (-5.58) 
SEC 1.0694 (0.67) 30.1008*** (8.78) 31.5687*** (9.17) 
SCC   -2.9771*** (-9.19) -3.0433*** (-9.41) 
High-tech 
focus 
HTC     0.0989* (1.94) 
IPC (Section A)     0.2308*** (2.87) 
Location HUB     0.0202 (0.16) 
 RUR     -0.0471 (-1.58) 
 LOC     -0.0389 (-1.16) 
 STE (North Carolina)     -0.2742** (-2.08) 
Model fit Pseudo R2 0.56 1.20 1.32 
 AIC 66.86 -5.51 -7.47 
 BIC 95.10 26.25 45.47 
Note: (a) ASA: amount of SBIR awards; EMP: number of employees; PAT: number of patents; FPC: 
federal procurement contract; TDD: technological distance from DoD; SEC: eigenvector centrality in the 
SBIR funding network; SCC: closeness centrality in the SBIR funding network; HTC: high-tech 
concentration; IPC: international patent classification; HUB: location in Historically Under-utilized 
Business Zones (HUBZones); RUR: location in the rural area; LOC: location in the leading states; STE: 
state (b) Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 10% level. 
 
Based on our hypotheses and the model fit, our interpretation follows the third model (M 
3). According to the analysis results, operational efficiency of the elite DoD SBIR awardees has 
statistically significant relationships (a) positively with PAT, FPC, SEC, HTC, and IPC (Section 
A), and (b) negatively with EMP, TDD, SCC, and STE (North Carolina). Figure 3 visually 
summarizes results on the Tobin analysis and partly supports our three hypotheses. The 
empirical results are summarized as follows: 
First, sub-hypothesis H1b is only supported and H1a and H1c are rebutted. SEC is 
positively related to efficiency, meaning that small firms’ funding connections to big-sized DoD 
components enhance their operational performance. However, TDD and SCC are negatively 
related to efficiency, meaning that small firms’ technological dissimilarity to the DoD and closer 
connections to more funding sources hurt their operational performance. Those results imply 
that (a) technological similarity (low technological distance) is better for small firms in building 
networks with funders, rather than technological dissimilarity (high technological distance), and 
(b) building a strong network with one of the big-sized DoD components and sticking to one 
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funding source are better for small firms in terms of operational efficiency, rather than 
developing weak networks with multiple DoD components. 
Second, sub-hypotheses H2a and H2b both are supported. HTC and IPC (Section A) 
are positively associated with efficiency, suggesting that small firms’ high-tech concentration, 
particularly in biotechnology (e.g., IPC A61B: diagnosis and surgery; A61F: prostheses; and 
A61K preparation for medical and dental purposes), improves their operational performance. 
Those results confirm that industrial context plays an important role in determining small firms’ 
operational performance. 
 
Figure 3. Concept and Result of Tobit Regression 
Note: (a) ASA: amount of SBIR awards; EMP: number of employees; PAT: number of patents; FPC: 
federal procurement contract; TDD: technological distance from DoD; SEC: eigenvector centrality in the 
SBIR funding network; SCC: closeness centrality in the SBIR funding network; HTC: high-tech 
concentration; IPC (A): international patent classification (section A); HUB: location in Historically Under-
utilized Business Zones (HUBZones); RUR: location in the rural area; LOC: location in the leading states; 
STE (NC): state (North Carolina). 
(b) *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
Finally, sub-hypotheses H3a and H3b are not confirmed. HUB, RUR, and LOC do not 
have statistically significant relationships with efficiency while STE (North Carolina) is negatively 
associated with efficiency. Those results imply that geospatial context does play a substantial 
role in determining small firms’ operational performance. There are some possible explanations: 
(a) the SBIR funding is geographically distributed on an equity basis or considering assistance 
for small firms located in disadvantageous areas, (b) lagging states, as well as leading states, 
are also active in offering business-friendly environment to small firms in their jurisdiction to 
invigorate their economies (e.g., the State of New Mexico is implementing the SBIR matching 
fund program), and (c) national laboratories and military bases located in remote areas 
contribute to R&D, network building, and commercialization (e.g., Sandia and Los Alamos 
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National Laboratories and Air Force Research Laboratories in New Mexico play a key role in the 
regional innovation system). On the other hand, it turned out that small firms located in the State 
of North Carolina underperform those in other states. It is rather contradictory considering its 
Research Triangle Park (RTP) that consists of three research universities (Duke University, the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State University). We cautiously 
conjecture that (a) there may be an imbalance between R&D/network building and 
commercialization (i.e., the former is strong due to the existence of RTP but the latter may be 
relatively weak), (b) there may be lack of knowledge spillover from RTP or business and policy 
efforts in promoting entrepreneurial innovation, and (c) the proportion of small firms that 
specialize in high technology may be relatively small.  
Conclusion and Future Extensions  
This study first evaluated the innovation performance of 252 elite DoD SBIR awardees in 
the context of technology transition and then examined the impacts of social, industrial, and 
geospatial factors on the performance. For the first task, we employed a two-stage, dynamic 
DEA to reflect more realistic conditions of innovation (as a complex and time-consuming 
process that requires social capital as well as traditional input factors). According to the DEA 
result, more than a quarter of companies (60) turned out efficient while three quarters are not 
fully efficient. About half of companies showed efficiency scores that are higher than 60%. It 
implies that there is still significant room for improvement for many companies.  
For the second task, we used Tobit regression analysis to deal with censored data (the 
upper limit of the 60 efficient companies in efficiency score is 100%). The statistical analysis 
demonstrated that our three hypotheses are partly supported. Our first hypothesis was that 
small companies with higher network building capacity outperform those with lower network 
building capacity. It turned out that small firms’ connections to influential funders contributed to 
their performance but their heterogeneous technological portfolios and connections to multiple 
funders did not. It suggests that developing and strengthening networks with big-sized funders 
(focused networking rather than distracted networking) positively affects the technology 
transition performance. The second hypothesis was that small companies with high-tech 
concentration outperform those with low- or medium-tech concentration. It turned out true, 
particularly for biotech companies. It suggests that industrial context plays a significant role in 
the technology transition performance. The last hypothesis was that small companies situated in 
the preferred location outperform those in the unpreferred location. It turned out that locational 
factors were not critical. It suggests that the geospatial context plays a minor role in the 
technology transition performance.  
While there are many studies on the knowledge generation function (e.g., Antonelli & 
Colombelli, 2018) and knowledge utilization or revenue/profit generation function (e.g., 
Lichtenthaler, 2005; Bergman & Usai, 2009), which account for the R&D sub-process at the first 
stage and commercialization sub-process at the second stage of our DEA framework, 
respectively, there are a relatively small number of studies on social link (or trust) generation 
function that represents the network building sub-process at the first stage. This study 
incorporated the concept of social capital into the DEA-based innovation performance 
measurement for the first time. In this study, we used technological distance based on the 
assumption that the DoD seeks small companies with different technological portfolios from its 
own portfolio as R&D partners (SBIR awardees in this case). Thus, we used technological 
distance as an input to the network building sub-process at the first stage of our DEA framework 
and eigenvector centrality as an output in the sub-process. However, there may be other 
alternative inputs that can better capture the input factors to the network building sub-process. 
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As the number of studies on social capital increases, we may be able to determine more 
suitable measures. 
Appendix 
All abbreviations used in this study are summarized as follows: DARPA: Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis, DIU: Defense 
Innovation Unit, DMU: Decision-Making Unit, DoD: Department of Defense, FPDS-NG: Federal 
Procurement Data System-Next Generation, EIS: European Innovation Scoreboard, KIPRIS: 
Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information Service, RIS: Regional Innovation System, RTS: 
Returns to Scale, NIS: National Innovation System, OE: Operational Efficiency, OECD: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, PT: Production Technology, R&D: 
Research and Development, RIS: Regional Innovation System, RTP: Research Triangle Park, 
RTS: Returns to Scale, SAM: System for Award Management, SBA: Small Business 
Administration, SBIR: Small Business Innovation Research, STTR: Small Business Technology 
Transfer, and URS: Unrestricted. 
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Abstract 
The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(OUSD A&S) is to quickly and cost effectively deliver and sustain secure and resilient capabilities 
to warfighters and international partners. There are urgent requirements to develop adaptive 
acquisition framework (AAF) to speed up software development and acquisition processes that 
strengthen the concepts of operations (CONOPS) such as distributed maritime operations 
(DMO). It is imperative for the Department of Defense (DoD) to shape the AAF using data-driven 
analysis linked to the National Defense Strategy and the nature of global threats, and scale new 
capabilities to counter new threats. The threat and capability coevolutionary matrix (TCCM) 
addresses the requirement. A threat is a problem a capability tries to deal with. A capability is the 
solution to the problem that represents a threat. Coevolutionary algorithms explore domains in 
which the quality of a capability or combination of capabilities is determined by its ability to 
successfully defeat a threat or combination of threats. TCCM has the potential to systematically 
optimize, recommend, and coevolve capabilities and threats in new and contested environments. 
We show a use case regarding helping a program executive office (PEO) to wargame capabilities 
and threats against a specific domain DMO using unclassified data compiled from open sources. 
Introduction 
It is necessary not only for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Sustainment (OUSD A&S) to shape the acquisition strategy but also for the whole 
Department of Defense (DoD) to apply data-driven analysis and innovative and adaptive 
concepts of operations (CONOPS) linked to the National Defense Strategy and the nature of 
global threats and to scale new capabilities for warfighters. 
For example, to enhance total force readiness and project combat power across the 
wide range of operations and spectrum of conflict at any time, the Navy needs flexible command 
and control (C2) organizational structures to meet the CONOPS. For example, DMO is a 
CONOPS for the Navy, and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) is a CONOPS for 
the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). Both DMO and EABO are emerging operation concepts for 
modernization of naval warfare. PMW 150, PEO C4I’s Program Office for C2 Systems and 
preeminent provider of C2 solutions, focuses on acquisitions to transform operational needs into 
effective and affordable operational and tactical C2 capabilities for the Navy, Marine Corps, 
Joint and coalition warfighters. PMW 150’s mission is to “innovatively meet operational 
requirements with relevant capabilities, enabling the warfighter to maintain C2 superiority” 
(Colpo, 2016). 
On the other hand, U.S. ships’ maritime operations, particularly in the littorals, will 
continue to be contested and dangerous; therefore, it is imperative to develop DMO and EABO 
towards a unifying operational vision. DMO aims to support national and strategic objectives in 
contested environments. The DMO concept considers not only offensive strikes as the primary 
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tactic for winning in battle, but also identifies the ability to deceive and confuse the enemy as a 
critical task to achieve success in a contested environment. The current efforts are focused on 
integration of existing platforms, systems, and capabilities with the DMO specific tactics to 
achieve maritime strategic and operational objectives. DMO is defined as the “warfighting 
capabilities necessary to gain and maintain sea-control through the employment of combat 
power that may be distributed over vast distances, multiple domains, and a wide array of 
platforms” (Navy Warfare Development Command [NWDC], 2017).  
The development of DMO as a concept for the operations of Navy and Marine assets 
stems from the Distributed Lethality (DL) model (Popa et al., 2018). The concept of DMO adopts 
an extended viewpoint of DL, comprised of three pillars: the ability to increase the offensive 
power of individual warships through networked firing capability, distribution of the offensive 
capability over a wide geographic area, and the allocation of sufficient resources to the surface 
platforms in order to enable the enhanced combat capability (Rowden, 2017). DMO also 
stresses the need for more resilient and sustainable surface platforms in all domains, including 
air, subsurface, and cyber warfare. The futuristic view of DMO is to be a fleet-centric fighting 
power, enabled by integration, distribution, and maneuverability that allows simultaneous and 
synchronized execution of multiple capabilities and tactics across multiple domains (contested-
air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace; DoD, 2018) in order to fight and win in complex 
contested environments (Canfield, 2017). Therefore, DMO not only includes traditional warfare 
capabilities of sensors, platforms, networks, and weapons, but also extends to other tactics that 
evolve with new technologies. The DMO concepts use advanced detection and deception 
involving ISR, machine learning (ML), and artificial intelligence (AI), with the use of unmanned 
systems particularly for enhanced capabilities in offensive tactical operations; therefore, by 
potentially leveraging different combinations of platforms, sensors, weapons, networks, and 
tactics, the combat power of a diverse yet unified force can be amplified across all maritime 
domains. 
The DMO concepts include detailed capabilities such as tactics for counter-measures, 
counter-targeting, and counter-engagements. Counter-measures are defensive capabilities 
which aim to divert threats. Counter-targeting may be offensive capabilities, deceptive tactics, 
and operational maneuvers that divert a threat. Deceptive tactics include swarms of unmanned 
assets, mechanical and physical counter-measures, electronic jamming, and the limiting of 
electromagnetic radiation, or emissions control (EMCON). Counter-engaging is to neutralize a 
threat.  
Traditionally, a baseline force structure consists of a fixed set of friendly force ships and 
aircraft arranged into action groups including a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG), Surface Action Group (SAG), and various independent deployable units such as 
expeditionary Marine units for EABO. 
The DMO operational requirements include capabilities, manpower, maintenance, and 
supply, among other resources, to be carefully analyzed, planned, and executed, which require 
the right data strategy, distributed infrastructure, and deep analytics. The technical concept of 
Threat and Capability Coevolutionary Matrix (TCCM) addresses the requirements of DMO and 
EABO operations. A threat is a problem that a capability tries to deal with, including the 
complexity and urgency. A capability is the solution to the problem that represents the threat. 
Coevolutionary algorithms from the ML/AI community explore domains in which the quality of a 
capability or combination of capabilities are determined by their ability to successfully defeat a 
threat or combination of threats. Coevolutionary algorithms used in a wargame simulation are 
similar to the Monte Carlo simulation widely used in defense applications, except they engage 
ML/AI like forecast and prediction, optimization, and game (minmax) algorithms. The DMO and 
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EABO concepts require flexibility and evolution of the capability and resource networks that 
handle ever changing and evolving threats.  
Methodology Review 
A TCCM contains three aspects, as follows: 
Data strategy 
One data strategy for a big organization such as the U.S. Navy is to build a 
centralized big data store for all the suborganizations. For this strategy, one needs to 
gather data from across the organizations and enterprises and put them in a centralized 
location. Building centralized data repositories can be very expensive, in addition to 
creating security and trust issues. An alternative strategy is distributed data strategy, where a 
complex enterprise usually includes highly interacting, interrelated, and interdependent sub-
systems. For example, data for a complex enterprise might be collected using distributed 
locations. This data strategy provides convenience, safety, and privacy for the data; however, it 
presents difficulty and challenges for data fusion and deep analytics. Traditional data sciences, 
even ML/AI algorithms used in small- or moderate-sized analysis, typically require tight coupling 
of the computations, where such an algorithm often executes in a single machine or job and 
reads all the data at once. Making a generic case of parallel and distributed computing across 
distributed data source proves a difficult task. One requires novel infrastructure such as 
Collaborative Learning Agents (CLA; Zhao & Zhou, 2014) or federated learning, where data 
from system of systems can be quickly examined locally, while analytic models from multiple 
agents can be also fused properly.  
Distributed Infrastructure and Collaborative Learning Agents 
The data strategy we focus on here is not only relevant to information warfare, but 
also to physical infrastructure such as force distribution, as well. Distributed force 
distribution allows avoidance of detection and flexibility of C2 among other innovations; for 
example, dynamic emergence and self-organization of new global structures can confuse 
the threats and adversaries. CLAs include distributed, networked, and peer-to-peer agent 
architecture and analytics. A single agent represents a single system capable of ingesting data, 
indexing, cataloging information, and performing knowledge and pattern discovery, machine 
learning from data, and separating patterns and anomalies from data. Multiple agents can work 
collaboratively in a network in Figure 1. In more detail, a CLA first applies unsupervised 
machine learning and data mining algorithms, indexes, catalogs, and data-mines structured and 
unstructured data sources and discovers knowledge patterns, then fuses models from its peer 
lists and makes them available for search and pattern match used for prediction. A network of 
CLAs’ collaboration is achieved through a peer list defined within each agent initially, through 
which each agent passes shared information to its peers, and then re-organizes or emerges 
based on a coevolution wargame with the threats. A CLA network and collaboration mechanism 
is fault-tolerant, self-organizing, adaptive, and resilient. A CLA is fault-tolerant because if one 
CLA goes down, it can be locally excluded and does not affect the whole network; it is self-
organizing because each CLA can have trusted peers (e.g., friends) based on its own real-time 
situation awareness and change dynamically. A CLA is adaptive because the top-level search, 
pattern match, and prediction depend on the real-time self-organized network structure. A CLA 
is resilient since it can apply the coevolutionary analytics in a wide space and simulate novel 
threat and capability for new and unknown situations.  
CLAs have been used in Navy applications such as building swarm intelligence to health 
monitoring of systems of systems such as ships, Internet of Things (IoTs; Zhao & Zhou, 2019), 
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Figure 1. A CLA is Used in Each Node  
Note: Each node’s content and data may include capabilities; capability needs to be indexed, cataloged, 
and data-mined first. 
Analytics 
The core analytics for TCCM is a wargame simulation with two asymmetrical players. 
The self-player (blue) is the capability holder. The opponent (red) of the self-player is a threat 
generator. The opponent generates new threats that may challenge the self-player’s capability. 
The self-player tries to predict and optimize capabilities to counter the opponent’s threat. The 
whole process iterates. The self-player uses a wargame simulation to constantly perform what-if 
analyses in both threat and capability perspectives to defend a complex enterprise and its 
operations in a distributed and contested environment. Such a wargame simulation allows one 
to search, simulate, and detect vulnerability of the complex enterprise and evolve 
countermeasures, solutions, and resilience in a dynamic and flexible fashion. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 408 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Figure 2. The Concept of TCCM and Wargame Simulation 
Coevolutionary algorithms (Goldberg, 1989; O’Reilly & Hemberg, 2018; Popovici et al., 
2012) provide search and optimization mechanisms based on evolutionary and genetic 
principles such as selection, mutation, and crossover. Coevolutionary algorithms explore 
domains in which the quality of a candidate solution (i.e., capability) is determined by its ability 
to successfully pass some set of tests (i.e., threats). Reciprocally, a threat’s quality is 
determined by its ability to force errors and inefficiencies from a capability. Such a competitive 
coevolution is similar to game theory (Brown & Sandholm, 2017); however, it does not require 
computation of gradient as in ML algorithms and requires less data compared to other ML/AI 
algorithms. The search can lead to an arms race between threats and capabilities, with both 
evolving while pursuing opposite objectives. Coevolutionary algorithms are similar to those 
encountered by generative adversarial networks (GANs; Arora et al., 2017; Goodfellow et al., 
2014). 
The mutation and crossover evolutionary principles are unsupervised with known trends 
to produce better solutions. In TCCM, a selection is accomplished by evaluating a fitness 
function for the capability holder to see how likely it can successfully defeat a threat. A fitness 
function is typically modeled using supervised or reinforcement machine learning algorithms 
when a payoff (reward or penalty) can be clearly observed. By using a CLA to represent a self-
player as a capability holder, the fitness function in this paper refers to a nearest neighbor 
lookup for an input threat (see the Use Case Scenario).  
Use Case Scenario 
The goal of this use case scenario is to help a program executive office (PEO) to 
wargame capabilities and threats in DMO focused areas. We will use this scenario to show a 
proof-of-concept of the TCCM.  
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Figure 3. TCCM Use Case Scenario 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the Navy’s warfare resource, capability, and assets may reside in 
different traditional warfare domains such as sensors, platforms, networks, and weapons, as 
well as the new tactics related to the DMO concept. The goal is to achieve the creation and 
continuous use of a distributed tactical common operational picture, weapon system network, 
and the integration of unmanned assets and existing platforms to enhance defensive and 
offensive capabilities. 
An order of battle (OOB) incorporates maritime platforms of surface ships, aircraft, 
weapons systems and sensors for both friendly and enemy forces. The high-level information of 
each platform, and asset for this paper, is compiled from open source databases, where a kill 
chain typically contains three steps: “find, target, and engage” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 
2013). 
Operational domains can also include different areas such as air, surface, subsurface, 
land, and cyber, as well as detailed tactics that are associated with each domain. In a DMO 
environment, flexible combinations of these capabilities and tactics can provide powerful 
swarms of new capabilities that are unpredictable to new threats. A demand or operational 
node, such as U.S. Fleet Forces C3F or C7F as a node, may encounter a threat that may 
require capabilities of UAS, ISR, EW, new capabilities of handling gray zone (e.g., South China 
Sea) activities, logistics, or intelligence. The requirements go to capability organizations (units, 
nodes). In current C2 structure, a Maritime Operations Center (MOC) may communicate with a 
carrier strike group (CSG) or an amphibious ready group (ARG), then a carrier task force (CTF), 
and other units. Can the structure be more flexible, re-organized in a more dynamic fashion, and 
handle a vast amount and wide range of capabilities, resources, and requests? Future DMO 
enables a force that is capable of winning a fleet-on-fleet engagement through the integration of 
manned and unmanned systems, execution of deceptive tactics, and enabling units to conduct 
offensive strikes (Popa et al., 2018).  
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Self-player (blue, capability): Evolve a solution based on a current threat’s 
characteristics (e.g., location). The solution may mean to find another CLA based on the input of 
required capability to increase the fitness functions representing measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs; global and overall measures) and measures of performance (MOPs; metrics for 
subtasks); for example, the selected CLA that represents an asset needs to contain required 
capability, and the asset has the highest probability of detection (POD) or probability of kill 
(POK) as MOP and MOE. 
Opponent (red, threat): Evolve the location and other characteristics to reduce the 
fitness of the self-player. 
A detailed simulation is set up based on a matrix of association and fitness values 
shown in Table 1. A synthetic data of such a table can be formed using the reference (Popa et 
al., 2018); for example, sensor capabilities and platforms associations for the blue force can be 
shown as in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Sensors and Platforms for the Blue Force (Popa et al., 2018) 
Sensor Capabilities Platforms 
Visual All Surface, All Air, All Unmanned 
Infrared 
CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, F-35, F/A-
18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 
Triton, TERN 
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 Triton 
Air Search Radar CVN, LHA/LHD, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, MH-60, AH-1, TERN 
Surface Search Radar All Surface Platforms, MH-60, AH-1, TERN 
Fire Control Radar CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout 
Navigation Radar All Surface Platforms 
Phased Array Radar CVN, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
AESA (Active Electronic Scanned Array Radar) F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MQ-4 Triton 
Airborne Early Warning Radar E-2, P-8 
Synthetic Aperture Radar—Maritime MH-60, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 Triton 
 
Weapon capabilities and platforms associations for the blue force are sampled in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Weapon Capabilities and Platforms Associations for the Blue Force (Popa et al., 2018) 
 
Missile Designator Type Launching Platform(s) 
Standard Missile-2 RIM-66 Medium Range Surface to Air CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
Standard Missile-3 RIM-161 Ballistic Missile Defense CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
Standard Missile-6 RIM-174 Extended Range Surface to Air, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
LRASM AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, F-35, F/A-18 
Maritime Strike 
Tomahawk MST Long Range Anti-Ship Cruise Missile CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
Harpoon AGM/RGM-84 Over the Horizon Anti-Ship Missile 
CG, DDG-51, LCS, F-35, 
F/A-18 
ESSM RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow - Medium Range Surface to Air Missile 
CVN, LHA/D, LPD, CG, 
DDG-51, DDG-1000, 
LCS 
Sidewinder AIM-9 Short Range Air to Air F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, AH-1 
Hellfire AGM-114 Short Range Air to Surface F-35, F/A-18, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8, TERN 
AMRAAM AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air F-35, F/A-18 
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The current operations for efficient ships are enabled by multiple systems and multiple 
weapons systems on a single platform. However, with DMO, “rather than heavily invest in 
expensive and exquisite capabilities that regional aggressors have optimized their forces to 
target, naval forces will persist forward with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms” 
(Blivas, 2020), for example, integrating the Marine’s EABO systems. These smaller platforms 
will be greatly advantaged by employment from EABOs situated on partner territory in proximity 
to close and confined seas (Corbett, 2018). Also, even with the current capabilities, weapons 
and sensors do not have to be in the same platform to collaborate for a kill chain; for example, 
an Aegis ashore can launch a missile when another DDG detects a threat. 
Table 3 lists examples of DMO tactics and counter-measures. As stated by Chung 
(2015), with the “increasing availability and proliferation of unmanned system technologies, such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in civilian and military applications, both opportunities and 
challenges arise in addressing large numbers of robots capable of collective interactions.” 
Swarm, described as a cooperative system comprised of numerous UAVs that function with 
limited operator involvement (Lachow, 2017) or as a tactic for deception, including saturation of 
radar and detection systems by deploying a large number of remotely piloted vehicles, as well 
as the ability to emulate a larger vessel such as a surface combatant or manned aircraft by 
radiating active emissions from the unmanned systems. 
IR Smoke can be used as a decoy for heat-seeking sensors and weapons. Electronic 
jamming is a function within the EW subcomponent of electronic attack and serves to 
overwhelm or deceive a sensor through the controlled and directed propagation of 
electromagnetic signals. Electronic jamming can also exploit a specific vulnerability such as the 
reliance on a single frequency. An EMCON employs measures to reduce the electromagnetic, 
acoustic, heat, and radar cross section signatures from the platform. For example, a ship or 
aircraft can limit nearly all navigation, communications, propulsion, and weapons systems to the 
minimum in order to reduce the probability of being detected. 
Another example is developing detection capabilities of signature deception for DMO 
and EABO since emerging ISR capabilities mean the applicability of DMO, and EABO is 
dependent on a competition of detection. The deliberate use of signature emission to deceive a 
self-player and use of detection methods to detect deception have the potential. 
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Table 4. Examples of Blue Force DMO’s Tactics (Popa et al., 2018) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Type 
Swarm 0 1 Discrete 
Chaff 0 200 Continuous 
Flares 0 50 Continuous 
Visual Smoke 0 50 Continuous 
IR Smoke 0 50 Continuous 
Active Decoys 0 25 Continuous 
Passive Decoys 0 300 Continuous 
Spot Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
Barrage Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
Sweep Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
DRFM Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
GPS Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
CG EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
DDG-51 EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
DDG-1000 EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
Application of Threat and Capability Coevolutionary Matrix  
One CLA can associate with an asset, a platform, a unit, or a node, and the matrix in 
Table 1 can translate into the following representation in a CLA’s association for a node: 
• Capability_Platform_ddg-51  Capability_Sensor_visual 1 
• Capability_Platform_ddg-51  Capability_Sensor_infrared 1 
• Capability_Platform_ddg-51  Capability_Sensor_ESM 1 
• Capability_Platform_ddg-51  Capability_Sensor_fire_control radar 1 
• Capability_Platform_ddg-51  Capability_Sensor_phased_array_radar 1 
Given a knowledge that the sensor of infrared is able to detect a threat platform x, an 
association between the threat’s characteristics (e.g., platform x) and a capability’s feature 
dimension can be stored in a node (e.g., Sensor 1 in Figure 4) as follows: 
• Capability_Sensor_infared Threat_Platform_x 1 
• Capability_Weapon_y Threat_Platform_x 1 
The primary focus for collaborative assets with respect to DMO is to employ various 
traditional capabilities as well as DMO specific tactics and counter-measures that enable the 
disruption of the threat’s kill chain to either prevent or lower the probability of the success of the 
threat. As shown in Figure 4, if a Threat Platform x shows up in a battlefield, the initial phase of 
a kill chain consists of a sequence of activities of sensor capability to detect and locate the 
threat. A Platform z equipped with CLA 0 in Figure 4 may send requests as inputs to its peer list 
of Sensor 1 (CLA 1) and Sensor 2 (CLA 2), which both have the infrared capability. Either of the 
sensors can potentially detect Threat Platform x and become the solution for Platform y’s (CLA 
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0) request. The following other factors can be integrated into the TCCM’s CLA’s fitness 
computation: 
• The probability of find or detection (POD), an important dimension for Platform z to make 
the decision of which solution to select from the sensors, may be different because of 
distance and range parameters. 
• Even for the same sensor, POD can vary due to environmental factors such as weather, 
clutter, threat employed counter-measures, counter-engagements, and counter-targeting 
tactics. The environment in the vicinity of contested areas has the potential to impact the 
ability to perform DMO, specifically with respect to weather conditions and sea states, for 
example, the heavy presence of neutral commercial air and sea traffic (clutters) that 
cause significant congestion in sea lanes and air passages. For example, one-third of all 
global shipping passes through the South China Sea, as it is the one of the most used 
sea transit lanes in the world (Hoffmann et al., 2016). This may cause significant 
variation for POD, while an optical or infrared sensor can distinguish the threat as a 
legitimate target or neutral traffic; however, the fact can be also leveraged as an 
advantage for deception and decoy operations. 
• A factor could be association constraints, for example, a U.S. aircraft carrier is a high 
value unit that is typically the highest targeting priority for the threat; therefore, the 
adversary’s combat capable platforms will have a non-zero probability of being assigned 
the CVN for targeting and engagement. 
• Another challenge is that adversaries may use maritime militia fishing fleets that serve 
as non-militarized ISR platforms, and the blue forces include general lack of 
geographical familiarity with the region as well as considerations for the attempted 
control and management of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Considering all the factors into the fitness best solution to Platform z via CLA 1 is the 
highest fitness from both sensors, for example, Sensor 1 (CLA 1) is selected. Since the peer list 
of the Sensor 1 (CLA 1) only includes Weapon 2 (CLA 4), Weapon 2 (CLA 4) is used for engaging 
with the Threat in the next step of the kill chain. Should Weapon 2 (CLA 2) be selected, which is 
a peer for Weapon 1 (CLA 3), Weapon 1 (CLA 3) would be used in the engaging step.  
If the threat is successfully engaged and killed, the adversaries may try to learn from the 
experience (data) and may try to avoid the detection by moving away from the last location of 
detection and engagement. For example, the Threat Platform x may try to move to a different 
location that is away from the combination Sensor 1 (CLA 1) and Weapon 2 (CLA 4); because 
of the distributed and different peer lists and combinations of the self-player’s assets, the self-
player (blue) may be not predictable from the experience for the Threat, since the Threat can be 
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Figure 4. A TCCM Example for Illustration 
 
Therefore, the following list shows the advantages of TCCM: 
• TCCM uses the peer lists to combine capabilities at the various stages of a kill chain to 
disrupt and degrade the threat progress to its target of blue and confuse its learning. 
Even the self-player (blue force) can become less predictable or unpredictable if the 
peer lists are purposely altered randomly and periodically. 
• TCCM represents pooled resources, and the model represents DMO as a united 
network of offensive lethality and firepower, and, therefore, all missiles are shared for 
cooperation and collaboration for all the assets and CLAs. 
• Because of the potential dimensions, features, and characteristics of threats and 
capabilities, and their combinations, peer lists can be extremely large. For example, with 
the current systems, there are many different types of procedures or action chains used 
to conduct a detect-to-engage (DTE) series of events where sub-tasks must occur for a 
weapons system to effectively engage a threat’s platform or location. Combinations of 
detecting or finding the target, establishing a track on the target’s location and 
movement, communication of targeting data between the sensor and weapon system, 
conducting the engagement with either kinetic or non-kinetic weapons, and evaluating 
the engagement to determine follow-on actions, can be extremely large. It is necessary 
to apply a systematic engine like TCCM to manage the large-scale tactical and 
distributed decisions.  
• TCCM is fault tolerant since the network is peer-to-peer. The network can be resilient 
like swarm intelligence, and CLAs can be re-organized to form emerging patterns which 
can be effective out of the box, given a wide range of contexts, and adapted to many 
others through reconfiguration and/or replacement (Goerger et al., 2014).  
Conclusions 
We show a TCCM and map it to a scenario that can help simulate threats and develop 
adaptations of capabilities for the benefits of the AAF, DMO, and EABO. 
TCCM has the potential to systematically optimize, recommend, and evolve solutions to 
warfighters’ requirements, which are more effective, suitable, survivable, sustainable, and 
affordable as a network of distributed and shared assets. A CLA network and collaboration 
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mechanism in TCCM makes it fault-tolerant, self-organizing, adaptive, and resilient. TCCM 
contains a system of data strategy, distributed infrastructure, and deep analytics that can greatly 
assist reconstructing defense acquisition, improving process effectiveness, and implementing 
the AAF, DMO, and EABO.  
Compared to the current method with less DMO and without CLA, the probabilities of 
detection and kill or fitness functions for a kill chain are modeled adaptively and are therefore 
much less predictable by the opponent, threat, or adversaries’ point of view, potentially adding 
to the concept and desired outcome of DMO for offense and defense. Should the opponent also 
adapt such a strategy, because of the asymmetry of assets and capabilities, the self-player is 
potentially still more advantageous over the opponent. Future work will include quantitative 
simulation to implement TCCM. 
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